Public report — wire, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 00:01 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Square/wire

coverage not measuredno automated testssingle-maintainer
33% At Risk
Architecture 94% Exemplary Code Health 82% Adequate Maturity 39% Weak Readiness 24% Critical Security 22% Critical

Hobby · weakest lens: Security (22%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

28/30dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
130findings with an exact file:lineof 142 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
30/89dimensions across the health lenses — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

square/wire carries serious gaps (33%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (94%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (82%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Security (22%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (24%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling).

For scale: Hobby (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (94%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 82% Adequate · gated by D4 Architecture 94% ★ Exemplary Maturity 39% Weak · gated by M2 Readiness 24% ⚠ Critical · gated by D9, P2, P3 Security 22% ⚠ Critical · gated by D28, D29, D36, D38
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 22% · 47% weightReadiness 24% · 26% weightMaturity 39% · 14% weightCode Health 82% · 8% weightArchitecture 94% · 4% weight

Raise Security 22 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 33 → ~42.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (65+)

65 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (57 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/Message.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (26 lines × 4) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) wire-schema/src/jvmMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/internal/JvmLanguages.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) wire-golden-files/src/main/kotlin/squareup/protos/opaque_types/OuterOpaqueType.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoWriter.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 5) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ReverseProtoWriter.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ReverseProtoWriter.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt
  • D8 · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • D16 · single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock
  • P2 · No structured logging

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+11.4 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server_cert_key_combo.pem.
+9.0 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+11.4 pts · Medium effort · Observability

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

At a glance — Code Health · 82% · Adequate · gated by D4

The Good
D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 5.3
The Ugly
D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 4.9 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 0.0

At a glance — Architecture · 94% · Exemplary

The Good
D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9

At a glance — Maturity · 39% · Weak · gated by M2

The Good
D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 9.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 4.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 24% · Critical · gated by D9, P2, P3

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 7.0
The Bad
D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 22% · Critical · gated by D28, D29, D36, D38

The Good
D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 1.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.1 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection28High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures10High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by addressing the missing test coverage in the Test Distribution area to ensure code reliability. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all projects to improve observability and enable effective debugging. Simultaneously, introduce static application security testing and resolve the identified leaked secret to secure the codebase. Finally, establish a consistent versioning strategy to ensure all builds and releases are clearly traceable.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+11.4 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server_cert_key_combo.pem.+9.0 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+11.4 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.+11.4 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Resolve the 9 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with AllTypes.swift (8), server_cert_key_combo.pem.+4.8 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+9.0 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.+7.4 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.+7.3 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 25 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 4% slop · 68% mixed · 28% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock0.2SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
samples/wire-grpc-sample/server/src/main/resources/ssl/server_cert_key_combo.pem4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
.github/workflows/build.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift4.4MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/workflows/release.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/publish-snapshot.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt7.0MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (57 lines × 2)
wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt7.0MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (26 lines × 4)
wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt7.2MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
.github/workflows/gradle-wrapper.yaml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt7.4MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)
wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt7.4MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)
wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ReverseProtoWriter.kt7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
samples/android-app-java-sample/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: exported_activity
samples/android-app-kotlin-minsdk-sample/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: exported_activity
samples/android-app-kotlin-sample/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: exported_activity
samples/android-app-variants-sample/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: exported_activity
samples/wire-grpc-sample/client/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: exported_activity
wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/Message.kt8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (29 lines × 2)
wire-schema/src/jvmMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/internal/JvmLanguages.kt8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D9D12D13D19D21D26D27D28D29D33D36D38AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6X1X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 130 of 142 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd986-1dcd-74ad-8cc1-ae0714a15976.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

24 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was HundredsFields.equals at 206.

What to do

  1. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

44 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was HundredsFields.equals at 205.

What to do

  1. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

42 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×9samples/wire-grpc-sample/client/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/whiteboard/MainActivity.kt:74
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×7wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:3143
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×4wire-golden-files/src/main/kotlin/squareup/protos/opaque_types/OuterOpaqueType.kt:162
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×4wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:72
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×3wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:970

+ 10 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ProtoAdapter.kt (4), Internal.kt (2), EmittingRules.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 7 Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ReverseProtoWriter.kt (2), WireJsonTest.kt (2), KotlinGenerator.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with KotlinGenerator.kt, OuterOpaqueType.kt, ProtoWriter.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: private-keysamples/wire-grpc-sample/server/src/main/resources/ssl/server_cert_key_combo.pem:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server_cert_key_combo.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The Wire documentation is clear and complete for a large multi-module project: the README gives a one-line license statement with links; benchmarks, golden files, and the Gradle plugin playground each have concise descriptions; the Swift runtime guide covers Xcode dependencies, codegen, test-running commands, performance testing, and baseline setup; schema tests show a real build example plus a handler class. The wire-schema-tests README is clipped mid-sentence but its outline (SchemaBuilder, recipes) exists, so no section is omitted.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No projects to assess.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Too little code to assess navigability.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

Secret: private-key · ×9samples/wire-grpc-sample/server/src/main/resources/ssl/server_cert_key_combo.pem:1detected by gitleaks finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with AllTypes.swift (8), server_cert_key_combo.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

28 finding(s): 0 critical, 23 high, 5 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×23.github/workflows/build.yml:23detected by semgrep finding
Medium: exported_activity · ×5samples/android-app-java-sample/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:12detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 23 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build.yml (13), release.yml (7), publish-snapshot.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (23 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with AndroidManifest.xml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

65 finding(s): 2 critical, 31 high, 24 medium, 8 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×31kotlin-js-store/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2kotlin-js-store/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×17kotlin-js-store/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 31 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (31). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (31 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 17 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (17). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • The root README is 108 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.

What to do

  • Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health82%Adequate — gated by D4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture94%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity39%Weak — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness24%Critical — gated by D9, P2, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security22%Critical — gated by D28, D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 60 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
  • AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~43476 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D35 Change Coupling — no production change history to mine for change-coupling
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (85 value object(s))
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 67 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×31
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — body-parser 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.20.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.16
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.17
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.18
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.0.5
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — engine.io 6.5.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.6.7
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.5
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — glob 10.4.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.5.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.18.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — postcss 8.5.10: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.5.12
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — postcss 8.5.10: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.5.18
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.0.3
  • + 6 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×23
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:52 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:54 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:75 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:90 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:92 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:108 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:124 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:126 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:183 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:184 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:194 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/gradle-wrapper.yaml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-snapshot.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-snapshot.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:16 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:50 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:54 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:60 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:74 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×9
  • Secret: private-key samples/wire-grpc-sample/server/src/main/resources/ssl/server_cert_key_combo.pem:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift:2778 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift:2779 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift:2780 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift:2781 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift:2783 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift:2784 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift:2785 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key wire-tests-swift/no-manifest/src/main/swift/AllTypes.swift:2786 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — shell-quote 1.8.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.8.4
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.7.5
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: private-key samples/wire-grpc-sample/server/src/main/resources/ssl/server_cert_key_combo.pem:1 — private-key detected.
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
Warning — 67 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×17
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — ajv 8.12.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.18.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.13
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — follow-redirects 1.15.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.6
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — follow-redirects 1.15.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.4
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — follow-redirects 1.15.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — http-proxy-middleware 2.0.9: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.0.10
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.2.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.1.1
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — launch-editor 2.11.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.14.1
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.18.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.17.23
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — micromatch 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.8
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.2
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — postcss 8.5.10: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.5.23
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — qs 6.11.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.14.1
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — qs 6.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.15.2
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] kotlin-js-store/yarn.lock — serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.0.5
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×9
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) samples/wire-grpc-sample/client/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/whiteboard/MainActivity.kt:74 — samples/wire-grpc-sample/client/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/whiteboard/MainActivity.kt:74-85 | samples/wire-grpc-sample/client/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/whiteboard/MainActivity.kt:120-131
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:738 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:738-749 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:759-770
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1187 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1187-1198 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1200-1211
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1286 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1286-1297 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1299-1310
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1649 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1649-1660 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1665-1676
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:251 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:251-262 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:288-299
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:288 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:288-299 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:312-323
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-schema/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/EmittingRules.kt:61 — wire-schema/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/EmittingRules.kt:61-72 | wire-schema/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/EmittingRules.kt:89-100
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) wire-schema/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/PruningRules.kt:143 — wire-schema/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/PruningRules.kt:143-154 | wire-schema/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/PruningRules.kt:181-192
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×7
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:3143 — wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:3143-3155 | wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:3217-3229
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1438 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1438-1450 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1457-1469
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ReverseProtoWriter.kt:225 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ReverseProtoWriter.kt:225-237 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ReverseProtoWriter.kt:241-253
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ReverseProtoWriter.kt:249 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ReverseProtoWriter.kt:249-260 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ReverseProtoWriter.kt:261-273
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt:1323 — wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt:1323-1335 | wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt:1411-1422
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1004 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1004-1016 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1044-1056
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1027 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1027-1039 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1142-1154
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×5
  • Medium: exported_activity samples/android-app-java-sample/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:12 — The application exports an activity. Any application on the device can launch the exported activity which may compromise the integrity of your application or its data. Ensure that any exported activities do not have privileged access to your application's control plane.
  • Medium: exported_activity samples/android-app-kotlin-minsdk-sample/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:12 — The application exports an activity. Any application on the device can launch the exported activity which may compromise the integrity of your application or its data. Ensure that any exported activities do not have privileged access to your application's control plane.
  • Medium: exported_activity samples/android-app-kotlin-sample/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:12 — The application exports an activity. Any application on the device can launch the exported activity which may compromise the integrity of your application or its data. Ensure that any exported activities do not have privileged access to your application's control plane.
  • Medium: exported_activity samples/android-app-variants-sample/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:11 — The application exports an activity. Any application on the device can launch the exported activity which may compromise the integrity of your application or its data. Ensure that any exported activities do not have privileged access to your application's control plane.
  • Medium: exported_activity samples/wire-grpc-sample/client/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:13 — The application exports an activity. Any application on the device can launch the exported activity which may compromise the integrity of your application or its data. Ensure that any exported activities do not have privileged access to your application's control plane.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×4
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) wire-golden-files/src/main/kotlin/squareup/protos/opaque_types/OuterOpaqueType.kt:162 — wire-golden-files/src/main/kotlin/squareup/protos/opaque_types/OuterOpaqueType.kt:162-177 | wire-golden-files/src/main/kotlin/squareup/protos/opaque_types/OuterOpaqueType.kt:253-268
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:2638 — wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:2638-2653 | wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:2695-2710
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoWriter.kt:152 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoWriter.kt:152-159 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoWriter.kt:165-180
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1121 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1121-1136 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1193-1208
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×4
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:72 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:72-81 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:91-100
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:213 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:213-222 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:240-249
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:478 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:478-487 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:514-523
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:680 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:680-689 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:702-711
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×3
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:970 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:970-988 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:998-1012
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt:701 — wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt:701-719 | wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt:722-740
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt:1169 — wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt:1169-1187 | wire-swift-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/swift/SwiftGenerator.kt:1222-1238
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×3
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:739 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:739-747 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:753-761
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1061 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1061-1069 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1157-1165
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1078 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1078-1086 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:1174-1182
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:2607 — wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:2607-2620 | wire-kotlin-generator/src/main/java/com/squareup/wire/kotlin/KotlinGenerator.kt:2663-2676
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:328 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:328-341 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:346-354
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:528 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:528-538 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:628-638
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:229 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:229-239 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/internal/Internal.kt:240-250
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1603 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1603-1610 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:1616-1623
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:122 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:122-129 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:130-137
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (0 author(s) across 0 commit(s) sampled).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (57 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (57 lines × 2) wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:881 — wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:881-890 | wire-tests/wire-json-shared-kotlin-tests/com/squareup/wire/WireJsonTest.kt:917-973
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/Message.kt:58 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/Message.kt:58-84 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/Message.kt:94-122
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (26 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (26 lines × 4) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:496 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:496-521 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:546-571 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:596-621 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:646-671
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) wire-schema/src/jvmMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/internal/JvmLanguages.kt:115 — wire-schema/src/jvmMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/internal/JvmLanguages.kt:115-132 | wire-schema/src/jvmMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/schema/internal/JvmLanguages.kt:141-158
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 5) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 5) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:411 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:411-425 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:509-523 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:559-573 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:609-623 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:659-673
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:872 — wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:872-886 | wire-runtime/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/squareup/wire/ProtoAdapter.kt:896-910
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · single-commit history · ×1
  • single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots: a single-commit clone exposes no history window, so the churn × complexity hotspot signal is unavailable — not scored for this run.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (0 commit(s) sampled).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .9artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .28artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)—dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .65artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fd986-1dcd-74ad-8cc1-ae0714a15976 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 67 · Warnings: 67 · Recommendations: 7 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 00:01 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md