Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
tennc/webshell carries serious gaps (26%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Code Health (97%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (96%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (9%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (13%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 7 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates).
For scale: Hobby (~318 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (97%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
97% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
96% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
48%
Weak · gated by M2, M4
Readiness
9% ⚠
Critical · gated by D9, D13, P1, P2, P3
Security
13% ⚠
Critical · gated by D28, D29
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 9% · 47% weightSecurity 13% · 26% weightMaturity 48% · 14% weightArchitecture 96% · 8% weightCode Health 97% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 9 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 26 → ~41.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 72%Plumbing 12%Tests 15%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,300–€6,700
| Cost to rebuild | €1,300–€6,700 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 26% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 10% boilerplate · 4% straight-line · 85% branching logic |
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 7 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with Nightrunner.aspx%20.txt, admine21.txt, aspxSH.txt.
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 7 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with Nightrunner.aspx%20.txt, admine21.txt, aspxSH.txt. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Bad
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Ugly
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 58 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 50 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 1 | Medium |
Roadmap
Immediately resolve the seven leaked secrets, starting with Nightrunner.aspx%20.txt, admine21.txt, and aspxSH.txt. Establish a CI workflow to build and run tests on every push or pull request, and ensure test coverage is addressed. Implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all projects. Finally, introduce static analysis tools like CodeQL to improve security and code quality.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 7 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with Nightrunner.aspx%20.txt, admine21.txt, aspxSH.txt. | +18.5 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +18.5 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +18.5 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +18.5 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package. | +18.5 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable. | +12.8 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Disclosure policy has no reporting contact finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy. | +5.2 pts | Low | Vulnerability-disclosure Policy |
| Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with nstview.php (12), itsec.php (8), lnc.php (8). | +8.7 pts | Medium | Static Analysis (SAST) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| php/admine21.txt | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| php/PHPshell/nstview/nstview.php | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: tainted-exec |
| php/itsec.php | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: tainted-exec |
| php/lnc.php | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: tainted-exec |
| php/2020.08.20.17.php | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: tainted-callable |
| php/twitter/1n73ction.php | 5.1 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| xakep-shells/PHP/SsEs.php.php.txt | 5.1 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token |
| xakep-shells/PHP/c100.php.txt | 5.1 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token |
| php/12309/12309.php.txt | 5.7 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: bash_reverse_shell |
| php/404.php.no.txt | 5.7 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| php/wso-ng/wso-ng.php | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| php/zxc/shell.php | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| pl/pps-pl/pps-v4.0.pl | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| xakep-shells/PHP/SnIpEr_SA Shell.php.txt | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| xakep-shells/PHP/r57 Shell.php.php.txt | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| xakep-shells/PHP/r577.php.php.txt | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| xakep-shells/PHP/r57.php.php.txt | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| xakep-shells/PHP/spy.php.php.txt | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| xakep-shells/PHP/s.php.php.txt | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| xakep-shells/PHP/sniper_sa_shell.txt | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 30 of 33 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 33 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D7D9D12D13D15D16D20D21D25D26D27D28D29D34D35D37AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P6X1X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 118 of 126 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Chropper.doPost at 23.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Chropper.doPost at 43.
What to do
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D7 · Architectural Integrity
Of 9 mechanizable ADRs, 9 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.
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D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
7 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential php/indrajith.txt:10
What to do
- Resolve the 7 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with Nightrunner.aspx%20.txt, admine21.txt, aspxSH.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
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D20 · ADR Quality
Evaluated 10 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 2.8/10 (frequently incomplete). 9 flagged with a specific gap.
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs for the internal file-upload handler (security, permission, abuse)asp/08小组内部交流专用.asp.txt
Embedded base64 eval script fragment (not an ADR)asp/2022-08-12.aspx.txt
This is a server-side ASP script with error-handling and request-variable extraction code (e.g. ReQUESt.sErVeRVArIABlEs), not an architecture decision recordasp/80sec内部专用过世界杀软休积最小功能超强超猛宇宙第一asp.txt
This is a raw PHP payload with no context (why command execution?), no explicit decision, and no consequences; only a titlephp/12309/12309.php.txt
The body is pure PHP code with no context/problem statement and no consequences/trade-offs (e.g. security risk from exposing a web shell), so it reads like a backdoor rather than an ADRphp/404.php.no.txt
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs for the internal… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 08小组内部交流专用.asp.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Embedded base64 eval script fragment (not an ADR) finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 2022-08-12.aspx.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 This is a server-side ASP script with error-handling and… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 80sec内部专用过世界杀软休积最小功能超强超猛宇宙第一asp.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D25 · ADR Conformance
1 conform / 2 violate across 10 ADRs.
ADR not followed: Home page: http://devilzc0de.com/ web-malware-collection-13-06-2012/PHP/27.9.txt
What to do
- Resolve the 2 ADR not followed finding(s) in ADR Conformance — start with 27.9.txt, 404.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Enforce ADR Conformance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
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D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
189 finding(s): 0 critical, 189 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key php/wso-ng/wso-ng.php:7
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 50 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with 1n73ction.php (3), SsEs.php.php.txt (3), c100.php.txt (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
4865 finding(s): 0 critical, 275 high, 4565 medium, 25 low.
High: csharp-sqli aspx/httpHandlers_backdoor/Customize.cs:271
What to do
- Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with nstview.php (12), itsec.php (8), lnc.php (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is present but lists no reporting contact.
Disclosure policy has no reporting contact
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Disclosure policy has no reporting contact finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Grow the ADR log (currently 10) — reach 20 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README claims webshell-venom project exists but evidence contains no such repository
- README claims a '免杀webshell无限生成工具' (infinite-kill webshell generator) exists but the evidence has no corresponding component
- README lists 20 webshell projects on GitHub, but the repository contains none of them
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README claims webshell-venom project exists but evidence contains no such repository; README claims a '免杀webshell无限生成工具' (infinite-kill webshell generator) exists but the evidence has no corresponding component; README lists 20 webshell projects on GitHub, but the repository contains none of them.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
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P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
What to do
- Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
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X1 · Async correctness
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 97% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Architecture | 96% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 48% | Weak — gated by M2, M4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 9% | Critical — gated by D9, D13, P1, P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 13% | Critical — gated by D28, D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 57 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — ~58 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 110 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key php/wso-ng/wso-ng.php:7
- Secret: generic-api-key php/wso-ng/wso-ng.php:17
- Secret: generic-api-key php/zxc/shell.php:1495
- Secret: generic-api-key php/zxc/shell.php:1772
- Secret: generic-api-key php/Shu1337.php:12
- Secret: generic-api-key php/admine21.txt:2
- Secret: generic-api-key php/admine21_decode.php:7
- Secret: generic-api-key php/404.php.no.txt:4
- Secret: generic-api-key php/wso/wso.php:3
- Secret: generic-api-key php/wso/WSO_4_0_5.php:3
- Secret: generic-api-key php/wso/WSO_base64.php:3
- Secret: generic-api-key php/other-decode.php:2
- Secret: generic-api-key php/poison.php:19
- Secret: generic-api-key www-7jyewu-cn/aspx经典大马.aspx:13
- Secret: generic-api-key php/twitter/bh.php:10
- Secret: generic-api-key php/twitter/1n73ction.php:4
- Secret: generic-api-key php/twitter/1n73ction.php:1059
- Secret: generic-api-key php/twitter/1n73ction.php:1336
- Secret: generic-api-key php/404.php.txt:4
- Secret: generic-api-key other/ololo.cfm:661
- Secret: generic-api-key php/wso/wso2_pack.php:2
- Secret: generic-api-key pl/pps-pl/pps-v1.0.pl:5
- Secret: generic-api-key pl/pps-pl/pps-v3.5.pl:7
- Secret: generic-api-key aspx/wso.aspx:12
- Secret: generic-api-key pl/pps-pl/pps-v4.0.pl:3
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: csharp-sqli aspx/httpHandlers_backdoor/Customize.cs:271
- High: tainted-exec fuzzdb-webshell/php/cmd.php:19
- High: tainted-exec fuzzdb-webshell/php/cmd.php:19
- High: tainted-exec fuzzdb-webshell/php/php-backdoor.php:29
- High: tainted-exec fuzzdb-webshell/php/php-backdoor.php:29
- High: tainted-exec fuzzdb-webshell/php/simple-backdoor.php:8
- High: tainted-exec fuzzdb-webshell/php/simple-backdoor.php:8
- High: bash_reverse_shell php/12309/12309.php.txt:1308
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.10.php:4
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.11.php:4
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.13.php:4
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.14.php:16
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.16.php:4
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.17.php:4
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.17.php:21
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.17.php:34
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.17.php:46
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.17.php:52
- High: tainted-callable php/2020.08.20.20.php:4
- High: tainted-exec php/PHPshell/Crystal/Crystal.php:673
- High: tainted-exec php/PHPshell/Crystal/Crystal.php:673
- High: tainted-exec php/PHPshell/nstview/nstview.php:910
- High: tainted-exec php/PHPshell/nstview/nstview.php:929
- High: tainted-exec php/PHPshell/nstview/nstview.php:984
- High: tainted-exec php/PHPshell/nstview/nstview.php:984
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential php/indrajith.txt:10
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential php/indrajith-2.0.txt:17
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential php/admine21.txt:2
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential aspx/z1(1).txt:24
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential aspx/lpl38-com-aspx.txt:23
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential aspx/Nightrunner.aspx%20.txt:24
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential web-malware-collection-13-06-2012/ASP/aspxSH.txt:30
D25 · ADR Conformance
- ADR not followed: Home page: http://devilzc0de.com/ web-malware-collection-13-06-2012/PHP/27.9.txt
- ADR not followed: 404 web-malware-collection-13-06-2012/PHP/404.txt
D18 · Solution Shape
- Dimension evaluation failed
Warning — 11 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D20 · ADR Quality
- No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs for the internal file-upload handler (security, permission, abuse) asp/08小组内部交流专用.asp.txt
D20 · ADR Quality
- Embedded base64 eval script fragment (not an ADR) asp/2022-08-12.aspx.txt
D20 · ADR Quality
- This is a server-side ASP script with error-handling and request-variable extraction code (e.g. ReQUESt.sErVeRVArIABlEs), not an architecture decision record asp/80sec内部专用过世界杀软休积最小功能超强超猛宇宙第一asp.txt
D20 · ADR Quality
- This is a raw PHP payload with no context (why command execution?), no explicit decision, and no consequences; only a title php/12309/12309.php.txt
D20 · ADR Quality
- The body is pure PHP code with no context/problem statement and no consequences/trade-offs (e.g. security risk from exposing a web shell), so it reads like a backdoor rather than an ADR php/404.php.no.txt
D20 · ADR Quality
- No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only a security incident example with no decision or risk discussion php/tw/2015-09-12.md
D20 · ADR Quality
- The body is pure PHP code with no context/problem statement and no consequences/trade-offs (e.g. backdoor risk, file-write permissions), so it is a script rather than an ADR web-malware-collection-13-06-2012/PHP/27.9.txt
D20 · ADR Quality
- This is a web shell with arbitrary directory traversal and find commands embedded in a PHP script, which is a security vulnerability rather than an architecture decision; no context/problem or consequences are stated web-malware-collection-13-06-2012/PHP/404.txt
D20 · ADR Quality
- The body is pure PHP boilerplate (error_reporting, define('IS_WIN', ...), s_array($_value), header content-type per charset, and a login/logout flow with scookie/p($meta refresh)) with no context/problem statement or consequences; the title '2008.php.php' gives no information xakep-shells/PHP/2008.php.php.txt
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
Recommendation — 4 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
- Disclosure policy has no reporting contact
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 189 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 4865 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |