Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
supabase/realtime carries serious gaps (63%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (97%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (87%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (57%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (58%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 3 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation); 4 Secret finding(s) (Secrets (history)).
For scale: Medium (~31,869 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.5 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (97%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
87%
Strong
Architecture
97% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
70%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
57%
Adequate · gated by D13
Security
58%
Adequate · gated by D28, D36
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 57% · 47% weightSecurity 58% · 26% weightMaturity 70% · 14% weightCode Health 87% · 8% weightArchitecture 97% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 57 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 63 → ~67.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (4+)
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €26,000–€130,000
| Cost to rebuild | €26,000–€130,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.9× (at 63% quality) |
| Size & shape | Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.5 person-years of build effort (about ~€78,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 57% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.exs (2), config.exs.
2
Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with broadcast_single_controller.ex, tenant_controller.ex, broadcast_controller.ex.
3
Resolve the 3 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with lint.yml, prod_build.yml, update-supabase-js.yml.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Medium asset (~0.5 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 57%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.exs (2), config.exs. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 8 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 6 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 3 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 3 | Medium |
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the three leaked secrets in the codebase, specifically in secrets.exs and config.exs, followed by addressing the four historical secret findings in the controller files. Next, establish a centralized architecture decision record system to document significant design choices and their consequences. Finally, improve project discoverability by adding a testing section to the root README and resolving the three high-priority static analysis findings in the CI configuration files.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.exs (2), config.exs. | +7.0 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with broadcast_single_controller.ex, tenant_controller.ex, broadcast_controller.ex. | +3.1 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Resolve the 3 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with lint.yml, prod_build.yml, update-supabase-js.yml. | +1.8 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +3.3 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite. | +2.9 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). | +0.9 pts | Low | IaC & Container Security |
| Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. | +0.9 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
| Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. | +0.9 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dockerfile | 1.9 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| bench/secrets.exs | 3.0 | Slop | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: jwt |
| lib/realtime_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex | 5.7 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: jwt |
| mix.lock | 6.3 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] |
| lib/realtime/tenants/authorization.ex | 7.0 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) |
| lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex | 7.1 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: RealtimeChannel.join (cyclomatic 18) |
| config/config.exs | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret |
| lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_single_controller.ex | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: jwt |
| lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_controller.ex | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: jwt |
| .github/workflows/lint.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/prod_build.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: secrets-inherit |
| .github/workflows/update-supabase-js.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex | 7.4 | Mixed | God Classes: TooManyMethods: Shard |
| forum/lib/forum/muster.ex | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Muster.start_link (cyclomatic 24) |
| forum/lib/forum/muster/scope.ex | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: FileTooLong: muster/scope.ex |
| lib/realtime_web/dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: TooManyMethods: TenantMigrations |
| lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/oid_database.ex | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) |
| lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) |
| lib/realtime/api/message.ex | 7.8 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Change coupling: message.ex ↔ migrations.ex |
| lib/realtime/api/tenant.ex | 8.0 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: tenant.ex ↔ tenant_view.ex |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 32 of 33 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 33 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D16D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R2R3R5R6R7R8R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 53 of 68 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Muster.start_link at 24. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being OidDatabase.name_for_type_id at 138 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
Muster.start_link (cyclomatic 24)forum/lib/forum/muster.ex:97
RealtimeChannel.join (cyclomatic 18)lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:43
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Muster.start_link at 23.
Muster.start_link (cognitive 23)forum/lib/forum/muster.ex:97
RealtimeChannel.join (cognitive 20)lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:43
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D3 · God Classes
10 god class(es) detected.
FileTooLong: muster/scope.ex forum/lib/forum/muster/scope.ex:0
TooManyMethods: Scope forum/lib/forum/muster/scope.ex:1
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D4 · Code Duplication
10 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (43 lines × 2) lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260707120000_restrict_realtime_schema.ex:7
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex:434
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/realtime/tenants/authorization.ex:93
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/oid_database.ex:37
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/oid_database.ex:161
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D13 · Secret Scanning
3 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/config.exs:21
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.exs (2), config.exs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
Top hotspots: test/e2e/realtime-check.ts (23×15=345); lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex (4×18=72)
Hotspot: test/e2e/realtime-check.ts test/e2e/realtime-check.ts
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D16 · Bus Factor
14 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/realtime_web/dashboard/recon_trace.ex.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
9 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: jwt lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_single_controller.ex:30
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with broadcast_single_controller.ex, tenant_controller.ex, broadcast_controller.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/lint.yml:84
What to do
- Resolve the 3 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with lint.yml, prod_build.yml, update-supabase-js.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 5 medium, 0 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
Medium IaC: DS-0013 Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
3 of 112 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/realtime_web/live/components.ex.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
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D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: broadcast_policies.ex↔presence_policies.ex 100%; authorization.ex↔broadcast_policies.ex 69%; authorization.ex↔presence_policies.ex 64%
Boundary-crossing change coupling: tenant.ex ↔ tenant_view.ex lib/realtime/api/tenant.ex
Change coupling: message.ex ↔ migrations.ex lib/realtime/api/message.ex
Change coupling clique: authorization.ex, broadcast_policies.ex, presence_policies.exlib/realtime/tenants/authorization.ex
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
Unpinned build actions
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 3 medium, 0 low.
