Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
thangchung/go-coffeeshop is sound in substance but carries real gaps (53%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (95%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (40%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (56%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency… (Security & performance tooling); approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Small (~4,310 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
95% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
56%
Adequate · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
40%
Weak · gated by P1, P3
Security
86%
Strong
Domain Modelling
79%
Adequate · gated by DM5
Event-Driven
80%
Strong
Accessibility
57%
Adequate
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 40% · 45% weightMaturity 56% · 25% weightAccessibility 57% · 14% weightDomain Modelling 79% · 8% weightEvent-Driven 80% · 4% weightSecurity 86% · 2% weightCode Health 95% · 1% weightArchitecture 100% · 1% weight
Raise Readiness 40 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 53 → ~62.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (21+)
- D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) internal/barista/app/app.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) cmd/kitchen/config/config.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) cmd/barista/config/config.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) cmd/barista/main.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 4) cmd/barista/main.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internal/barista/eventhandlers/barista_ordered.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internal/counter/events/handlers/barista_order_updated.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/counter/main.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/barista/eventhandlers/barista_ordered.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/barista/eventhandlers/barista_ordered.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/counter/infras/repo/orders_postgres.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) internal/counter/app/app.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) internal/counter/infras/repo/orders_postgres.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) internal/counter/domain/order.go
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 build/nomad/jobs/barista-api.nomad.hcl
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 build/nomad/jobs/counter-api.nomad.hcl
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 build/nomad/jobs/kitchen-api.nomad.hcl
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 cmd/barista/config.yml
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 cmd/counter/config.yml
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 cmd/kitchen/config.yml
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 docker-compose.yaml
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,400–€12,000
| Cost to rebuild | €2,400–€12,000 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 53% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€7,200 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 40% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
2
Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
3
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 40%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
The Good
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Event-Driven
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 9 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 7 | Medium |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 2 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration pipeline that builds and tests every change to ensure immediate feedback. Next, integrate static analysis and security scanning into the build process to catch regressions automatically. Then, enforce approval gates before promoting to production to ensure stability. Finally, clean up orphaned files and document key architectural decisions to maintain knowledge freshness and clarity.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +11.0 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally. | +11.0 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion. | +7.9 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +3.9 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +3.9 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs. | +3.7 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh. | +3.6 pts | Medium | Page structure |
| Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. | +3.6 pts | Medium | A11y enforcement |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| go.mod | 0.7 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| internal/barista/eventhandlers/barista_ordered.go | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| internal/counter/app/app.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: App.Worker (cognitive 33) |
| internal/barista/app/app.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: App.Worker (cognitive 18) |
| cmd/barista/main.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) |
| internal/counter/infras/repo/orders_postgres.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
| cmd/counter/main.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
| build/nomad/jobs/barista-api.nomad.hcl | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 |
| build/nomad/jobs/counter-api.nomad.hcl | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 |
| build/nomad/jobs/kitchen-api.nomad.hcl | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 |
| cmd/barista/config.yml | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 |
| cmd/counter/config.yml | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 |
| cmd/kitchen/config.yml | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 |
| docker-compose.yaml | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 |
| internal/kitchen/app/app.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: App.Worker (cognitive 18) |
| cmd/kitchen/config/config.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) |
| cmd/barista/config/config.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) |
| internal/counter/events/handlers/barista_order_updated.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| internal/counter/domain/order.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
| cmd/product/main.go | 9.3 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): Low: grpc-server-insecure-connection |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 33 of 35 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 35 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D34D35D38AC3AC6AC7AX5DM1DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4M1M2M3M4P1P3P4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 35 of 41 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was App.Worker at 33.
App.Worker (cognitive 18) internal/barista/app/app.go:49
App.Worker (cognitive 33)internal/counter/app/app.go:74
What to do
- Resolve the 2 App.Worker (cognitive 18) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with app.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 App.Worker (cognitive 33) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with app.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
14 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/counter/main.go:45
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internal/barista/eventhandlers/barista_ordered.go:52
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)internal/barista/app/app.go:67
Duplicated block (15 lines × 3)cmd/kitchen/config/config.go:36
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)cmd/barista/config/config.go:34
What to do
- Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with barista_ordered.go (2), main.go, orders_postgres.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with barista_ordered.go, barista_order_updated.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with app.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D19 · Documentation Quality
The README is a solid project description for go-coffeeshop, covering the .NET/C# alternatives, a detailed technical-stack list with cross-references to many Go packages (grpc-gateway, echo, amqp091-go, sqlc, wire, cleanenv), and an explicit Services table mapping each service to its URI. It also references a CoffeeShop - Choreography Saga screenshot and a Starting project link pointing to .devcontainer, but the document is clipped mid-sentence inside Starting project, so the remaining sections (Screenshots, Home screen, Payment screen, Order list screen, HashiCorp stack deployment, Development, Clean Domain-driven Design, Generate dependency injection instances with wire, Generate code with sqlc, Debug Apps, Trouble shooting, Roadmap, Credits) are present in the outline and must not be flagged as missing. The visible content is clear but thin on narrative structure; it reads more like a list than an engaging documentation set.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 5.0/10. — The README is a solid project description for go-coffeeshop, covering the .NET/C# alternatives, a detailed technical-stack list with cross-references to many Go packages (grpc-gateway, echo, amqp091-go, sqlc, wire, cleanenv), and an explicit Services table mapping each service to its URI. It also references a CoffeeShop - Choreography Saga screenshot and a Starting project link pointing to .devcontainer, but the document is clipped mid-sentence inside Starting project, so the remaining sections (Screenshots, Home screen, Payment screen, Order list screen, HashiCorp stack deployment, Development, Clean Domain-driven Design, Generate dependency injection instances with wire, Generate code with sqlc, Debug Apps, Trouble shooting, Roadmap, Credits) are present in the outline and must not be flagged as missing. The visible content is clear but thin on narrative structure; it reads more like a list than an engaging documentation set.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 2 low.
Low: grpc-server-insecure-connection cmd/counter/main.go:51
Do you agree with this assessment?
D31 · IaC & Container Security
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 7 medium, 0 low.
Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 build/nomad/jobs/barista-api.nomad.hcl:45
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
7 of 7 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is internal/counter/infras/repo/orders_postgres.go.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
9 finding(s): 2 critical, 2 high, 5 medium, 0 low.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
What to do
- Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC3 · Page structure
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX5 · Architecture & structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM5 · Encapsulated state
- `Order` exposes publicly writable state (ID, OrderSource, LoyaltyMemberID, OrderStatus, Location, LineItems). — order.go:12
What to do
- Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM7 · Repository granularity
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM8 · Value-object opportunities
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED2 · Event/command shape
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED3 · Event naming
- `ItemTypeCakePop` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
- `ItemTypeCappuccino` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
- `ItemTypeCoffeeBlack` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
- `ItemTypeCoffeeWithRoom` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
- `ItemTypeCroissant` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
- `ItemTypeCroissantChocolate` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
- `ItemTypeEspresso` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
- `ItemTypeEspressoDouble` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
- `ItemTypeLatte` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
- `ItemTypeMuffin` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×4) — events.go:11, events.go:22, events.go:33, …
What to do
- Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
- `baristaOrderedEventHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — barista_ordered.go:34
- `usecase.PlaceOrder` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — service.go:48
- `kitchenOrderedEventHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — kitchen_ordered.go:37
What to do
- Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 95% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 56% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 40% | Weak — gated by P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 86% | Strong | Solid. |
| Domain Modelling | 79% | Adequate — gated by DM5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 80% | Strong | Solid. |
| Accessibility | 57% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Not included — 70 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No form control/button found in the parsed markup — AC2 not applicable here.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — vertical-slice architecture detected, but individual slices could not be resolved from namespaces or project layout
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~16 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds; 1 Go aggregate(s) recording domain events (own events-slice append / raise-record)
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 4 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
Warning — 30 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 build/nomad/jobs/barista-api.nomad.hcl:45
- Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 build/nomad/jobs/counter-api.nomad.hcl:64
- Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 build/nomad/jobs/kitchen-api.nomad.hcl:45
- Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 cmd/barista/config.yml:14
- Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 cmd/counter/config.yml:14
- Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 cmd/kitchen/config.yml:14
- Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_4 docker-compose.yaml:74
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2023-2041 go.mod
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/counter/main.go:45
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/barista/eventhandlers/barista_ordered.go:39
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/barista/eventhandlers/barista_ordered.go:68
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/counter/infras/repo/orders_postgres.go:55
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- App.Worker (cognitive 18) internal/barista/app/app.go:49
- App.Worker (cognitive 18) internal/kitchen/app/app.go:49
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internal/barista/eventhandlers/barista_ordered.go:52
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internal/counter/events/handlers/barista_order_updated.go:35
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- App.Worker (cognitive 33) internal/counter/app/app.go:74
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) internal/barista/app/app.go:67
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) cmd/kitchen/config/config.go:36
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) cmd/barista/config/config.go:34
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) cmd/barista/main.go:72
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 4) cmd/barista/main.go:28
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) internal/counter/app/app.go:90
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) internal/counter/infras/repo/orders_postgres.go:47
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) internal/counter/domain/order.go:54
Recommendation — 5 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Low: grpc-server-insecure-connection cmd/counter/main.go:51
- Low: grpc-server-insecure-connection cmd/product/main.go:44
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 7 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 9 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |