microbin — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

This application holds a weak overall standing of 46%, indicating a system that is small and easy to replace but currently fails to meet basic operational standards. While the underlying code structure is sound and performance is excellent, the significant gaps in maturity and readiness create unnecessary friction for future development and expose the business to compliance and usability risks. The asset is compact, comprising roughly 3,600 lines of production code with no dedicated test coverage, meaning a rebuild would cost approximately €3,300 and take just one engineer a few days. This low replacement cost is a critical factor in prioritizing remediation, as the financial barrier to fixing issues is minimal compared to the value at stake.

The most pressing theme is accessibility failure, which scores a critical 35%. This is not merely a technical debt issue but a direct business risk involving legal compliance and market reach. Without proper text alternatives for images, keyboard operability for custom controls, and captions for video content, the application excludes users with disabilities and invites regulatory scrutiny. Remediation here offers the highest leverage, as these fixes are relatively straightforward and can be enforced through existing test suites to prevent regression.

A second theme is the velocity tax imposed by moderate code quality. Although the architecture is robust, the average code complexity and cohesion score of 5.3 out of 10 means that every change in weaker areas costs 7–15% more effort than it should. This inefficiency compounds over time, slowing down feature delivery and increasing the likelihood of defects. While the code is not broken, it is not optimized for rapid iteration, which will become a bottleneck as the business scales.

On the positive side, the system demonstrates strong performance and a clean architectural foundation, ensuring that core transactions are reliable and fast. The lack of boilerplate and declarative noise suggests a focused codebase. However, the absence of measured domain modeling and event-driven patterns means our assessment of long-term scalability is partial. To maximize impact, the team should immediately prioritize accessibility fixes, as they offer the best return on investment and mitigate the most significant business risks. This approach stabilizes the user experience while keeping the low cost of ownership in mind.

Code Health 73% Adequate · gated by D2 Architecture 79% Strong Maturity 47% Weak · gated by M2 Readiness 49% Weak · gated by D8, P7 Security 69% Adequate · gated by D29, D36 Accessibility 35% Weak · gated by AC1, AC4 Performance 100% ★ Exemplary

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Accessibility 35% · 46% weightMaturity 47% · 25% weightReadiness 49% · 14% weightSecurity 69% · 8% weightCode Health 73% · 4% weightArchitecture 79% · 2% weightPerformance 100% · 1% weight

Raise Accessibility 35 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 46 → ~55.

New since the last scan (4+)

4 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-09-14) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D2 · aes.AES._prepare (cognitive 22) templates/assets/aes.js
D6 · Low cohesion: Pasta (LCOM4 5) src/pasta.rs
D30 · REDACTED
P7 · Outbound HTTP without resilience src/util/http_client.rs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,100–€5,400

Cost to rebuild	€1,100–€5,400 (0.1 person-years (18–57 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 46% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€3,300 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 35% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

+9.8 pts · Medium effort · Text alternatives

Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.

+9.8 pts · Medium effort · Keyboard semantics

Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

+9.7 pts · Medium effort · A11y enforcement

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 35%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (3,642 LoC) · weakest lens: Accessibility 35%

→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics

The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 5.3/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 7–15% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)

Evidence: D1/D2/D4/D6 code quality: averaging 5.3/10 across the code-quality signals actually measured

→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

29 modules, 21 dependencies. Every dependency points down the layering — no cycles.

Module dependency matrix. The row depends on the column; the number is how many type pairs create the dependency. A cell above the diagonal is part of a dependency cycle.
depends on →	1 microbin.args	6 microbin.pasta	13 microbin.util.version
1 microbin.args
2 microbin.endpoints.archive
3 microbin.endpoints.file
4 microbin.endpoints.remove
5 microbin.endpoints.static_resources
6 microbin.pasta
7 microbin.util.animalnumbers
8 microbin.util.auth
9 microbin.util.hashids
10 microbin.util.http_client
11 microbin.util.syntaxhighlighter
12 microbin.util.telemetry
13 microbin.util.version
14 templates.assets
15 microbin		1
16 microbin.endpoints.admin	1	1	1
17 microbin.endpoints.auth_admin	1
18 microbin.endpoints.auth_upload	1
19 microbin.endpoints.create	1
20 microbin.endpoints.edit	1	1
21 microbin.endpoints.errors	1
22 microbin.endpoints.guide	1
23 microbin.endpoints.list	1	1
24 microbin.endpoints.pasta	1	1
25 microbin.endpoints.qr	1	1
26 microbin.util.db		1
27 microbin.util.db_json		1
28 microbin.util.db_sqlite		1
29 microbin.util.misc		1

Dependency, pointing down the layeringAbove the diagonal — part of a cycleThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 73% · Adequate · gated by D2 ·

The Good

D3 · Rust God Classes 8.2 D4 · Rust Code Duplication 7.3 D17 · Rust Explicit Debt 9.9 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0

The Ugly

D1 · Rust Cyclomatic Complexity 4.2 D2 · Rust Cognitive Complexity 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 79% · Strong ·

The Good

D6 · Rust Cohesion (LCOM4) 7.6 D26 · Rust Project Cohesion 10.0 D35 · Rust Change Coupling 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

The Ugly

AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.8

At a glance — Maturity · 47% · Weak · gated by M2 ·

The Good

D15 · Rust Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · Rust Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · Rust Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · Rust Knowledge Freshness 7.9 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 7.0

The Bad

D16 · Rust Bus Factor 6.9 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.0

The Ugly

D20 · Rust ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 49% · Weak · gated by D8, P7 ·

The Good

D9 · Rust Test Distribution 10.0 D12 · Rust Dependency Hygiene 9.4 D13 · Rust Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 7.0

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

The Ugly

D8 · Rust Code Coverage 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 4.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0

At a glance — Security · 69% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36 ·

The Good

D28 · Rust Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · Rust IaC & Container Security 9.4 D37 · Rust Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 10.0 D43 · Rust Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · Rust Platform End-of-Life 10.0

The Bad

D30 · Rust Dependency Vulnerabilities 5.1

The Ugly

D29 · Rust Static Analysis (SAST) 0.5 D36 · Rust Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 35% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC4 ·

The Good

AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0

The Bad

AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 5.6 AC3 · Repo Page structure 5.4

The Ugly

AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 1.0 AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2021 — Injection	58	High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	19	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	4	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, ensure all media elements have appropriate text alternatives and that every form control and button has a programmatic label to support screen readers. Next, make custom controls fully keyboard-operable and fix anchor links to guarantee navigation works without a mouse. Finally, enforce these accessibility standards in your test suite and CI pipeline to prevent regressions, while also correcting basic page structure issues like language attributes and heading order.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.	+9.8 pts	Medium	Text alternatives
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.	+9.8 pts	Medium	Keyboard semantics
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.	+9.7 pts	Medium	A11y enforcement
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.	+9.3 pts	Medium	Page structure
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.	+9.3 pts	Medium	Forms & labels
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.	+3.8 pts	Low	ADR Quality
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.	+3.8 pts	Low	Code Coverage
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).	+4.3 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 27 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 11% slop · 82% mixed · 7% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	0.7	Slop	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	0.9	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	2.0	Slop	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.1	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
src/endpoints/file.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
src/endpoints/admin.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
REDACTED	6.2	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
src/pasta.rs	6.3	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)
REDACTED	6.3	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
src/endpoints/edit.rs	7.0	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private (cyclomatic 16)
src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs	7.0	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (21 lines × 5)
src/endpoints/archive.rs	7.1	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive (cyclomatic 16)
src/endpoints/pasta.rs	7.1	Mixed	Cognitive Complexity: microbin::endpoints::pasta::pastaresponse (cognitive 22)
src/endpoints/create.rs	7.2	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: microbin::endpoints::create::create (cyclomatic 67)
REDACTED	7.2	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
templates/assets/aes.js	7.4	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 102)
src/endpoints/remove.rs	7.4	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove (cyclomatic 18)

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 36

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 138

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 30

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 36

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 46 of 49 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 49 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D6D8D9D12D13D15D16D17D19D20D21D26D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D37D43D44AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX10AX3AX4AX9M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6P7PF3X29

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 171 of 204 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a0f1f2-e36c-7dcd-a4fb-ed01861cfcf3.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (Cargo.toml), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — it reads .NET projects — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X20 Mistyped argument guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was (anonymous) at 102. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being microbin::endpoints::create::expiration_to_timestamp at 16 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.

microbin::endpoints::create::create (cyclomatic 67) · ×8src/endpoints/create.rs:112

(anonymous) (cyclomatic 102)templates/assets/aes.js:2

What to do

Resolve the 8 microbin finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with file.rs (2), edit.rs (2), create.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 102) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with aes.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was microbin::endpoints::create::create at 126.

microbin::endpoints::create::create (cognitive 126) · ×12src/endpoints/create.rs:112

aes.AES._prepare (cognitive 22)templates/assets/aes.js:202

(anonymous)::_prepare (cognitive 22)templates/assets/aes.js:202

What to do

Resolve the 12 microbin finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with edit.rs (3), file.rs (2), pasta.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 aes.AES._prepare (cognitive 22) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with aes.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 (anonymous) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with aes.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

FunctionTooLong: microbin::endpoints::create::createsrc/endpoints/create.rs:112

TooManyFields: Argssrc/args.rs:16

What to do

Resolve the 1 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with create.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 TooManyFields finding(s) in God Classes — start with args.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

31 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×6src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:42

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×4src/pasta.rs:172

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2src/endpoints/edit.rs:173

Duplicated block (30–32 lines × 2)src/endpoints/edit.rs:217

Duplicated block (26 lines × 2)src/endpoints/edit.rs:32

+ 17 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 6 Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with auth_upload.rs (5), edit.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with pasta.rs (3), edit.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with edit.rs, remove.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: Pasta (LCOM4 5)src/pasta.rs:74

What to do

Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with pasta.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 test methods: 2 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Rust suite contributes 2 `#[test]` function(s) across 1 file(s) declaring at least one; its unit/integration split is Cargo's own — 0 of those file(s) are integration-test targets under a crate's tests/ directory, and the rest are #[test] functions compiled into the crate they test.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

12 outdated, 0 yanked direct Cargo dependencies. Only DIRECT edges are graded: a transitive crate cannot be moved past what its parent's requirement admits, so reporting one would be advice its owner cannot take. A newer release is reported only where this repository's OWN requirement already admits it, so the remedy is `cargo update` and never a manifest edit — which means a release outside the declared range is deliberately NOT charged, because a written-down constraint is a decision rather than a defect. Note that a bare requirement is a CARET, and for a 0.x crate its ceiling is the minor. Whether any crate is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — crates.io publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.

Outdated: actix-web · ×12

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D16 · Bus Factor6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/endpoints/pasta.rs. Counted over 14 of the 28 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 deducted task-comment markers across 3642 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×2src/endpoints/file.rs:112

What to do

Resolve the 2 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with file.rs, admin.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README (README.md) is a single cohesive document that clearly states what the project is and how to run it: 'MicroBin is a super tiny, feature-rich, configurable, self-contained and self-hosted paste bin web application' with installation via Docker and Cargo, plus links to the website, screenshots, guide, roadmap, and an outline of features. It is well written for its single file scope.

Documentation: no project overviewREADME.md

What to do

Resolve the 1 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 build units (Cargo) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

58 finding(s): 0 critical, 17 high, 41 medium, 0 low. 12 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 10 file(s) — `REDACTED` (line 1, line 34, line 39, …), `templates/auth_upload.html` (lines 1–3, line 61, lines 105–107, …), `templates/edit.html` (line 1, line 15, line 39), `templates/error.html` (line 1), `REDACTED` (line 1, lines 11–15), … (+5 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

REDACTED

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 12 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

19 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 16 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium advisory (unmaintained) finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security9.4 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 of 14 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs. Counted over 14 of the 28 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

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D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.

An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×3) — REDACTED:5, REDACTED:41, REDACTED:114
Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. This player's source is set at runtime, so there is no caption file to author here: give the player a way to carry captions — accept a track/captions URL alongside the media and render a <track kind="captions"> when one is supplied — and capture that asset wherever the media enters the product (upload, import or generation). (×2) — REDACTED:8, REDACTED:130

What to do

Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC2 · Forms & labels5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×7) — templates/auth_admin.html:5, templates/auth_admin.html:7, templates/auth_upload.html:14, …
This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id. (×2) — templates/edit.html:6, templates/index.html:249
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — REDACTED:36

What to do

Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC3 · Page structure5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — REDACTED:6
A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — REDACTED:16
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — REDACTED:2
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — REDACTED:2

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

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AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".

An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×10) — templates/guide.html:2, templates/guide.html:6, templates/guide.html:15, …

What to do

Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.

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AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

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AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.

No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 14 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

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AX10 · Code composition4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

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AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.

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M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

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M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

What to do

Add `#[cfg(test)] mod tests` blocks beside the code they cover — the attribute keeps them out of the release build, a stronger separation than a folder — reserve `tests/` for black-box integration tests, and run `cargo test` in CI.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy7.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README omits the Rust backend project — reported by the model that read the README against this repository; no term search was run for this one, so nothing here has been checked against the tree. Treat it as a reading to confirm, not as a measured contradiction: verify it against the code before acting on it, and if the footprint it describes does exist, this row is wrong.
README omits the WebAssembly frontend project — reported by the model that read the README against this repository; no term search was run for this one, so nothing here has been checked against the tree. Treat it as a reading to confirm, not as a measured contradiction: verify it against the code before acting on it, and if the footprint it describes does exist, this row is wrong.
README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists — searched for: `rag`, `langchain`, `llamaindex`, `pinecone`, `weaviate`, `qdrant`, `embeddings`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest files (package.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.slnx, *.yml, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README omits the Rust backend project; README omits the WebAssembly frontend project; README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.

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P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry with tracing-opentelemetry) and a health-check endpoint (a /health route on your axum/actix router) for operability.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
Deployment is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever reaches the release trigger goes to production unreviewed, so a mistaken merge or tag is live before anyone can stop it.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

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P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

`reqwest::blocking::Client::new(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — src/util/http_client.rs:7

What to do

Give every client a whole-request bound: `reqwest::Client::builder().timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))` (never `reqwest::get` or `Client::new()`, which have none), ureq's `timeout_global`, or wrap the call in `tokio::time::timeout`; add retry with back-off (`reqwest-retry`'s `RetryTransientMiddleware`, `backoff`) around dependencies that fail.

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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC1 · Text alternatives	1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5	Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics	2.1.1, 2.4.3	Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness	4.1.2	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	73%	Adequate — gated by D2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	79%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	47%	Weak — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	49%	Weak — gated by D8, P7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	69%	Adequate — gated by D29, D36	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility	35%	Weak — gated by AC1, AC4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.

Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control

Not included — 66 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: Rust with no dependency-injection crate has no container to hand one lifetime's instance to another — every value is owned by the code that builds it, and the borrow checker rejects a longer-lived value keeping a borrow of a shorter-lived one.
AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Rust's compiler refuses unsynchronised shared mutation — a value shared across threads must be Sync — so the race this check looks for cannot be written. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — time="2026-09-30T10:53:44Z" level=warning msg="The \"MICROBIN_SHORT_PATH\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." microbin Pulling microbin Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: time="2026-09-30T10:53:44Z" level=warning msg="The \"MICROBIN_DEFAULT_PRIVACY\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." microbin Pulling microbin Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's 435 shipped crate(s) were read from its REDACTED, but crates.io could not be asked for the licence of 59 of them (HTTP 429 Unknown Error), and a licence verdict over part of a dependency graph is not a licence verdict. Nothing is asserted about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Cargo build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# syntax, and none was loaded for this repository. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: Rust spells out every heap allocation and makes borrowed slices (&[T], &str) its ordinary parameter types, so the allocation-aware style this card rewards elsewhere is the language's baseline rather than a rung to climb. TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X12 Unreachable branch — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X13 Undrained process stream — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X14 Bypassable address classification — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X19 Unrestored process-global state — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X22 Contradicted release guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X25 Inert configuration knob — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 36 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

AC2 · Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label · ×6

<input> without a programmatic label templates/auth_admin.html:5 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label templates/auth_admin.html:7 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label templates/auth_upload.html:14 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label templates/auth_upload.html:72 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label templates/index.html:265 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label templates/index.html:268 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

AC1 · Text alternatives · <img> without a text alternative · ×3

<img> without a text alternative REDACTED:5 — An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
<img> without a text alternative REDACTED:41 — An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
<img> without a text alternative REDACTED:114 — An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×3

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

AC2 · Forms & labels · <label> that labels no control · ×2

<label> that labels no control templates/edit.html:6 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
<label> that labels no control templates/index.html:249 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.

AC2 · Forms & labels · <textarea> without a programmatic label · ×1

<textarea> without a programmatic label templates/index.html:250 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.

AC2 · Forms & labels · <select> without a programmatic label · ×1

<select> without a programmatic label REDACTED:36 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.

AC3 · Page structure · <html> without a lang · ×1

<html> without a lang REDACTED:2 — The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1

REDACTED

D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1

No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely. Start with the code you change most often: add a suite in a framework a runner can collect (Rust's built-in `#[test]` harness (with `cargo test`)), and run it in CI so the gap cannot reopen.

Serious — 138 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
+ 9 more in this group — see findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · microbin · ×12

microbin::endpoints::create::create (cognitive 126) src/endpoints/create.rs:112 — microbin::endpoints::create::create has cognitive complexity 126 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 27 (54 pts), loops 14 (37 pts), match/switch 9 (29 pts), boolean chains 6 (nesting depth added 70). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove (cognitive 66) src/endpoints/remove.rs:69 — microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove has cognitive complexity 66 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16 (62 pts), boolean chains 3, loops 1 (nesting depth added 46). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
microbin::endpoints::file::post_secure_file (cognitive 47) src/endpoints/file.rs:17 — microbin::endpoints::file::post_secure_file has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15 (40 pts), loops 2 (6 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 29). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
microbin::endpoints::file::get_file (cognitive 46) src/endpoints/file.rs:122 — microbin::endpoints::file::get_file has cognitive complexity 46 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16 (40 pts), loops 2 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 28). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive (cognitive 44) src/endpoints/archive.rs:14 — microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive has cognitive complexity 44 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17 (39 pts), loops 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 24). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
microbin::util::misc::remove_expired (cognitive 43) src/util/misc.rs:14 — microbin::util::misc::remove_expired has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (36 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 1 (2 pts), match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 26). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit (cognitive 43) src/endpoints/edit.rs:311 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (33 pts), loops 4 (8 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 23). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private (cognitive 32) src/endpoints/edit.rs:212 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (23 pts), loops 4 (8 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
microbin::endpoints::admin::post_admin (cognitive 24) src/endpoints/admin.rs:30 — microbin::endpoints::admin::post_admin has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (15 pts), loops 3 (7 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
microbin::endpoints::pasta::pastaresponse (cognitive 22) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:24 — microbin::endpoints::pasta::pastaresponse has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (17 pts), boolean chains 2, match/switch 1 (2 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit_private (cognitive 21) src/endpoints/edit.rs:124 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit_private has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (15 pts), loops 3 (5 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
microbin::endpoints::pasta::postrawpasta (cognitive 19) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:349 — microbin::endpoints::pasta::postrawpasta has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (15 pts), match/switch 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Anchor without href · ×10

Anchor without href templates/guide.html:2 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href templates/guide.html:6 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href templates/guide.html:15 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href templates/guide.html:25 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href templates/guide.html:37 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href templates/guide.html:48 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href REDACTED:50 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href REDACTED:53 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href REDACTED:139 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href REDACTED:142 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · microbin · ×8

microbin::endpoints::create::create (cyclomatic 67) src/endpoints/create.rs:112 — microbin::endpoints::create::create has cyclomatic complexity 67 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
microbin::endpoints::file::post_secure_file (cyclomatic 18) src/endpoints/file.rs:17 — microbin::endpoints::file::post_secure_file has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove (cyclomatic 18) src/endpoints/remove.rs:69 — microbin::endpoints::remove::post_remove has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
microbin::util::misc::remove_expired (cyclomatic 17) src/util/misc.rs:14 — microbin::util::misc::remove_expired has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
microbin::endpoints::file::get_file (cyclomatic 16) src/endpoints/file.rs:122 — microbin::endpoints::file::get_file has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private (cyclomatic 16) src/endpoints/edit.rs:212 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_submit_edit_private has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit (cyclomatic 16) src/endpoints/edit.rs:311 — microbin::endpoints::edit::post_edit has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive (cyclomatic 16) src/endpoints/archive.rs:14 — microbin::endpoints::archive::get_archive has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×6

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:42 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:42-54 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:82-94 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:117 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:117-129 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:157-169 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:192 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:192-204 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:232-244 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:267 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:267-279 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:307-319 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:342 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:342-354 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:382-394 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:292 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:292-304 | src/endpoints/remove.rs:150-165 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unmaintained) · ×5

REDACTED
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×5

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unsound) · ×4

REDACTED
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D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×4

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/pasta.rs:172 — src/pasta.rs:172-182 | src/pasta.rs:210-220 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:362 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:362-372 | src/endpoints/remove.rs:142-153 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/pasta.rs:184 — src/pasta.rs:184-194 | src/pasta.rs:222-232 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:310 — src/endpoints/pasta.rs:310-320 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:383-393 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×3

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AC1 · Text alternatives · <video> without a captions track · ×2

<video> without a captions track REDACTED:8 — Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. This player's source is set at runtime, so there is no caption file to author here: give the player a way to carry captions — accept a track/captions URL alongside the media and render a <track kind="captions"> when one is supplied — and capture that asset wherever the media enters the product (upload, import or generation).
<video> without a captions track REDACTED:130 — Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. This player's source is set at runtime, so there is no caption file to author here: give the player a way to carry captions — accept a track/captions URL alongside the media and render a <track kind="captions"> when one is supplied — and capture that asset wherever the media enters the product (upload, import or generation).

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×2

TodoComment src/endpoints/file.rs:112 — // TODO: make streaming <21-10-24, dvdsk> — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/endpoints/admin.rs:62 — // todo status report more sophisticated — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2

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D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×2

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D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:173 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:173-186 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:283-296 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/endpoints/remove.rs:40 — src/endpoints/remove.rs:40-53 | src/endpoints/remove.rs:116-129 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 · ×1

Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 REDACTED:6 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.

AC3 · Page structure · Data table has no header cells · ×1

Data table has no header cells REDACTED:16 — A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope).

AC3 · Page structure · Page without a main landmark · ×1

Page without a main landmark REDACTED:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.

AC7 · A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1

Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 14 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 102) · ×1

(anonymous) (cyclomatic 102) templates/assets/aes.js:2 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 102 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 5 of the 102 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 36 function items inside it that branch (_prepare, coerceArray, checkInts, …). Those helpers are already separate functions, so extracting the branching again is not available. To reduce it, move them out of the body to the enclosing scope, where each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · aes.AES._prepare (cognitive 22) · ×1

aes.AES._prepare (cognitive 22) templates/assets/aes.js:202 — aes.AES._prepare has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 9 (17 pts), if/else 3 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) · ×1

(anonymous)::_prepare (cognitive 22) templates/assets/aes.js:202 — (anonymous)::_prepare has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 9 (17 pts), if/else 3 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

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D3 · God Classes · FunctionTooLong · ×1

FunctionTooLong: microbin::endpoints::create::create src/endpoints/create.rs:112 — FunctionTooLong — microbin::endpoints::create::create runs 212 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 112 over it, 2.12× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.

D3 · God Classes · TooManyFields · ×1

TooManyFields: Args src/args.rs:16 — TooManyFields — 45 stored fields beside 4 methods. The bar is 30 stored fields; this is 15 over it, 1.50× the bar. This is width in DATA, not behaviour: every reader that takes the whole type couples to all of its fields, so a change to any one of them is a change every reader has to be checked against. To reduce it, group the fields that are read together by the same callers into a smaller type of their own, and have this one hold that type as a single member — each reader then names only the group it uses.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

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D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (30–32 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (30–32 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:217 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:217-248 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:316-345 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:32 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:32-57 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:84-109 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (21 lines × 5) · ×1

Duplicated block (21 lines × 5) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:62 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:62-82 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:137-157 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:212-232 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:287-307 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:362-382 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:174 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:174-190 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:249-265 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:324-340 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:24 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:24-40 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:99-115 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15–16 lines × 7) · ×1

Duplicated block (15–16 lines × 7) src/endpoints/archive.rs:21 — src/endpoints/archive.rs:21-35 | src/endpoints/file.rs:26-40 | src/endpoints/file.rs:131-145 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:33-47 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:204-219 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:286-300 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:359-373 — before extracting anything, compare `src/endpoints/archive.rs` and `src/endpoints/file.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14–15 lines × 8) · ×1

Duplicated block (14–15 lines × 8) src/endpoints/archive.rs:25 — src/endpoints/archive.rs:25-38 | src/endpoints/file.rs:30-43 | src/endpoints/file.rs:135-148 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:37-50 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:208-222 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:290-303 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:363-376 | src/endpoints/qr.rs:28-41 — before extracting anything, compare `src/endpoints/archive.rs` and `src/endpoints/file.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/endpoints/edit.rs:146 — src/endpoints/edit.rs:146-160 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:245-259 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14–15 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (14–15 lines × 2) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:106 — src/endpoints/pasta.rs:106-120 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:240-253 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12–13 lines × 10) · ×1

Duplicated block (12–13 lines × 10) src/endpoints/archive.rs:28 — src/endpoints/archive.rs:28-39 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:149-160 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:248-259 | src/endpoints/file.rs:33-44 | src/endpoints/file.rs:138-149 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:40-51 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:211-223 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:293-304 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:366-377 | src/endpoints/qr.rs:31-42 — before extracting anything, compare `src/endpoints/archive.rs` and `src/endpoints/file.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (13 lines × 3) src/endpoints/pasta.rs:105 — src/endpoints/pasta.rs:105-117 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:239-251 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:415-427 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/util/db_sqlite.rs:88 — src/util/db_sqlite.rs:88-99 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:248-259 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 7) · ×1

Duplicated block (11 lines × 7) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:28 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:28-38 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:68-78 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:103-113 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:143-153 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:218-228 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:293-303 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:368-378 — all 7 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 8) · ×1

Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 8) src/endpoints/archive.rs:19 — src/endpoints/archive.rs:19-28 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:26-34 | src/endpoints/file.rs:24-33 | src/endpoints/file.rs:129-138 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:31-40 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:202-211 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:284-293 | src/endpoints/pasta.rs:357-366 — before extracting anything, compare `src/endpoints/archive.rs` and `src/endpoints/file.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 5) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 5) src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:35 — src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:35-42 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:110-117 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:185-192 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:260-267 | src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs:335-342 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) src/util/db_sqlite.rs:216 — src/util/db_sqlite.rs:216-240 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:265-288 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) src/util/db_sqlite.rs:89 — src/util/db_sqlite.rs:89-99 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:249-259 | src/util/db_sqlite.rs:297-307 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/endpoints/create.rs:161 — src/endpoints/create.rs:161-167 | src/endpoints/create.rs:189-195 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/endpoints/admin.rs:35 — src/endpoints/admin.rs:35-39 | src/endpoints/edit.rs:135-139 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1

Low cohesion: Pasta (LCOM4 5) src/pasta.rs:74 — Pasta's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×1

Outbound HTTP without resilience src/util/http_client.rs:7 — `reqwest::blocking::Client::new(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.

Minor — 18 finding(s)

M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×3

README/code drift — README omits the Rust backend project — reported by the model that read the README against this repository; no term search was run for this one, so nothing here has been checked against the tree. Treat it as a reading to confirm, not as a measured contradiction: verify it against the code before acting on it, and if the footprint it describes does exist, this row is wrong.
README/code drift — README omits the WebAssembly frontend project — reported by the model that read the README against this repository; no term search was run for this one, so nothing here has been checked against the tree. Treat it as a reading to confirm, not as a measured contradiction: verify it against the code before acting on it, and if the footprint it describes does exist, this row is wrong.
README/code drift — README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists — searched for: `rag`, `langchain`, `llamaindex`, `pinecone`, `weaviate`, `qdrant`, `embeddings`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest files (package.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.slnx, *.yml, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/endpoints/pasta.rs, src/args.rs, src/endpoints/remove.rs, src/util/misc.rs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.

D19 · Documentation Quality · Documentation · ×1

Documentation: no project overview README.md — The README begins with a strong overview but does not quote it in any later section; the reader cannot tell whether this is the only document or if there is an architecture/design doc, and no feature list is present. Ensure every listed feature (entirely self-contained executable, E2E encryption, animal identifiers) appears in a heading so readers can find them without scanning.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

REDACTED

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 3 of 14 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 14 of the 28 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: src/util/db_sqlite.rs, src/endpoints/auth_upload.rs, src/endpoints/qr.rs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

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M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

M2 · Architecture documentation · No architecture diagram/doc · ×1

No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1

No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No release approval gate · ×1

No release approval gate — Deployment is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever reaches the release trigger goes to production unreviewed, so a mistaken merge or tag is live before anyone can stop it.

P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1

No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

Minor — 12 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×12

Outdated: actix-web — `actix-web` is locked at 4.13.0 but 4.15.0 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"4"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p actix-web` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: actix-web-httpauth — `actix-web-httpauth` is locked at 0.8.2 but 0.8.3 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.8.2"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p actix-web-httpauth` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: bytes — `bytes` is locked at 1.11.1 but 1.12.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1.11.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p bytes` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: chrono — `chrono` is locked at 0.4.44 but 0.4.45 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.4.19"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p chrono` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: futures — `futures` is locked at 0.3.32 but 0.3.34 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.3"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p futures` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: html-escape — `html-escape` is locked at 0.2.13 but 0.2.15 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.2.13"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p html-escape` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: log — `log` is locked at 0.4.29 but 0.4.34 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.4.21"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p log` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: openssl — `openssl` is locked at 0.10.76 but 0.10.81 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.10.64"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p openssl` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: rust-embed — `rust-embed` is locked at 8.11.0 but 8.12.0 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"8.3.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p rust-embed` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: rustls — `rustls` is locked at 0.23.37 but 0.23.45 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.23"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p rustls` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: serde — `serde` is locked at 1.0.228 but 1.0.229 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1.0.197"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p serde` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: serde_json — `serde_json` is locked at 1.0.149 but 1.0.151 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1.0.114"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p serde_json` and commit the updated REDACTED.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-dc09f30986c5497db8e700ea26886a5c/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-dc09f30986c5497db8e700ea26886a5c/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	58	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	19	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	4	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	0	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 01a0f1f2-e36c-7dcd-a4fb-ed01861cfcf3 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Szabodanika/microbin

Findings by grade

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 73% · Adequate · gated by D2 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 79% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 47% · Weak · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 49% · Weak · gated by D8, P7 ·

At a glance — Security · 69% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36 ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 35% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC4 ·

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts