Public report — supertonic, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 07-08-2026 @ 18:14 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Supertone-Inc/supertonic

44% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate

Hobby · 865 LoC · 1 projects · weakest lens: Readiness (17%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

37/39dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
64findings with an exact file:lineof 73 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
39/93dimensions across the health lenses865 LoC · 1 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

supertone-inc/supertonic carries serious gaps (44%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Code Health (95%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (17%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (62%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling).

For scale: Hobby (~865 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (95%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 17% · 47% weightMaturity 62% · 26% weightArchitecture 69% · 14% weightSecurity 73% · 8% weightCode Health 95% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 17 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 44 → ~67.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 65%Plumbing 35%
New since the last scan (58+)

58 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D1 · UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cyclomatic 30) csharp/Helper.cs
  • D1 · parseArgs (cyclomatic 20) nodejs/example_onnx.js
  • D2 · UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cognitive 24) csharp/Helper.cs
  • D2 · Helper.ChunkText (cognitive 21) csharp/Helper.cs
  • D2 · parseArgs (cognitive 20) nodejs/example_onnx.js
  • D2 · chunkText (cognitive 19) web/helper.js
  • D2 · chunkText (cognitive 19) nodejs/helper.js
  • D3 · FileTooLong: web/helper.js web/helper.js
  • D3 · FileTooLong: nodejs/helper.js nodejs/helper.js
  • D8 · No automated tests
  • D15 · Hotspot: csharp/Helper.cs csharp/Helper.cs
  • D29 · Medium: unsafe-path-combine csharp/Helper.cs
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2024-3106 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2024-3107 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3373 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3420 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3447 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3503 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3563 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3750 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3751 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3849 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3956 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4006 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4007 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4008 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4009 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4010 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4011 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4012 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4013 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4014 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4015 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4155 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-4175 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4337 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4340 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4341 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4342 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4403 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4601 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4602 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4603 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4864 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4865 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4869 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4870 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4918 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4946 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4947 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4970 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4971 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4976 go/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4977 go/go.mod
  • P2 · No structured logging

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €640–€3,300
Cost to rebuild€640–€3,300 (0.1 person-years (11–35 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 44% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeHobby · 19% boilerplate · 16% straight-line · 65% branching logic

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — library/CLI, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+22.7 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+22.7 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
+25.8 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

At a glance — Code Health · 95% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Adequate

At a glance — Maturity · 62% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 17% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, P1, P2, P3

At a glance — Security · 73% · Adequate · gated by D38

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection2Medium

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration workflow to build and test on every push or pull request. Next, implement structured logging across all projects to improve observability and health monitoring. Then, introduce static application security testing and other security tooling to identify vulnerabilities early. Finally, address the single missing automated test and ensure all test suites are properly distributed and executed.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+22.7 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+22.7 ptsLowTest Distribution
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+25.8 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+25.8 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.+25.8 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+4.0 ptsLowADR Quality
Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Helper.cs.+3.3 ptsLowComment Value
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.+4.2 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 7 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 100% mixed · 0% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
csharp/Helper.cs4.0MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: unsafe-path-combine
py/uv.lock4.5MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
go/go.mod5.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970
nodejs/example_onnx.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: parseArgs (cyclomatic 20)
web/helper.js7.8MixedCognitive Complexity: chunkText (cognitive 19)
nodejs/helper.js7.8MixedCognitive Complexity: chunkText (cognitive 19)
go/helper.go7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 37 of 39 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 39 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D17D20D21D24D26D28D29D33D35D38AX10AX3AX4AX5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3X1X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 64 of 73 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fdd6e-e7ff-7570-85e1-329d6afb6820.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis at 30.

UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cyclomatic 30)csharp/Helper.cs:80
parseArgs (cyclomatic 20)nodejs/example_onnx.js:13

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis at 24.

chunkText (cognitive 19) · ×2web/helper.js:476
UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cognitive 24)csharp/Helper.cs:80
Helper.ChunkText (cognitive 21)csharp/Helper.cs:805
parseArgs (cognitive 20)nodejs/example_onnx.js:13

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 chunkText (cognitive 19) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with helper.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Helper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Helper.ChunkText (cognitive 21) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Helper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: web/helper.js · ×2web/helper.js:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with helper.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 2 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — the solution has no test code.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 2 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: csharp/Helper.cs (2×30=60)

Hotspot: csharp/Helper.cscsharp/Helper.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 865 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9.

TodoCommentcsharp/Helper.cs:129

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 109 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 valuable / 1 redundant across 105 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentcsharp/Helper.cs:514

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Helper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

Medium: unsafe-path-combine · ×2csharp/Helper.cs:545detected by semgrep finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

68 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 62 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6py/uv.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 · ×44go/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 44 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (44). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (44 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with uv.lock (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — Helper.cs:684

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health95%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Architecture69%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Maturity62%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness17%Critical — gated by D8, D9, P1, P2, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security73%Adequate — gated by D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 55 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 865 LoC the codebase is tiny and single-project, so explicit bounded contexts are unnecessary.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 8 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×6
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock — msgpack 1.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.2.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock — protobuf 6.32.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.33.5
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock — urllib3 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.6.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock — urllib3 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.6.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock — urllib3 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.6.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] py/uv.lock — urllib3 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.7.0
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — the solution has no test code. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 58 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×44
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go/go.mod — golang.org/x/text 0.14.0: GO-2026-5970 — upgrade to 0.39.0
  • Medium CVE: GO-2024-3105 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2024-3105 — upgrade to 1.22.7
  • Medium CVE: GO-2024-3106 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2024-3106 — upgrade to 1.22.7
  • Medium CVE: GO-2024-3107 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2024-3107 — upgrade to 1.22.7
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3373 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-3373 — upgrade to 1.22.11
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3420 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-3420 — upgrade to 1.22.11
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3447 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-3447 — upgrade to 1.22.12
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3503 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-3503 — upgrade to 1.23.7
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3563 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-3563 — upgrade to 1.23.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3750 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-3750 — upgrade to 1.23.10
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3751 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-3751 — upgrade to 1.23.10
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3849 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-3849 — upgrade to 1.23.12
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3956 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-3956 — upgrade to 1.23.12
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4006 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4006 — upgrade to 1.24.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4007 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4007 — upgrade to 1.24.9
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4008 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4008 — upgrade to 1.24.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4009 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4009 — upgrade to 1.24.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4010 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4010 — upgrade to 1.24.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4011 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4011 — upgrade to 1.24.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4012 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4012 — upgrade to 1.24.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4013 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4013 — upgrade to 1.24.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4014 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4014 — upgrade to 1.24.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4015 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4015 — upgrade to 1.24.8
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4155 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4155 — upgrade to 1.24.11
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4175 go/go.mod — stdlib 1.21.99: GO-2025-4175 — upgrade to 1.24.11
  • + 19 more in this group — see findings.md.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · chunkText (cognitive 19) · ×2
  • chunkText (cognitive 19) web/helper.js:476 — chunkText has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
  • chunkText (cognitive 19) nodejs/helper.js:522 — chunkText has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×2
  • Medium: unsafe-path-combine csharp/Helper.cs:545 — String argument onnxDir is used to read or write data from a file via Path.Combine without direct sanitization via Path.GetFileName. If the path is user-supplied data this can lead to path traversal.
  • Medium: math-random-used go/helper.go:7 — Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×2
  • FileTooLong: web/helper.js web/helper.js:0 — FileTooLong — 561 lines.
  • FileTooLong: nodejs/helper.js nodejs/helper.js:0 — FileTooLong — 559 lines.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cyclomatic 30) · ×1
  • UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cyclomatic 30) csharp/Helper.cs:80 — UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · parseArgs (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • parseArgs (cyclomatic 20) nodejs/example_onnx.js:13 — parseArgs has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×1
  • Hotspot: csharp/Helper.cs csharp/Helper.cs — csharp/Helper.cs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 30. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1
  • TodoComment csharp/Helper.cs:129 — // TODO: Need advanced normalizer for better performance — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1128.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis (cognitive 24) csharp/Helper.cs:80 — UnicodeProcessor.RemoveEmojis has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Helper.ChunkText (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • Helper.ChunkText (cognitive 21) csharp/Helper.cs:805 — Helper.ChunkText has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · parseArgs (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • parseArgs (cognitive 20) nodejs/example_onnx.js:13 — parseArgs has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
Recommendation — 6 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (10 author(s) across 49 commit(s) sampled).
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment csharp/Helper.cs:514 — "LoadOnnx, above public: ONNX model loading" — trim - the header is generated; keep only the one line naming the loader
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (49 commit(s) sampled).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .2artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .68artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fdd6e-e7ff-7570-85e1-329d6afb6820 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md