soybean-admin-nestjs — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

soybeanjs/soybean-admin-nestjs carries serious gaps (35%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Code Health (86%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (19%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Accessibility (29%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Run what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup).

For scale: Medium (~23,802 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 86% Strong Architecture 65% Adequate · gated by R9 Maturity 56% Adequate · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 19% ⚠ Critical · gated by R8, P1, P3, P5 Security 65% Adequate · gated by D38 Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary Accessibility 29% Weak · gated by AC1, AC2, AC4

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 19% · 46% weightAccessibility 29% · 25% weightMaturity 56% · 14% weightArchitecture 65% · 8% weightSecurity 65% · 4% weightCode Health 86% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 19 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 35 → ~47.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (41+)

41 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-30) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 frontend/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 backend/Dockerfile
D35 · Change coupling: en-us.ts ↔ zh-cn.ts frontend/src/locales/langs/en-us.ts
D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
R10 · Duplicated block (22 lines × 3 locations) frontend/src/views/access-key/index.vue
R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/views/access-key/index.vue
R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) backend/apps/base-demo/src/base-demo.module.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-rbac.service.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 6 locations) backend/apps/base-system/src/infra/bounded-contexts/access-key/access_key.infra.module.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 4 locations) backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 4 locations) backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts
R11 · Boundary violation [package:undeclared-workspace-dep] frontend/packages/materials/src/libs/page-tab/shared.ts
R2 · Complex function validateKey (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 10) backend/libs/infra/guard/src/api-key/services/complex-api-key.service.ts
R7 · Dead file (~57 LoC) backend/apps/base-demo/src/main.ts
R7 · Dead file (~56 LoC) backend/prisma/seeds/sys/sysUser.ts
R8 · Unused dependency 'dotenv'
R8 · Unused dependency 'source-map-support'
R9 · Import cycle (5 files) frontend/src/hooks/common/router.ts

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €6,800–€34,000

Cost to rebuild	€6,800–€34,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (113–357 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 35% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code	~1132 LoC unreachable (18 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€20,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 19% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

+13.8 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

+13.8 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

+13.8 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Medium asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 19%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (23,802 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 19%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

At a glance — Code Health · 86% · Strong

The Good

D3 · TypeScript God Classes 9.6 D4 · TypeScript Code Duplication 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 7.8 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 9.5 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 7.5

At a glance — Architecture · 65% · Adequate · gated by R9

The Good

D35 · TypeScript Change Coupling 10.0 R11 · React / TS Import Boundaries 9.4

The Ugly

R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 2.3

At a glance — Maturity · 56% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

The Good

D15 · TypeScript Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · TypeScript Bus Factor 9.8 D19 · TypeScript Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · TypeScript Naming Consistency 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Bad

M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.2

The Ugly

D34 · TypeScript Knowledge Freshness 0.2 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 19% · Critical · gated by R8, P1, P3, P5

The Good

D13 · TypeScript Secret Scanning 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 10.0

The Bad

R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 5.7

The Ugly

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 0.0

At a glance — Security · 65% · Adequate · gated by D38

The Good

D28 · TypeScript Secrets (history) 9.0 D31 · TypeScript IaC & Container Security 9.4 D33 · TypeScript JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0

The Ugly

D29 · TypeScript Static Analysis (SAST) 4.2 D38 · TypeScript OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 29% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC2, AC4

The Good

AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0

The Bad

AC3 · Repo Page structure 5.7

The Ugly

AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 1.0 AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 3.5 AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	50	High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection	5	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	5	High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	2	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration workflow that builds and tests every change to ensure immediate feedback. Next, integrate static security and performance tooling into this pipeline to fail the build on regressions. Then, formalize disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure-as-code to meet recovery objectives. Finally, clean up dependencies by removing unused packages and expand test coverage to include all reachable production modules.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+13.8 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+13.8 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+13.8 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.	+13.8 pts	Medium	Dependency Hygiene
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).	+12.2 pts	Medium	Test Coverage
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.	+9.1 pts	Medium	Text alternatives
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.	+9.1 pts	Medium	Keyboard semantics
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.	+9.0 pts	Medium	Forms & labels

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 11 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 18% slop · 55% mixed · 27% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
backend/pnpm-lock.yaml	2.3	Slop	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml	2.3	Slop	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
frontend/Dockerfile	4.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
frontend/pnpm-workspace.yaml	5.1	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: pnpm-block-exotic-sub-dependencies
frontend/src/service/request/index.ts	7.2	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
backend/.npmrc	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age
frontend/.npmrc	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age
backend/Dockerfile	7.2	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2
backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts	8.5	Near-clean	God Classes: TooManyMethods: AuthZService
backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts	8.5	Near-clean	God Classes: TooManyMethods: AuthZManagementService
frontend/src/locales/langs/en-us.ts	8.5	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Change coupling: en-us.ts ↔ zh-cn.ts

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 37 of 39 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 39 dimensions across the health lenses

D3D4D13D15D16D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D38AC1AC2AC3AC4AC6AC7DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5R1R10R11R2R3R4R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 67 of 74 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fcabf-92ad-7ae3-9464-6be6467f29d9.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D3 · God Classes9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: AuthZService · ×2backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts:13

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D16 · Bus Factor9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is backend/apps/base-system/src/main.ts.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

SoybeanAdmin NestJS has strong README presence: the main project README covers a full online preview link, an extensive '简介' ('Introduction') section explaining monorepo structure and the optional CQRS/ddd examples, and a clear outline linking every visible heading. The backend README is focused on NestJS framework details (NPM version, CircleCI, Discord) but does not yet cover the project's main features or installation path for the admin scaffolding.

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — SoybeanAdmin NestJS has strong README presence: the main project README covers a full online preview link, an extensive '简介' ('Introduction') section explaining monorepo structure and the optional CQRS/ddd examples, and a clear outline linking every visible heading. The backend README is focused on NestJS framework details (NPM version, CircleCI, Discord) but does not yet cover the project's main features or installation path for the admin scaffolding.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

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D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-keyfrontend/src/service/request/index.ts:17detected by gitleaks finding

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age · ×5backend/.npmrc:1detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 5 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with pnpm-workspace.yaml (3), .npmrc (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 2 low.

High IaC: DS-0002frontend/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 · ×2frontend/Dockerfile:1detected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×2backend/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

96 of 98 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is frontend/packages/color/src/constant/name.ts.

Largest orphaned file · ×3frontend/packages/color/src/constant/name.ts

Dormant codebase

What to do

Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with name.ts, authz.service.ts, authz-management.service.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: en-us.ts↔zh-cn.ts 80%

Change coupling: en-us.ts ↔ zh-cn.tsfrontend/src/locales/langs/en-us.ts

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

67 finding(s): 3 critical, 45 high, 13 medium, 6 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×43backend/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3backend/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2backend/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2frontend/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

Resolve the 43 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (43). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (43 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — soybean-avatar.vue:3, header-banner.vue:7

What to do

Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC2 · Forms & labels3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — config-operation.vue:3

What to do

Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

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AC3 · Page structure5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

An iframe with no title (or an empty one) is announced only as "frame". Add a non-empty title describing its content, or an aria-label. — [url].vue:3

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — layout-mode-card.vue:3

What to do

Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with jest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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M1 · Documentation (README)6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 10 of 11 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

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M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.

What to do

Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R10 · Code Duplication7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

frontend/src/views/access-key/index.vue:96 · frontend/src/views/manage/role/index.vue:119 · frontend/src/views/manage/user/index.vue:121 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.vue:96
frontend/src/views/access-key/index.vue:9 · frontend/src/views/manage/user/index.vue:9 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — index.vue:9
backend/apps/base-demo/src/base-demo.module.ts:51 · backend/apps/base-system/src/app.module.ts:44 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — base-demo.module.ts:51
backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-rbac.service.ts:158 · backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts:161 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — authz-rbac.service.ts:158
backend/apps/base-system/src/infra/bounded-contexts/access-key/access_key.infra.module.ts:10 · backend/apps/base-system/src/infra/bounded-contexts/api-endpoint/api-endpoint/api-endpoint.infra.module.ts:10 · backend/apps/base-system/src/infra/bounded-contexts/iam/domain/domain-infra.module.ts:10 · backend/apps/base-system/src/infra/bounded-contexts/iam/tokens/tokens.infra.module.ts:10 · +2 more site(s) not listed — the 6 copies are spread across 6 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — access_key.infra.module.ts:10
backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts:203 · backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts:258 · backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts:503 · backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts:558 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — authz-management.service.ts:203
backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts:435 · backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts:583 · backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts:735 · backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts:883 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — authz-management.service.ts:435
backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts:583 · backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts:883 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — authz-management.service.ts:583

What to do

Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.

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R11 · Import Boundaries9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

frontend/packages/materials/src/libs/page-tab/shared.ts:1 imports @sa/color, a package this repository publishes, but this package's own package.json does not list it in dependencies (or peer/optional dependencies) — it resolves only through the workspace link, so an installed copy of this package is missing it. Add it to this package's dependencies. — shared.ts:1

What to do

Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.

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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×3) — local-route.migrate.ts:77, casbin-prisma.adapter.ts:154, complex-api-key.service.ts:56

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R3 · Large Files9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.

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R4 · Test Coverage5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — name.ts, en-us.ts, zh-cn.ts, …

What to do

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

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R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

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R7 · Dead Code7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

Unreachable from the 21 application, 30 tooling and 4 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (21 application, 30 tooling, 4 test roots considered) (×7) — sysMenu.ts, local-route.migrate.ts, casbinRule.ts, …

What to do

Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

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R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×2) — uno.config.ts:4, assets.ts:2
Imported only as a TYPE and declared in no reachable package.json. The import is erased at compile time, so nothing is installed and no runtime resolution depends on it — but type-checking a clean clone will fail. Declare the typings it resolves through (or the package itself) in the owning package.json. — index.ts:1
Declared in backend/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

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R9 · Circular Imports2.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

frontend/src/hooks/common/router.ts → frontend/src/router/index.ts → frontend/src/router/guard/index.ts → frontend/src/router/guard/route.ts → frontend/src/store/modules/auth/index.ts → frontend/src/hooks/common/router.ts (one verified cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 62 files) — router.ts

What to do

Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.

Do you agree with this assessment?

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC1 · Text alternatives	1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5	Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics	2.1.1, 2.4.3	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	86%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	65%	Adequate — gated by R9	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity	56%	Adequate — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	19%	Critical — gated by R8, P1, P3, P5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	65%	Adequate — gated by D38	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Accessibility	29%	Weak — gated by AC1, AC2, AC4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~76 lines of test source are present (.ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a bun lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 55 finding(s)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×43

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — @fastify/static 8.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.1.1. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @fastify/static 8.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 10.1.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 10.1.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against @fastify/static 8.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — @isaacs/brace-expansion 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @isaacs/brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @isaacs/brace-expansion to 5.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — @nestjs/microservices 11.1.3: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @nestjs/microservices ^11.1.3, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 11.1.19, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @nestjs/microservices moves onto 11.1.19 or later; if the flagged 11.1.3 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @nestjs/microservices with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — @nestjs/platform-fastify 11.1.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 11.1.24. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @nestjs/platform-fastify 11.1.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 11.1.24 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 11.1.24 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against @nestjs/platform-fastify 11.1.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — axios 1.6.8: [GHSA redacted] — axios is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the 1.8.3 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin axios to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 29 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 1.6.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 29 advisories this scan raises against axios 1.6.8: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — axios 1.8.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.0. This is 1 of 29 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 1.8.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 29 advisories this scan raises against axios 1.8.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — defu 6.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.1.5
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — fastify 5.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares fastify ^5.4.0, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 5.8.5, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so fastify moves onto 5.8.5 or later; if the flagged 5.3.3 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin fastify with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fastify 5.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.8.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.8.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against fastify 5.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — fastify 5.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares fastify ^5.4.0, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 5.8.5, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so fastify moves onto 5.8.5 or later; if the flagged 5.4.0 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin fastify with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fastify 5.4.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.8.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.8.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against fastify 5.4.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — find-my-way 9.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — find-my-way is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin find-my-way to 9.7.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: backend/pnpm-lock.yaml, frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — glob 10.4.5: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 10.5.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: backend/pnpm-lock.yaml, frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — glob 11.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 11.1.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — glob 11.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 11.1.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — immutable 5.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 5.1.8 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against immutable 5.0.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.1.8 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.1.8 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against immutable 5.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares js-yaml ^4.1.0, but the vulnerable 3.14.1 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own js-yaml entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares js-yaml ^4.1.0, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 4.3.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so js-yaml moves onto 4.3.0 or later; if the flagged 4.1.0 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin js-yaml with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: backend/pnpm-lock.yaml, frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — jws 3.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — jws is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin jws to 3.2.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: backend/pnpm-lock.yaml, frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
+ 18 more in this group — see findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×5

High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age backend/.npmrc:1 — This .npmrc does not set a minimum release age or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a minimum release age (`min-release-age = 7` for the npm CLI, `minimum-release-age = 7` for pnpm, `minimumReleaseAge` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, or `npmMinimalAgeGate: 7d` in `.yarnrc.yml` for Yarn Berry) — use the key your package manager reads; Yarn Classic has no release-age setting, so pin exact versions and review lockfile bumps there instead to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: v11.10 Reference: https://github.blog/changelog/2026-02-18-npm-bulk-trusted-publishing-config-and-script-security-now-generally-available/. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age frontend/.npmrc:1 — This .npmrc does not set a minimum release age or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a minimum release age (`min-release-age = 7` for the npm CLI, `minimum-release-age = 7` for pnpm, `minimumReleaseAge` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, or `npmMinimalAgeGate: 7d` in `.yarnrc.yml` for Yarn Berry) — use the key your package manager reads; Yarn Classic has no release-age setting, so pin exact versions and review lockfile bumps there instead to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: v11.10 Reference: https://github.blog/changelog/2026-02-18-npm-bulk-trusted-publishing-config-and-script-security-now-generally-available/. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: pnpm-block-exotic-sub-dependencies frontend/pnpm-workspace.yaml:1 — Missing or incorrect blockExoticSubdeps. Set `blockExoticSubdeps: true` to prevent transitive dependencies from being installed from untrusted sources (git URLs, tarball URLs and local paths a dependency pulls in behind your lockfile). Added in: v10.26.0 Reference: https://pnpm.io/settings#blockexoticsubdeps. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: pnpm-minimum-release-age frontend/pnpm-workspace.yaml:1 — This pnpm workspace configuration does not set a minimum release age. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add `minimumReleaseAge: 10080` (minutes) to wait at least seven days before installing newly published package versions. Added in: v10.16.0 Reference: https://pnpm.io/settings#minimumreleaseage. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: pnpm-trust-policy frontend/pnpm-workspace.yaml:1 — Missing or incorrect trustPolicy. Set `trustPolicy: no-downgrade` to prevent malicious package updates from downgrading security settings. Added in: v10.21.0 Reference: https://pnpm.io/settings#trustpolicy. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×3

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — @fastify/middie 9.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — @fastify/middie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @fastify/middie to 9.3.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @fastify/middie 9.0.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 9.3.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 9.3.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against @fastify/middie 9.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — form-data 4.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 4.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.0.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.0.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 4.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — form-data 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 4.0.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.0.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.0.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×2

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — svgo 2.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — svgo is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin svgo to 2.8.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against svgo 2.8.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.8.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.8.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against svgo 2.8.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×1

Secret: generic-api-key frontend/src/service/request/index.ts:17 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1

High IaC: DS-0002 frontend/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.

Warning — 7 finding(s)

D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×2

TooManyMethods: AuthZService backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts:13 — TooManyMethods — 70 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: AuthZManagementService backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts:12 — TooManyMethods — 52 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×2

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 frontend/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 backend/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml — @intlify/core-base 11.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — @intlify/core-base is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @intlify/core-base to 11.1.10 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/pnpm-lock.yaml — @nestjs/core 11.1.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 11.1.18

D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1

Change coupling: en-us.ts ↔ zh-cn.ts frontend/src/locales/langs/en-us.ts — `frontend/src/locales/langs/en-us.ts` and `frontend/src/locales/langs/zh-cn.ts` change together 80% of the time (8 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.

Recommendation — 10 finding(s)

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Largest orphaned file · ×3

Largest orphaned file frontend/packages/color/src/constant/name.ts — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
Largest orphaned file backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz.service.ts — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
Largest orphaned file backend/libs/infra/casbin/src/services/authz-management.service.ts — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×2

Low IaC: DS-0026 backend/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 9528`, so a request to `localhost:9528` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 frontend/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.ts) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 2 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: backend/apps/base-system/src/main.ts, backend/apps/base-demo/src/base-demo.controller.ts. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1

Dormant codebase — 96 of 98 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 96 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1

Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.ts) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.

Info — 2 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	1	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	5	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	5	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	67	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fcabf-92ad-7ae3-9464-6be6467f29d9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Soybeanjs/soybean-Admin-Nestjs

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

At a glance — Code Health · 86% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 65% · Adequate · gated by R9

At a glance — Maturity · 56% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 19% · Critical · gated by R8, P1, P3, P5

At a glance — Security · 65% · Adequate · gated by D38

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Accessibility · 29% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC2, AC4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts