Public report of supabase/realtime, published 22 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 22 October 2026, 23:58 UTC · Survey ID cd_77b66e1a598048d381129c575a9c45e2
supabase/realtime
Measured 22 October 2026, 23:54 UTC, at code version 6d2e13c
Regression: 1 dimension fell since the last survey
A regression is a drop of 0.5 points or more in the score, or of 2.5 or more out of 10 in a dimension, since the last survey.
CAI scoreAdequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Down 4 since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A medium codebase: 38,495 lines of product code in 3 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.6 person-years · Weakest lens: Security and Compliance, 46
Findings by how serious they are
37 critical105 serious44 minor
11 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
22 October 2026, 23:54 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
75of 79 dimensions measured by tools. The other 4 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
162of 186 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 24 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
79dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 38,495 lines of product code in 3 projects.
supabase/realtime scores 53 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, while six of its seven lenses score higher still: Performance at 97, rated Exemplary, and Architecture at 82, Maturity at 69, Production Readiness at 59, Code Health at 58 and Accessibility at 55, all rated Adequate.
The score is lower than those six because the weakest lens counts most, and here that is Security and Compliance, which scores 46 and is rated Weak. Its Supply-chain Provenance & Signing dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Security and Compliance can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to stop accepting every TLS certificate: delete `verify: :verify_none` (hackney's `insecure: true`, a `verify_fun` that answers `{:valid, _}`, a `match_fun` that returns `true`) so the chain, hostname and expiry are verified, and trust a self-signed or private server by giving the client its CA (`cacertfile:`, `cacerts:`) — never by switching verification off and to resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST), and if Security and Compliance rose to 70, the score would rise from 53 to about 59.
37 findings are critical: eight in REDACTED Scanning, seven in Static Analysis (SAST), six in Secrets (history), five in Forms & labels, four in IaC & Container Security, three in Web-Security Posture, one in ARIA correctness, one in Change Coupling, one in Page structure and one in Test Quality.
Watchdog couldn't measure 11 dimensions in this code, among them Code Coverage, Test Distribution and Test Reliability, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 38,495 lines, which would take an estimated 0.6 person-years, around €87,000, to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Web-Security Posture · Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant REDACTED
Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Fixed since the last survey: 8 findings
These 8 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 8 October 2026, and are gone from this one.
Web-Security Posture · Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant config/config.exs
Rebuild cost: about €87,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€29,000 to €150,000, for 482 to 1,528 hours of work, about 0.6 person-years for 1 to 2 engineers
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 53. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Medium: 38,495 lines of product code
How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Stop accepting every TLS certificate: delete `verify: :verify_none` (hackney's `insecure: true`, a `verify_fun` that answers `{:valid, _}`, a `match_fun` that returns `true`) so the chain, hostname and expiry are verified, and trust a self-signed or private server by giving the client its CA (`cacertfile:`, `cacerts:`) — never by switching verification off.
This repository constructs a TLS client that accepts any certificate at 2 sites, not one: `config/runtime.exs:182` (`verify: :verify_none`), `lib/realtime/database.ex:88` (`verify: :verify_none`). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €87,000 to build again, about 0.6 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Security and Compliance, at 46 (Weak). Security and Compliance is about how well the product is protected, and how it handles personal data. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Security and Compliance also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Security and Compliance grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Security and Compliance actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Stop accepting every TLS certificate: delete `verify: :verify_none` (hackney's `insecure: true`, a `verify_fun` that answers `{:valid, _}`, a `match_fun` that returns `true`) so the chain, hostname and expiry are verified, and trust a self-signed or private server by giving the client its CA (`cacertfile:`, `cacerts:`) — never by switching verification off. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 7 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.
81 modules, with 16 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.
The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 41 more are left out to keep it readable.
Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
RealtimeWeb.InspectorLive uses (global), so a change to (global) can break RealtimeWeb.InspectorLive, while a change to RealtimeWeb.InspectorLive can't break (global).
Position
Below the diagonal: RealtimeWeb.InspectorLive uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in RealtimeWeb.StatusLive uses a type in (global).
The types involved
RealtimeWeb.StatusLive.Index → RealtimeWeb
Direction
RealtimeWeb.StatusLive uses (global), so a change to (global) can break RealtimeWeb.StatusLive, while a change to RealtimeWeb.StatusLive can't break (global).
Position
Below the diagonal: RealtimeWeb.StatusLive uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
test.e2e.src uses test.e2e.src.helpers, so a change to test.e2e.src.helpers can break test.e2e.src, while a change to test.e2e.src can't break test.e2e.src.helpers.
Position
Below the diagonal: test.e2e.src uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Extensions.PostgresCdcRls uses Realtime, so a change to Realtime can break Extensions.PostgresCdcRls, while a change to Extensions.PostgresCdcRls can't break Realtime.
Position
Below the diagonal: Extensions.PostgresCdcRls uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in Realtime.PromEx.Plugins uses a type in Realtime.
The types involved
Realtime.PromEx.Plugins.Presence → Realtime.Logs
Direction
Realtime.PromEx.Plugins uses Realtime, so a change to Realtime can break Realtime.PromEx.Plugins, while a change to Realtime.PromEx.Plugins can't break Realtime.
Position
Below the diagonal: Realtime.PromEx.Plugins uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Realtime.Tenants.ReplicationConnection uses Realtime, so a change to Realtime can break Realtime.Tenants.ReplicationConnection, while a change to Realtime.Tenants.ReplicationConnection can't break Realtime.
Position
Below the diagonal: Realtime.Tenants.ReplicationConnection uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
RealtimeWeb.Dashboard uses Realtime, so a change to Realtime can break RealtimeWeb.Dashboard, while a change to RealtimeWeb.Dashboard can't break Realtime.
Position
Below the diagonal: RealtimeWeb.Dashboard uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
RealtimeWeb.RealtimeChannel uses Realtime, so a change to Realtime can break RealtimeWeb.RealtimeChannel, while a change to RealtimeWeb.RealtimeChannel can't break Realtime.
Position
Below the diagonal: RealtimeWeb.RealtimeChannel uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
RealtimeWeb uses RealtimeWeb.RealtimeChannel, so a change to RealtimeWeb.RealtimeChannel can break RealtimeWeb, while a change to RealtimeWeb can't break RealtimeWeb.RealtimeChannel.
Position
Below the diagonal: RealtimeWeb uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health · 58% · Adequate · gated by R3 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures
15
High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration
15
High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection
7
High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
7
Medium
Roadmap
Immediately disable insecure TLS verification across all client connections by enforcing strict certificate validation and trusting only authorized certificate authorities. Resolve all static analysis findings related to SQL injection risks in replication logic, and eliminate high-severity secrets exposed in configuration files, Docker artifacts, and database exports. Finally, remove all leaked secrets from test and development environment files to prevent unauthorized access.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Stop accepting every TLS certificate: delete `verify: :verify_none` (hackney's `insecure: true`, a `verify_fun` that answers `{:valid, _}`, a `match_fun` that returns `true`) so the chain, hostname and expiry are verified, and trust a self-signed or private server by giving the client its CA (`cacertfile:`, `cacerts:`) — never by switching verification off. This repository constructs a TLS client that accepts any certificate at 2 sites, not one: `config/runtime.exs:182` (`verify: :verify_none`), `lib/realtime/database.ex:88` (`verify: :verify_none`). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines)
REDACTED
7.2
Mixed
REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Mixed
REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Mixed
Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Mixed
Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Mixed
Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/decoder.ex
7.3
Mixed
Explicit Debt: TodoComment
How the grades work
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 37
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 105
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 44
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 11
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 75 of 79 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 79 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 162 of 186 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: this repository's production source spans .ex, and our analyzer cannot run the .ex test suite(s) — so no coverage was collected for the repository as a whole. The JavaScript/TypeScript half did build and run, and its own line coverage came back at 100.0% — but that is a figure for one half of the product, and we do not publish a partial one as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. In the meantime, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures and real coverage will be read. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then both halves are read on the next scan.
D9 Test Distribution — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test distribution NOT SCORED: this repository's production source spans more than one ecosystem, and the test-pyramid census cannot read the .ex test suite(s) — so the pyramid was not measured for the repository as a whole. The suites we could count came back with 74 test method(s) (8 unit, 3 integration, 0 BDD, 63 e2e), but that is a shape for one part of the product and we do not publish a partial pyramid as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — test distribution is excluded from the score rather than counted.
D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 74 test(s) behind this row are the ones the JavaScript/TypeScript census could read, and this repository also carries at least 187 test source file(s) (.exs, .ex) that it cannot: it reads JavaScript/TypeScript test declarations off disk, so a JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability NOT SCORED: this repository's production source includes .ex, and the built-in reliability runner cannot re-run the .ex test suite(s) — so reliability was not measured for the repository as a whole. The JavaScript/TypeScript (node:test via `npm ci --ignore-scripts` in assets/ (8 tests)): measured (0 flaky) suite(s) did re-run, and came back with 0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s) — but that is a figure for one half of the product, and we do not publish a partial one as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — test reliability is excluded from the score rather than counted.
D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its Hex package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (compose.yml). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — tenant_db Pulling realtime_db Pulling realtime_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden tenant_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: realtime Skipped - No image to be pulled realtime_db Skipped - Image is already being pulled by tenant_db tenant_db Pulling tenant_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found, and this repository's Elixir is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift and Dart), and its Elixir source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D26, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
3 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Muster.start_link at 30. A further 3 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being OidDatabase.name_for_type_id at 138 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 3 files carry no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of their over-threshold functions was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/oid_database.ex (OidDatabase.name_for_type_id at 138), lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/event_log_component.ex (EventLogComponent.event_label at 25), lib/realtime/nodes.ex (Nodes.default_region_mapping at 19). They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.
Bring the 3 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with Muster.start_link (cyclomatic 30), initRealtime (cyclomatic 30), RealtimeChannel.join (cyclomatic 19). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.0 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Bring the 6 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with initRealtime (cognitive 37), Muster.start_link (cognitive 29), RealtimeChannel.join (cognitive 26). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 6 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.6 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.0 / 10Stronggated by 8 serious findings✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 5 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with scope.ex, realtime_channel.ex, recon_trace.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 TooManyFunctions finding(s) in God Classes — start with tenants.ex, api.ex, index.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
14 duplicated block group(s) detected. A further 2 rows report members as variants of one another; they aggregate block groups already counted above and are not themselves counted.
+ 9 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with cache.ex, distributed.ex, jwt_verification.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with distributed.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with 20241030150047_messages_partitioning.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
2 production modules (OTP), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 1 module(s) off the main sequence.
Off the main sequence: forum
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D10 · Test Quality7.2 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 13 zero-assertion, 3 synchronised by a fixed sleep, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 74 tests. Measured on the JavaScript/TypeScript suite only — at least 187 test source file(s) (.exs, .ex) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.
No assertions (empty test): postgres changes system message latencytest/e2e/src/suites/load-postgres-changes.ts:14
No assertions: user is able to receive self broadcast · ×12test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:30
Fixed-sleep synchronisation: user is able to receive self broadcast · ×3test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:30
What to do
Resolve the 12 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with tests.ts (10), connection.ts, authorization.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with load-postgres-changes.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Fixed-sleep synchronisation finding(s) in Test Quality — start with tests.ts (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
6 outdated, 0 retired direct Hex dependencies, 0 pinning defect(s). Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a Hex app name does not determine the modules it provides (`ecto_sql` provides Ecto.Adapters.SQL), and a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source, so absence of a reference is not evidence of an unused dependency. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
Outdated: esbuild · ×6
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
8 secret(s) detected. 1 detection(s) on lines whose every credible literal is a keyboard-row or short-ascending-run composition (`1234567890abcdef`) were excluded — a value a hand typed for a documentation example was never minted, and there is no issuer at which it could be revoked.
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
Enforce REDACTED Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 82 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's REDACTED closed over the declarations its mix.exs files do not gate behind `only:`. Packages it asks for ONLY under `only: [:dev, :test]` (or any other non-prod environment, such as `:docs`) are excluded: they are not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release. A further 4 package(s) the closure reaches resolve from git, a path or a local override and publish no licence this pass can read; they are outside this verdict. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's Hex package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Top hotspots: lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex (23×19=437); test/e2e/src/orchestrator.ts (3×17=51); lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/event_log_component.ex (2×25=50) Repeated repair below the complexity floor: lib/realtime/tenants/migrations.ex (8 of 12 changes were fixes); lib/realtime/application.ex (7 of 12 changes were fixes); lib/realtime/database.ex (5 of 8 changes were fixes)
Resolve the 15 Repeated repair finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with migrations.ex, application.ex, database.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with realtime_channel.ex, orchestrator.ts, event_log_component.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
14 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is forum/lib/forum/muster/scope.ex. Counted over 132 of the 320 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
8 deducted task-comment markers across 38495 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
TodoComment · ×7.dialyzer_ignore.exs:1
FixmeCommenttest/integration/tests.ts:191
What to do
Resolve the 7 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with decoder.ex (2), .dialyzer_ignore.exs, tenant.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 FixmeComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with tests.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The repository's root README (Supabase Realtime) is clear and complete for a product-level overview: it shows the logo, a status badge with license and coverage, a table of features by version, links to examples/feature-requests/bug-templates, and an outline that all sections exist. The dev directories' READMEs are focused on their own tiers (bench/postgres/scripts) rather than the repository, so they do not fall under the root's scope. The architecture document is a comprehensive tour of Realtime's structure plus glossary and flow, with each section present in the outline. All visible content is clear; no defects.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
1 of 3 build units (Mix, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion
What to do
Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 3 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 2 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 6 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 2 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.
Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 7 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (6), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
14 of 132 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220615214548_add_quoted_regtypes_backward_compatibility_support.ex. Counted over 132 of the 320 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
Resolve the 1 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with tenant.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with cdc_rls.ex, metrics_controller.ex, app.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Change-coupling hub finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with mix.exs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — lib/realtime_web/live/status_live/index.html.heex:43
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×3) — lib/realtime_web/live/status_live/index.html.heex:51, lib/realtime_web/live/status_live/index.html.heex:93, lib/realtime_web/live/status_live/index.html.heex:138
A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. — lib/realtime_web/templates/layout/app.html.heex:4
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — lib/realtime_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — lib/realtime_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
aria-hidden="true" here hides the subtree from assistive tech, but a focusable descendant stays in the tab order — a keyboard user can land on a control screen readers can't see. Add inert, take the descendants out of the tab order (tabindex="-1"), or drop aria-hidden. — lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/conn_component.html.heex:256
What to do
Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.
No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over your pages. Add an accessibility checker (axe-core, pa11y or Lighthouse) over your HTML in CI and fail the build on new violations. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 7 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain you already use: add `jsx-a11y` to the `plugins` array in your oxlint config (its a11y rules are off until the plugin is listed), then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 1 of 2 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README.md names `supabase/postgres`, but no file or folder `supabase/postgres` exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:73
README.md names Postgres 14, but the manifest declares `postgres` ^3.4.9. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:78
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README.md names `supabase/postgres`, but no file or folder `supabase/postgres` exists; README.md names Postgres 14, but the manifest declares `postgres` ^3.4.9.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Dependabot is configured but does not watch `github-actions`, `npm` — add those `package-ecosystem` entries to .github/dependabot.yml so those dependencies get the same automatic update and advisory pressure as the ones it already covers.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
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P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
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R1 · Type Safety8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.
Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
runSuites has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — test/e2e/src/orchestrator.ts:29
cleanPayload has cyclomatic complexity 15 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/js/app.js:37
initRealtime has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 13; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/js/app.js:147
apply has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/js/app.js:382
signIn has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/js/app.js:455
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R3 · Large Files0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
assets/js/app.js has 453 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — assets/js/app.js:1
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
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R4 · Test Coverage3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×2) — assets/js/app.js:1, priv/static/worker.js:1
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
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R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
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R7 · Dead Code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
This top-level declaration is not exported and its name occurs nowhere else in its module — not called, read, typed against, re-exported or named by a string. Nothing outside the module can reach a non-exported binding, so this is the whole search: remove it, or use it. — test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:439
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Read from this repository's Elixir source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. This repository serves HTTP itself (lib/realtime_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`), so its Elixir source was also read for the server controls: TLS served or HSTS set, security response headers, cookie flags and inbound validation — each credited where its Elixir spelling appears in production source, not proven on every route. A router that plugs Phoenix's `put_secure_browser_headers` is credited the headers Phoenix sends by default (`content-security-policy` from Phoenix 1.8, `x-frame-options` before it, as the `REDACTED` pins), and a cookie Plug sets the HttpOnly flag it sets by default.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.
`verify: :verify_none` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the override so the peer is verified — `verify: :verify_peer` is what `:ssl`, Mint, Finch, Req and hackney use when nothing is set (OTP 26 and later default to it). Give it the trust roots to check against: `cacerts: :public_key.cacerts_get()` (OTP 25+) or the `CAStore` package's `cacertfile: CAStore.file_path()`, with `customize_hostname_check: [match_fun: :public_key.pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(:https)]` so the hostname is checked too. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `cacertfile:`/`cacerts:`, which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. (×2) — config/runtime.exs:182, lib/realtime/database.ex:88
`jwt_secret` is the secret key and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash. — REDACTED:180
This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Elixir source or production configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (an endpoint's `https: [...]`, `scheme: :https`, `Plug.Cowboy.https`, SiteEncrypt), no `force_ssl:` or `plug Plug.SSL` redirecting to HTTPS and sending HSTS, no `strict-transport-security` header, no `rewrite_on: [:x_forwarded_proto]` or `x-forwarded-proto` read for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: lib/realtime_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
Set: Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies. Missing: Strict-Transport-Security — the four headers that carry the points of this card's security-headers term (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options), 0.5 each.(−0.5 on this card.) The server: lib/realtime_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
What to do
Stop accepting every TLS certificate: delete `verify: :verify_none` (hackney's `insecure: true`, a `verify_fun` that answers `{:valid, _}`, a `match_fun` that returns `true`) so the chain, hostname and expiry are verified, and trust a self-signed or private server by giving the client its CA (`cacertfile:`, `cacerts:`) — never by switching verification off. This repository constructs a TLS client that accepts any certificate at 2 sites, not one: `config/runtime.exs:182` (`verify: :verify_none`), `lib/realtime/database.ex:88` (`verify: :verify_none`). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations.
Secure the server's transport: set `force_ssl: [rewrite_on: [:x_forwarded_proto], hsts: true]` on the endpoint in `config/prod.exs` (Plug.SSL redirects to HTTPS and sends `Strict-Transport-Security`; `rewrite_on` trusts the TLS-terminating proxy in front of it), or serve TLS itself with the endpoint's `https: [port: 443, cipher_suite: :strong, keyfile: …, certfile: …]`.
Add Strict-Transport-Security beside the headers the Elixir server already sets.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether async functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on an AbortSignal (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 0/2 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
`diagnose` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — assets/js/app.js:102
`signIn` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — assets/js/app.js:455
What to do
Thread an AbortSignal through async functions that make requests, so the work stops when its caller gives up.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.
Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (18%; ≈20% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 45 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 4 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not included — 50 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes; this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Elixir processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — no exported interface declares behaviour
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — tenant_db Pulling realtime_db Pulling realtime_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden tenant_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: realtime Skipped - No image to be pulled realtime_db Skipped - Image is already being pulled by tenant_db tenant_db Pulling tenant_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (Ecto, Postgrex, MyXQL, Mongo, EventStore, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not scored — polyglot repository, one half has no runner
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.ex), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — polyglot repository, one half has no runner
D9 Test Distribution — Test distribution not scored — polyglot repository, one half's tests are uncountable
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (11 value object(s))
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 2 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: Elixir runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Elixir processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Elixir's `nil` is an atom in a dynamically typed language: `@spec`s are checked by an external analysis that has no nullability operator, so there is no null-typed discipline in the language to adopt. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <select> without a programmatic label · ×3
<select> without a programmatic label lib/realtime_web/live/status_live/index.html.heex:51— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<select> without a programmatic label lib/realtime_web/live/status_live/index.html.heex:93— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<select> without a programmatic label lib/realtime_web/live/status_live/index.html.heex:138— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
TLS certificate validation disabled config/runtime.exs:182— `verify: :verify_none` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the override so the peer is verified — `verify: :verify_peer` is what `:ssl`, Mint, Finch, Req and hackney use when nothing is set (OTP 26 and later default to it). Give it the trust roots to check against: `cacerts: :public_key.cacerts_get()` (OTP 25+) or the `CAStore` package's `cacertfile: CAStore.file_path()`, with `customize_hostname_check: [match_fun: :public_key.pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(:https)]` so the hostname is checked too. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `cacertfile:`/`cacerts:`, which keeps the chain and hostname checks on.
TLS certificate validation disabled lib/realtime/database.ex:88— `verify: :verify_none` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the override so the peer is verified — `verify: :verify_peer` is what `:ssl`, Mint, Finch, Req and hackney use when nothing is set (OTP 26 and later default to it). Give it the trust roots to check against: `cacerts: :public_key.cacerts_get()` (OTP 25+) or the `CAStore` package's `cacertfile: CAStore.file_path()`, with `customize_hostname_check: [match_fun: :public_key.pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(:https)]` so the hostname is checked too. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `cacertfile:`/`cacerts:`, which keeps the chain and hostname checks on.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <input> without a programmatic label · ×1
<input> without a programmatic label lib/realtime_web/live/status_live/index.html.heex:43— This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
AC2 · Forms & labels· Link with no accessible name · ×1
Link with no accessible name lib/realtime_web/templates/layout/app.html.heex:4— A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label.
AC3 · Page structure· Document without a <title> · ×1
Document without a <title> lib/realtime_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2— A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>.
AC5 · ARIA correctness· aria-hidden hides a focusable element · ×1
aria-hidden hides a focusable element lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/conn_component.html.heex:256— aria-hidden="true" here hides the subtree from assistive tech, but a focusable descendant stays in the tab order — a keyboard user can land on a control screen readers can't see. Add inert, take the descendants out of the tab order (tabindex="-1"), or drop aria-hidden.
D10 · Test Quality· No assertions (empty test) · ×1
No assertions (empty test): postgres changes system message latency test/e2e/src/suites/load-postgres-changes.ts:14— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: tenant.ex ↔ tenant_view.ex lib/realtime/api/tenant.ex:1— `lib/realtime/api/tenant.ex` (context realtime) and `lib/realtime_web/views/tenant_view.ex` (context realtime_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 64% of the time (7 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `5cfea1f6` fix: tenant flag for presence (#1739); `896e844b` fix: per tenant presence limit settings (#1710); `d7e63906` feat: expose additional limits for tenant endpoints (#695) — run `git show` on any of them.
S1 · Web-Security Posture· Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant · ×1
Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant REDACTED:180— `jwt_secret` is the secret key and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime/tenants/migrations.ex lib/realtime/tenants/migrations.ex:210— lib/realtime/tenants/migrations.ex changed 12 times in last 90 days and 8 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 6 (its worst body is Migrations.migrate at line 210), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: replay messages sent in one transaction in send order (#2202)”; “fix: improve authorize function for read checks (#2368)”; “fix: pg changes committed behind a synchronous standby (#2272)”; “fix(migrations): ensure base grants on realtime.messages (#2284)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime/tenants/migrations.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime/application.ex lib/realtime/application.ex:29— lib/realtime/application.ex changed 12 times in last 90 days and 7 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 8 (its worst body is Application.start at line 29), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: replace tracker with a Socket level check (#2363)”; “fix: fixes boot ordering of presence usage poller (#2370)”; “fix: start PubSub after Muster (#2267)”; “chore(lint): Switch to credo strict mode, fix violations (#2200)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime/application.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime/database.ex lib/realtime/database.ex:400— lib/realtime/database.ex changed 8 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 13 (its worst body is Database.pool_size_by_application_name at line 400), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: pg changes committed behind a synchronous standby (#2272)”; “fix: tear down every realtime replication slot, not only a single one (#2247)”; “fix: don't log negative `DatabaseLackOfConnections` (#2156)”; “fix: update watch dog to check if slot is active (#2122)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime/database.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime_web/channels/user_socket.ex lib/realtime_web/channels/user_socket.ex:100— lib/realtime_web/channels/user_socket.ex changed 5 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 6 (its worst body is UserSocket.connect at line 100), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: replace tracker with a Socket level check (#2363)”; “fix(auth): support tenants that only have a jwt_jwks (#2237)”; “chore(lint): Switch to credo strict mode, fix violations (#2200)”; “fix: bump phoenix (#2082)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime_web/channels/user_socket.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime/tenants/connect.ex lib/realtime/tenants/connect.ex:98— lib/realtime/tenants/connect.ex changed 5 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 7 (its worst body is Connect.lookup_or_start_connection at line 98), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: dont delay Connect shutdown(#2212)”; “chore(lint): Switch to credo strict mode, fix violations (#2200)”; “fix: faster tests (#2094)”; “fix: resilient connect pool (#2072)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime/tenants/connect.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/tenant.ex lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/tenant.ex:305— lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/tenant.ex changed 6 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 5 (its worst body is Tenant.poller_stop_tags at line 305), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: report zero connections on vacant tenants (#2166)”; “fix: even better buckets! 🪣 (#2165)”; “fix: use a better split of buckets for metrics (#2164)”; “fix: feature flag fanout tenant metric (#2051)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/tenant.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime_web/dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex lib/realtime_web/dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex:625— lib/realtime_web/dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 6 (its worst body is TenantMigrations.read_plan at line 625), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(dashboard): repair schema_migrations primary key on backfill (#2303)”; “fix(admin): cancel pgdelta (#2264)”; “fix: remove lumis and improve cli testing (#2121)”; “fix: pgdelta connection issues (#2103)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime_web/dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/subscription_manager.ex lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/subscription_manager.ex:79— lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/subscription_manager.ex changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 7 (its worst body is SubscriptionManager.handle_continue at line 79), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: reduce queue target on subs pool (#2276)”; “fix: set statement timeout for Subscriptions queries (#2255)”; “chore(lint): Switch to credo strict mode, fix violations (#2200)”; “fix: specify what is stopping on SubscriptionManager (#2139)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/subscription_manager.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/subscriptions.ex lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/subscriptions.ex:349— lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/subscriptions.ex changed 4 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 9 (its worst body is Subscriptions.parse_subscription_params at line 349), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: record Postgres Changes subscribers only after the subscription transaction commits (#2393)”; “fix: set statement timeout for Subscriptions queries (#2255)”; “fix: ignore missing subscription table on delete (#2229)”; “fix: PG changes empty select returns just primary keys (#2140)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/subscriptions.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel/broadcast_handler.ex lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel/broadcast_handler.ex:203— lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel/broadcast_handler.ex changed 5 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 10 (its worst body is BroadcastHandler.authorize_write at line 203), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: reply with errors to acked private broadcast failures (#2280)”; “fix: restart the channel events RateCounter with the tenant's current limit (#2275)”; “fix: check extension write policies lazily (#2089)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel/broadcast_handler.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_single_controller.ex lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_single_controller.ex:89— lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_single_controller.ex changed 4 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 3 (its worst body is BroadcastSingleController.broadcast at line 89), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: broadcast single broadcast parsing (#2402)”; “fix: pick single broadcast payload type from Content-Type (#2379)”; “chore(lint): Switch to credo strict mode, fix violations (#2200)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_single_controller.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime/api.ex lib/realtime/api.ex:117— lib/realtime/api.ex changed 4 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 3 (its worst body is Api.create_tenant at line 117), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: look up the tenant on the primary when deleting it (#2226)”; “fix: normalize Realtime `:region` (#2159)”; “fix: add bulk heahtcheck endpoint (#2170)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime/api.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime_web/channels/auth/jwt_verification.ex lib/realtime_web/channels/auth/jwt_verification.ex:135— lib/realtime_web/channels/auth/jwt_verification.ex changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 6 (its worst body is JwtVerification.generate_signer at line 135), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(auth): support tenants that only have a jwt_jwks (#2237)”; “chore(lint): Switch to credo strict mode, fix violations (#2200)”; “fix(auth): accept the RFC 8037 EdDSA alg for OKP keys (#2060)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime_web/channels/auth/jwt_verification.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime/log_filter.ex lib/realtime/log_filter.ex:11— lib/realtime/log_filter.ex changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 3 (its worst body is LogFilter.setup at line 11), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: supress ranch listener killed logs (#2259)”; “fix(logs): ignore ranch stream killed (#2218)”; “fix: handle ranch charlist format in log filter (#2167)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime/log_filter.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: lib/realtime_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex lib/realtime_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex:192— lib/realtime_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 8 (its worst body is TenantController.delete at line 192), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: look up the tenant on the primary when deleting it (#2226)”; “fix: add bulk heahtcheck endpoint (#2170)”; “fix: improve naming on controller for postgres changes pool configuration (#2075)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
No assertions: user is able to receive self broadcast test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:30— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: user is able to use the endpoint to broadcast test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:55— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: user is able to receive presence updates test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:78— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: user is able to receive presence updates on private channels test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:107— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: user using private channel cannot connect if does not have enough permissions test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:142— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: user using private channel can connect if they have enough permissions test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:162— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: authenticated user receives insert broadcast change from a specific topic based on id test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:204— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: user is able to receive INSERT only events from a subscribed table with filter applied test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:259— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: user is able to receive UPDATE only events from a subscribed table with filter applied test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:298— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: user is able to receive DELETE only events from a subscribed table with filter applied test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:339— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: first connect latency test/e2e/src/suites/connection.ts:11— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: user using private channel can connect with enough permissions test/e2e/src/suites/authorization.ts:31— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
TodoComment lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/decoder.ex:175— # TODO: Verify this is correct with real data from Postgres — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/decoder.ex:189— # TODO: Handle case where pg_catalog is blank, we should still return the schema as pg_catalog — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment lib/realtime/api/tenant.ex:51— # TODO: remove after infra update — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment lib/realtime/tenants/encryption_reconciler.ex:9— # TODO: delete this module once no tenant is left on AES-128-ECB.
TodoComment lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel/broadcast_handler.ex:52— # TODO: hard limits and buffering based on ack — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_single_controller.ex:55— # TODO: uncomment when broadcast persistence is public and ready — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Change coupling: cdc_rls.ex ↔ supervisor.ex lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/cdc_rls.ex:1— `lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/cdc_rls.ex` and `lib/extensions/postgres_cdc_rls/supervisor.ex` change together 67% of the time (8 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 8 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `4653393d` fix: scope postgres cdc syn registry (#1594); `29152cbe` feat: Connect to tenant database on channel join (#677); `23cf5028` update test — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: metrics_controller.ex ↔ router.ex lib/realtime_web/controllers/metrics_controller.ex:1— `lib/realtime_web/controllers/metrics_controller.ex` and `lib/realtime_web/router.ex` change together 65% of the time (11 of the 17 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 11 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `69178464` fix: remove double endpoint for metrics (#1794); `48e20005` feat: separate node from tenant metrics (#1724); `93ce90ab` feat: add /metrics/:region endpoint (#1656) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: app.js ↔ conn_component.ex assets/js/app.js:1— `assets/js/app.js` and `lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/conn_component.ex` change together 57% of the time (12 of the 21 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 12 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `6ab99a1f` chore(devtools): manual presence controls in the inspector (#2315); `587538c9` fix: improve inspector usability (#2079); `55c33c0d` feat: improve inspector and status page (#2032) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: tenant_controller.ex ↔ tenant_view.ex lib/realtime_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex:1— `lib/realtime_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex` and `lib/realtime_web/views/tenant_view.ex` change together 55% of the time (6 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 6 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `ae4c6756` fix: Improve start counter logic on Connect module (#1190); `89e6fbe0` fix: update tenant admin reload endpoint; `d48a122e` fix tenant api and update test (at that commit the files were still `lib/multiplayer_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex` and `lib/multiplayer_web/views/tenant_view.ex`) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: tenants.ex ↔ rpc.ex lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/tenants.ex:1— `lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/tenants.ex` and `lib/realtime/rpc.ex` change together 54% of the time (7 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `4588af5e` fix: remove tenant tag on RPC metrics (#1655); `1e6abde8` feat: Add gen_rpc as an option for broadcasting messages (#1419); `70709b8d` Fix missing log and telemetry metadata (#1417) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: message.ex ↔ REDACTED lib/realtime/api/message.ex:1— `lib/realtime/api/message.ex` and `REDACTED` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 5 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `97f85f0f` fix: provide microsecond granularity by using binary pgoutput mode (#…; `5ccea17b` feat: replay realtime.messages (#1526); `b3c59dc0` fix: alter id to uuid type (#1199) (at that commit the file was still `lib/realtime/broadcast_changes/handler.ex`) — run `git show` on any of them.
FileTooLong: muster/scope.ex forum/lib/forum/muster/scope.ex— FileTooLong — 1082 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), declaring 62 functions. The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 582 over it, 2.16× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: channels/realtime_channel.ex lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex— FileTooLong — 904 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), declaring 45 functions. The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 404 over it, 1.81× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: dashboard/recon_trace.ex lib/realtime_web/dashboard/recon_trace.ex— FileTooLong — 696 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 196 over it, 1.39× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex lib/realtime_web/dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex— FileTooLong — 663 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), declaring 45 functions. The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 163 over it, 1.33× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: muster/shard.ex forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex— FileTooLong — 506 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), declaring 45 functions. The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 6 over it, 1.01× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
D10 · Test Quality· Fixed-sleep synchronisation · ×3
Fixed-sleep synchronisation: user is able to receive self broadcast test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:30— This test starts work it did not wait for (`channel`, still running when the sleep starts) and then orders itself against it with `sleep(0.2)` — a fixed wait, not a signal that the work is done. Whether it passes depends on how loaded the machine is, which is why a test written this way is green on a developer's box and random in CI. Wait for the event itself instead: the process's own exit or output, a completion handle, or a condition polled to a timeout.
Fixed-sleep synchronisation: user is able to receive presence updates test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:78— This test starts work it did not wait for (`channel`, still running when the sleep starts) and then orders itself against it with `sleep(0.2)` — a fixed wait, not a signal that the work is done. Whether it passes depends on how loaded the machine is, which is why a test written this way is green on a developer's box and random in CI. Wait for the event itself instead: the process's own exit or output, a completion handle, or a condition polled to a timeout.
Fixed-sleep synchronisation: user is able to receive presence updates on private channels test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:107— This test starts work it did not wait for (`channel`, still running when the sleep starts) and then orders itself against it with `sleep(0.2)` — a fixed wait, not a signal that the work is done. Whether it passes depends on how loaded the machine is, which is why a test written this way is green on a developer's box and random in CI. Wait for the event itself instead: the process's own exit or output, a completion handle, or a condition polled to a timeout.
Hotspot: lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:54— lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex changed 23 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 19 in RealtimeChannel.join at line 54. 14 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: test/e2e/src/orchestrator.ts test/e2e/src/orchestrator.ts:29— test/e2e/src/orchestrator.ts changed 3 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 17 in runSuites at line 29. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- test/e2e/src/orchestrator.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/event_log_component.ex lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/event_log_component.ex:194— lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/event_log_component.ex changed 2 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 25 in EventLogComponent.event_label at line 194. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 1 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-07-24..2026-10-22, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-24 16:47:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-22 16:47:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/realtime_web/live/inspector_live/event_log_component.ex`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
TooManyFunctions: Tenants lib/realtime/tenants.ex:1— TooManyFunctions — 34 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 4 over it, 1.13× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: Api lib/realtime/api.ex:1— TooManyFunctions — 31 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 1 over it, 1.03× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: Index lib/realtime_web/live/status_live/index.ex:1— TooManyFunctions — 31 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 1 over it, 1.03× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/realtime/feature_flags/cache.ex:29— lib/realtime/feature_flags/cache.ex:29-34 | lib/realtime/tenants/cache.ex:12-17 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:79— lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:79-84 | lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/gen_rpc.ex:80-85 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex` and `lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/gen_rpc.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 63 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/realtime_web/channels/auth/jwt_verification.ex:103— lib/realtime_web/channels/auth/jwt_verification.ex:103-108 | lib/realtime_web/channels/auth/jwt_verification.ex:113-118 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
R4 · Test Coverage· No test reaches this file · ×2
No test reaches this file assets/js/app.js:1— No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
No test reaches this file priv/static/worker.js:1— No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Async function without AbortSignal · ×2
Async function without AbortSignal: diagnose assets/js/app.js:102— `diagnose` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: signIn assets/js/app.js:455— `signIn` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
AC3 · Page structure· Page without a main landmark · ×1
Page without a main landmark lib/realtime_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
AC7 · A11y enforcement· Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1
Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over your pages. Add an accessibility checker (axe-core, pa11y or Lighthouse) over your HTML in CI and fail the build on new violations. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 7 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
Muster.start_link (cyclomatic 30) forum/lib/forum/muster.ex:140— Muster.start_link has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
initRealtime (cyclomatic 30) assets/js/app.js:147— initRealtime has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 11 of the 30 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 10 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 236, a function literal at line 191, heartbeatCallback, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
RealtimeChannel.join (cyclomatic 19) lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:54— RealtimeChannel.join has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
FixmeComment test/integration/tests.ts:191— // // FIXME write assertions — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
initRealtime (cognitive 37) assets/js/app.js:147— initRealtime has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (15 pts), ternaries 6 (11 pts), other 7, boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 8). Most of this is not in the body itself: 13 of the 37 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 10 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 236, a function literal at line 191, heartbeatCallback, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
Muster.start_link (cognitive 29) forum/lib/forum/muster.ex:140— Muster.start_link has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 19, if/else 10. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
RealtimeChannel.join (cognitive 26) lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:54— RealtimeChannel.join has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17 (21 pts), match/switch 3 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
Scope.handle_info (cognitive 18) forum/lib/forum/muster/scope.ex:1175— Scope.handle_info has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (15 pts), match/switch 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 8). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
app.cleanPayload (cognitive 18) assets/js/app.js:37— app.cleanPayload has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (11 pts), ternaries 3 (5 pts), boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Change-coupling hub: mix.exs → REDACTED, prod.exs, runtime.exs, message.ex, gen_rpc.ex, pub_sub.ex, helpers.ex, metrics_cleaner.ex, latency.ex, tenant.ex, tenants.ex, repo.ex, rpc.ex, batch_broadcast.ex, cache.ex, connect.ex, janitor.ex, migrations.ex, REDACTED, channels_authorization.ex, broadcast_handler.ex, logging.ex, broadcast_controller.ex, fallback_controller.ex, REDACTED, assign_tenant.ex, auth_tenant.ex, tenant_broadcaster.ex, seeds.exs mix.exs— `mix.exs` changes together with 29 other files — `REDACTED`, `config/prod.exs`, `config/runtime.exs`, `lib/realtime/api/message.ex`, `lib/realtime/gen_rpc.ex`, `lib/realtime/gen_rpc/pub_sub.ex`, `lib/realtime/helpers.ex`, `lib/realtime/metrics_cleaner.ex`, `lib/realtime/monitoring/latency.ex`, `lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/tenant.ex`, `lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/tenants.ex`, `lib/realtime/repo.ex`, `lib/realtime/rpc.ex`, `lib/realtime/tenants/batch_broadcast.ex`, `lib/realtime/tenants/cache.ex`, `lib/realtime/tenants/connect.ex`, `lib/realtime/tenants/janitor.ex`, `lib/realtime/tenants/migrations.ex`, `REDACTED`, `lib/realtime_web/channels/auth/channels_authorization.ex`, `lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel/broadcast_handler.ex`, `lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel/logging.ex`, `lib/realtime_web/controllers/broadcast_controller.ex`, `lib/realtime_web/controllers/fallback_controller.ex`, `REDACTED`, `lib/realtime_web/plugs/assign_tenant.ex`, `lib/realtime_web/plugs/auth_tenant.ex`, `lib/realtime_web/tenant_broadcaster.ex`, `priv/repo/seeds.exs` — none of which declares a dependency on it: one file is the hub of 29 separate couplings, not 29 unrelated pairs. Read the hub first: if the others each duplicate a part of what it does, the shared concern belongs in ONE unit and extracting it clears every edge at once; if the hub is a registry, dispatcher or barrel that must name each of them, the coupling is structural and the question is whether that list can be discovered instead of enumerated. Fixing the hub is one change; breaking the couplings one pair at a time is 29.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:88— lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:88-99 | lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/gen_rpc.ex:89-100 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 12 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) · ×1
Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20241030150047_messages_partitioning.ex:6— lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20241030150047_messages_partitioning.ex:6-124 | lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260616120000_add_postgrest_filter_ops.ex:22-688 | lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260626120000_readd_postgrest_filter_ops.ex:25-691 | lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260707120000_restrict_realtime_schema.ex:7-92 | lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260707120000_restrict_realtime_schema.ex:96-171 — These 5 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 5 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 5 times.
Duplicated block (30–39 lines × 2) forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex:431— forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex:431-469 | forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex:527-556 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (34 lines × 2) lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260707120000_restrict_realtime_schema.ex:16— lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260707120000_restrict_realtime_schema.ex:16-49 | lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260707120000_restrict_realtime_schema.ex:97-141 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (24–25 lines × 2) lib/realtime/monitoring/peep/partitioned.ex:51— lib/realtime/monitoring/peep/partitioned.ex:51-75 | lib/realtime/monitoring/peep/partitioned_tables.ex:83-106 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 5) lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20241030150047_messages_partitioning.ex:75— lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20241030150047_messages_partitioning.ex:75-95 | lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260616120000_add_postgrest_filter_ops.ex:22-75 | lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260626120000_readd_postgrest_filter_ops.ex:25-78 | lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260707120000_restrict_realtime_schema.ex:7-49 | lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260707120000_restrict_realtime_schema.ex:96-141 — there are 5 copies across 4 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 5 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (18–19 lines × 2) forum/lib/forum/census.ex:54— forum/lib/forum/census.ex:54-72 | forum/lib/forum/muster.ex:195-212 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) lib/realtime/tenants/authorization.ex:98— lib/realtime/tenants/authorization.ex:98-114 | lib/realtime/tenants/authorization.ex:153-169 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/oid_database.ex:37— lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/oid_database.ex:37-51 | lib/realtime/nodes.ex:49-63 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:414— lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:414-426 | lib/realtime_web/channels/realtime_channel.ex:667-679 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:93— lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:93-99 | lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/gen_rpc.ex:94-100 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex` and `lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/gen_rpc.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 63 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (50 lines × 2) lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:26— lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex:26-75 | lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/gen_rpc.ex:27-76 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/distributed.ex` and `lib/realtime/monitoring/prom_ex/plugins/gen_rpc.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 63 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/realtime_web/live/components.ex:422— lib/realtime_web/live/components.ex:422-426 | lib/realtime_web/views/error_helpers.ex:41-45 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Off the main sequence: forum — forum: abstractness 0.07, instability 0.00, distance 0.93 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
P12 · CI test-gate honesty· Coverage collected but not gated · ×1
Coverage collected but not gated — CI collects a coverage report but no step enforces a minimum — coverage could halve and CI stays green. Add a step that fails the build when coverage drops below a floor (your coverage tool's minimum-threshold flag, or a coverage-gate action) so the number guards something. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: this repository's CI files AND its coverage configuration — the well-known coverage and test-runner config files, read at the repository root and inside workspace package directories two levels down, so a floor declared beside the tests rather than in the pipeline is credited — matched against the threshold settings this check knows by name. A floor set in your coverage service's web UI rather than in a committed file, or under a setting whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
Complex function runSuites (cyclomatic 17, cognitive 18) test/e2e/src/orchestrator.ts:29— runSuites has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function cleanPayload (cyclomatic 15, cognitive 18) assets/js/app.js:37— cleanPayload has cyclomatic complexity 15 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function initRealtime (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 13) assets/js/app.js:147— initRealtime has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 13; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function apply (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 10) assets/js/app.js:382— apply has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function signIn (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 9) assets/js/app.js:455— signIn has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
assets/js/app.js: 453 lines of code assets/js/app.js:1— assets/js/app.js has 453 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220615214548_add_quoted_regtypes_backward_compatibility_support.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230308225145_output_full_record_when_unchanged_toast.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220916233421_update_apply_rls_function_to_pass_through_delete_events_on_filter.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230119133233_millisecond_precision_for_walrus.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230128025212_enable_filtering_on_delete_record.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220603232444_add_output_for_data_less_than_equal_64_bytes_when_payload_too_large.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230228184745_convert_commit_timestamp_to_utc.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220107221237_update_change_timestamp_to_iso_8601_zulu_format.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220312004840_update_apply_rls_function_to_apply_iso_8601.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20211228014915_add_wal_payload_on_errors_in_apply_rls_function.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20211124070109_enable_realtime_apply_rls_function_postgrest_9_compatibility.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/adapters/postgres/oid_database.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230128025114_add_in_op_to_filters.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230227211149_update_subscription_check_filters_for_in_filter_non_text_types.ex:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Duplicated predicate lib/realtime/api.ex:476— `Application.get_env(:realtime, :master_region) || region` appears character-identically in 4 files — lib/realtime/api.ex, lib/realtime/application.ex, lib/realtime/repo_replica.ex, lib/realtime_web/dashboard/node_info.ex. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate forum/lib/forum/census.ex:62— `is_integer(max_restarts) and max_restarts >= 0` appears character-identically in 2 files — forum/lib/forum/census.ex, forum/lib/forum/muster.ex. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate forum/lib/forum/census.ex:69— `is_integer(max_seconds) and max_seconds > 0` appears character-identically in 2 files — forum/lib/forum/census.ex, forum/lib/forum/muster.ex. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate forum/lib/forum/census.ex:43— `is_integer(partitions) and partitions >= 1` appears character-identically in 2 files — forum/lib/forum/census.ex, forum/lib/forum/muster.ex. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
README/code drift README.md:73— README.md names `supabase/postgres`, but no file or folder `supabase/postgres` exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
README/code drift README.md:78— README.md names Postgres 14, but the manifest declares `postgres` ^3.4.9. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 11 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: forum/lib/forum/muster/scope.ex, forum/lib/forum/muster/shard.ex, forum/lib/forum/muster.ex, lib/realtime_web/dashboard/muster.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220603231003_add_quoted_regtypes_support.ex, forum/lib/forum/supervisor.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260827120000_empty_select_columns_return_primary_keys.ex, forum/lib/forum/census.ex (+3 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor· Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 1 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (14 single-owned of 132 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 132 of the 320 production source files in this repository met that bar). They are anonymized user #2 (3 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above. The files folded here: lib/realtime_web/dashboard/tenant_migrations.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20260709120000_fix_apply_rls_filter_role_leak.ex, lib/mix/tasks/realtime.export_tenant_schema.ex.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.
D26 · Project Cohesion· Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 1 of 3 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 3.3/10. The most over is `(repository root)` (32275 LoC, 323 module-visible types across 42 directories). Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the module first (group each responsibility into its own package or directory and keep the cross-boundary members non-public), since splitting a published package moves types between packages and breaks consumers.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 14 of 132 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 132 of the 320 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220615214548_add_quoted_regtypes_backward_compatibility_support.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230308225145_output_full_record_when_unchanged_toast.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220916233421_update_apply_rls_function_to_pass_through_delete_events_on_filter.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230119133233_millisecond_precision_for_walrus.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230128025212_enable_filtering_on_delete_record.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220603232444_add_output_for_data_less_than_equal_64_bytes_when_payload_too_large.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20230228184745_convert_commit_timestamp_to_utc.ex, lib/realtime/tenants/repo/migrations/20220107221237_update_change_timestamp_to_iso_8601_zulu_format.ex (and 6 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
R7 · Dead Code· Unused module-local declaration 'generateJwtToken' · ×1
Unused module-local declaration 'generateJwtToken' test/e2e/legacy/tests.ts:439— This top-level declaration is not exported and its name occurs nowhere else in its module — not called, read, typed against, re-exported or named by a string. Nothing outside the module can reach a non-exported binding, so this is the whole search: remove it, or use it.
No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Elixir source or production configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (an endpoint's `https: [...]`, `scheme: :https`, `Plug.Cowboy.https`, SiteEncrypt), no `force_ssl:` or `plug Plug.SSL` redirecting to HTTPS and sending HSTS, no `strict-transport-security` header, no `rewrite_on: [:x_forwarded_proto]` or `x-forwarded-proto` read for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: lib/realtime_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
Security headers incomplete — Set: Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies. Missing: Strict-Transport-Security — the four headers that carry the points of this card's security-headers term (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options), 0.5 each.(−0.5 on this card.) The server: lib/realtime_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal · ×1
Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal — Only 0/2 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
Outdated: esbuild — `:esbuild` is locked at 0.10.0 but 0.10.1 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 0.4"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update esbuild` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: opentelemetry_exporter — `:opentelemetry_exporter` is locked at 1.10.0 but 1.11.0 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.10"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update opentelemetry_exporter` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: phoenix_live_dashboard — `:phoenix_live_dashboard` is locked at 0.9.0 but 0.9.1 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 0.7"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update phoenix_live_dashboard` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: phoenix_live_view — `:phoenix_live_view` is locked at 1.2.11 but 1.2.13 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.0"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update phoenix_live_view` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: req — `:req` is locked at 0.7.4 but 0.7.5 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 0.7.4"` requirement declared in mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update req` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: telemetry — `:telemetry` is locked at 1.3.0 but 1.4.2 is the current stable release on hex.pm, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.3"` requirement declared in forum/mix.exs — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `mix deps.update telemetry` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a16609-4cda-77bc-92ef-ccb1698beffb · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 37 · Warnings: 105 · Recommendations: 38 · Info: 6 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 22-10-2026 @ 23:54 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.