Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
songquanpeng/one-api carries serious gaps (27%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (10%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (37%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup).
For scale: — (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly — (—). Approximate, ±~30%.
Raise Readiness 10 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 27 → ~45.
New since the last scan (100+)
- D1 · EditChannel (cyclomatic 29) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js
- D1 · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29) web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js
- D1 · Breadcrumbs (cyclomatic 28) web/berry/src/ui-component/extended/Breadcrumbs.js
- D1 · Profile (cyclomatic 26) web/berry/src/views/Profile/index.js
- D1 · SystemSetting (cyclomatic 24) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js
- D1 · handleInputChange (cyclomatic 24) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js
- D1 · submit (cyclomatic 23) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js
- D1 · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 23) web/berry/src/views/Authentication/AuthForms/AuthRegister.js
- D1 · submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) web/default/src/components/OperationSetting.js
- D1 · submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) web/air/src/components/OperationSetting.js
- D1 · submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/OperationSetting.js
- D1 · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 19) web/berry/src/views/User/component/EditModal.js
- D1 · submit (cyclomatic 18) web/air/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js
- D1 · submit (cyclomatic 17) web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js
- D1 · handleInputChange (cyclomatic 16) web/default/src/components/SystemSetting.js
- D2 · Breadcrumbs (cognitive 43) web/berry/src/ui-component/extended/Breadcrumbs.js
- D2 · submitConfig (cognitive 36) web/default/src/components/OperationSetting.js
- D2 · submitConfig (cognitive 36) web/air/src/components/OperationSetting.js
- D2 · submitConfig (cognitive 36) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/OperationSetting.js
- D2 · EditChannel (cognitive 28) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js
- D2 · (anonymous) (cognitive 28) web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js
- D2 · submit (cognitive 27) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js
- D2 · Profile (cognitive 25) web/berry/src/views/Profile/index.js
- D2 · handleInputChange (cognitive 24) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js
- D2 · SystemSetting (cognitive 23) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js
- D2 · submit (cognitive 22) web/air/src/pages/Token/EditToken.js
- D2 · (anonymous) (cognitive 22) web/berry/src/views/Authentication/AuthForms/AuthRegister.js
- D2 · submit (cognitive 21) web/air/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js
- D2 · submit (cognitive 21) web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js
- D2 · (anonymous) (cognitive 18) web/berry/src/views/User/component/EditModal.js
- D2 · handleInputChange (cognitive 16) web/default/src/components/SystemSetting.js
- D2 · Header (cognitive 16) web/default/src/components/Header.js
- D3 · FileTooLong: components/LogsTable.js web/default/src/components/LogsTable.js
- D3 · FileTooLong: components/ChannelsTable.js web/default/src/components/ChannelsTable.js
- D8 · No automated tests
- D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key common/random/main.go
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key common/helper/helper.go
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5764 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3553 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4771 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4772 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5004 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3487 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4116 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4134 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4135 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5005 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5006 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5013 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5014 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5015 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5016 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5017 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5018 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5019 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5020 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5021 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5023 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5033 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5932 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4815 go.mod
- R10 · Duplicated block (38 lines × 2 locations) web/air/src/components/ChannelsTable.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (29 lines × 2 locations) web/air/src/components/LogsTable.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (25 lines × 2 locations) web/air/src/pages/Token/EditToken.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (22 lines × 2 locations) web/air/src/pages/Redemption/EditRedemption.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (21 lines × 2 locations) web/air/src/helpers/utils.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (20 lines × 3 locations) web/air/src/components/OperationSetting.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2 locations) web/air/src/context/User/reducer.js
- R2 · Complex function EditChannel (cyclomatic 29, cognitive 28) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js
- R2 · Complex function Breadcrumbs (cyclomatic 28, cognitive 43) web/berry/src/ui-component/extended/Breadcrumbs.js
- R2 · Complex function Profile (cyclomatic 26, cognitive 25) web/berry/src/views/Profile/index.js
- R2 · Complex function handleInputChange (cyclomatic 24, cognitive 24) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js
- R2 · Complex function submit (cyclomatic 23, cognitive 27) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js
- R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 23, cognitive 22) web/berry/src/views/Authentication/AuthForms/AuthRegister.js
- R7 · Dead file (~910 LoC) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js
- R7 · Dead file (~641 LoC) web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js
- R7 · Dead file (~556 LoC) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/OperationSetting.js
- R7 · Dead file (~324 LoC) web/berry/src/views/Profile/index.js
- R7 · Dead file (~319 LoC) web/berry/src/views/Token/component/EditModal.js
- R7 · Dead file (~316 LoC) web/berry/src/views/Authentication/AuthForms/AuthLogin.js
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 31 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 4 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 3 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish application observability by implementing structured logging and health checks across all services. Next, strengthen security and performance by integrating static analysis and secret scanning into the development pipeline. Then, formalize disaster recovery by codifying backup procedures and documenting recovery time and data loss objectives. After that, improve test coverage by adding tests for all production modules. Finally, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring imports.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +17.8 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +17.8 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +21.1 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package. | +21.1 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. | +21.1 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +21.1 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +21.1 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +19.1 pts | Medium | Tooling |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| go.mod | 0.2 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| Dockerfile | 4.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| .github/workflows/docker-image.yml | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/ci.yml | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/linux-release.yml | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/macos-release.yml | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/windows-release.yml | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| common/random/main.go | 5.1 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js | 7.2 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: EditChannel (cyclomatic 29) |
| web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js | 7.2 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29) |
| web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js | 7.2 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: SystemSetting (cyclomatic 24) |
| common/helper/helper.go | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| web/berry/src/ui-component/extended/Breadcrumbs.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Breadcrumbs (cyclomatic 28) |
| web/berry/src/views/Profile/index.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Profile (cyclomatic 26) |
| web/berry/src/views/Authentication/AuthForms/AuthRegister.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 23) |
| web/default/src/components/OperationSetting.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) |
| web/air/src/components/OperationSetting.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) |
| web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/OperationSetting.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) |
| web/berry/src/views/User/component/EditModal.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 19) |
| web/air/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: submit (cyclomatic 18) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 44 of 45 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 45 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 121 of 132 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
15 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was EditChannel at 29.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with OperationSetting.js (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 EditChannel (cyclomatic 29) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with EditChannel.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with EditModal.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
17 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Breadcrumbs at 43.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 submitConfig (cognitive 36) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with OperationSetting.js (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 submit (cognitive 21) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with EditChannel.js, EditModal.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Breadcrumbs (cognitive 43) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Breadcrumbs.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
2 god class(es) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with ChannelsTable.js, LogsTable.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — the solution has no test code.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
D28 · Secrets (history)
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with helper.go, main.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
31 finding(s): 0 critical, 24 high, 6 medium, 1 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 24 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docker-image.yml (7), ci.yml (5), linux-release.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (24 issue-level).
- Resolve the 6 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with utils.js (2), cache.go, common.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with email.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 2 low.
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
138 finding(s): 10 critical, 7 high, 119 medium, 2 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 33 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (33). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 warning-level).
- Resolve the 10 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (10). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
- Resolve the 7 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.
What to do
- Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 242 plain JS
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication
- web/air/src/components/ChannelsTable.js:42 · web/air/src/components/UsersTable.js:20 — ChannelsTable.js:42
- web/air/src/components/LogsTable.js:89 · web/air/src/components/UsersTable.js:48 — LogsTable.js:89
- web/air/src/pages/Token/EditToken.js:52 · web/default/src/pages/Token/EditToken.js:54 — EditToken.js:52
- web/air/src/App.js:89 · web/air/src/App.js:197 — App.js:89
- web/air/src/pages/Redemption/EditRedemption.js:28 · web/air/src/pages/Token/EditToken.js:59 — EditRedemption.js:28
- web/air/src/helpers/utils.js:154 · web/default/src/helpers/utils.js:156 — utils.js:154
- web/air/src/components/OperationSetting.js:85 · web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/OperationSetting.js:106 · web/default/src/components/OperationSetting.js:99 — OperationSetting.js:85
- web/air/src/context/User/reducer.js:1 · web/default/src/context/User/reducer.js:1 — reducer.js:1
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — EditModal.js:285, EditChannel.js:30, Breadcrumbs.js:30, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — SystemSetting.js, ChannelsTable.js, ChannelsTable.js, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 3 application, 0 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (3 application, 0 tooling, 0 test roots considered) (×7) — SystemSetting.js, EditModal.js, OperationSetting.js, …
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — index.js:9, index.js:13, index.js:8
- Declared in web/air/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
- web/berry/src/utils/api.js → web/berry/src/utils/common.js → web/berry/src/utils/api.js — api.js
- web/default/src/helpers/api.js → web/default/src/helpers/utils.js → web/default/src/helpers/api.js — api.js
What to do
- Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
X1 · Async correctness
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 37% | Weak — gated by R1, R10, R7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Maturity | 60% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 10% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, R8, P2, P3, P5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 44% | Weak — gated by D29, D36, D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 58 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 46 finding(s)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:25
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:28
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:37
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:44
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:45
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-image.yml:21
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-image.yml:35
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-image.yml:38
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-image.yml:41
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-image.yml:47
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-image.yml:55
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-image.yml:62
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/linux-release.yml:21
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/linux-release.yml:30
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/linux-release.yml:42
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/linux-release.yml:57
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/macos-release.yml:21
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/macos-release.yml:30
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/macos-release.yml:42
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/macos-release.yml:50
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/windows-release.yml:24
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/windows-release.yml:33
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/windows-release.yml:45
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/windows-release.yml:53
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Secret: generic-api-key common/random/main.go:16
- Secret: generic-api-key common/helper/helper.go:139
- Dimension evaluation failed
- High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
- No automated tests
Warning — 76 finding(s)
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-4503 go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5764 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3553 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-4771 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-4772 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5004 go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3487 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4116 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4134 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4135 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5005 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5006 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5013 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5014 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5015 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5016 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5017 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5018 go.mod
- Medium: math-random-used common/random/main.go:5
- Medium: math-random-used model/cache.go:12
- Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml web/air/src/helpers/utils.js:7
- Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml web/berry/src/utils/common.js:17
- Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml web/default/src/helpers/render.js:118
- Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml web/default/src/helpers/utils.js:7
- submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) web/default/src/components/OperationSetting.js:97
- submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) web/air/src/components/OperationSetting.js:83
- submitConfig (cyclomatic 21) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/OperationSetting.js:104
- submitConfig (cognitive 36) web/default/src/components/OperationSetting.js:97
- submitConfig (cognitive 36) web/air/src/components/OperationSetting.js:83
- submitConfig (cognitive 36) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/OperationSetting.js:104
- submit (cognitive 21) web/air/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js:216
- submit (cognitive 21) web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js:154
- FileTooLong: components/LogsTable.js web/default/src/components/LogsTable.js:0
- FileTooLong: components/ChannelsTable.js web/default/src/components/ChannelsTable.js:0
- EditChannel (cyclomatic 29) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js:30
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29) web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js:285
- Breadcrumbs (cyclomatic 28) web/berry/src/ui-component/extended/Breadcrumbs.js:30
- Profile (cyclomatic 26) web/berry/src/views/Profile/index.js:41
- SystemSetting (cyclomatic 24) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js:26
- handleInputChange (cyclomatic 24) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js:130
- submit (cyclomatic 23) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js:170
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 23) web/berry/src/views/Authentication/AuthForms/AuthRegister.js:135
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 19) web/berry/src/views/User/component/EditModal.js:135
- submit (cyclomatic 18) web/air/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js:216
- submit (cyclomatic 17) web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js:154
- handleInputChange (cyclomatic 16) web/default/src/components/SystemSetting.js:116
- LLM evaluation failed
- Breadcrumbs (cognitive 43) web/berry/src/ui-component/extended/Breadcrumbs.js:30
- EditChannel (cognitive 28) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js:30
- (anonymous) (cognitive 28) web/berry/src/views/Channel/component/EditModal.js:285
- submit (cognitive 27) web/default/src/pages/Channel/EditChannel.js:170
- Profile (cognitive 25) web/berry/src/views/Profile/index.js:41
- handleInputChange (cognitive 24) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js:130
- SystemSetting (cognitive 23) web/berry/src/views/Setting/component/SystemSetting.js:26
- submit (cognitive 22) web/air/src/pages/Token/EditToken.js:134
- (anonymous) (cognitive 22) web/berry/src/views/Authentication/AuthForms/AuthRegister.js:135
- (anonymous) (cognitive 18) web/berry/src/views/User/component/EditModal.js:135
- handleInputChange (cognitive 16) web/default/src/components/SystemSetting.js:116
- Header (cognitive 16) web/default/src/components/Header.js:84
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 Dockerfile
- Unpinned build actions
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
- Low IaC: DS-0005 Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile
- Test reliability not included
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
- Low: missing-ssl-minversion common/message/email.go:61
- No build provenance
- No artifact signing
- No SBOM
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 3 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 31 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 4 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 138 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |