Public report — tailscale, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
1418findings with an exact file:lineof 1436 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
55/116dimensions across the health lenses300096 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
tailscale/tailscale is sound in substance but carries real gaps (53%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Accessibility (37%) — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost. Security (57%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative… (Text alternatives); Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler) (Keyboard semantics); accessibility in the toolchain (A11y enforcement).
For scale: Large (~300,096 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~5.5 person-years (~3–11 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
0.7× (at 53% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Large · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code
~36 LoC unreachable (1 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)
This codebase represents roughly ~5.5 person-years of build effort (about ~€790,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 37% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Large asset (~5.5 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 37%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
The top fix pays for itself · High · Economics
The top-ranked fix costs roughly 3–10 engineer-days once. Not doing it costs about 56.6–339.4 engineer-days every year, paid as drag on the ~381,916 lines this team changes annually — a bill that arrives whether or not anyone books it. On those figures the fix breaks even in roughly 1–2 months and is free after that. Method, stated so this is not read as a quotation: debt from the ranked task's effort band; interest = annual changed lines (measured, annualised from the 90-day window) ÷ an ASSUMED 150–400 lines per engineer-day × the 6–13% drag implied by the code-quality signals; breaking point = debt ÷ annual interest. A modelled planning range built from measured inputs and one named assumption — not a quotation, a valuation, or a certified figure.
Evidence: D15 churn: 94,171 line(s) changed over a 90-day window ⇒ ~381,916/year · D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 5.6/10 ⇒ a 6–13% drag on each change · top-ranked remediation: Medium effort ⇒ about 3–10 engineer-day(s)
→ Do the top-ranked fix now if this code will still be yours in 2 months.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 5.6/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 6–13% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
Evidence: D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 5.6/10 across the code-quality signals actually measured
→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
462 modules, 2729 dependencies — 3 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 84% · Adequate · gated by D2
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
50
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
42
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
37
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by adding text alternatives for all images, media, and video content to ensure proper description. Next, make custom controls keyboard-operable and ensure all interactive elements and anchors have correct semantics and links. Then, implement accessibility enforcement in the toolchain by adding relevant plugins and tests to gate quality in CI. Finally, fix page structure by declaring language, titles, and landmarks, and ensure every form control and button has a programmatic label.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 53 of 55 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 55 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 1418 of 1436 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement: Runtime enforcement is read from committed policy files — a Tetragon/Falco/Kyverno stack installed cluster-wide (Helm release, platform add-on) with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a committed policy is declared intent, not proof the engine is running and blocking in the live cluster.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
396 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was controlclient.peerChangeDiff at 93. A further 7 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being Node.Equal at 38 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 389 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 2 main.main (cyclomatic 33) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with tsidp.go, listpkgs.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 main.main (cyclomatic 19) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with featuretags.go, main.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 controlclient.peerChangeDiff (cyclomatic 93) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with map.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 656 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 3 main.main (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with main.go, proxy-to-grafana.go, update.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 main.main (cognitive 57) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with tsidp.go, listpkgs.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 main.main (cognitive 35) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with natc.go, gocross.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 62 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with local.go (2), tailnet-lock.go (2), derp.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (62 warning-level).
Resolve the 28 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with local.go (2), derpserver.go (2), vnet.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (28 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
83 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is cmd/fbstatus/fbstatus.go.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×6
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
What to do
Resolve the 6 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
Tailscale's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, architecture/design docs, and a dedicated licenses doc. The main content is the Tailscale CLI repository README (tsnet), which explains how to embed a self-contained node inside a Go process using gVisor, covers usage with code examples, and documents authentication, multiple-node running, and the Server type's interfaces. A separate README for the DERP packet-relay system describes its WireGuard-based map, home selection, and regional meshing, while the licenses doc explains dependency licensing generation, CSV output options, reviewer instructions, and a detailed review process. The READMEs are all clipped by the scanner at the end of each file (e.g., '…(clipped here by the scanner for evaluation') but the full outline is visible, so no section is flagged as missing. All files are clearly written with real examples rather than stub code. The Tailscale documentation is comprehensive across a wide range of deployment options: Kubernetes node deployments (standalone proxy, sidecar, subnet router), OIDC identity provider tsidp, systray command for Linux, pgproxy PostgreSQL wire protocol proxy, nginx-auth reverse-proxy tool with UNIX socket security enhancements, gitops-pusher CI workflow, DERP server guide, and connector-gen pre-configured app connectors. The READMEs are well written, each covering setup, prerequisites, configuration examples, and caveats, with a strong architecture/usage outline for every documented path. There is no single missing section across the set.
The overview mentions that the iOS and Android apps use this repo's code but also states the mobile GUI code lives elsewhere; the reader cannot tell whether the mobile code is open source from the text alone.README.md
What to do
Resolve the 1 The overview mentions that the iOS and Android apps use this repo's code… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown.github/dependabot.yml:16detected by semgrep finding
Medium: math-random-used · ×49cmd/derper/bootstrap_dns.go:12detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 49 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with natc.go (2), web.go (2), testcontrol.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (49 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dependabot.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×11Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: KSV-0050 · ×2cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/operator-rbac.yamldetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×29cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/deployment.yamldetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 29 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with operator.yaml (8), deployment.yaml (4), deploy.yaml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (29 warning-level).
Resolve the 11 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4), operator.yaml (2), Dockerfile.base. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with operator-rbac.yaml, operator.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
72 of 798 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is kube/kubeclient/client.go.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×21client/web/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×9client/web/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×4client/web/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]client/web/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 21 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (14), go.mod (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 issue-level).
Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (5), go.mod (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod, yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the Kubernetes deployment wires runtime threat enforcement — a detection engine (Tetragon/Falco) and/or an admission-control policy gate (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity). Presence of committed policy, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a runtime threat-detection engine (Tetragon TracingPolicy / Falco) and an admission-control policy (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity). Reward-leaning; NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No runtime threat detection finding(s) in Runtime Threat Enforcement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d42_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — event.html:39, index.html:50
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has no associated label. Add a <label htmlFor> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×2) — toggle.tsx:24, ssh.tsx:97
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label htmlFor>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — ssh.tsx:90
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×4) — ui-edit.html:43, ui-edit.html:51, ui-edit.html:63, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). (×4) — device-details-view.tsx:52, device-details-view.tsx:108, device-details-view.tsx:159, …
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — hello.tmpl.html:43
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×6) — index.html:2, ui-edit.html:2, ui-list.html:2, …
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×5) — index.html:2, status.html:2, index.html:22, …
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — main.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabIndex={0} + a key handler. — go-panic-display.tsx:12
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
`.btn-warning` sets color: white on background-color: rgb(245 158 11) — 2.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — ui-style.css:131
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with vitest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether cross-context integration events stay loosely coupled — no producer-owned enums/domain types leaking to consumers. Shared-kernel/contracts types are allowed.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): integration-event properties scanned for producer-domain type/enum leaks versus primitives and shared-kernel types. Deterministic, hard fact.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.
`DebugEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — debug.go:197
What to do
Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 2 of 3 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.3 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README omits the Android app (https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale-android)
README omits the QNAP package (https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale-qpkg)
README omits the Chocolatey packaging (https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale-chocolatey)
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README omits the Android app (https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale-android); README omits the QNAP package (https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale-qpkg); README omits the Chocolatey packaging (https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale-chocolatey).
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists and the service already exposes health probe endpoints (healthz/livez/readyz or a container healthcheck), but no manifest in this repository wires them into readiness/liveness probes, a rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or a migration job — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse. If that wiring lives in a separate ops/Helm repository, document the pointer here so release safety is evidenced.
What to do
Wire the existing health endpoints into readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy in the deployment manifests — or document where that wiring lives — so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
client/web/src/components/login-toggle.tsx:63 · client/web/src/components/login-toggle.tsx:93 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — login-toggle.tsx:63
client/web/src/components/views/login-view.tsx:38 · client/web/src/components/views/login-view.tsx:66 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — login-view.tsx:38
client/web/src/components/views/device-details-view.tsx:60 · client/web/src/components/views/device-details-view.tsx:75 · client/web/src/components/views/device-details-view.tsx:130 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. — device-details-view.tsx:60
client/web/src/components/views/device-details-view.tsx:111 · client/web/src/components/views/device-details-view.tsx:133 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — device-details-view.tsx:111
client/web/src/components/views/ssh-view.tsx:19 · client/web/src/components/views/subnet-router-view.tsx:42 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — ssh-view.tsx:19
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×5) — button.tsx:52, exit-node-selector.tsx:19, dialog.tsx:222, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage0.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — exit-node-selector.tsx, login-toggle.tsx, api.ts, …
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 4 application, 2 tooling and 1 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (4 application, 2 tooling, 1 test roots considered) — collapsible.tsx
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~212667 lines of test source are present (.go, .ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go, .ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
ED1 Handler temporal coupling — no event handlers detected — temporal-coupling check not applicable
ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds; 10 Go aggregate(s) recording domain events (own events-slice append / raise-record)
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Issue — 37 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×21
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.23.3: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with a `resolutions` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with a `resolutions` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with a `resolutions` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— flatted 3.2.9: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with a `resolutions` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.2.9, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.9: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— form-data 4.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.6 with a `resolutions` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/containerd/containerd 1.7.29: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/containerd/containerd is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/containerd/containerd@v1.7.32`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against github.com/containerd/containerd 1.7.29: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5064, GO-2026-5338, GO-2026-5622.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5 5.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5@v5.9.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5 5.8.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 5.17.1: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/go-git/go-git/v5@v5.19.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 5.17.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5496.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/moby/buildkit 0.20.2: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/moby/buildkit is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/moby/buildkit@v0.28.1`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against github.com/moby/buildkit 0.20.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/prometheus/prometheus 0.49.2-0.20240125131847-c3b8ef1694ff: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.305.2. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against github.com/prometheus/prometheus 0.49.2-0.20240125131847-c3b8ef1694ff: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— go.opentelemetry.io/otel 1.39.0: [GHSA redacted] — go.opentelemetry.io/otel is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get go.opentelemetry.io/otel@v1.41.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— js-yaml 4.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with a `resolutions` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— lodash 4.17.23: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with a `resolutions` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.23: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with a `resolutions` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— minimatch 9.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 9.0.7 with a `resolutions` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 9.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 9.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— oras.land/oras-go/v2 2.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — oras.land/oras-go/v2 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get oras.land/oras-go/v2@v2.6.2`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against oras.land/oras-go/v2 2.6.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5885.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with a `resolutions` entry). (in 2 dependency files: client/web/yarn.lock, cmd/tsconnect/yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares postcss ^8.4.31, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 8.5.12, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so postcss moves onto 8.5.12 or later; if the flagged 8.5.6 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin postcss with a `resolutions` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: client/web/yarn.lock, cmd/tsconnect/yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— rollup 4.52.5: [GHSA redacted] — rollup is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin rollup to 4.59.0 with a `resolutions` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— vite 5.4.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.4.3. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against vite 5.4.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.4.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.4.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against vite 5.4.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/web/yarn.lock— ws 8.17.1: [GHSA redacted] — ws is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ws to 8.21.0 with a `resolutions` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ws 8.17.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.21.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.21.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ws 8.17.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.base— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: KSV-0014 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/deployment.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0056 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/operator-rbac.yaml— Manage Kubernetes networking
High IaC: KSV-0014 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/nameserver/deploy.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0056 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml— Manage Kubernetes networking
High IaC: DS-0002 release/dist/qnap/files/scripts/Dockerfile.qpkg— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 ssh/tailssh/testcontainers/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0025 ssh/tailssh/testcontainers/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apt-get`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0029 ssh/tailssh/testcontainers/Dockerfile— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.78.0: [GHSA redacted] — google.golang.org/grpc is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get google.golang.org/grpc@v1.79.3`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against google.golang.org/grpc 1.78.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:16— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
FileTooLong: ipnlocal/local.go ipn/ipnlocal/local.go:0— FileTooLong — 4749 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: magicsock/magicsock.go wgengine/magicsock/magicsock.go:0— FileTooLong — 2386 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: vnet/vnet.go tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:0— FileTooLong — 1908 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: derpserver/derpserver.go derp/derpserver/derpserver.go:0— FileTooLong — 1510 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: linuxfw/nftables_runner.go util/linuxfw/nftables_runner.go:0— FileTooLong — 1352 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: netstack/netstack.go wgengine/netstack/netstack.go:0— FileTooLong — 1282 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: localapi/localapi.go ipn/localapi/localapi.go:0— FileTooLong — 1251 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: controlclient/direct.go control/controlclient/direct.go:0— FileTooLong — 1216 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tsnet/tsnet.go tsnet/tsnet.go:0— FileTooLong — 1200 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: testcontrol/testcontrol.go tstest/integration/testcontrol/testcontrol.go:0— FileTooLong — 1153 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: k8s-operator/operator.go cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:0— FileTooLong — 1151 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: ipnlocal/serve.go ipn/ipnlocal/serve.go:0— FileTooLong — 1082 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: magicsock/endpoint.go wgengine/magicsock/endpoint.go:0— FileTooLong — 1076 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: cli/serve_v2.go cmd/tailscale/cli/serve_v2.go:0— FileTooLong — 1050 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: cli/debug.go cmd/tailscale/cli/debug.go:0— FileTooLong — 1044 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: osrouter/router_linux.go wgengine/router/osrouter/router_linux.go:0— FileTooLong — 1041 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tailcfg/tailcfg.go tailcfg/tailcfg.go:0— FileTooLong — 999 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tsidp/tsidp.go cmd/tsidp/tsidp.go:0— FileTooLong — 972 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tailssh/tailssh.go ssh/tailssh/tailssh.go:0— FileTooLong — 968 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: ipnlocal/tailnet-lock.go ipn/ipnlocal/tailnet-lock.go:0— FileTooLong — 958 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: netcheck/netcheck.go net/netcheck/netcheck.go:0— FileTooLong — 941 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: conn25/conn25.go feature/conn25/conn25.go:0— FileTooLong — 912 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: resolver/tsdns.go net/dns/resolver/tsdns.go:0— FileTooLong — 889 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: wgengine/userspace.go wgengine/userspace.go:0— FileTooLong — 869 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: k8s-operator/proxygroup.go cmd/k8s-operator/proxygroup.go:0— FileTooLong — 853 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/derper/bootstrap_dns.go:12— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/derpprobe/derpprobe.go:122— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/hello/helloserver/helloserver.go:62— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml:6905— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/k8s-operator/egress-services.go:14— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/k8s-operator/ingress-for-pg.go:14— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/k8s-operator/nodeport-service-ports.go:7— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/natc/ippool/ipx.go:9— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/natc/natc.go:17— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/natc/natc.go:190— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/sniproxy/handlers.go:10— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/stund/stund.go:35— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/stunstamp/stunstamp.go:19— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/stunstamp/stunstamp_linux.go:14— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: insecure-module-used cmd/tailscale/cli/web.go:155— The package `net/http/cgi` is on the import blocklist. The package is vulnerable to httpoxy attacks ([CVE redacted]). It is recommended to use `net/http` or a web framework to build a web application instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/tailscale/cli/web.go:170— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/testcontrol/testcontrol.go:39— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/tta/tta.go:286— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/tta/tta.go:445— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/vnet/vnet-main.go:116— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls cmd/xdpderper/xdpderper.go:98— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used control/controlclient/direct.go:20— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: potential-dos-via-decompression-bomb derp/xdp/headers/update.go:92— Detected a possible denial-of-service via a zip bomb attack. By limiting the max bytes read, you can mitigate this attack. `io.CopyN()` can specify a size. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used ipn/ipnlocal/local.go:18— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: tainted-url-host ipn/localapi/debugderp.go:249— A request was found to be crafted from user-input `r`. This can lead to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities, potentially exposing sensitive data. It is recommend where possible to not allow user-input to craft the base request, but to be treated as part of the path or query parameter. When user-input is necessary to craft the request, it is recommended to follow OWASP best practices to prevent abuse, including using an allowlist.
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/deployment.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/deployment.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/deployment.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/deployment.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0048 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/operator-rbac.yaml— Manage Kubernetes workloads and pods
Medium IaC: KSV-0049 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/operator-rbac.yaml— Manage configmaps
Medium IaC: KSV-0113 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/operator-rbac.yaml— Manage namespace secrets
Medium IaC: KSV-0113 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/chart/templates/proxy-rbac.yaml— Manage namespace secrets
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/nameserver/deploy.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/nameserver/deploy.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/nameserver/deploy.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0048 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml— Manage Kubernetes workloads and pods
Medium IaC: KSV-0049 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml— Manage configmaps
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0113 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml— Manage namespace secrets
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: DS-0013 release/dist/qnap/files/scripts/Dockerfile.qpkg— 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/operator.yaml:6842— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/nameserver/svc.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/nameserver/sa.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/nameserver/deploy.yaml:1— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/nameserver/cm.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV2_K8S_3 cmd/k8s-operator/deploy/manifests/authproxy-rbac.yaml:19— No ServiceAccount/Node should have `impersonate` permissions for groups/users/service-accounts
TooManyMethods: LocalBackend ipn/ipnlocal/local.go:225— TooManyMethods — 391 methods, declared across 14 files: ipnlocal/local.go (263), ipnlocal/tailnet-lock.go (44), ipnlocal/serve.go (32), ipnlocal/drive.go (12), +10 more file(s). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Conn wgengine/magicsock/magicsock.go:157— TooManyMethods — 135 methods, declared across 7 files: magicsock/magicsock.go (91), magicsock/derp.go (33), magicsock/peermtu.go (4), magicsock/magicsock_linux.go (3), +3 more file(s). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Client client/local/local.go:70— TooManyMethods — 128 methods, declared across 8 files: local/local.go (88), local/tailnetlock.go (26), local/cert.go (5), local/routecheck.go (2), +4 more file(s). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Handler ipn/localapi/localapi.go:207— TooManyMethods — 87 methods, declared across 8 files: localapi/localapi.go (55), localapi/debug.go (13), localapi/tailnetlock.go (13), localapi/localapi_drive.go (2), +4 more file(s). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: nodeBackend ipn/ipnlocal/node_backend.go:75— TooManyMethods — 67 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Server tstest/integration/testcontrol/testcontrol.go:53— TooManyMethods — 66 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Tracker health/health.go:80— TooManyMethods — 62 methods, declared across 3 files: health/health.go (59), health/state.go (2), health/usermetrics.go (1). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: endpoint wgengine/magicsock/endpoint.go:58— TooManyMethods — 53 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: linuxRouter wgengine/router/osrouter/router_linux.go:64— TooManyMethods — 48 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: profileManager ipn/ipnlocal/profiles.go:42— TooManyMethods — 47 methods, declared across 2 files: ipnlocal/profiles.go (45), ipnlocal/profiles_notwindows.go (2). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Server tsnet/tsnet.go:206— TooManyMethods — 46 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Server derp/derpserver/derpserver.go:128— TooManyMethods — 45 methods, declared across 2 files: derpserver/derpserver.go (44), derpserver/fortest.go (1). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Wrapper net/tstun/wrap.go:97— TooManyMethods — 44 methods, declared across 2 files: tstun/wrap.go (42), tstun/wrap_linux.go (2). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: userspaceEngine wgengine/userspace.go:67— TooManyMethods — 44 methods, declared across 2 files: wgengine/userspace.go (38), wgengine/pendopen.go (6). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Client client/tailscale/tailscale.go:41— TooManyMethods — 43 methods, declared across 7 files: tailscale/acl.go (11), tailscale/dns.go (10), tailscale/tailscale.go (8), tailscale/devices.go (6), +3 more file(s). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Client derp/derphttp/derphttp_client.go:57— TooManyMethods — 40 methods, declared across 2 files: derphttp/derphttp_client.go (39), derphttp/mesh_client.go (1). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: nftablesRunner util/linuxfw/nftables_runner.go:70— TooManyMethods — 39 methods, declared across 2 files: linuxfw/nftables_runner.go (32), linuxfw/nftables_for_svcs.go (7). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. Most of these members implement linuxfw.NetfilterRunner (31 of 39 members), so moving them onto a smaller type would remove them from that contract rather than reduce it. To reduce it, split the contract instead: give each cohesive group of operations its own smaller interface and its own implementing type. Where the contract has to stay whole, move the work behind these members into collaborator types, so what is left here is a forward per member rather than a responsibility per member.
TooManyMethods: network tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:673— TooManyMethods — 38 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Impl wgengine/netstack/netstack.go:160— TooManyMethods — 38 methods, declared across 2 files: netstack/netstack.go (37), netstack/netstack_userping.go (1). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Server tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:913— TooManyMethods — 37 methods, declared across 2 files: vnet/vnet.go (36), vnet/conf.go (1). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: TestNode tstest/integration/integration.go:620— TooManyMethods — 36 methods, declared across 3 files: integration/integration.go (27), integration/service_windows.go (7), integration/service_notwindows.go (2). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: iptablesRunner util/linuxfw/iptables_runner.go:39— TooManyMethods — 36 methods, declared across 2 files: linuxfw/iptables_runner.go (31), linuxfw/iptables_for_svcs.go (5). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. Most of these members implement linuxfw.NetfilterRunner (31 of 36 members), so moving them onto a smaller type would remove them from that contract rather than reduce it. To reduce it, split the contract instead: give each cohesive group of operations its own smaller interface and its own implementing type. Where the contract has to stay whole, move the work behind these members into collaborator types, so what is left here is a forward per member rather than a responsibility per member.
TooManyMethods: serveEnv cmd/tailscale/cli/serve_legacy.go:161— TooManyMethods — 34 methods, declared across 3 files: cli/serve_v2.go (21), cli/serve_legacy.go (11), cli/funnel.go (2). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Auto control/controlclient/auto.go:117— TooManyMethods — 34 methods, declared across 2 files: controlclient/auto.go (32), controlclient/direct.go (2). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: sclient derp/derpserver/derpserver.go:1823— TooManyMethods — 33 methods, declared across 2 files: derpserver/derpserver.go (31), derpserver/derpserver_linux.go (2). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) client/tailscale/tailscale.go:172— client/tailscale/tailscale.go:172-182 | internal/client/tailscale/tailscale.go:74-85 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `client/tailscale/tailscale.go:172` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/derper/derper.go:205— cmd/derper/derper.go:205-215 | cmd/derpprobe/derpprobe.go:126-137 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/derper/derper.go:205` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/k8s-operator/egress-services.go:691— cmd/k8s-operator/egress-services.go:691-701 | cmd/k8s-operator/svc-for-pg.go:760-770 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/k8s-operator/egress-services.go:691` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/tailscale/cli/debug.go:1308— cmd/tailscale/cli/debug.go:1308-1318 | cmd/tailscale/cli/debug.go:1384-1394 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/tailscale/cli/debug.go:1308` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/tsidp/tsidp.go:488— cmd/tsidp/tsidp.go:488-498 | cmd/tsidp/tsidp.go:535-545 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/tsidp/tsidp.go:488` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) derp/derphttp/derphttp_client.go:417— derp/derphttp/derphttp_client.go:417-427 | derp/derphttp/derphttp_client.go:563-573 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `derp/derphttp/derphttp_client.go:417` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) feature/conn25/conn25.go:1333— feature/conn25/conn25.go:1333-1345 | feature/conn25/conn25.go:1389-1399 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `feature/conn25/conn25.go:1333` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) feature/wakeonlan/wakeonlan.go:61— feature/wakeonlan/wakeonlan.go:61-71 | feature/wakeonlan/wakeonlan.go:131-141 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `feature/wakeonlan/wakeonlan.go:61` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/client/tailscale/vip_service.go:48— internal/client/tailscale/vip_service.go:48-58 | internal/client/tailscale/vip_service.go:71-81 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `internal/client/tailscale/vip_service.go:48` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) ipn/localapi/debug.go:412— ipn/localapi/debug.go:412-422 | ipn/localapi/debug.go:458-468 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `ipn/localapi/debug.go:412` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) ipn/localapi/localapi.go:1695— ipn/localapi/localapi.go:1695-1705 | ipn/localapi/localapi.go:1742-1752 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `ipn/localapi/localapi.go:1695` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) ipn/serve.go:282— ipn/serve.go:282-292 | ipn/serve.go:295-305 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `ipn/serve.go:282` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) sessionrecording/connect.go:391— sessionrecording/connect.go:391-401 | sessionrecording/connect.go:416-426 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sessionrecording/connect.go:391` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:1656— tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:1656-1666 | tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:2078-2089 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:1656` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:1677— tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:1677-1687 | tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:2060-2071 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:1736— tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:1736-1746 | tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:1961-1972 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) util/linuxfw/nftables_for_svcs.go:84— util/linuxfw/nftables_for_svcs.go:84-94 | util/linuxfw/nftables_for_svcs.go:167-177 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `util/linuxfw/nftables_for_svcs.go:84` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) version/mkversion/mkversion.go:371— version/mkversion/mkversion.go:371-381 | version/mkversion/mkversion.go:428-438 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `version/mkversion/mkversion.go:371` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) wgengine/netstack/netstack.go:951— wgengine/netstack/netstack.go:951-961 | wgengine/netstack/netstack.go:988-998 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `wgengine/netstack/netstack.go:951` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) cmd/containerboot/egressservices.go:307— cmd/containerboot/egressservices.go:307-315 | cmd/containerboot/egressservices.go:325-333 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/containerboot/egressservices.go:307` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) cmd/k8s-operator/ingress.go:84— cmd/k8s-operator/ingress.go:84-92 | cmd/k8s-operator/svc.go:125-133 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1119— cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1119-1127 | cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1200-1208 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1119` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1279— cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1279-1287 | cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1811-1819 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1279` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1299— cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1299-1307 | cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1830-1838 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/k8s-operator/operator.go:1299` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) cmd/k8s-operator/proxygroup.go:1036— cmd/k8s-operator/proxygroup.go:1036-1044 | cmd/k8s-operator/tsrecorder.go:546-554 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/k8s-operator/proxygroup.go:1036` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) cmd/k8s-operator/svc-for-pg.go:165— cmd/k8s-operator/svc-for-pg.go:165-173 | cmd/k8s-operator/svc.go:206-217 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/k8s-operator/svc-for-pg.go:165` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) cmd/tailscale/cli/serve_legacy.go:238— cmd/tailscale/cli/serve_legacy.go:238-246 | cmd/tailscale/cli/serve_v2.go:380-388 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) feature/tpm/tpm.go:241— feature/tpm/tpm.go:241-249 | ipn/store/stores.go:212-220 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `feature/tpm/tpm.go:241` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) ipn/ipnlocal/local.go:8902— ipn/ipnlocal/local.go:8902-8910 | ipn/ipnlocal/local.go:8942-8950 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `ipn/ipnlocal/local.go:8902` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) k8s-operator/api-proxy/proxy.go:218— k8s-operator/api-proxy/proxy.go:218-226 | k8s-operator/api-proxy/proxy.go:288-296 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `k8s-operator/api-proxy/proxy.go:218` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) net/netcheck/netcheck.go:549— net/netcheck/netcheck.go:549-557 | net/netcheck/netcheck.go:579-587 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `net/netcheck/netcheck.go:549` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) tailcfg/tailcfg.go:1653— tailcfg/tailcfg.go:1653-1661 | tailcfg/tailcfg.go:1695-1703 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tailcfg/tailcfg.go:1653` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) tstest/natlab/vnet/easyaf.go:54— tstest/natlab/vnet/easyaf.go:54-62 | tstest/natlab/vnet/nat.go:256-264 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tstest/natlab/vnet/easyaf.go:54` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:2060— tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:2060-2068 | tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:2078-2086 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tstest/natlab/vnet/vnet.go:2060` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) types/views/views.go:742— types/views/views.go:742-750 | types/views/views.go:761-769 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `types/views/views.go:742` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) wgengine/router/osrouter/router_linux.go:804— wgengine/router/osrouter/router_linux.go:804-812 | wgengine/router/osrouter/router_linux.go:844-852 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `wgengine/router/osrouter/router_linux.go:804` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.