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 1 of 2 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
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P6 · Release Hygiene
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R1 · Type Safety
- 3 typed · 2 plain JS — the untyped files are assets/js/app.js, priv/static/worker.js.
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
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R10 · Code Duplication
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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. — realtime-check.ts:2005
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R3 · Large Files
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R5 · Dependency Freshness
What to do
- Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
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R6 · Tooling
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R7 · Dead Code
- 2 file(s) (~323 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: assets/js/app.js imports '../vendor/topbar', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — assets
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R8 · Dependency Hygiene
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R9 · Circular Imports
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 87% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 97% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 70% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 57% | Adequate — gated by D13 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 58% | Adequate — gated by D28, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~36758 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ex, .exs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ex, .exs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (28 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R4 Test Coverage — 3 test file(s) reach none of 2 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 14 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: jwt lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_single_controller.ex:30
- Secret: jwt lib/realtime_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex:281
- Secret: jwt lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_controller.ex:23
- Secret: jwt bench/secrets.exs:5
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/config.exs:21
- Leaked secret: jwt bench/secrets.exs:5
- Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret bench/secrets.exs:7
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/lint.yml:84
- High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/prod_build.yml:182
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/update-supabase-js.yml:55
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfile
D35 · Change Coupling
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: tenant.ex ↔ tenant_view.ex lib/realtime/api/tenant.ex
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: runtime.exs ↔ gen_rpc.ex config/runtime.exs
Warning — 42 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes
- FileTooLong: muster/scope.ex forum/lib/forum/muster/scope.ex:0
- FileTooLong: channels/realtime_channel.ex lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:0
- FileTooLong: dashboard/recon_trace.ex lib/realtime_web/dashboard/recon_trace.ex:0
- FileTooLong: dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex lib/realtime_web/dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex:0
- FileTooLong: muster/shard.ex forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex:0
D3 · God Classes
- TooManyMethods: Scope forum/lib/forum/muster/scope.ex:1
- TooManyMethods: Shard forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex:1
- TooManyMethods: RealtimeChannel lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:1
- TooManyMethods: TenantMigrations lib/realtime_web/dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex:1
- TooManyMethods: Tenants lib/realtime/tenants.ex:1
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: message.ex ↔ migrations.ex lib/realtime/api/message.ex
- Change coupling: message.ex ↔ replication_connection.ex lib/realtime/api/message.ex
- Change coupling: cdc_rls.ex ↔ supervisor.ex lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/cdc_rls.ex
- Change coupling: tenant_controller.ex ↔ tenant_view.ex lib/realtime_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex
- Change coupling: app.js ↔ conn_component.ex assets/js/app.js
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0013 Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 Dockerfile:42
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile:1
- Medium IaC: CKV2_DOCKER_1 Dockerfile:112
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock
- Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock
- Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- Hotspot: test/e2e/realtime-check.ts test/e2e/realtime-check.ts
- Hotspot: lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (43 lines × 2) lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260707120000_restrict_realtime_schema.ex:7
- Duplicated block (43 lines × 2) lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:26
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex:434
- Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) lib/realtime/monitoring/peep/partitioned.ex:56
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/realtime/tenants/authorization.ex:93
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:474
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Muster.start_link (cyclomatic 24) forum/lib/forum/muster.ex:97
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- RealtimeChannel.join (cyclomatic 18) lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:43
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Muster.start_link (cognitive 23) forum/lib/forum/muster.ex:97
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- RealtimeChannel.join (cognitive 20) lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:43
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling clique: authorization.ex, broadcast_policies.ex, presence_policies.ex lib/realtime/tenants/authorization.ex
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Unpinned build actions
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/oid_database.ex:37
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/oid_database.ex:161
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/conn_component.ex:71
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:93
Recommendation — 10 finding(s)
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D16 · Bus Factor
- Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No build provenance
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No artifact signing
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No SBOM
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 9 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 3 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 8 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 3 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |