tlandeka/authentication-microservice-with-domain-driven-design

Executive summary

tlandeka/authentication-microservice-with-domain-driven-design scores 52 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, while five of its six lenses score higher still: Architecture and Security and Compliance at 90, both rated Exemplary, and Domain Modelling and Code Health at 65 and Maturity at 60, all rated Adequate. Watchdog judged it as a template, sample or demo, meant to be read or copied, so the dimensions about building, releasing and running a product don't apply, and its lenses are rated against a lower bar. The score itself is worked out as for any repository.

The score is lower than those five because the weakest lens counts most, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 35 and is rated Adequate. Its Security & performance tooling dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning and to resolve the 1 Inverted test pyramid finding(s) in Test Distribution, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 52 to about 65.

Six findings are critical: two in Static Analysis (SAST), one in Dependency Vulnerabilities, one in IaC & Container Security, one in REDACTED Scanning and one in Secrets (history).

Watchdog couldn't measure 17 dimensions in this code, among them Code Coverage, Test Reliability and Internal API Consistency, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 3,704 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €7,000, to rebuild.

Code Health 65 Adequate, capped by Nullable reference types Architecture 90 ★ Exemplary Maturity 60 Adequate, capped by Architecture documentation Production Readiness 35 Adequate, capped by Security & performance tooling and DR & Backup Security and Compliance 90 ★ Exemplary Domain Modelling 65 Adequate, capped by Repository granularity

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.

Production Readiness 35 · counts for 46%Maturity 60 · counts for 25%Domain Modelling 65 · counts for 14%Code Health 65 · counts for 8%Architecture 90 · counts for 4%Security and Compliance 90 · counts for 2%

If Production Readiness rose from 35 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 52 to about 65.

Code composition: what the lines of code are

Product code 79%Tests 21%

New since the last survey: 2 findings

These 2 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 8 October 2026.

REDACTED Scanning · REDACTED
Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 1 finding

This critical or serious finding was in the previous survey, on 8 October 2026, and is gone from this one.

Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED

Rebuild cost: about €7,000 · Estimate

Cost to rebuild	€2,300 to €12,000, for 39 to 122 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem	High, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor	×0.7 at a score of 52. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size	Small: 3,704 lines of product code

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED.

Raises the score by about 12 points · Low effort · REDACTED Scanning

Resolve the 1 Inverted test pyramid finding(s) in Test Distribution.

Raises the score by about 3 points · Low effort · Test Distribution

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Raises the score by about 6 points · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk

This code would cost about €7,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 35 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.

Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts

What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.

If you do one thing first · First action

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 12 points for low effort, because it clears the 1 REDACTED Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.

Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

42 modules, with 108 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 9 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 2 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →	2 mcauthentication.application	3 mcauthentication.application.contracts	4 mcauthentication.domain.users	5 mcauthentication.application.configuration	6 mcauthentication.application.contracts.security	7 mcauthentication.application.recovery.command	8 mcauthentication.application.recovery.dto	9 mcauthentication.application.registration.command	10 mcauthentication.application.registration.query	11 mcauthentication.application.users.dto	12 mcauthentication.domain.oauth2	13 mcauthentication.domain.registration.rules	15 mcauthentication.domain.users.rules	16 mcauthentication.infrastructure.springboot.filter	17 mcauthentication.infrastructure.springboot.security	18 mcauthentication.application.authentication.command	19 mcauthentication.application.users.command	20 mcauthentication.application.users.query	21 mcauthentication.domain	22 mcauthentication.infrastructure.http.oauth2	23 mcauthentication.infrastructure.processing	24 mcauthentication.domain.registration	25 mcauthentication.infrastructure.processing.builder	27 mcauthentication.application.registration.dto	28 mcauthentication.domain.registration.events	30 mcauthentication.infrastructure.persistence	31 mcauthentication.infrastructure.springboot.configuration	32 mcauthentication.domain.session	33 mcauthentication.application.authentication.dto
1 mcauthentication
2 mcauthentication.application
3 mcauthentication.application.contracts
4 mcauthentication.domain.users
5 mcauthentication.application.configuration		1
6 mcauthentication.application.contracts.security		7
7 mcauthentication.application.recovery.command		3
8 mcauthentication.application.recovery.dto		1
9 mcauthentication.application.registration.command		4
10 mcauthentication.application.registration.query		1
11 mcauthentication.application.users.dto		1	1
12 mcauthentication.domain.oauth2			2
13 mcauthentication.domain.registration.rules																						5
14 mcauthentication.domain.users.events			2
15 mcauthentication.domain.users.rules			1
16 mcauthentication.infrastructure.springboot.filter		1																									1	1	1
17 mcauthentication.infrastructure.springboot.security																													1
18 mcauthentication.application.authentication.command		1			2
19 mcauthentication.application.users.command					1
20 mcauthentication.application.users.query			1		1
21 mcauthentication.domain			1									1	1									2						1
22 mcauthentication.infrastructure.http.oauth2											5
23 mcauthentication.infrastructure.processing		4		4
24 mcauthentication.domain.registration			6																1
25 mcauthentication.infrastructure.processing.builder		2		2																	1
26 mcauthentication.infrastructure.service																			1
27 mcauthentication.application.registration.dto		1																				1
28 mcauthentication.domain.registration.events			1																			2
29 mcauthentication.infrastructure		4																					2
30 mcauthentication.infrastructure.persistence			8																			4						4
31 mcauthentication.infrastructure.springboot.configuration		1	1								1			1	2					2		1	2			2
32 mcauthentication.domain.session			8																								1
33 mcauthentication.application.authentication.dto		1	1							1																		3
34 mcauthentication.application.registration		1	2	5				4	1	1												4		1	1			1
35 mcauthentication.application.users	1		3	2						1							1	1				1						1
36 mcauthentication.domain.session.events			1																									1
37 mcauthentication.domain.session.rule																												1
38 mcauthentication.application.authentication	2			5						2	2					5						1						11	3
39 mcauthentication.application.recovery	1	1		4		3	1												1			3		1	1				1
40 mcauthentication.infrastructure.springboot.controller		6				2		1							1	4	1										1	1	1

Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 65% · Adequate · gated by X5 ·

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.8 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0

The Bad

X3 · Repo Exception handling 5.4

The Ugly

X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 90% · Exemplary ·

The Good

D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 6.4 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 60% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 6.0

The Ugly

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 35% · Adequate · gated by P3, P5 ·

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 8.5 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 9.6 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 7.9 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 7.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Bad

D13 · .NET / C# REDACTED Scanning 5.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

The Ugly

P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0

At a glance — Security · 90% · Exemplary ·

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 9.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 8.1 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 9.2 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.2 D43 · .NET / C# Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 8.5 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 65% · Adequate · gated by DM7 ·

The Good

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM12 · Repo Ambient inputs in the domain 9.8 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 7.7 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0

The Bad

DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 5.3

The Ugly

DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 2.7

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A05:2025 — Injection	9	High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration	6	High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures	3	High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures	2	High / Critical

Roadmap

Immediately resolve the leaked secret in REDACTED and integrate automated security scanning into the CI pipeline to prevent regressions. Strengthen operational resilience by codifying backup and disaster recovery procedures in infrastructure as code, and address the inverted test pyramid to improve test coverage. Finally, document significant design decisions in a dedicated folder to preserve architectural context for the team.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED.	+11.6 pts	Low	REDACTED Scanning
Resolve the 1 Inverted test pyramid finding(s) in Test Distribution.	+3.5 pts	Low	Test Distribution
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+6.4 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+6.4 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.	+2.5 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10.	+2.0 pts	Medium	Documentation Quality
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.	+1.8 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.	+1.8 pts	Medium	Release Hygiene

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 17 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 18% mixed · 82% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	2.7	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.1	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/recovery/SendPasswordRecoveryEmailCommandHandler.java	6.7	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
REDACTED	7.2	Near-clean	REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Near-clean	Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/registration/SendRegistrationConfirmationEmailCommandHandler.java	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/recovery/CreatePasswordRecoveryCodeCommandHandler.java	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/registration/RegisterNewUserCommandHandler.java	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/infrastructure/processing/LoggingCommandHandlerDecorator.java	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/authentication/FacebookLoginCommandHandler.java	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)
src/test/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/weblayer/springboot/controller/RegistrationControllerTest.java	8.5	Near-clean	Test Quality: No assertions: shouldCreateUserRegistration
REDACTED	8.7	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Low: REDACTED

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 6

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 26

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 177

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 17

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 67 of 70 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 70 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D19D21D26D28D29D30D31D35D43D44AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX9DM1DM11DM12DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8DM9IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P6P8X14X15X16X18X19X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 39 of 209 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a164bb-5e98-7902-aaa7-d59d0ab1959e.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.java) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.java) and this repository declares a JVM test suite (repository root, Maven), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Currency was graded against Maven Central, but whether an artifact is DEPRECATED is not: Maven Central publishes no deprecation marker, exactly as rubygems.org does not. Whether one is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either — no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Two of this dimension's four signals are therefore unread on a Maven tree, and its score reflects currency alone.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 9 commit(s), too few for a reliable trend signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 9 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict.
D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (9 commit(s) sampled).
D35 Change Coupling — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 9 commit(s), too few for a reliable change-coupling signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — mc-authentication_db Pulling mc-authentication_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: mc-authentication_db Pulling mc-authentication_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
DM9 Scattered domain decisions — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Arm one resolves each comparison operand to the domain member it judges, and that binding exists only in a Roslyn compilation, which this run did not load. Arm two ran over the neutral model because this repository's frontend declares whether each construction is produced or passed. A rule decided in two places would not appear above.
ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check decides whether a handler's mutation is safe to re-run by recognising its persistence writes (a database save, a repository write, an event publish) and its guards. Those markers are .NET member names, so in this repository's language a write such as `repository.save(order)` is not recognised and a same-named call on an unrelated library type could be. The handlers were found; their idempotency was neither confirmed nor ruled out.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Java is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

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D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

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D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/authentication/FacebookLoginCommandHandler.java:33

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/recovery/SendPasswordRecoveryEmailCommandHandler.java:20

What to do

Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with FacebookLoginCommandHandler.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with SendPasswordRecoveryEmailCommandHandler.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 14 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

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D9 · Test Distribution8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

40 test methods: 0 unit, 40 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Inverted test pyramid

What to do

Resolve the 1 Inverted test pyramid finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D10 · Test Quality9.6 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 40 tests.

No assertions: shouldCreateUserRegistrationsrc/test/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/weblayer/springboot/controller/RegistrationControllerTest.java:25

What to do

Resolve the 1 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with RegistrationControllerTest.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene~~8.0~~ 7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 99% · ceiling Verified

161 outdated artifact(s) of 185 resolved by the build, graded against Maven Central. The poms themselves state a version for only 18 of 25 declaration(s) — the rest are parent- or BOM-managed, which is why this is read from the resolved graph rather than from the manifests. 2 resolved artifact(s) could not be graded: Maven Central carries no such coordinate, or it publishes nothing but pre-releases. That is a definite answer and is counted, not charged. Whether any of these is DEPRECATED is not graded — Maven Central publishes no deprecation marker, exactly as rubygems.org does not. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.data.jpa [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-data-jpa

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.aop [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-aop

Outdated (compile -- module org.aspectj.weaver [auto]): org.aspectj:aspectjweaver

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.jdbc [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-jdbc

Outdated (compile -- module com.zaxxer.hikari): com.zaxxer:HikariCP

+ 156 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · REDACTED Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce REDACTED Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 16 declared JVM dependency artifact(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, over the coordinates this repository's 1 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) declare with a version resolvable from the manifest itself — the same declaration-site closure this analysis reads for dependency currency. The JVM has no lockfile a checkout is guaranteed to carry, so this is deliberately NOT the transitive closure. 7 further coordinate(s) are declared with no version at the declaration site — inherited from a parent POM, a BOM or an unresolved Gradle version reference — and are NOT graded: this verdict covers what the checkout pins, not the full transitive graph. A further 2 coordinate(s) are not published to Maven Central — another repository (Google's Maven hosts androidx), a SNAPSHOT, or a private artifact — so their licences are not readable from here and they are outside this verdict.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D17 · Explicit Debt9.8 / 10Stronggated by 5 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 deducted task-comment markers across 3704 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×5src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/recovery/SendPasswordRecoveryEmailCommandHandler.java:21

What to do

Resolve the 5 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with SendPasswordRecoveryEmailCommandHandler.java, SendRegistrationConfirmationEmailCommandHandler.java, CreatePasswordRecoveryCodeCommandHandler.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README is a well-written single document that states the project purpose (a Spring Boot authentication microservice with Domain-Driven Design) and gives an overview of its main goals (showing DDD/CQRS implementation, presentation of application ready for production), explains what it does (form registration, login flows, password recovery, session auth), and lists how to run it (docker-compose up -d, local profile). It also documents the test plan and a TODO list. The document is well-structured with an outline; however, its scope is limited to one file rather than the repository as a whole, so any missing overview/installation/usage/contributing/licence would be flagged against it.

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — The repository's root README is a well-written single document that states the project purpose (a Spring Boot authentication microservice with Domain-Driven Design) and gives an overview of its main goals (showing DDD/CQRS implementation, presentation of application ready for production), explains what it does (form registration, login flows, password recovery, session auth), and lists how to run it (docker-compose up -d, local profile). It also documents the test plan and a TODO list. The document is well-structured with an outline; however, its scope is limited to one file rather than the repository as a whole, so any missing overview/installation/usage/contributing/licence would be flagged against it.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 build units (Maven) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)8.1 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 3 medium, 4 low. 2 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `mvnw` (lines 220–221) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

REDACTED

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 2 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities9.2 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.2 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 4 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D44 · Platform End-of-Life8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 1 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 19 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

End-of-life framework: Spring Boot 2REDACTED:1

What to do

Resolve the 1 End-of-life framework finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition6.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

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AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM11 · Constructible invalid state5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

`Session`'s public constructor takes `userAgent`, `ipAddress` as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `Session` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse. — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/session/Session.java:55
`User`'s public constructor takes `aFirstName`, `aLastName`, `anEmail` as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `User` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse. — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/users/User.java:38

What to do

Give each aggregate one way in that can refuse — a guarded constructor, value-object parameters that validate themselves, or a private constructor behind a factory that returns a failure.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

`PasswordService` draws from `new Random(` inside `generateStrongPassword`. The outcome is not a function of the inputs, so no test can assert which result this produces, and the same inputs replay differently. Take the randomness as a parameter — an injected `Random`, a seeded generator, or the already-chosen value — so a caller (and a test) can decide it. — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/registration/PasswordService.java:22

What to do

Take the randomness as an input — an injected `Random` or a seeded generator, or the already-chosen value — so a test can decide what the domain produces.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`Session` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/session/Session.java:28

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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DM7 · Repository granularity2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) and keep the persistence query handle behind the contract, so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged, and (C#/VB) repository INTERFACES whose members return a live persistence query handle (IQueryable/DbSet/IMongoQueryable) — implementations and specification evaluators are out of population by design, since composing a query internally is what an implementation is for. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

`SessionRepository` is a repository over `Session`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Session` through its owning aggregate instead. — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/session/SessionRepository.java:8
`UserRepository` is a repository over `User`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `User` through its owning aggregate instead. — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/users/UserRepository.java:5

What to do

Define repositories per aggregate root and keep the query handle inside them; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Java: methods that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

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M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy6.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists — searched for: `kubernetes`, `k8s`, `helm`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:59
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests — searched for: `microservice`, `service-mesh`, `istio`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:1

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.

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P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry-java or Micrometer) and a health-check endpoint (Spring Boot Actuator's /actuator/health, or a /health route) for operability.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 861 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

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P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

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P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether database schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than being auto-created from the model at startup.

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `NullPointerException` (Java, Kotlin, Scala), `ArgumentError.notNull` (Dart) or `ArgumentNullException` (F#'s `nullArg`) tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an enhanced `for` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is iterating invalidates the fail-fast iterator it is holding, so the next `next()` throws `ConcurrentModificationException` and the remaining elements are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X3 · Exception handling5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

`catch (Exception)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/infrastructure/springboot/filter/TokenAuthenticationFilter.java:79

What to do

Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)

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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

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X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether Java packages are null-marked and not undermined by heavy nullness suppression — a package under `@NullMarked` (or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, or a NullAway/Checker Framework configuration naming it) makes an unannotated reference exclude null, and `@SuppressWarnings("NullAway")`, `("nullness")`, `("null")` and `castToNonNull(…)` are what silence it.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

0/42 of this repository's Java package directories are under a non-null default: a `package-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked` (JSpecify) or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, `@DefaultQualifier(NonNull.class)`; a `module-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked`; every type in it `@NullMarked`; or a build that runs NullAway with the package in `AnnotatedPackages`, or the Checker Framework's `NullnessChecker`. Elsewhere every reference admits null and no checker warns on the dereference that throws a `NullPointerException`.

What to do

Declare the default where Java declares it: `@NullMarked` (org.jspecify.annotations) in each package's `package-info.java`, or once in `module-info.java`, and run NullAway (Error Prone) or the Checker Framework so the declaration is enforced. Then annotate the real exceptions `@Nullable` and resolve the suppressions rather than adding to them: a `@SuppressWarnings("NullAway")` or `castToNonNull(x)` on a value the checker could show to be null is a `NullPointerException` waiting for the path that makes it true — where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (a null check, `Objects.requireNonNull`, a non-null field initialised in the constructor).

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Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	65%	Adequate — gated by X5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	90%	Exemplary	Solid.
Maturity	60%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	35%	Adequate — gated by P3, P5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	90%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Domain Modelling	65%	Adequate — gated by DM7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.

Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

Not included — 55 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — mc-authentication_db Pulling mc-authentication_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: mc-authentication_db Pulling mc-authentication_db Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .java suite was found but not re-run
D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (domain), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.java), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Maven build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
DM10 One transaction, one aggregate — no repository writes detected — no operation to judge against the one-aggregate rule
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (19 CQRS handler(s))
ED5 Idempotency — Not assessed, and this one is on us: 16 command handler(s) or message consumer(s) were found here, but this check does not yet recognise persistence writes in this repository's language. Idempotency was neither confirmed nor ruled out — this is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the JVM source (service entry point: src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/McAuthenticationApplication.java:18 (@SpringBootApplication))
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a REDACTED, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: allocation awareness is rated where code engineers for it — at least 400 production lines that ship benchmarks or already use allocation-aware idioms (8 or more). This repository's Java code has 4,724 production line(s), 0 such use(s) and no benchmarks, so there is no allocation work to rate. The card is reward-only: its absence costs nothing.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X12 Unreachable branch — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X13 Undrained process stream — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Java was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Java request off Android takes no token: it is cancelled through the handle it returns (Future.cancel, Call.cancel, a Disposable), ambiently (io.grpc.Context) or by interrupting its thread, not through a parameter
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 6 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
REDACTED

D13 · REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1

REDACTED

D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1

REDACTED

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1

REDACTED

Serious — 26 finding(s)

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×5

TodoComment src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/recovery/SendPasswordRecoveryEmailCommandHandler.java:21 — //todo maybe validate if exist — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/registration/SendRegistrationConfirmationEmailCommandHandler.java:21 — //todo maybe validate if exist — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/recovery/CreatePasswordRecoveryCodeCommandHandler.java:26 — //todo send recovery code — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/registration/RegisterNewUserCommandHandler.java:34 — //todo send email — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/infrastructure/processing/LoggingCommandHandlerDecorator.java:17 — //todo log — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×4

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

DM11 · Constructible invalid state · Constructible in an invalid state · ×2

Constructible in an invalid state: Session src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/session/Session.java:55 — `Session`'s public constructor takes `userAgent`, `ipAddress` as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `Session` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse.
Constructible in an invalid state: User src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/users/User.java:38 — `User`'s public constructor takes `aFirstName`, `aLastName`, `anEmail` as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `User` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse.

DM7 · Repository granularity · Repository for a non-root entity · ×2

Repository for a non-root entity: SessionRepository → Session src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/session/SessionRepository.java:8 — `SessionRepository` is a repository over `Session`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Session` through its owning aggregate instead.
Repository for a non-root entity: UserRepository → User src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/users/UserRepository.java:5 — `UserRepository` is a repository over `User`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `User` through its owning aggregate instead.

D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×1

No assertions: shouldCreateUserRegistration src/test/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/weblayer/springboot/controller/RegistrationControllerTest.java:25 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/authentication/FacebookLoginCommandHandler.java:33 — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/authentication/FacebookLoginCommandHandler.java:33-43 | src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/authentication/GoogleLoginCommandHandler.java:33-41 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit. Note first that the copies are not typed on the same thing: the declarations holding them bind `command` to `FacebookLoginCommand` in one and `GoogleLoginCommand` in another, and the duplicated lines use it. The extracted unit therefore needs a parameter type that fits BOTH — their common supertype where they have one, or a new abstraction over them where they do not — and settling that is the step that comes BEFORE the extraction above. Where the two types are deliberately unrelated, the duplication is the price of that separation and the honest resolution is to record the decision rather than to extract.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/recovery/SendPasswordRecoveryEmailCommandHandler.java:20 — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/recovery/SendPasswordRecoveryEmailCommandHandler.java:20-26 | src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/application/registration/SendRegistrationConfirmationEmailCommandHandler.java:20-26 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note first that the copies are not typed on the same thing: the declarations holding them bind `aCommand` to `SendPasswordRecoveryEmailCommand` in one and `SendRegistrationConfirmationEmailCommand` in another, and the duplicated lines use it. The extracted unit therefore needs a parameter type that fits BOTH — their common supertype where they have one, or a new abstraction over them where they do not — and settling that is the step that comes BEFORE the extraction above. Where the two types are deliberately unrelated, the duplication is the price of that separation and the honest resolution is to record the decision rather than to extract.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life · End-of-life framework · ×1

End-of-life framework: Spring Boot 2 REDACTED:1 — REDACTED depends on `org.springframework.boot` at a version that pins Spring Boot 2, and Spring Boot 2.x, open-source support ended 2023-11-24. The constraint cannot admit a different major, so this repository stays on it until the declaration is edited. An end-of-life framework receives no further releases, including security releases.

DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain · Domain type reads a global random source · ×1

Domain type reads a global random source: PasswordService src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/registration/PasswordService.java:22 — `PasswordService` draws from `new Random(` inside `generateStrongPassword`. The outcome is not a function of the inputs, so no test can assert which result this produces, and the same inputs replay differently. Take the randomness as a parameter — an injected `Random`, a seeded generator, or the already-chosen value — so a caller (and a test) can decide it.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model · Anemic entity · ×1

Anemic entity: Session src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/domain/session/Session.java:28 — `Session` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.

P5 · DR & Backup · No DR/backup evidence · ×1

No DR/backup evidence — A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) · ×1

Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/infrastructure/springboot/filter/TokenAuthenticationFilter.java:79 — `catch (Exception)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.

Minor — 16 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
REDACTED

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×2

README/code drift README.md:59 — README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists — searched for: `kubernetes`, `k8s`, `helm`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
README/code drift README.md:1 — README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests — searched for: `microservice`, `service-mesh`, `istio`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

REDACTED

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D9 · Test Distribution · Inverted test pyramid · ×1

Inverted test pyramid — Only 0 % of tests are unit tests (0 unit vs 40 integration, 0 BDD); a broader unit base gives faster, more localised feedback.

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1

No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 861 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1

No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1

No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×1

Duplicated predicate src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/infrastructure/springboot/controller/AbstractController.java:50 — `StringUtils.hasText(jwt) && tokenProvider.validateToken(jwt)` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/infrastructure/springboot/controller/AbstractController.java, src/main/java/com/tomo/mcauthentication/infrastructure/springboot/filter/TokenAuthenticationFilter.java. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.

X5 · Nullable reference types · Java packages are not null-marked everywhere · ×1

Java packages are not null-marked everywhere — 0/42 of this repository's Java package directories are under a non-null default: a `package-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked` (JSpecify) or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, `@DefaultQualifier(NonNull.class)`; a `module-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked`; every type in it `@NullMarked`; or a build that runs NullAway with the package in `AnnotatedPackages`, or the Checker Framework's `NullnessChecker`. Elsewhere every reference admits null and no checker warns on the dereference that throws a `NullPointerException`.

Minor — 161 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.data.jpa [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.data.jpa [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-data-jpa — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-data-jpa 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.aop [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.aop [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-aop — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-aop 2.6.2 → 3.5.16 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.aspectj.weaver [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.aspectj.weaver [auto]): org.aspectj:aspectjweaver — org.aspectj:aspectjweaver 1.9.7 → 1.9.26 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.jdbc [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.jdbc [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-jdbc — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-jdbc 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.zaxxer.hikari) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.zaxxer.hikari): com.zaxxer:HikariCP — com.zaxxer:HikariCP 4.0.3 → 7.1.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.jdbc [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.jdbc [auto]): org.springframework:spring-jdbc — org.springframework:spring-jdbc 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module java.transaction [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module java.transaction [auto]): jakarta.transaction:jakarta.transaction-api — jakarta.transaction:jakarta.transaction-api 1.3.3 → 2.0.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module java.persistence [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module java.persistence [auto]): jakarta.persistence:jakarta.persistence-api — jakarta.persistence:jakarta.persistence-api 2.2.3 → 3.2.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.hibernate.orm.core [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.hibernate.orm.core [auto]): org.hibernate:hibernate-core — org.hibernate:hibernate-core 5.6.3.Final → 7.4.13.Final available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.jboss.logging [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.jboss.logging [auto]): org.jboss.logging:jboss-logging — org.jboss.logging:jboss-logging 3.4.2.Final → 3.6.3.Final available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module net.bytebuddy) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module net.bytebuddy): net.bytebuddy:byte-buddy — net.bytebuddy:byte-buddy 1.11.22 → 1.18.15 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module antlr (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module antlr (auto)): antlr:antlr — antlr:antlr 2.7.7 → 20030911 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.jboss.jandex [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.jboss.jandex [auto]): org.jboss:jandex — org.jboss:jandex 2.2.3.Final → 3.3.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.hibernate.commons.annotations [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.hibernate.commons.annotations [auto]): org.hibernate.common:hibernate-commons-annotations — org.hibernate.common:hibernate-commons-annotations 5.1.2.Final → 7.0.3.Final available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.glassfish.jaxb.runtime) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.glassfish.jaxb.runtime): org.glassfish.jaxb:jaxb-runtime — org.glassfish.jaxb:jaxb-runtime 2.3.5 → 4.0.9 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.sun.xml.txw2) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.sun.xml.txw2): org.glassfish.jaxb:txw2 — org.glassfish.jaxb:txw2 2.3.5 → 4.0.9 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.sun.istack.runtime) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.sun.istack.runtime): com.sun.istack:istack-commons-runtime — com.sun.istack:istack-commons-runtime 3.0.12 → 4.2.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module jakarta.activation) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module jakarta.activation): com.sun.activation:jakarta.activation — com.sun.activation:jakarta.activation 1.2.2 → 2.0.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.data.jpa [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.data.jpa [auto]): org.springframework.data:spring-data-jpa — org.springframework.data:spring-data-jpa 2.6.0 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.data.commons [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.data.commons [auto]): org.springframework.data:spring-data-commons — org.springframework.data:spring-data-commons 2.6.0 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.orm [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.orm [auto]): org.springframework:spring-orm — org.springframework:spring-orm 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.context [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.context [auto]): org.springframework:spring-context — org.springframework:spring-context 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.tx [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.tx [auto]): org.springframework:spring-tx — org.springframework:spring-tx 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.beans [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.beans [auto]): org.springframework:spring-beans — org.springframework:spring-beans 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.aspects [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.aspects [auto]): org.springframework:spring-aspects — org.springframework:spring-aspects 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.web [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.web [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-web — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-web 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.autoconfigure [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.autoconfigure [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-autoconfigure — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-autoconfigure 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.logging [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.logging [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-logging — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-logging 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module logback.classic (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module logback.classic (auto)): ch.qos.logback:logback-classic — ch.qos.logback:logback-classic 1.2.9 → 1.6.5 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module logback.core (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module logback.core (auto)): ch.qos.logback:logback-core — ch.qos.logback:logback-core 1.2.9 → 1.6.5 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.logging.slf4j [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.logging.slf4j [auto]): org.apache.logging.log4j:log4j-to-slf4j — org.apache.logging.log4j:log4j-to-slf4j 2.17.0 → 2.26.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.logging.log4j) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.logging.log4j): org.apache.logging.log4j:log4j-api — org.apache.logging.log4j:log4j-api 2.17.0 → 2.26.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module jul.to.slf4j (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module jul.to.slf4j (auto)): org.slf4j:jul-to-slf4j — org.slf4j:jul-to-slf4j 1.7.32 → 2.0.20 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module java.annotation [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module java.annotation [auto]): jakarta.annotation:jakarta.annotation-api — jakarta.annotation:jakarta.annotation-api 1.3.5 → 3.0.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.yaml.snakeyaml [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.yaml.snakeyaml [auto]): org.yaml:snakeyaml — org.yaml:snakeyaml 1.29 → 2.7 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.json [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.json [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-json — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-json 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.datatype.jdk8) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.datatype.jdk8): com.fasterxml.jackson.datatype:jackson-datatype-jdk8 — com.fasterxml.jackson.datatype:jackson-datatype-jdk8 2.13.1 → 2.22.4 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.datatype.jsr310) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.datatype.jsr310): com.fasterxml.jackson.datatype:jackson-datatype-jsr310 — com.fasterxml.jackson.datatype:jackson-datatype-jsr310 2.13.1 → 2.22.4 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.module.paramnames) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.module.paramnames): com.fasterxml.jackson.module:jackson-module-parameter-names — com.fasterxml.jackson.module:jackson-module-parameter-names 2.13.1 → 2.22.4 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.tomcat [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.tomcat [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-tomcat — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-tomcat 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.tomcat.embed.core) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.tomcat.embed.core): org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core — org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core 9.0.56 → 11.0.27 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.tomcat.embed.el) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.tomcat.embed.el): org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-el — org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-el 9.0.56 → 11.0.27 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.tomcat.embed.websocket) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.tomcat.embed.websocket): org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-websocket — org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-websocket 9.0.56 → 11.0.27 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.web [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.web [auto]): org.springframework:spring-web — org.springframework:spring-web 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.webmvc [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.webmvc [auto]): org.springframework:spring-webmvc — org.springframework:spring-webmvc 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.expression [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.expression [auto]): org.springframework:spring-expression — org.springframework:spring-expression 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module spring.boot.starter.test [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module spring.boot.starter.test [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-test — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-test 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module spring.boot.test [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module spring.boot.test [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-test — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-test 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module spring.boot.test.autoconfigure [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module spring.boot.test.autoconfigure [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-test-autoconfigure — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-test-autoconfigure 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module json.path (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module json.path (auto)): com.jayway.jsonpath:json-path — com.jayway.jsonpath:json-path 2.6.0 → 3.0.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module json.smart (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module json.smart (auto)): net.minidev:json-smart — net.minidev:json-smart 2.4.7 → 2.6.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module accessors.smart (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module accessors.smart (auto)): net.minidev:accessors-smart — net.minidev:accessors-smart 2.4.7 → 2.6.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.objectweb.asm) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.objectweb.asm): org.ow2.asm:asm — org.ow2.asm:asm 9.1 → 9.11.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module java.xml.bind) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module java.xml.bind): jakarta.xml.bind:jakarta.xml.bind-api — jakarta.xml.bind:jakarta.xml.bind-api 2.3.3 → 4.0.5 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module jakarta.activation) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module jakarta.activation): jakarta.activation:jakarta.activation-api — jakarta.activation:jakarta.activation-api 1.2.2 → 2.1.4 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.assertj.core) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.assertj.core): org.assertj:assertj-core — org.assertj:assertj-core 3.21.0 → 3.27.7 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.hamcrest [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.hamcrest [auto]): org.hamcrest:hamcrest — org.hamcrest:hamcrest 2.2 → 3.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.junit.jupiter) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.junit.jupiter): org.junit.jupiter:junit-jupiter — org.junit.jupiter:junit-jupiter 5.8.2 → 6.1.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.junit.jupiter.api) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.junit.jupiter.api): org.junit.jupiter:junit-jupiter-api — org.junit.jupiter:junit-jupiter-api 5.8.2 → 6.1.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.opentest4j) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.opentest4j): org.opentest4j:opentest4j — org.opentest4j:opentest4j 1.2.0 → 1.3.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.junit.platform.commons) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.junit.platform.commons): org.junit.platform:junit-platform-commons — org.junit.platform:junit-platform-commons 1.8.2 → 6.1.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.junit.jupiter.params) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.junit.jupiter.params): org.junit.jupiter:junit-jupiter-params — org.junit.jupiter:junit-jupiter-params 5.8.2 → 6.1.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.junit.jupiter.engine) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.junit.jupiter.engine): org.junit.jupiter:junit-jupiter-engine — org.junit.jupiter:junit-jupiter-engine 5.8.2 → 6.1.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.junit.platform.engine) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.junit.platform.engine): org.junit.platform:junit-platform-engine — org.junit.platform:junit-platform-engine 1.8.2 → 6.1.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.mockito [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.mockito [auto]): org.mockito:mockito-core — org.mockito:mockito-core 4.0.0 → 5.24.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module net.bytebuddy.agent) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module net.bytebuddy.agent): net.bytebuddy:byte-buddy-agent — net.bytebuddy:byte-buddy-agent 1.11.22 → 1.18.15 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.objenesis [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.objenesis [auto]): org.objenesis:objenesis — org.objenesis:objenesis 3.2 → 3.6 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.mockito.junit.jupiter [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.mockito.junit.jupiter [auto]): org.mockito:mockito-junit-jupiter — org.mockito:mockito-junit-jupiter 4.0.0 → 5.24.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module jsonassert (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module jsonassert (auto)): org.skyscreamer:jsonassert — org.skyscreamer:jsonassert 1.5.0 → 1.5.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.core [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.core [auto]): org.springframework:spring-core — org.springframework:spring-core 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.jcl [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.jcl [auto]): org.springframework:spring-jcl — org.springframework:spring-jcl 5.3.14 → 6.2.19 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module spring.test [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module spring.test [auto]): org.springframework:spring-test — org.springframework:spring-test 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module org.xmlunit [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module org.xmlunit [auto]): org.xmlunit:xmlunit-core — org.xmlunit:xmlunit-core 2.8.4 → 2.14.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module spring.security.test [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module spring.security.test [auto]): org.springframework.security:spring-security-test — org.springframework.security:spring-security-test 5.6.1 → 7.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.core [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.core [auto]): org.springframework.security:spring-security-core — org.springframework.security:spring-security-core 5.6.1 → 7.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.crypto [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.crypto [auto]): org.springframework.security:spring-security-crypto — org.springframework.security:spring-security-crypto 5.6.1 → 7.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.web [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.web [auto]): org.springframework.security:spring-security-web — org.springframework.security:spring-security-web 5.6.1 → 7.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.security [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.boot.starter.security [auto]): org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-security — org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-security 2.6.2 → 4.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.aop [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.aop [auto]): org.springframework:spring-aop — org.springframework:spring-aop 5.3.14 → 7.0.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.config [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.config [auto]): org.springframework.security:spring-security-config — org.springframework.security:spring-security-config 5.6.1 → 7.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.oauth2.client [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.oauth2.client [auto]): org.springframework.security:spring-security-oauth2-client — org.springframework.security:spring-security-oauth2-client 5.6.1 → 7.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.oauth2.core [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.security.oauth2.core [auto]): org.springframework.security:spring-security-oauth2-core — org.springframework.security:spring-security-oauth2-core 5.6.1 → 7.1.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module oauth2.oidc.sdk (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module oauth2.oidc.sdk (auto)): com.nimbusds:oauth2-oidc-sdk — com.nimbusds:oauth2-oidc-sdk 9.19 → 11.38.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module content.type (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module content.type (auto)): com.nimbusds:content-type — com.nimbusds:content-type 2.1 → 2.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module lang.tag (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module lang.tag (auto)): com.nimbusds:lang-tag — com.nimbusds:lang-tag 1.5 → 1.7 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.nimbusds.jose.jwt [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.nimbusds.jose.jwt [auto]): com.nimbusds:nimbus-jose-jwt — com.nimbusds:nimbus-jose-jwt 9.14 → 10.10 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module jjwt.api (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module jjwt.api (auto)): io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-api — io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-api 0.11.2 → 0.13.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module jjwt.impl (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module jjwt.impl (auto)): io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-impl — io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-impl 0.11.2 → 0.13.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module jjwt.jackson (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module jjwt.jackson (auto)): io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson — io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson 0.11.2 → 0.13.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.databind) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.databind): com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind — com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind 2.13.1 → 2.22.4 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.annotation) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.annotation): com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-annotations — com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-annotations 2.13.1 → 2.22 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.core) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.jackson.core): com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core — com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.13.1 → 2.22.4 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (provided -- module lombok) · ×1

Outdated (provided -- module lombok): org.projectlombok:lombok — org.projectlombok:lombok 1.18.22 → 1.18.48 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module pipelinr (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module pipelinr (auto)): net.sizovs:pipelinr — net.sizovs:pipelinr 0.7 → 0.11 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module org.postgresql.jdbc [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module org.postgresql.jdbc [auto]): org.postgresql:postgresql — org.postgresql:postgresql 42.3.1 → 42.7.14 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module org.checkerframework.checker.qual [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module org.checkerframework.checker.qual [auto]): org.checkerframework:checker-qual — org.checkerframework:checker-qual 3.5.0 → 4.3.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.flywaydb.core [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.flywaydb.core [auto]): org.flywaydb:flyway-core — org.flywaydb:flyway-core 8.4.3 → 13.11.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module exec.maven.plugin (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module exec.maven.plugin (auto)): org.codehaus.mojo:exec-maven-plugin — org.codehaus.mojo:exec-maven-plugin 1.2.1 → 3.6.4 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.toolchain (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.toolchain (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-toolchain — org.apache.maven:maven-toolchain 1.0 → 2.2.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.project (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.project (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-project — org.apache.maven:maven-project 2.0.6 → 2.2.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.settings (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.settings (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-settings — org.apache.maven:maven-settings 2.0.6 → 3.10.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.profile (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.profile (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-profile — org.apache.maven:maven-profile 2.0.6 → 2.2.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.plugin.registry (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.plugin.registry (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-plugin-registry — org.apache.maven:maven-plugin-registry 2.0.6 → 2.2.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.model (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.model (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-model — org.apache.maven:maven-model 2.0.6 → 3.10.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.artifact (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.artifact (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-artifact — org.apache.maven:maven-artifact 2.0.6 → 3.10.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.artifact.manager (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.artifact.manager (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-artifact-manager — org.apache.maven:maven-artifact-manager 2.0.6 → 2.2.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.repository.metadata (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.repository.metadata (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-repository-metadata — org.apache.maven:maven-repository-metadata 2.0.6 → 3.10.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module wagon.provider.api (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module wagon.provider.api (auto)): org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-provider-api — org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-provider-api 1.0-beta-2 → 3.5.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.core (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.core (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-core — org.apache.maven:maven-core 2.0.6 → 3.10.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.file (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.file (auto)): org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-file — org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-file 1.0-beta-2 → 3.5.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.plugin.parameter.documenter (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.plugin.parameter.documenter (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-plugin-parameter-documenter — org.apache.maven:maven-plugin-parameter-documenter 2.0.6 → 2.2.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.http.lightweight (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.http.lightweight (auto)): org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-http-lightweight — org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-http-lightweight 1.0-beta-2 → 3.5.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.http.shared (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.http.shared (auto)): org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-http-shared — org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-http-shared 1.0-beta-2 → 3.5.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module xml.apis (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module xml.apis (auto)): xml-apis:xml-apis — xml-apis:xml-apis 1.0.b2 → 2.0.2 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.reporting.api (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.reporting.api (auto)): org.apache.maven.reporting:maven-reporting-api — org.apache.maven.reporting:maven-reporting-api 2.0.6 → 4.0.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module doxia.sink.api (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module doxia.sink.api (auto)): org.apache.maven.doxia:doxia-sink-api — org.apache.maven.doxia:doxia-sink-api 1.0-alpha-7 → 2.2.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.error.diagnostics (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.error.diagnostics (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-error-diagnostics — org.apache.maven:maven-error-diagnostics 2.0.6 → 2.2.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module commons.cli (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module commons.cli (auto)): commons-cli:commons-cli — commons-cli:commons-cli 1.0 → 1.11.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.ssh.external (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.ssh.external (auto)): org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-ssh-external — org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-ssh-external 1.0-beta-2 → 3.5.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.ssh.common (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.ssh.common (auto)): org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-ssh-common — org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-ssh-common 1.0-beta-2 → 3.5.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.plugin.descriptor (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.plugin.descriptor (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-plugin-descriptor — org.apache.maven:maven-plugin-descriptor 2.0.6 → 2.2.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module plexus.interactivity.api (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module plexus.interactivity.api (auto)): org.codehaus.plexus:plexus-interactivity-api — org.codehaus.plexus:plexus-interactivity-api 1.0-alpha-4 → 1.6.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.monitor (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.monitor (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-monitor — org.apache.maven:maven-monitor 2.0.6 → 2.2.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.ssh (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module wagon.ssh (auto)): org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-ssh — org.apache.maven.wagon:wagon-ssh 1.0-beta-2 → 3.5.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module jsch (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module jsch (auto)): com.jcraft:jsch — com.jcraft:jsch 0.1.27 → 0.1.55 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module classworlds (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module classworlds (auto)): classworlds:classworlds — classworlds:classworlds 1.1 → 20040709.190353 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module maven.plugin.api (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module maven.plugin.api (auto)): org.apache.maven:maven-plugin-api — org.apache.maven:maven-plugin-api 2.0.6 → 3.10.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module plexus.utils (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module plexus.utils (auto)): org.codehaus.plexus:plexus-utils — org.codehaus.plexus:plexus-utils 2.0.5 → 4.1.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile) · ×1

Outdated (compile): org.codehaus.plexus:plexus-container-default — org.codehaus.plexus:plexus-container-default 1.0-alpha-9 → 2.1.1 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.hamcrest.core.deprecated [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.hamcrest.core.deprecated [auto]): org.hamcrest:hamcrest-core — org.hamcrest:hamcrest-core 2.2 → 3.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module commons.exec (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module commons.exec (auto)): org.apache.commons:commons-exec — org.apache.commons:commons-exec 1.1 → 1.6.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.commons.lang3 [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.apache.commons.lang3 [auto]): org.apache.commons:commons-lang3 — org.apache.commons:commons-lang3 3.12.0 → 3.21.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module modelmapper (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module modelmapper (auto)): org.modelmapper:modelmapper — org.modelmapper:modelmapper 2.4.5 → 3.2.8 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module snakeyaml (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module snakeyaml (auto)): org.yaml:snakeyaml — org.yaml:snakeyaml 1.23 → 2.7 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module mailgun (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module mailgun (auto)): net.sargue:mailgun — net.sargue:mailgun 1.10.0 → 2.0.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module jersey.client (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module jersey.client (auto)): org.glassfish.jersey.core:jersey-client — org.glassfish.jersey.core:jersey-client 2.35 → 4.0.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module java.ws.rs) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module java.ws.rs): jakarta.ws.rs:jakarta.ws.rs-api — jakarta.ws.rs:jakarta.ws.rs-api 2.1.6 → 4.0.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module jersey.media.multipart (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module jersey.media.multipart (auto)): org.glassfish.jersey.media:jersey-media-multipart — org.glassfish.jersey.media:jersey-media-multipart 2.35 → 4.0.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module org.jvnet.mimepull) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module org.jvnet.mimepull): org.jvnet.mimepull:mimepull — org.jvnet.mimepull:mimepull 1.9.15 → 1.11.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module jersey.hk2 (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module jersey.hk2 (auto)): org.glassfish.jersey.inject:jersey-hk2 — org.glassfish.jersey.inject:jersey-hk2 2.28 → 4.0.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module jersey.common (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module jersey.common (auto)): org.glassfish.jersey.core:jersey-common — org.glassfish.jersey.core:jersey-common 2.35 → 4.0.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module osgi.resource.locator (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module osgi.resource.locator (auto)): org.glassfish.hk2:osgi-resource-locator — org.glassfish.hk2:osgi-resource-locator 1.0.3 → 3.0.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module hk2.locator (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module hk2.locator (auto)): org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-locator — org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-locator 2.5.0 → 4.0.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module aopalliance.repackaged (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module aopalliance.repackaged (auto)): org.glassfish.hk2.external:aopalliance-repackaged — org.glassfish.hk2.external:aopalliance-repackaged 2.5.0 → 4.0.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module hk2.api (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module hk2.api (auto)): org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-api — org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-api 2.5.0 → 4.0.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module hk2.utils (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module hk2.utils (auto)): org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-utils — org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-utils 2.5.0 → 4.0.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module javassist (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module javassist (auto)): org.javassist:javassist — org.javassist:javassist 3.22.0-CR2 → 3.33.0-GA available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module gson (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module gson (auto)): com.google.code.gson:gson — com.google.code.gson:gson 2.8.5 → 2.14.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module io.swagger.v3.oas.annotations [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module io.swagger.v3.oas.annotations [auto]): io.swagger.core.v3:swagger-annotations — io.swagger.core.v3:swagger-annotations 2.1.2 → 2.2.55 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module io.swagger.v3.oas.models [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module io.swagger.v3.oas.models [auto]): io.swagger.core.v3:swagger-models — io.swagger.core.v3:swagger-models 2.1.2 → 2.2.55 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module io.github.classgraph) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module io.github.classgraph): io.github.classgraph:classgraph — io.github.classgraph:classgraph 4.8.83 → 6.0.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (runtime -- module org.mapstruct [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (runtime -- module org.mapstruct [auto]): org.mapstruct:mapstruct — org.mapstruct:mapstruct 1.3.1.Final → 1.6.3 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module swagger.annotations (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module swagger.annotations (auto)): io.swagger:swagger-annotations — io.swagger:swagger-annotations 1.5.20 → 1.6.16 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module swagger.models (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module swagger.models (auto)): io.swagger:swagger-models — io.swagger:swagger-models 1.5.20 → 1.6.16 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.classmate) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module com.fasterxml.classmate): com.fasterxml:classmate — com.fasterxml:classmate 1.5.1 → 1.8.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module org.slf4j [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module org.slf4j [auto]): org.slf4j:slf4j-api — org.slf4j:slf4j-api 1.7.32 → 2.0.20 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.plugin.core [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.plugin.core [auto]): org.springframework.plugin:spring-plugin-core — org.springframework.plugin:spring-plugin-core 2.0.0.RELEASE → 4.1.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile -- module spring.plugin.metadata [auto]) · ×1

Outdated (compile -- module spring.plugin.metadata [auto]): org.springframework.plugin:spring-plugin-metadata — org.springframework.plugin:spring-plugin-metadata 2.0.0.RELEASE → 3.0.0 available.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (test -- module mockito.inline (auto)) · ×1

Outdated (test -- module mockito.inline (auto)): org.mockito:mockito-inline — org.mockito:mockito-inline 3.8.0 → 5.2.0 available.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-150daddba57a4e6d9a892548a48a0ba1/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	1	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-150daddba57a4e6d9a892548a48a0ba1/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	9	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .	2	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	6	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .	0	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 01a164bb-5e98-7902-aaa7-d59d0ab1959e · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Findings by how serious they are

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

At a glance — Code Health · 65% · Adequate · gated by X5 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 90% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Maturity · 60% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 35% · Adequate · gated by P3, P5 ·

At a glance — Security · 90% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 65% · Adequate · gated by DM7 ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts