Public report — live-debugger, published 3 Oct 2026.
Concrete security findings (which rule fired, in which file, on which line; CVE IDs, secret matches,
dependency versions) are REDACTED in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Public
Codebase surveyMeasured under the Code Assurance Index · rubric rubric-2026.10.1 (frozen) · verify this surveyFiledcd_5a1b5311fc5b4c98bdeaaa25fdde69ce
Filed 3 October 2026, 12:58 UTC
Public
Medium · 21,537 LoC · 4 projects · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (49%)
Findings by grade
69 critical58 serious28 minor17 could not be resolved — could be critical — see Limitations
This survey was produced by
Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
3 October 2026, 12:40 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index does not certify,
approve or guarantee this codebase; it records a reproducible number and the evidence it was computed from. The
standard is authored by Canine Development, who also build Watchdog — its only implementation today. That is said
here so the number is checked rather than believed.
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
119findings with an exact file:lineof 155 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
75/132dimensions across the health lenses21537 LoC · 4 projects — wide & deep
⚠ A critical security finding caps this grade — resolve it before relying on the score below; see the Security lens.
The system is currently at risk, scoring 53% overall. While the underlying architecture is robust and performance is excellent, the platform’s operational readiness and security posture are insufficient for reliable, long-term delivery. This gap exposes the business to preventable outages and security regressions, threatening both customer trust and development velocity.
The asset is of medium size, comprising roughly 21,500 lines of production code. Despite its scale, the logic is highly concentrated, meaning the effort to rebuild or significantly refactor the core is minimal—estimated at just 0.2 person-years or approximately €31,000. This low rebuild cost highlights that the current issues are not due to inherent complexity, but rather a lack of disciplined operational practices and security hygiene. The value at stake is significant, but the cost to secure it is surprisingly low.
The primary concern is operational fragility. With a readiness score of 49%, the system lacks the necessary testing depth and observability to safely handle changes. This inverted test pyramid means that modifications are likely to introduce defects that only surface in production, leading to increased support costs and delayed releases. The business faces a tangible risk of instability as the team attempts to iterate on a foundation that cannot reliably validate its own changes.
A secondary, critical risk is security exposure. The security score of 51% is dragged down by confirmed leaked secrets and the absence of automated static analysis. Without a security gate in the continuous integration pipeline, vulnerabilities can slip into production unnoticed. This is not a theoretical risk; active secrets have been identified, creating immediate liability. The lack of automated security checks means every release carries an unquantified risk of compromise.
On the positive side, the architecture is sound, scoring 83%, and performance is perfect. The code is clean, with no boilerplate or straight-line logic, indicating a well-structured domain model. This strong foundation makes remediation straightforward and less disruptive than it would be in a more chaotic system.
Focus first on hardening the delivery pipeline. Implementing a static application security testing step in CI is the highest-leverage action. It is a small effort that immediately blocks security regressions and forces better security habits. Once this gate is in place, address the leaked secrets and begin rebalancing the test pyramid to improve readiness. This sequence delivers the fastest reduction in risk with minimal investment.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 53% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€31,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 49% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2).
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 49%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
140 modules, 57 dependencies. Every dependency points down the layering — no cycles.
Showing the 40 most-connected modules; 100 more are not drawn.
Module dependency matrix. The row depends on the column; the number is how many type pairs create the dependency. A cell above the diagonal is part of a dependency cycle.
LiveDebugger.API.System.FileSystem uses LiveDebugger.API.System. Changing LiveDebugger.API.System can break LiveDebugger.API.System.FileSystem, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
13→4 LiveDebugger.API.System.Module depends on LiveDebugger.API.System✕
Type pairs
1 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.API.System.Module → type in LiveDebugger.API.System) reference.
LiveDebugger.API.System.Module uses LiveDebugger.API.System. Changing LiveDebugger.API.System can break LiveDebugger.API.System.Module, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
14→4 LiveDebugger.API.System.ProcessInfo depends on LiveDebugger.API.System✕
Type pairs
1 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.API.System.ProcessInfo → type in LiveDebugger.API.System) reference.
LiveDebugger.API.System.ProcessInfo uses LiveDebugger.API.System. Changing LiveDebugger.API.System can break LiveDebugger.API.System.ProcessInfo, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
15→3 LiveDebugger.API.TracesStorage depends on LiveDebugger.API✕
Type pairs
1 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.API.TracesStorage → type in LiveDebugger.API) reference.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.AssociatedLiveViews.Web uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.AssociatedLiveViews.Web, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
20→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.AsyncJobs depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
1 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.AsyncJobs → type in LiveDebugger.App) reference.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.AsyncJobs.Web uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.AsyncJobs.Web, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
22→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
2 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
23→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.Components depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
3 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.Components → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.Components uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.Components, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
24→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.HookComponents depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
9 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.HookComponents → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.HookComponents uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.HookComponents, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
25→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.Hooks depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
4 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.Hooks → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.Hooks uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.Hooks, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
26→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.LiveComponents depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
1 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.LiveComponents → type in LiveDebugger.App) reference.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.LiveComponents uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.CallbackTracing.Web.LiveComponents, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
27→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.ComponentsTree.Web depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
2 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.ComponentsTree.Web → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.ComponentsTree.Web uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.ComponentsTree.Web, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
28→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
2 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
29→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web.HookComponents depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
2 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web.HookComponents → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web.HookComponents uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web.HookComponents, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
30→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web.Hooks depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
3 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web.Hooks → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web.Hooks uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.NodeState.Web.Hooks, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
31→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Resources depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
1 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Resources → type in LiveDebugger.App) reference.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Resources.Components uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Resources.Components, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
33→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Resources.Web depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
1 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Resources.Web → type in LiveDebugger.App) reference.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Resources.Web uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Resources.Web, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
34→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Streams.Web depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
2 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Streams.Web → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Streams.Web uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Streams.Web, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
35→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Streams.Web.Hooks depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
1 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Streams.Web.Hooks → type in LiveDebugger.App) reference.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Streams.Web.Hooks uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Streams.Web.Hooks, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
36→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
2 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.Components uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.Components, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
38→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.HookComponents depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
2 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.HookComponents → type in LiveDebugger.App) references.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.HookComponents uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.HookComponents, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
39→17 LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.Hooks depends on LiveDebugger.App✕
Type pairs
1 distinct (type in LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.Hooks → type in LiveDebugger.App) reference.
LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.LiveComponents uses LiveDebugger.App. Changing LiveDebugger.App can break LiveDebugger.App.Debugger.Web.LiveComponents, not the reverse.
Position
Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
At a glance — Code Health · 58% · Adequate · gated by X5 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
42
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
31
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
2
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, integrate a SAST step into the CI pipeline to block security regressions and immediately resolve the two leaked secrets found in the codebase. Next, address the inverted test pyramid to improve test reliability and add a type-checking script to the build process. Finally, enhance system operability by implementing OpenTelemetry tracing and a health-check endpoint.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2).
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 69
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 58
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 28
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 17
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 71 of 75 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 75 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 119 of 155 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the JavaScript/TypeScript suite(s) run through a browser-driven runner the coverage collector does not drive — e2e/ (@playwright/test) — a gap in the analyzer, not something this repository is missing. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo. In the meantime, commit (or publish into the working tree) the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and the real number is read on the next scan. You can widen what we reach: optional: commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces, and the real number is read on the next scan.
D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 53 test(s) behind this row are the ones the JavaScript/TypeScript census could read, and this repository also carries at least 59 test source file(s) (.exs) that it cannot: it reads JavaScript/TypeScript test declarations off disk, so a JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.ts, .exs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its Hex package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (mix.exs), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `landing/src/components/TopBarBanner/config.ts`, `priv/static/app.js` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's TypeScript/JavaScript is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust and Erlang source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust or Erlang was found, and this repository's Elixir, JavaScript, TypeScript is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby or Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript makes no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin and PHP), and its Elixir source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D26, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
Bring the 3 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with TopBarBannerClient.TopBarBanner (cyclomatic 27), Header.Header (cyclomatic 17), block.Block (cyclomatic 17). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.1 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Bring the 3 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with TopBarBannerClient.TopBarBanner (cognitive 30), Header.Header (cognitive 22), TopBarBannerClient.BannerZoneSlot (cognitive 17). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.0 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.2 / 10Stronggated by 4 serious findings✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with TopBarBannerClient.tsx, inspect.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with components.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 TooManyFunctions finding(s) in God Classes — start with traces_storage.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with associated_live_views_live.ex, filters_form.ex, async_demo_component.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with global_traces_live.ex, async_demo_component.ex, node_traces_live.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with diff_trace.ex, async_demo_component.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
2 production modules (npm+OTP), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D9 · Test Distribution2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
53 test methods: 0 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 53 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 53 `it`/`test` case(s) across 13 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.
Inverted test pyramid
What to do
Resolve the 1 Inverted test pyramid finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 53 tests. Measured on the JavaScript/TypeScript suite only — at least 59 test source file(s) (.exs) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
11 outdated, 0 retired direct Hex dependencies, 0 pinning defect(s). Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a Hex app name does not determine the modules it provides (`ecto_sql` provides Ecto.Adapters.SQL), and a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source, so absence of a reference is not evidence of an unused dependency. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
Outdated: bandit · ×11
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 26 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's REDACTED closed over the declarations its mix.exs files do not gate behind `only:`. Packages it asks for ONLY under `only: [:dev, :test]` (or any other non-prod environment, such as `:docs`) are excluded: they are not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release. This repository publishes itself under Apache-2.0, which is its own choice and is not judged here. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's Hex package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
6 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/node_state/web/hook_components/assigns_history.ex. Counted over 106 of the 236 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
0 deducted task-comment markers across 21537 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The repository's root README and the assets/README describe the project (LiveDebugger as a Phoenix LiveView browser tool) with an overview, version badges, and links to each document. The assets/README also gives concrete install/build steps for app/client/npm packages, while e2e/, test/, and lib/live_debugger directories are READMEs of their own subdirectories, documenting the separate JS/CSS bundles, esbuild bundling, Light/Dark mode, client communication, and services layers without a repository-level overview. The architecture/design docs (live_debugger/app/README.md) give detailed file/folder conventions, hooks, nested LiveViews, and service breakdowns; all are present and complete. Comprehensive documentation for LiveDebugger covering browser features, content security policy, memory limits, update checks, disabling the tool, default settings, dead-view mode, elements inspection, and a detailed Features Overview listing Assigns Inspection, Callback Tracing, Components Highlighting, and Components Tree. The README also includes installation (Mix dependency + live_debugger_tags meta tag for dev), an integrated-terminal example, and a YouTube embed tour. All the outlined architecture/design docs are present.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
1 of 4 build units (Mix, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion
What to do
Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
31 finding(s): 0 critical, 29 high, 2 medium, 0 low. 25 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 2 file(s) — `landing/src/components/TopBarBanner/config.ts` (line 22), `priv/static/app.js` — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 25 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (25 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.
Resolve the 26 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (13), REDACTED (7), REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
10 of 106 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is dev/live_views/memory_explosion.ex. Counted over 106 of the 236 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Orphaned files with no living knowledge
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
Resolve the 4 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with components.ex (2), tracing.ex, url.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 4 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
End-of-life runtime: Node.js 20
What to do
Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.
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AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — devtools/common/panel.html:1
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — devtools/common/panel.html:1
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — devtools/common/panel.html:1, landing/src/layouts/Layout.astro:26
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".
The repo's own CSS styles .live-debugger-tooltip-option with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×6) — assets/client/components/debug_options/debug_options.html:2, assets/client/components/debug_options/debug_options.html:24, assets/client/components/debug_options/debug_options.html:55, …
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 37 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with @axe-core/playwright in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 3 of 3 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
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P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
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P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 12365 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
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R1 · Type Safety5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
41 typed · 41 plain JS — the untyped files are assets/app/app.js, assets/app/hooks/assigns_body_search_highlight.js, assets/app/hooks/auto_clear_flash.js, assets/app/hooks/chart_hook.js, assets/app/hooks/close_sidebar_on_resize.js, assets/app/hooks/code_mirror_textarea.js (+35 more).
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.
Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.
devtools/chrome/devtools.js:5 · devtools/firefox/devtools.js:5 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — devtools/chrome/devtools.js:5
assets/client/components/tooltip/tooltip.js:13 · assets/client/components/tooltip/tooltip.js:40 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 56 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both spans, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — assets/client/components/tooltip/tooltip.js:13
What to do
Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Block has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — landing/src/components/ui/block.tsx:56
we has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — priv/static/client.js:163
setTooltipPosition has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/app/hooks/tooltip.js:3
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R3 · Large Files9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
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R7 · Dead Code9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
26 file(s) (~2297 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — landing
Unreachable from the 55 application, 3 tooling and 17 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (55 application, 3 tooling, 17 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×2) — devtools/chrome/devtools.js, devtools/firefox/devtools.js
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Declared in assets/app/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether async functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on an AbortSignal (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 0/2 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
`checkForUpdate` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — assets/app/app.js:91
`fetchLatestRelease` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — landing/src/components/ui/Header.tsx:54
What to do
Thread an AbortSignal through async functions that make requests, so the work stops when its caller gives up.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.
Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether strict null checking is enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` assertion — TypeScript's `strictNullChecks` (which `strict` turns on) is what makes `string` exclude `null` and `undefined`, and the postfix `!` is the operator that silences it.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
0/1 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.
What to do
The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 53 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes; this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Elixir processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server did not expose a crawlable HTTP endpoint in time — no runtime evidence This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no .exs test runner
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 2 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (3 value object(s))
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# and JavaScript/TypeScript, and neither was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the Elixir, JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: dev/router.ex:2 (use Phoenix.Router))
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript and Elixir runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R4 Test Coverage — 17 test file(s) reach none of 64 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Elixir processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics· Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable · ×6
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable assets/client/components/debug_options/debug_options.html:2— The repo's own CSS styles .live-debugger-tooltip-option with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable assets/client/components/debug_options/debug_options.html:24— The repo's own CSS styles .live-debugger-tooltip-option with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable assets/client/components/debug_options/debug_options.html:55— The repo's own CSS styles .live-debugger-tooltip-option with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable priv/static/client.js:80— The repo's own CSS styles .live-debugger-tooltip-option with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable priv/static/client.js:102— The repo's own CSS styles .live-debugger-tooltip-option with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable priv/static/client.js:133— The repo's own CSS styles .live-debugger-tooltip-option with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
<html> without a lang devtools/common/panel.html:1— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
AC3 · Page structure· Document without a <title> · ×1
Document without a <title> devtools/common/panel.html:1— A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>.
Change coupling: components.ex ↔ router.ex dev/components.ex— `dev/components.ex` and `dev/router.ex` change together 67% of the time (8 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 8 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `26bbe145` Fix: disable tracing when heap size limit is reached (#972); `c3423ecd` Enhancement: Add better handling of callbacks exceptions (#884); `4dd6772c` Feature: Add streams section (#817) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: tracing.ex ↔ trace_handler.ex lib/live_debugger/services/callback_tracer/actions/tracing.ex— `lib/live_debugger/services/callback_tracer/actions/tracing.ex` and `lib/live_debugger/services/callback_tracer/gen_servers/trace_handler.ex` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 6 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `bde824e5` Enhancement: Improve tracing performance (#989); `1f49a43e` Chore: Bump required liveview version to v1.1.7 (#974); `26bbe145` Fix: disable tracing when heap size limit is reached (#972) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: components.ex ↔ main.ex dev/components.ex— `dev/components.ex` and `dev/live_views/main.ex` change together 54% of the time (7 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `cb60aa8b` Task: Limit refreshed callback traces (#181); `0b1202be` Task: Refactor LiveViewDiscoveryService (#170); `372df6d4` Fix older LiveView compatibility (#46) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: url.js ↔ live_debugger.ex devtools/common/url.js— `devtools/common/url.js` and `lib/live_debugger.ex` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 5 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `242342a4` Refactor: Don't reload in iframe, remove Window Discovery (#690); `a9687c6c` Bug: Extension redirects not working properly (#468); `58272b21` Task: Add mode for disconnected LiveViews (#412) — run `git show` on any of them.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/associated_live_views/web/associated_live_views_live.ex:141— lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/associated_live_views/web/associated_live_views_live.ex:141-154 | lib/live_debugger/app/discovery/web/live_components/active_live_views.ex:126-139 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/live_components/filters_form.ex:425— lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/live_components/filters_form.ex:425-438 | lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/components_tree/web/components_tree_live.ex:159-172 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:157— dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:157-170 | dev/live_views/async_demo.ex:141-154 — before extracting anything, compare `dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex` and `dev/live_views/async_demo.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/global_traces_live.ex:102— lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/global_traces_live.ex:102-111 | lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/node_traces_live.ex:79-88 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:174— dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:174-183 | dev/live_views/async_demo.ex:158-167 — before extracting anything, compare `dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex` and `dev/live_views/async_demo.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/node_traces_live.ex:32— lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/node_traces_live.ex:32-41 | lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/components_tree/web/components_tree_live.ex:40-49 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
AC3 · Page structure· Page without a main landmark · ×2
Page without a main landmark devtools/common/panel.html:1— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark landing/src/layouts/Layout.astro:26— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
FunctionTooLong: TopBarBannerClient.TopBarBanner landing/src/components/TopBarBanner/TopBarBannerClient.tsx:329— FunctionTooLong — TopBarBanner runs 158 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 58 over it, 1.58× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
FunctionTooLong: inspect.initElementInspection assets/client/services/inspect.js:3— FunctionTooLong — initElementInspection runs 110 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 10 over it, 1.10× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/live_debugger/services/callback_tracer/actions/diff_trace.ex:27— lib/live_debugger/services/callback_tracer/actions/diff_trace.ex:27-33 | lib/live_debugger/services/callback_tracer/actions/function_trace.ex:42-48 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:202— dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:202-208 | dev/live_views/async_demo.ex:186-192 — before extracting anything, compare `dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex` and `dev/live_views/async_demo.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Dead file (~21 LoC) devtools/chrome/devtools.js— no import path from any entry point (55 application, 3 tooling, 17 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~21 LoC) devtools/firefox/devtools.js— no import path from any entry point (55 application, 3 tooling, 17 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
AC7 · A11y enforcement· Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1
Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 37 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
TopBarBannerClient.TopBarBanner (cyclomatic 27) landing/src/components/TopBarBanner/TopBarBannerClient.tsx:329— TopBarBannerClient.TopBarBanner has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 8 of the 27 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 6 function literals inside it that branch (lines 418, 372, 492, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
Header.Header (cyclomatic 17) landing/src/components/ui/Header.tsx:44— Header.Header has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 6 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 4 function literals inside it that branch (lines 77, 54, 135, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
block.Block (cyclomatic 17) landing/src/components/ui/block.tsx:56— block.Block has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
TopBarBannerClient.TopBarBanner (cognitive 30) landing/src/components/TopBarBanner/TopBarBannerClient.tsx:329— TopBarBannerClient.TopBarBanner has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (18 pts), ternaries 4 (5 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 6). Most of this is not in the body itself: 8 of the 30 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 6 function literals inside it that branch (lines 418, 372, 390, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
Header.Header (cognitive 22) landing/src/components/ui/Header.tsx:44— Header.Header has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (9 pts), ternaries 6 (7 pts), error handling 2 (3 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 6). Most of this is not in the body itself: 6 of the 22 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 4 function literals inside it that branch (lines 77, 54, 146, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
TopBarBannerClient.BannerZoneSlot (cognitive 17) landing/src/components/TopBarBanner/TopBarBannerClient.tsx:141— TopBarBannerClient.BannerZoneSlot has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (14 pts), ternaries 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 3). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 17 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 7 function literals inside it that branch (lines 206, 153, 157, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
FileTooLong: web/components.ex lib/live_debugger/app/web/components.ex— FileTooLong — 977 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), declaring 41 functions. The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 477 over it, 1.95× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
TooManyFunctions: Impl lib/live_debugger/api/traces_storage.ex:169— TooManyFunctions — 36 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 6 over it, 1.20× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/async_jobs/web/async_jobs_live.ex:36— lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/async_jobs/web/async_jobs_live.ex:36-44 | lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/node_state/web/node_state_live.ex:36-44 | lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/streams/web/streams_live.ex:38-46 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/hook_components/filters_fullscreen.ex:20— lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/hook_components/filters_fullscreen.ex:20-25 | lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/callback_tracing/web/hook_components/filters_sidebar.ex:17-22 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/live_debugger/services/callback_tracer/actions/state.ex:48— lib/live_debugger/services/callback_tracer/actions/state.ex:48-52 | lib/live_debugger/services/telemetry_handler/gen_servers/telemetry_handler.ex:66-70 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:143— dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:143-153 | dev/live_views/async_demo.ex:127-137 — before extracting anything, compare `dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex` and `dev/live_views/async_demo.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:187— dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex:187-198 | dev/live_views/async_demo.ex:171-182 — before extracting anything, compare `dev/live_components/async_demo_component.ex` and `dev/live_views/async_demo.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
End-of-life runtime: Node.js 20 — .tool-versions declares Node.js 20 as this project's version file, and Node.js 20, support ended 2026-04-30. An unsupported runtime receives no security patches, so every vulnerability disclosed in it since 2026-04-30 is present and unfixable without moving off it. This is a migration rather than an upgrade: there is no newer release of a runtime that has ended.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) devtools/chrome/devtools.js:5— devtools/chrome/devtools.js:5 · devtools/firefox/devtools.js:5 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
R10 · Code Duplication· Duplicated block with local edits (13 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
Duplicated block with local edits (13 matched lines × 2 locations) assets/client/components/tooltip/tooltip.js:13— assets/client/components/tooltip/tooltip.js:13 · assets/client/components/tooltip/tooltip.js:40 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 56 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both spans, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Complex function Block (cyclomatic 17, cognitive 12) landing/src/components/ui/block.tsx:56— Block has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity· Complex function we (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 12) · ×1
Complex function we (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 12) priv/static/client.js:163— we has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function setTooltipPosition (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 11) assets/app/hooks/tooltip.js:3— setTooltipPosition has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
No typecheck script — test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
Unused dependency '@codemirror/theme-one-dark' — Declared in assets/app/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Unused dependency 'phoenix' — Declared in assets/app/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Unused dependency 'phoenix_html' — Declared in assets/app/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 3 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/node_state/web/hook_components/assigns_history.ex, lib/live_debugger/app/discovery/web/live_components/dead_live_views.ex, lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/web/components.ex. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor· Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 3 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (6 single-owned of 106 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 106 of the 236 production source files in this repository met that bar). They are anonymized user #2 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #3 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #4 (1 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
D26 · Project Cohesion· Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 1 of 4 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 5.0/10. The most over is `(repository root)` (19642 LoC, 236 module-visible types across 87 directories). Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the module first (group each responsibility into its own package or directory and keep the cross-boundary members non-public), since splitting a published package moves types between packages and breaks consumers.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 10 of 106 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 106 of the 236 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: dev/live_views/memory_explosion.ex, lib/mix/tasks/live_debugger.install.ex, lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/components_tree/utils.ex, lib/live_debugger/app/web/live_components/tracer_status.ex, lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/associated_live_views/web/associated_live_views_live.ex, lib/live_debugger/app/utils/url.ex, lib/live_debugger/app/discovery/web/live_components/active_live_views.ex, lib/live_debugger/app/debugger/node_state/web/hooks/temporary_assigns.ex (and 2 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 12365 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal · ×1
Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal — Only 0/2 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
X5 · Nullable reference types· Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks · ×1
Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks — 0/1 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.
Outdated: bandit — `:bandit` is locked at 1.10.4 but 1.12.5 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.6"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update bandit` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: credo — `:credo` is locked at 1.7.17 but 1.7.19 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.7"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update credo` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: ex_doc — `:ex_doc` is locked at 0.40.1 but 0.40.4 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 0.34"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update ex_doc` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: igniter — `:igniter` is locked at 0.7.7 but 0.8.4 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 0.5 and >= 0.5.40"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update igniter` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: mox — `:mox` is locked at 1.2.0 but 1.3.2 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.2"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update mox` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: phoenix — `:phoenix` is locked at 1.8.5 but 1.8.15 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.7"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update phoenix` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: phoenix_live_dashboard — `:phoenix_live_dashboard` is locked at 0.8.7 but 0.9.1 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 0.8"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update phoenix_live_dashboard` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: phoenix_live_reload — `:phoenix_live_reload` is locked at 1.6.2 but 1.7.0 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.5"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update phoenix_live_reload` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: phoenix_live_view — `:phoenix_live_view` is locked at 1.1.28 but 1.2.12 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.1 and >= 1.1.7"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update phoenix_live_view` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: phx_new — `:phx_new` is locked at 1.8.5 but 1.8.15 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.7"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update phx_new` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: tailwind — `:tailwind` is locked at 0.4.1 but 0.5.1 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 0.3"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update tailwind` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 2 file(s) — `landing/src/components/TopBarBanner/config.ts`, `priv/static/app.js` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a101c7-f4a9-779a-84a5-886dd3ba0765 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 69 · Warnings: 58 · Recommendations: 17 · Info: 11 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-10-2026 @ 12:40 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.