Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
supertone-inc/supertonic carries serious gaps (44%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Code Health (95%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (17%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (62%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Hobby (~865 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (95%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 17 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 44 → ~67.
New since the last scan (58+)
- D1 · UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cyclomatic 30) csharp/Helper.cs
- D1 · parseArgs (cyclomatic 20) nodejs/example_onnx.js
- D2 · UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cognitive 24) csharp/Helper.cs
- D2 · Helper.ChunkText (cognitive 21) csharp/Helper.cs
- D2 · parseArgs (cognitive 20) nodejs/example_onnx.js
- D2 · chunkText (cognitive 19) web/helper.js
- D2 · chunkText (cognitive 19) nodejs/helper.js
- D3 · FileTooLong: web/helper.js web/helper.js
- D3 · FileTooLong: nodejs/helper.js nodejs/helper.js
- D8 · No automated tests
- D15 · Hotspot: csharp/Helper.cs csharp/Helper.cs
- D29 · Medium: unsafe-path-combine csharp/Helper.cs
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2024-3106 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2024-3107 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3373 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3420 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3447 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3503 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3563 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3750 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3751 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3849 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3956 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4006 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4007 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4008 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4009 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4010 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4011 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4012 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4013 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4014 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4015 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4155 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4175 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4337 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4340 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4341 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4342 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4403 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4601 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4602 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4603 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4864 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4865 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4869 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4870 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4918 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4946 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4947 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4970 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4971 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4976 go/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4977 go/go.mod
- P2 · No structured logging
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €640–€3,300
| Cost to rebuild | €640–€3,300 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 44% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 19% boilerplate · 16% straight-line · 65% branching logic |
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 2 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to build and test on every push or pull request. Next, implement structured logging across all projects to improve observability and health monitoring. Then, introduce static application security testing and other security tooling to identify vulnerabilities early. Finally, address the single missing automated test and ensure all test suites are properly distributed and executed.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +22.7 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +22.7 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +25.8 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +25.8 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package. | +25.8 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +4.0 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Helper.cs. | +3.3 pts | Low | Comment Value |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +4.2 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| csharp/Helper.cs | 4.0 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: unsafe-path-combine |
| py/uv.lock | 4.5 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| go/go.mod | 5.8 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 |
| nodejs/example_onnx.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: parseArgs (cyclomatic 20) |
| web/helper.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: chunkText (cognitive 19) |
| nodejs/helper.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: chunkText (cognitive 19) |
| go/helper.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 37 of 39 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 39 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 64 of 73 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis at 30.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
5 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis at 24.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 chunkText (cognitive 19) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with helper.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Helper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Helper.ChunkText (cognitive 21) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Helper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
2 god class(es) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with helper.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 · Coupling
1 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 2 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — the solution has no test code.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 2 packages use a banned license.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
Top hotspots: csharp/Helper.cs (2×30=60)
D17 · Explicit Debt
1 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 865 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9.
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 109 sampled symbols.
D24 · Comment Value
10 valuable / 1 redundant across 105 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Helper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 1 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
68 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 62 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 44 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (44). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (44 warning-level).
- Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with uv.lock (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX5 · Architecture & structure
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
- A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — Helper.cs:684
What to do
- Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
X1 · Async correctness
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~0.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 95% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Architecture | 69% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Maturity | 62% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 17% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, P1, P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 73% | Adequate — gated by D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 55 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 865 LoC the codebase is tiny and single-project, so explicit bounded contexts are unnecessary.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 8 finding(s)
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
- Dimension evaluation failed
- No automated tests
Warning — 58 finding(s)
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2024-3105 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2024-3106 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2024-3107 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3373 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3420 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3447 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3503 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3563 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3750 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3751 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3849 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3956 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4006 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4007 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4008 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4009 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4010 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4011 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4012 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4013 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4014 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4015 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4155 go/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-4175 go/go.mod
- chunkText (cognitive 19) web/helper.js:476
- chunkText (cognitive 19) nodejs/helper.js:522
- Medium: unsafe-path-combine csharp/Helper.cs:545
- Medium: math-random-used go/helper.go:7
- FileTooLong: web/helper.js web/helper.js:0
- FileTooLong: nodejs/helper.js nodejs/helper.js:0
- UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cyclomatic 30) csharp/Helper.cs:80
- parseArgs (cyclomatic 20) nodejs/example_onnx.js:13
- Hotspot: csharp/Helper.cs csharp/Helper.cs
- TodoComment csharp/Helper.cs:129
- LLM evaluation failed
- UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cognitive 24) csharp/Helper.cs:80
- Helper.ChunkText (cognitive 21) csharp/Helper.cs:805
- parseArgs (cognitive 20) nodejs/example_onnx.js:13
Recommendation — 6 finding(s)
- Test reliability not included
- early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
- No ADRs found
- redundant comment csharp/Helper.cs:514
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 68 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |