Public report of szabodanika/microbin, published 14 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 14 November 2026, 20:06 UTC · Survey ID cd_3d3340cd61024475a82888899f86aa83

szabodanika/microbin

Measured 14 November 2026, 20:03 UTC, at code version 5268924

CAI score 43out of 100 At risk Down 2 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

A small codebase: 3,642 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: under 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 36

Findings by how serious they are

39 critical 205 serious 36 minor

11 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Assert small markCanine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
14 November 2026, 20:03 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

50of 50 dimensions measured by tools.
250of 280 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 30 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
50dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 3,642 lines of product code in 1 project.
Chapters

Executive summary

szabodanika/microbin is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the build pipeline. Its score is held back in part because two passwords or keys sit in the current code. It scores 43 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.

Production Readiness, at 36, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first steps are replacing the two exposed passwords or keys and switching the old ones off and adding tests for untested code, each worth about 7 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 49.

Twelve pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Four known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers, and eight form fields can't be read by a screen reader. Pinning each tool to an exact version, updating the vulnerable packages and labelling the form fields would close these risks. Limiting each secret to its own step would fix the four secrets exposed to more of the pipeline than needed, and the two passwords or keys in the code and the password or key in the code's history need replacing, with the old ones switched off. The three images with no text description need a text description.

The product code is 3,642 lines, about €3,200 to rebuild.

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Production Readiness 36 · counts for 46%Accessibility 37 · counts for 25%Maturity 51 · counts for 14%Security and Compliance 58 · counts for 8%Code Health 75 · counts for 4%Architecture 78 · counts for 2%Performance 100 · counts for 1%

If Production Readiness rose from 36 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 43 to about 49.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 100%
New since the last survey: 47 findings

These 47 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 28 October 2026.

We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 11 findings

These 11 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 28 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Code Duplication · Duplicated block (21 lines × 5) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs
  • Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs
  • Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs
  • Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 8) src/endpoints/archive.rs
  • Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 5) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs
  • Code Coverage · No automated tests
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0367 REDACTED
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement templates/assets/water.css
  • A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
Rebuild cost: about €3,200 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€1,000 to €5,300, for 17 to 55 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 43. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 3,642 lines of product code
What it is notNot a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.

How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 7 points · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Resolve the 27 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with pasta.rs (2), args.rs, REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 7 points · Medium effort · Code Coverage
3
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with main.rs.
Raises the score by about 3 points · Low effort · ADR Quality

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €3,200 to build again, under 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 36 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 7 points for low effort, because it clears the 2 Secret Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
What hard-to-read code costs each year · Cost
Four dimensions measure how easy the code is to work in: two measure how tangled its logic is, one how much of it is copied, and one how well each part sticks to a single job. In this codebase they average 4.0 out of 10. Code at that level is slower to change than clean code, and we estimate the extra work at 10% to 22% on every change.
How this is estimated: It rests on an assumption of our own: code scoring 8 out of 10 or more adds no extra work, and each point below 8 adds 2.5% to 5.6% to every change, never less than 2% to 5% and never more than 40% to 60% in all. The result is a range for planning, not a measurement.
Based on: Cyclomatic Complexity · Cognitive Complexity · Code Duplication · Cohesion (LCOM4)
What to do: Start with the files listed under Churn × Complexity Hotspots, which change often and are hard to read, because that is where the extra work is paid most often.

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

30 modules, with 21 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 microbin.args2 microbin.endpoints.archive3 microbin.endpoints.file4 microbin.endpoints.remove5 microbin.endpoints.static_resources6 microbin.pasta7 microbin.util.animalnumbers8 microbin.util.auth9 microbin.util.hashids10 microbin.util.http_client11 microbin.util.syntaxhighlighter12 microbin.util.telemetry13 microbin.util.version14 templates15 templates.assets16 microbin17 microbin.endpoints.admin18 microbin.endpoints.auth_admin19 microbin.endpoints.auth_upload20 microbin.endpoints.create21 microbin.endpoints.edit22 microbin.endpoints.errors23 microbin.endpoints.guide24 microbin.endpoints.list25 microbin.endpoints.pasta26 microbin.endpoints.qr27 microbin.util.db28 microbin.util.db_json29 microbin.util.db_sqlite30 microbin.util.misc
1 microbin.args
2 microbin.endpoints.archive
3 microbin.endpoints.file
4 microbin.endpoints.remove
5 microbin.endpoints.static_resources
6 microbin.pasta
7 microbin.util.animalnumbers
8 microbin.util.auth
9 microbin.util.hashids
10 microbin.util.http_client
11 microbin.util.syntaxhighlighter
12 microbin.util.telemetry
13 microbin.util.version
14 templates
15 templates.assets
16 microbin1
17 microbin.endpoints.admin111
18 microbin.endpoints.auth_admin1
19 microbin.endpoints.auth_upload1
20 microbin.endpoints.create1
21 microbin.endpoints.edit11
22 microbin.endpoints.errors1
23 microbin.endpoints.guide1
24 microbin.endpoints.list11
25 microbin.endpoints.pasta11
26 microbin.endpoints.qr11
27 microbin.util.db1
28 microbin.util.db_json1
29 microbin.util.db_sqlite1
30 microbin.util.misc1
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 microbin.args2 microbin.endpoints.archive3 microbin.endpoints.file4 microbin.endpoints.remove5 microbin.endpoints.static_resources6 microbin.pasta7 microbin.util.animalnumbers8 microbin.util.auth9 microbin.util.hashids10 microbin.util.http_client11 microbin.util.syntaxhighlighter12 microbin.util.telemetry13 microbin.util.version14 templates15 templates.assets16 microbin17 microbin.endpoints.admin18 microbin.endpoints.auth_admin19 microbin.endpoints.auth_upload20 microbin.endpoints.create21 microbin.endpoints.edit22 microbin.endpoints.errors23 microbin.endpoints.guide24 microbin.endpoints.list25 microbin.endpoints.pasta26 microbin.endpoints.qr27 microbin.util.db28 microbin.util.db_json29 microbin.util.db_sqlite30 microbin.util.miscmicrobin.args1microbin.endpoints.archive2microbin.endpoints.file3microbin.endpoints.remove4microbin.endpoints.static_resources5microbin.pasta6microbin.util.animalnumbers7microbin.util.auth8microbin.util.hashids9microbin.util.http_client10microbin.util.syntaxhighlighter11microbin.util.telemetry12microbin.util.version13templates14templates.assets15microbin16microbin.endpoints.admin17microbin.endpoints.auth_admin18microbin.endpoints.auth_upload19microbin.endpoints.create20microbin.endpoints.edit21microbin.endpoints.errors22microbin.endpoints.guide23microbin.endpoints.list24microbin.endpoints.pasta25microbin.endpoints.qr26microbin.util.db27microbin.util.db_json28microbin.util.db_sqlite29microbin.util.misc30111111111111111111111

At a glance — Code Health · 75% · Adequate · gated by D2, D4 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 78% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 51% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 36% · Weak · gated by D8, D13, P7 ·

At a glance — Security · 58% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36 ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 37% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC4 ·

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2025 — Injection58High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures49High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures4High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration4High / Critical

Roadmap

Top priorities: Resolve the 27 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with pasta.rs (2), args.rs, REDACTED; Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED; Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED.+6.6 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Resolve the 27 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with pasta.rs (2), args.rs, REDACTED.+6.9 ptsMediumCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with main.rs.+2.9 ptsLowADR Quality
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.+3.7 ptsMediumText alternatives
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.+3.7 ptsMediumKeyboard semantics
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.+1.2 ptsLowBus Factor
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.+2.4 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Resolve the 5 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with edit.rs, auth_upload.rs, db_sqlite.rs.+1.1 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 43 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 9% slop · 56% mixed · 35% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.0SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED0.5SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED0.6SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED2.0SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED4.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
src/pasta.rs4.1MixedCode Duplication: Edited copy of a member (37 corresponding lines)
src/endpoints/edit.rs5.5MixedCyclomatic Complexity: microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private (cyclomatic 16)
src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs5.5MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (21 lines × 5)
src/endpoints/archive.rs5.6MixedCyclomatic Complexity: microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive (cyclomatic 16)
src/endpoints/pasta.rs5.6MixedCognitive Complexity: microbin::endpoints::pasta::pastaresponse (cognitive 22)
src/endpoints/create.rs5.6MixedCyclomatic Complexity: microbin::endpoints::create::create (cyclomatic 67)
src/util/db_sqlite.rs5.7MixedCode Duplication: Edited copies of one member (3 members, 47+ corresponding lines)
REDACTED5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
src/endpoints/remove.rs5.9MixedCyclomatic Complexity: microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove (cyclomatic 18)
src/endpoints/file.rs6.0MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
REDACTED6.2MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
src/util/misc.rs6.3MixedCyclomatic Complexity: microbin::util::misc::remove_expired (cyclomatic 17)
REDACTED6.3MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 39

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 205

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 36

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 11

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 50 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.

Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.

What we checked — 50 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D6D8D12D13D14D15D16D17D19D20D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D37D43D44AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AX10AX3AX4AX9C2M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6P7PF3S1X1X21X30

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 250 of 280 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1dba8-7b5a-706a-8819-0537958782e6.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (Cargo.toml), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
  • D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
  • D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) — 17 | >>> FROM gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12 18 | 19 | WORKDIR /app -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12: failed to resolve source metadata for gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12:latest: failed to do request: Head "https://gcr.io/v2/distroless/cc-debian12/manifests/latest": Forbidden; runtime evidence skipped.
  • C2 Access Controls — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Rust is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Rust is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was microbin::endpoints::create::create at 67. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being microbin::endpoints::create::expiration_to_timestamp at 16 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.

microbin::endpoints::create::create (cyclomatic 67) · ×8src/endpoints/create.rs:112
index.html.form.onsubmit (cyclomatic 16)templates/index.html:307

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with microbin::endpoints::create::create (cyclomatic 67). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 6.4 to about 8.0/10.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

16 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was microbin::endpoints::create::create at 126.

microbin::endpoints::create::create (cognitive 126) · ×12src/endpoints/create.rs:112
aes.AES._prepare (cognitive 22)templates/assets/aes.js:202
index.html.form.onsubmit (cognitive 21)templates/index.html:307
index.html.document.addEventListener("paste") (cognitive 16)templates/index.html:570

What to do

  1. Bring the 2 bodies over 60 down to 60 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with microbin::endpoints::create::create (cognitive 126), microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove (cognitive 66). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 2.0 to about 4.1/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 60; a cleaner split scores higher.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

FunctionTooLong: microbin::endpoints::create::createsrc/endpoints/create.rs:112
TooManyFields: Argssrc/args.rs:16

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with create.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 TooManyFields finding(s) in God Classes — start with args.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the production code is copy-pasted: the share of production lines inside a reported copy (every copy of a duplicated block or of an edited member, each line once), 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), scored on the share of production lines inside a reported copy (each line once; 10 at none, 0 at a quarter). Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

32 duplicated block group(s) detected. 32.5 % of the production lines (1,184 of 3,642) are in a reported copy. A further 8 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×6src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:42
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×4src/pasta.rs:172
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2src/endpoints/edit.rs:173
Edited copy of a member (84 corresponding lines)src/endpoints/edit.rs:216
Edited copy of a member (93 corresponding lines)src/endpoints/pasta.rs:29

+ 26 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with auth_upload.rs (5), edit.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with pasta.rs (3), edit.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with edit.rs, remove.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: Pasta (LCOM4 5)src/pasta.rs:74

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with pasta.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from the analyzer's own run of the suite, computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. A coverage report found in the repository is never read. When the suite can't be built/run in-image, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 1.0% — 27 file(s) below 50%. Measured from the Rust suite (repository root: `cargo test --workspace` instrumented over 28 production file(s), 1 test binaries and 0 doc-test binaries).

Low coverage: src/args.rs · ×27src/args.rs:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 27 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with pasta.rs (2), args.rs, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (27 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, not deprecated, and not bloated. Known vulnerabilities are D30's.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (capped-linear for deprecation, prerelease and outdated) per KLoC. Known-vulnerable packages are D30's and are not charged here (rubric-2026.11.2). Exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

12 outdated, 0 yanked direct Cargo dependencies. Only DIRECT edges are graded: a transitive crate cannot be moved past what its parent's requirement admits, so reporting one would be advice its owner cannot take. A newer release is reported only where this repository's OWN requirement already admits it, so the remedy is `cargo update` and never a manifest edit — which means a release outside the declared range is deliberately NOT charged, because a written-down constraint is a decision rather than a defect. Note that a bare requirement is a CARET, and for a 0.x crate its ceiling is the minor. Whether any crate is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — crates.io publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.

Outdated: actix-web · ×12

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 435 shipped crate(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from crates.io over the crates a consumer compiles — this repository's REDACTED closed over its manifests' `[dependencies]` and `[build-dependencies]`. Crates it asks for ONLY under `[dev-dependencies]` are excluded: they are not compiled by anything that depends on this repository. This repository publishes itself under BSD-3-Clause, which is its own choice and is not judged here.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/endpoints/pasta.rs. Counted over 14 of the 28 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 deducted task-comment markers across 3642 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×2REDACTED:62

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED, file.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Every ADR read by its section structure: nine located rules (a missing Decision, Context or Consequences section, a stale status, two records deciding the same question, a dangling supersede link, a number-only title, a single option, no named cost, no status where the log uses one, no enforcement field where the log adopted one), each a fixed deduction from 10; the score is the mean over evaluated records. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs foundsrc/main.rs:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with main.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

58 finding(s): 0 critical, 17 high, 41 medium, 0 low. 12 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 10 file(s) — `REDACTED` (line 1, line 34, line 39, …), `templates/auth_upload.html` (lines 1–3, line 61, lines 105–107, …), `templates/edit.html` (line 1, line 15, line 39), `templates/error.html` (line 1), `REDACTED` (line 1, lines 11–15), … (+5 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 12 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

41 finding(s): 1 critical, 3 high, 37 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 Medium advisory (unsound) finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (16). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.4 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness6.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 of 14 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/endpoints/edit.rs. Counted over 14 of the 28 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×5src/endpoints/edit.rs:1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with edit.rs, auth_upload.rs, db_sqlite.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×3) — REDACTED:5, REDACTED:41, REDACTED:114
  • Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. This player's source is set at runtime, so there is no caption file to author here: give the player a way to carry captions — accept a track/captions URL alongside the media and render a <track kind="captions"> when one is supplied — and capture that asset wherever the media enters the product (upload, import or generation). (×2) — REDACTED:8, REDACTED:130

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×7) — templates/auth_admin.html:5, templates/auth_admin.html:7, templates/auth_upload.html:14, …
  • This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id. (×2) — templates/edit.html:6, templates/index.html:249
  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — REDACTED:36

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — REDACTED:6
  • A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — REDACTED:16
  • The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — REDACTED:2
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — REDACTED:2

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".

  • An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×10) — templates/guide.html:2, templates/guide.html:6, templates/guide.html:15, …

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • `.embed-media` moves (`transition: transform 0.2s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — REDACTED:588
  • `button` moves (`transition: background-color .1s linear, border-color .1s linear, color .1s linear, box-shadow .1s linear, transform .1s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. (×2) — templates/assets/water.css:88, templates/assets/water.css:94
  • `input` moves (`transition: background-color .1s linear, border-color .1s linear, color .1s linear, box-shadow .1s linear, transform .1s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. (×2) — templates/assets/water.css:100, templates/assets/water.css:106
  • `textarea` moves (`transition: background-color .1s linear, border-color .1s linear, color .1s linear, box-shadow .1s linear, transform .1s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. (×2) — templates/assets/water.css:112, templates/assets/water.css:118

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.

What to do

  • Name the access rules — roles and permissions declared once (an enum Role/Permission, actix-web-grants #[protect(…)], axum-login's permission_required!, a casbin or oso policy) and consulted where access is checked, so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.

Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a health-check endpoint (a /health route on your axum/actix router) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
  • Deployment is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever reaches the release trigger goes to production unreviewed, so a mistaken merge or tag is live before anyone can stop it.

What to do

  • Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `reqwest::blocking::Client::new(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — src/util/http_client.rs:7
  • `reqwest::Client::new(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — src/util/http_client.rs:12
  • `reqwest::blocking::Client::builder(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — src/util/http_client.rs:17
  • `reqwest::Client::builder(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — src/util/http_client.rs:25

What to do

  • Give every client a whole-request bound: `reqwest::Client::builder().timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))` (never `reqwest::get` or `Client::new()`, which have none), ureq's `timeout_global`, or wrap the call in `tokio::time::timeout`; add retry with back-off (`reqwest-retry`'s `RetryTransientMiddleware`, `backoff`) around dependencies that fail.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

S1 · Web-Security Posture4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Read from this repository's Rust source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. This repository serves HTTP itself (`HttpServer::new(` (src/main.rs:104)), so its Rust source was also read for the server controls: TLS served or HSTS set, security response headers, cookie flags and inbound validation — each credited where its Rust spelling appears in production source, not proven on every route. A Rocket 0.5 application is credited the headers Rocket's default `Shield` sends unless it attaches its own, and its cookie jar's SameSite=Strict default; a session middleware its default cookie flags.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • This repository starts an HTTP server and nothing in its Rust source or committed `Rocket.toml` secures the transport: no TLS served (actix-web `bind_rustls`/`bind_openssl`, axum-server `bind_rustls` with a `RustlsConfig`, tonic `ServerTlsConfig`, a `TlsAcceptor`, Rocket's `[default.tls]`), no `Strict-Transport-Security` header, no `X-Forwarded-Proto` read from a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `HttpServer::new(` (src/main.rs:104).
  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Rust server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `HttpServer::new(` (src/main.rs:104).
  • This repository's Rust server sets cookies (src/endpoints/create.rs:414 — `Cookie::build`) and no `secure`, `http_only` or `same_site` flag is switched on anywhere, nor are its cookies Rocket's or a session middleware's, which carry flags by default. (−1.5 on this card.)

What to do

  • Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (`HttpServer::bind_rustls_0_23(addr, config)` in actix-web, `axum_server::bind_rustls(addr, RustlsConfig::from_pem_file(…))`, tonic's `Server::builder().tls_config(ServerTlsConfig::new().identity(…))`, Rocket's `[default.tls]`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and check `X-Forwarded-Proto`; send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only.
  • Set security response headers on what the server sends — actix-web's `DefaultHeaders::new().add((header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff"))`, tower-http's `SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(…)` on an axum router, or keep Rocket's default `Shield` — with `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response.
  • Flag the cookies the server sets: `Cookie::build((name, value)).secure(true).http_only(true).same_site(SameSite::Lax)` — or actix-session's `SessionMiddleware`/tower-sessions' `SessionManagerLayer`, which flag their cookie by default — on every session and auth cookie.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health75%Adequate — gated by D2, D4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture78%StrongSolid.
Maturity51%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness36%Weak — gated by D8, D13, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security58%Adequate — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility37%Weak — gated by AC1, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 65 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: Rust with no dependency-injection crate has no container to hand one lifetime's instance to another — every value is owned by the code that builds it, and the borrow checker rejects a longer-lived value keeping a borrow of a shorter-lived one.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Rust's compiler refuses unsynchronised shared mutation — a value shared across threads must be Sync — so the race this check looks for cannot be written. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — 17 | >>> FROM gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12 18 | 19 | WORKDIR /app -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12: failed to resolve source metadata for gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12:latest: failed to do request: Head "https://gcr.io/v2/distroless/cc-debian12/manifests/latest": Forbidden; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read html yet; not measured.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .rs source were not judged.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (4266 LoC, 38 module-visible types across 5 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
  • D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.rs), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Cargo build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 28 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 25% of this repository's production lines — rust (3,642 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
  • X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — X16 reached only 25% of this repository's production lines — rust (3,642 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Rust was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Rust request takes no token: a future is cancelled by dropping it, from outside the call (select!, a timeout, an aborted task), and reqwest, hyper and tonic take none
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Rust's compiler refuses the unsynchronised version: a collection shared between a callback's thread and the waiting body must be `Sync`, which a `Vec`, `VecDeque` or `HashMap` is only behind a `Mutex`/`RwLock`, so the race this check looks for cannot be written in safe Rust. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Rust was read, and it logs through none: the `log` crate's macros take one finished message (as log4net does in C#; its `kv` values are an opt-in its backends mostly drop), `println!`/`eprintln!` are not loggers, or it makes no log call outside its tests and examples at all. Calls through `tracing` (`tracing::info!`, or `info!` imported from it) would be judged.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 39 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AC2 · Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label · ×6
  • <input> without a programmatic label templates/auth_admin.html:5 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
  • <input> without a programmatic label templates/auth_admin.html:7 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
  • <input> without a programmatic label templates/auth_upload.html:14 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
  • <input> without a programmatic label templates/auth_upload.html:72 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
  • <input> without a programmatic label templates/index.html:265 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
  • <input> without a programmatic label templates/index.html:268 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AC1 · Text alternatives · <img> without a text alternative · ×3
  • <img> without a text alternative REDACTED:5 — An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
  • <img> without a text alternative REDACTED:41 — An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
  • <img> without a text alternative REDACTED:114 — An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AC2 · Forms & labels · <label> that labels no control · ×2
  • <label> that labels no control templates/edit.html:6 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control templates/index.html:249 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AC2 · Forms & labels · <textarea> without a programmatic label · ×1
  • <textarea> without a programmatic label templates/index.html:250 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
AC2 · Forms & labels · <select> without a programmatic label · ×1
  • <select> without a programmatic label REDACTED:36 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
AC3 · Page structure · <html> without a lang · ×1
  • <html> without a lang REDACTED:2 — The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
D28 · Secrets (history) · High secret · ×1
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • REDACTED
Serious — 205 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
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  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • + 9 more in this group — see findings.md.
D8 · Code Coverage · Low coverage · ×27
  • Low coverage: src/args.rs src/args.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/98).
  • Low coverage: REDACTED REDACTED:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/68).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/archive.rs src/endpoints/archive.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/90).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/auth_admin.rs src/endpoints/auth_admin.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/20).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/261).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/create.rs src/endpoints/create.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/279).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/edit.rs src/endpoints/edit.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/293).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/errors.rs src/endpoints/errors.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/file.rs src/endpoints/file.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/141).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/guide.rs src/endpoints/guide.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/list.rs src/endpoints/list.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/18).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/pasta.rs src/endpoints/pasta.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/274).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/qr.rs src/endpoints/qr.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/36).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/remove.rs src/endpoints/remove.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/113).
  • Low coverage: src/endpoints/static_resources.rs src/endpoints/static_resources.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/11).
  • Low coverage: src/main.rs src/main.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/61).
  • Low coverage: src/pasta.rs src/pasta.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/175).
  • Low coverage: src/util/auth.rs src/util/auth.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/21).
  • Low coverage: src/util/db.rs src/util/db.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/45).
  • Low coverage: src/util/db_json.rs src/util/db_json.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/29).
  • Low coverage: src/util/db_sqlite.rs src/util/db_sqlite.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/245).
  • Low coverage: src/util/hashids.rs src/util/hashids.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/10).
  • Low coverage: src/util/http_client.rs src/util/http_client.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: src/util/misc.rs src/util/misc.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/104).
  • Low coverage: src/util/syntaxhighlighter.rs src/util/syntaxhighlighter.rs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/23).
  • + 2 more in this group — see findings.md.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unsound) · ×16
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity · microbin · ×12
  • microbin::endpoints::create::create (cognitive 126) src/endpoints/create.rs:112 — microbin::endpoints::create::create has cognitive complexity 126 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 27 (54 pts), loops 14 (37 pts), match/switch 9 (29 pts), boolean chains 6 (nesting depth added 70). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove (cognitive 66) src/endpoints/remove.rs:69 — microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove has cognitive complexity 66 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16 (62 pts), boolean chains 3, loops 1 (nesting depth added 46). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
  • microbin::endpoints::file::post_secure_file (cognitive 47) src/endpoints/file.rs:17 — microbin::endpoints::file::post_secure_file has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15 (40 pts), loops 2 (6 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 29). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
  • microbin::endpoints::file::get_file (cognitive 46) src/endpoints/file.rs:122 — microbin::endpoints::file::get_file has cognitive complexity 46 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16 (40 pts), loops 2 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 28). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
  • microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive (cognitive 44) src/endpoints/archive.rs:14 — microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive has cognitive complexity 44 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17 (39 pts), loops 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 24). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
  • microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit (cognitive 43) src/endpoints/edit.rs:311 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (33 pts), loops 4 (8 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 23). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
  • microbin::util::misc::remove_expired (cognitive 43) src/util/misc.rs:14 — microbin::util::misc::remove_expired has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (36 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 1 (2 pts), match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 26). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
  • microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private (cognitive 32) src/endpoints/edit.rs:212 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (23 pts), loops 4 (8 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • microbin::endpoints::admin::post_admin (cognitive 24) REDACTED:30 — microbin::endpoints::admin::post_admin has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (15 pts), loops 3 (7 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • microbin::endpoints::pasta::pastaresponse (cognitive 22) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:24 — microbin::endpoints::pasta::pastaresponse has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (17 pts), boolean chains 2, match/switch 1 (2 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit_private (cognitive 21) src/endpoints/edit.rs:124 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit_private has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (15 pts), loops 3 (5 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • microbin::endpoints::pasta::postrawpasta (cognitive 19) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:349 — microbin::endpoints::pasta::postrawpasta has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (15 pts), match/switch 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Anchor without href · ×10
  • Anchor without href templates/guide.html:2 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
  • Anchor without href templates/guide.html:6 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
  • Anchor without href templates/guide.html:15 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
  • Anchor without href templates/guide.html:25 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
  • Anchor without href templates/guide.html:37 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
  • Anchor without href templates/guide.html:48 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
  • Anchor without href REDACTED:50 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
  • Anchor without href REDACTED:53 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
  • Anchor without href REDACTED:139 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
  • Anchor without href REDACTED:142 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×9
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D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · microbin · ×8
  • microbin::endpoints::create::create (cyclomatic 67) src/endpoints/create.rs:112 — microbin::endpoints::create::create has cyclomatic complexity 67 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
  • microbin::endpoints::file::post_secure_file (cyclomatic 18) src/endpoints/file.rs:17 — microbin::endpoints::file::post_secure_file has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove (cyclomatic 18) src/endpoints/remove.rs:69 — microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • microbin::util::misc::remove_expired (cyclomatic 17) src/util/misc.rs:14 — microbin::util::misc::remove_expired has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive (cyclomatic 16) src/endpoints/archive.rs:14 — microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private (cyclomatic 16) src/endpoints/edit.rs:212 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit (cyclomatic 16) src/endpoints/edit.rs:311 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • microbin::endpoints::file::get_file (cyclomatic 16) src/endpoints/file.rs:122 — microbin::endpoints::file::get_file has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard · ×7
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard REDACTED:588 — `.embed-media` moves (`transition: transform 0.2s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard templates/assets/water.css:88 — `button` moves (`transition: background-color .1s linear, border-color .1s linear, color .1s linear, box-shadow .1s linear, transform .1s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard templates/assets/water.css:94 — `button` moves (`transition: background-color .1s linear, border-color .1s linear, color .1s linear, box-shadow .1s linear, transform .1s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard templates/assets/water.css:100 — `input` moves (`transition: background-color .1s linear, border-color .1s linear, color .1s linear, box-shadow .1s linear, transform .1s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard templates/assets/water.css:106 — `input` moves (`transition: background-color .1s linear, border-color .1s linear, color .1s linear, box-shadow .1s linear, transform .1s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard templates/assets/water.css:112 — `textarea` moves (`transition: background-color .1s linear, border-color .1s linear, color .1s linear, box-shadow .1s linear, transform .1s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard templates/assets/water.css:118 — `textarea` moves (`transition: background-color .1s linear, border-color .1s linear, color .1s linear, box-shadow .1s linear, transform .1s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×6
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unmaintained) · ×6
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D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×6
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:42 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:42-54 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:82-94 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:42` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:117 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:117-129 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:157-169 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:117` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:192 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:192-204 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:232-244 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:192` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:267 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:267-279 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:307-319 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:267` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:342 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:342-354 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:382-394 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:342` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:292 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:292-304 | src/endpoints/remove.rs:150-165 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/edit.rs:292` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×4
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/pasta.rs:172 — src/pasta.rs:172-182 | src/pasta.rs:210-220 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/pasta.rs:172` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:362 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:362-372 | src/endpoints/remove.rs:142-153 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/edit.rs:362` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/pasta.rs:184 — src/pasta.rs:184-194 | src/pasta.rs:222-232 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/pasta.rs:184` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:310 — src/endpoints/pasta.rs:310-320 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:383-393 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/pasta.rs:310` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×4
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience src/util/http_client.rs:7 — `reqwest::blocking::Client::new(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience src/util/http_client.rs:12 — `reqwest::Client::new(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience src/util/http_client.rs:17 — `reqwest::blocking::Client::builder(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience src/util/http_client.rs:25 — `reqwest::Client::builder(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×3
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AC1 · Text alternatives · <video> without a captions track · ×2
  • <video> without a captions track REDACTED:8 — Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. This player's source is set at runtime, so there is no caption file to author here: give the player a way to carry captions — accept a track/captions URL alongside the media and render a <track kind="captions"> when one is supplied — and capture that asset wherever the media enters the product (upload, import or generation).
  • <video> without a captions track REDACTED:130 — Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. This player's source is set at runtime, so there is no caption file to author here: give the player a way to carry captions — accept a track/captions URL alongside the media and render a <track kind="captions"> when one is supplied — and capture that asset wherever the media enters the product (upload, import or generation).
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×2
  • TodoComment REDACTED:62 — // todo status report more sophisticated — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/endpoints/file.rs:112 — // TODO: make streaming <21-10-24, dvdsk> — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×2
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D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:173 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:173-186 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:283-296 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/edit.rs:173` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/endpoints/remove.rs:40 — src/endpoints/remove.rs:40-53 | src/endpoints/remove.rs:116-129 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 · ×1
  • Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 REDACTED:6 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
AC3 · Page structure · Data table has no header cells · ×1
  • Data table has no header cells REDACTED:16 — A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope).
AC3 · Page structure · Page without a main landmark · ×1
  • Page without a main landmark REDACTED:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · index.html.form.onsubmit (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • index.html.form.onsubmit (cyclomatic 16) templates/index.html:307 — index.html.form.onsubmit has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). Of this number, 13 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · aes.AES._prepare (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • aes.AES._prepare (cognitive 22) templates/assets/aes.js:202 — aes.AES._prepare has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 9 (17 pts), if/else 3 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · index.html.form.onsubmit (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • index.html.form.onsubmit (cognitive 21) templates/index.html:307 — index.html.form.onsubmit has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (16 pts), boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · index.html.document.addEventListener("paste") (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • index.html.document.addEventListener("paste") (cognitive 16) templates/index.html:570 — index.html.document.addEventListener("paste") has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (12 pts), loops 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 4). Of this number, 15 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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D3 · God Classes · FunctionTooLong · ×1
  • FunctionTooLong: microbin::endpoints::create::create src/endpoints/create.rs:112 — FunctionTooLong — microbin::endpoints::create::create runs 212 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 112 over it, 2.12× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyFields · ×1
  • TooManyFields: Args src/args.rs:16 — TooManyFields — 45 stored fields beside 4 methods. The bar is 30 stored fields; this is 15 over it, 1.50× the bar. This is width in DATA, not behaviour: every reader that takes the whole type couples to all of its fields, so a change to any one of them is a change every reader has to be checked against. To reduce it, group the fields that are read together by the same callers into a smaller type of their own, and have this one hold that type as a single member — each reader then names only the group it uses.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
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D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (84 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (84 corresponding lines) src/endpoints/edit.rs:216 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:216-308 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:315-398 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 84 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (93 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (93 corresponding lines) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:29 — src/endpoints/pasta.rs:29-126 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:353-445 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 93 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (45 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (45 corresponding lines) src/endpoints/edit.rs:25 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:25-69 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:75-121 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 45 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (37 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (37 corresponding lines) src/pasta.rs:170 — src/pasta.rs:170-206 | src/pasta.rs:208-244 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 37 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 47+ corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copies of one member (3 members, 47+ corresponding lines) src/util/db_sqlite.rs:14 — src/util/db_sqlite.rs:14-100 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:183-259 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:261-307 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 47 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) src/pasta.rs:136 — src/pasta.rs:136-149 | src/pasta.rs:151-168 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 14 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) src/endpoints/create.rs:31 — src/endpoints/create.rs:31-42 | src/endpoints/create.rs:45-58 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 12 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines) src/util/db.rs:37 — src/util/db.rs:37-46 | src/util/db.rs:61-70 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 10 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (30–32 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (30–32 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:217 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:217-248 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:316-345 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:32 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:32-57 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:84-109 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/edit.rs:32` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (21 lines × 5) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (21 lines × 5) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:62 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:62-82 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:137-157 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:212-232 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:287-307 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:362-382 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:62` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:174 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:174-190 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:249-265 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:324-340 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:174` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:24 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:24-40 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:99-115 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:24` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15–16 lines × 7) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15–16 lines × 7) src/endpoints/archive.rs:21 — src/endpoints/archive.rs:21-35 | src/endpoints/file.rs:26-40 | src/endpoints/file.rs:131-145 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:33-47 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:204-219 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:286-300 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:359-373 — before extracting anything, compare `src/endpoints/archive.rs` and `src/endpoints/file.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/archive.rs:21` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:146 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:146-160 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:245-259 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14–15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14–15 lines × 2) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:106 — src/endpoints/pasta.rs:106-120 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:240-253 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/pasta.rs:106` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 8) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 8) src/endpoints/archive.rs:25 — src/endpoints/archive.rs:25-38 | src/endpoints/file.rs:30-43 | src/endpoints/file.rs:135-148 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:37-50 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:208-222 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:290-303 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:363-376 | src/endpoints/qr.rs:28-41 — before extracting anything, compare `src/endpoints/archive.rs` and `src/endpoints/file.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/archive.rs:25` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `src/endpoints/file.rs:46` calls `password_from_multipart` and `src/endpoints/file.rs:151` does not — after which the two agree again for 3 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 3) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:105 — src/endpoints/pasta.rs:105-117 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:239-251 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:415-427 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 10) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 10) src/endpoints/archive.rs:28 — src/endpoints/archive.rs:28-39 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:149-160 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:248-259 | src/endpoints/file.rs:33-44 | src/endpoints/file.rs:138-149 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:40-51 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:211-223 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:293-304 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:366-377 | src/endpoints/qr.rs:31-42 — before extracting anything, compare `src/endpoints/archive.rs` and `src/endpoints/file.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `src/endpoints/file.rs:46` calls `password_from_multipart` and `src/endpoints/file.rs:151` does not — after which the two agree again for 4 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/util/db_sqlite.rs:88 — src/util/db_sqlite.rs:88-99 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:248-259 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/util/db_sqlite.rs:88` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 7) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 7) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:28 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:28-38 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:68-78 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:103-113 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:143-153 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:218-228 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:293-303 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:368-378 — all 7 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:28` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just before the matched lines, `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:66` calls `into_inner` and `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:26` does not — after which the two agree again for 2 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 8) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 8) src/endpoints/archive.rs:19 — src/endpoints/archive.rs:19-28 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:26-34 | src/endpoints/file.rs:24-33 | src/endpoints/file.rs:129-138 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:31-40 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:202-211 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:284-293 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:357-366 — before extracting anything, compare `src/endpoints/archive.rs` and `src/endpoints/file.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 5) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 5) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:35 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:35-42 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:110-117 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:185-192 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:260-267 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:335-342 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:35` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) src/util/db_sqlite.rs:216 — src/util/db_sqlite.rs:216-240 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:265-288 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/util/db_sqlite.rs:216` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) src/util/db_sqlite.rs:89 — src/util/db_sqlite.rs:89-99 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:249-259 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:297-307 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/util/db_sqlite.rs:89` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/pasta.rs:138 — src/pasta.rs:138-146 | src/pasta.rs:156-164 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/pasta.rs:138` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it and carries on into the declaration that follows — the window is the tail of one member plus the head of the next, so no call can be substituted for those exact lines, and the smallest declaration that contains all of them is the type they sit in. The repeated unit is the member each site sits in: where those members' bodies are the same, move one whole member to the shared location and have the others delegate to it; where the copies are a run of near-identical overloads or wrappers that differ only in their signatures, the repetition IS the run — a one-line delegation has no helper inside it to lift — so generate the run from the set it enumerates, or accept it and keep each member's own documentation with it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/endpoints/create.rs:161 — src/endpoints/create.rs:161-167 | src/endpoints/create.rs:189-195 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/endpoints/create.rs:161` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it and carries on into the declaration that follows — the window is the tail of one member plus the head of the next, so no call can be substituted for those exact lines, and the smallest declaration that contains all of them is the type they sit in. The repeated unit is the member each site sits in: where those members' bodies are the same, move one whole member to the shared location and have the others delegate to it; where the copies are a run of near-identical overloads or wrappers that differ only in their signatures, the repetition IS the run — a one-line delegation has no helper inside it to lift — so generate the run from the set it enumerates, or accept it and keep each member's own documentation with it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) REDACTED:35 — REDACTED:35-39 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:135-139 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:35` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1
  • Low cohesion: Pasta (LCOM4 5) src/pasta.rs:74 — Pasta's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
Minor — 24 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×5
  • Orphaned file src/endpoints/edit.rs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/util/db_sqlite.rs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file REDACTED:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/endpoints/qr.rs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
C2 · Access Controls · No named authorization policies · ×1
  • No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/endpoints/pasta.rs, src/args.rs, src/endpoints/remove.rs, src/util/misc.rs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found src/main.rs:1 — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`. ADRs are expected here because `src/main.rs` makes this repository a deployable product (line 1).
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 5 of 14 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated, example/demo and scaffolding-template trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 14 of the 28 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: src/util/db_sqlite.rs, src/endpoints/edit.rs, src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs, REDACTED, src/endpoints/qr.rs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M2 · Architecture documentation · No architecture diagram/doc · ×1
  • No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1
  • No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No release approval gate · ×1
  • No release approval gate — Deployment is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever reaches the release trigger goes to production unreviewed, so a mistaken merge or tag is live before anyone can stop it.
P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1
  • No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected · ×1
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — This repository starts an HTTP server and nothing in its Rust source or committed `Rocket.toml` secures the transport: no TLS served (actix-web `bind_rustls`/`bind_openssl`, axum-server `bind_rustls` with a `RustlsConfig`, tonic `ServerTlsConfig`, a `TlsAcceptor`, Rocket's `[default.tls]`), no `Strict-Transport-Security` header, no `X-Forwarded-Proto` read from a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `HttpServer::new(` (src/main.rs:104).
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1
  • No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Rust server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `HttpServer::new(` (src/main.rs:104).
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Secure cookie flags not detected · ×1
  • Secure cookie flags not detected — This repository's Rust server sets cookies (src/endpoints/create.rs:414 — `Cookie::build`) and no `secure`, `http_only` or `same_site` flag is switched on anywhere, nor are its cookies Rocket's or a session middleware's, which carry flags by default. (−1.5 on this card.)
Minor — 12 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×12
  • Outdated: actix-web — `actix-web` is locked at 4.13.0 but 4.19.0 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"4"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p actix-web` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: actix-web-httpauth — `actix-web-httpauth` is locked at 0.8.2 but 0.8.3 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.8.2"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p actix-web-httpauth` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: bytes — `bytes` is locked at 1.11.1 but 1.12.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1.11.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p bytes` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: chrono — `chrono` is locked at 0.4.44 but 0.4.45 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.4.19"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p chrono` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: futures — `futures` is locked at 0.3.32 but 0.3.34 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.3"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p futures` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: lazy_static — `lazy_static` is locked at 1.5.0 but 1.5.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1.4.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p lazy_static` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: log — `log` is locked at 0.4.29 but 0.4.35 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.4.21"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p log` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: openssl — `openssl` is locked at 0.10.76 but 0.10.82 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.10.64"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p openssl` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: rust-embed — `rust-embed` is locked at 8.11.0 but 8.14.0 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"8.3.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p rust-embed` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: rustls — `rustls` is locked at 0.23.37 but 0.23.46 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.23"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p rustls` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: serde — `serde` is locked at 1.0.228 but 1.0.229 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1.0.197"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p serde` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: serde_json — `serde_json` is locked at 1.0.149 but 1.0.154 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1.0.114"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p serde_json` and commit the updated REDACTED.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-d8e27a5c931d4109b430e2c90c7343ea/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-d8e27a5c931d4109b430e2c90c7343ea/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt .58artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .41artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .4artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 01a1dba8-7b5a-706a-8819-0537958782e6 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md