Public report β€” jazz, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 22:57 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Tmobile/jazz

57% At Risk

Medium Β· 55,568 LoC Β· 1 projects Β· rebuild ~0.6 person-years Β· weakest lens: Readiness (50%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated β€” reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this β–Έ

34/36dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic Β· confidence 1.0 Β· 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
64findings with an exact file:lineof 70 β€” the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
36/112dimensions across the health lenses55568 LoC Β· 1 projects β€” wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens β€” the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

tmobile/jazz is sound in substance but carries real gaps (57%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it β€” friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) β€” the domain model is expressive and well-guarded.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (50%) β€” releases are harder to depend on β€” versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Architecture (54%) is the next concern β€” the code resists change, so features cost more over time.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI (Tooling); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: Medium (~55,568 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.6 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built β€” each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 50% Β· 46% weightArchitecture 54% Β· 25% weightMaturity 67% Β· 14% weightCode Health 68% Β· 8% weightSecurity 69% Β· 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% Β· 2% weight

Raise Readiness 50 β†’ 70 (the Healthy floor) β‡’ headline 57 β†’ ~62.

Code composition β€” where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (28+)

28 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) β€” surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D29 Β· High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 Β· High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 Β· High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D32 Β· Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-log core/jazz_cognito-admin-authorizer/index.js
  • D32 Β· Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-url core/jazz_usermanagement/scm/scmFactory.js
  • D38 Β· Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock
  • D38 Β· Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock
  • D38 Β· Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock
  • D38 Β· Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock
  • D38 Β· High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock
  • D38 Β· High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock
  • R10 Β· Duplicated block (20 lines × 2 locations) core/jazz_t-vault/index.js
  • R10 Β· Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) core/jazz_asset-event-handler/index.js
  • R10 Β· Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/environment-logs/env-logs-section.component.ts
  • R10 Β· Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/service-overview/service-overview.component.ts
  • R10 Β· Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) core/jazz_apigee-proxy-aws/components/error-handler.js
  • R10 Β· Duplicated block (16 lines × 3 locations) core/jazz_asset-event-handler/index.js
  • R10 Β· Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) core/jazz_asset-event-handler/utils/utils.js
  • R10 Β· Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) core/jazz_deployments/index.js
  • R11 Β· Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] core/jazz_ui/src/app/environment-module/environment.module.ts
  • R11 Β· Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/daterange-picker.component.ts
  • R11 Β· Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] core/jazz_ui/src/app/service-module/service.module.imports.common.ts
  • R11 Β· Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] core/jazz_ui/src/app/service-module/service.module.ts
  • R11 Β· Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] core/jazz_ui/src/app/shared-module/shared.module.ts
  • R2 Β· Complex function applyFilter (cyclomatic 32, cognitive 36) core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/service-metrics/service-metrics.component.ts
  • R4 Β· No test reaches this file core/jazz_cognito-authorizer/components/auth-policy.js
  • R4 Β· No test reaches this file core/jazz_cognito-authorizer/index.js
  • R7 Β· Dead file (~47 LoC) core/jazz_cloud-logs-streamer/components/error-handler.js

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings β€” line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled β€” €30,000–€150,000
Cost to rebuild€30,000–€150,000 (0.3–0.9 person-years (496–1,574 h), ~1–2 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard β€” harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8Γ— (at 57% quality) β€” the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium Β· effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code~764 LoC unreachable (18 file(s)) β€” that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.6 person-years of build effort (about ~€90,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 50% β€” the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.1) β€” library/CLI, CQRS × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only β€” most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
+6.5 pts Β· Medium effort Β· Dependency Hygiene
2
Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
+5.8 pts Β· Medium effort Β· Tooling
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
+5.2 pts Β· Medium effort Β· Test Coverage

Diagnosis β€” what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens Β· Medium Β· Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.6 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 50%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there β€” that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.6 person-years rebuild (55,568 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 50%
β†’ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first β€” highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move Β· Medium Β· Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
β†’ Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

Architecture β€” module dependency matrix

31 modules, 3 dependencies β€” every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows β€” an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…34008be7cf29c96c49e9fcom.slf.modelcom.slf.util…lates/api-template-go…/function-template-go…emplate-go/components…o/functions/function1…o/functions/function2…s.api-template-python…hon.components.config…hon.components.errors…hon.components.logger…n.components.response…template-python.index…-template-python.test…ction-template-python…hon.components.config…hon.components.logger…-template-python.test…hon.components.config…hon.components.errors…hon.components.logger…n.components.response…n.functions.function1…ctions.function1.test…tion1.test.test_hello…n.functions.function2…ctions.function2.test…tion2.test.test_hellocom.slf.exceptionscom.slf.services…34008be7cf29c96c49e9f1com.slf.model2com.slf.util3…lates/api-template-go4…/function-template-go5…emplate-go/components6…o/functions/function17…o/functions/function28…s.api-template-python9…hon.components.config10…hon.components.errors11…hon.components.logger12…n.components.response13…template-python.index14…-template-python.test15…ction-template-python16…hon.components.config17…hon.components.logger18…-template-python.test19…hon.components.config20…hon.components.errors21…hon.components.logger22…n.components.response23…n.functions.function124…ctions.function1.test25…tion1.test.test_hello26…n.functions.function227…ctions.function2.test28…tion2.test.test_hello29com.slf.exceptions30com.slf.services31152

At a glance β€” Code Health Β· 68% Β· Adequate Β· gated by R1

At a glance β€” Architecture Β· 54% Β· Adequate Β· gated by AX10

At a glance β€” Maturity Β· 67% Β· Adequate Β· gated by D34

At a glance β€” Readiness Β· 50% Β· Adequate Β· gated by R8

At a glance β€” Security Β· 69% Β· Adequate Β· gated by D29, D38

At a glance β€” Domain Modelling Β· 100% Β· Exemplary

Security & Compliance β€” OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 β€” Vulnerable & Outdated Components46High / Critical
A03:2021 β€” Injection9High / Critical
A04:2021 β€” Insecure Design2Medium

Roadmap

Begin by cleaning up the project's dependencies by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring all imports. Next, enforce type checking in the CI pipeline by adding and running the noEmit script. Then, increase test coverage by writing tests for the currently unreached modules. After that, correct import boundary violations to ensure modules are accessed only through public exports. Finally, address the three largest orphaned files to improve codebase freshness.

Ranked by impact Γ· effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+6.5 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+5.8 ptsMediumTooling
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+5.2 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.+4.7 ptsMediumImport Boundaries
Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness β€” start with service-overview.component.ts, create-service.component.ts, service-metrics.component.ts.+1.6 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 1 Change coupling clique finding(s) in Change Coupling β€” start with config.js.+0.8 ptsLowChange Coupling
Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling β€” start with get.js.+0.8 ptsLowChange Coupling
Resolve the 1 The Python function template README duplicates the local-run steps… finding(s) in Documentation Quality β€” start with README.md.+0.8 ptsLowDocumentation Quality

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 β€” a quality signature. Of 12 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 8% slop Β· 67% mixed Β· 25% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock0.2SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
core/jazz_test-lambda/index.js7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: ssrf
core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/environment-assets/env-assets-section.component.html7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href
core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/environment-overview/env-overview-section.component.html7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href
core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/jenkins-status/jenkins-status.component.html7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href
core/jazz_ui/src/app/secondary-components/create-service/oss/create-service.component.html7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href
core/jazz_cognito-admin-authorizer/index.js7.9MixedData Compliance (PII/GDPR): Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-log
core/jazz_usermanagement/scm/scmFactory.js7.9MixedData Compliance (PII/GDPR): Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-url
core/jazz_deployments/components/config.js8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling clique: config.js, create.js, delete.js, get.js, getList.js, index.js, update.js, error-handler.js, logger.js, response.js, utils.js
core/jazz_environments/components/crud/get.js8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: get.js ↔ getList.js
templates/function-template-python/README.md9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: The Python function template README duplicates the local-run steps verbatim for requirements.txt and requirements-dev.txt, repeating the same install-and-test process twice.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment β€” run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 34 of 36 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 β€” the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: βœ“ Measured β€” a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled β€” an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory β€” an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): βœ“ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; β—‹ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean β€” a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence β€” absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled Β· advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample β€” advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked β€” 36 dimensions across the health lenses
D5D13D15D17D19D21D26D28D29D31D32D33D34D35D38AX10AX3AX5DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4R1R10R11R2R3R4R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality β€” in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report β€” three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line β€” never an absolute scratch path. Here, 64 of 70 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals β€” a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it β€” Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled Β· advisory β€” not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score β€” and this report, byte for byte β€” is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) β€” re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0βœ“ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0βœ“ deterministic
jscpdCode duplicationβ€”βœ“ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302βœ“ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302βœ“ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 Β· 0.31.0βœ“ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 Β· 0.69.3 Β· 3.2.533βœ“ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming β€” sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM Β· sampled Β· advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc9d8-d38d-775a-84c7-2e37bac77c58.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension β€” tool, version, invocation and retained raw output β€” is in Appendix B β€” Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency β€” what happened this run

What ran differently this time β€” a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities β€” scanner not present in this environment β€” The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared β€” every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap β€” a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see β€” the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies β€” runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree β€” a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history β€” a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual β€” undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded β€” it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs β€” it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample β€” it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project β€” a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns β€” a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) β€” it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules β€” it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code β€” they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles β€” risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension β€” code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS β€” files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics β€” a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present β€” it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see β€” only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) β€” D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D5 Β· Coupling6.9 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type β€” the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 6.9 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

1 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). β€” Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented β€” provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D13 Β· Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 Β· Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex β€” the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 Β· Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code β€” TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 0 LoC (0.0/KLoC) β†’ score 10.0.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D19 Β· Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled Β· advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective Strong / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

Jazz's documentation is strong and complete for a serverless platform: an excellent README with branding badges, an introduction, overview of services, deployment targets, CI/CD, and a detailed installation guide; the per-project template docs cover each Jazz template type (static website, Python SLA app, Java SLA app, Go SLA app, ReactJS site) with requirements, local-run steps for tests, and configuration details. The visible content is clear and well-structured.

The Python function template README duplicates the local-run steps verbatim for requirements.txt and requirements-dev.txt, repeating the same install-and-test process twice.templates/function-template-python/README.md
XML-doc coverage: extensionsbuilds/azure-config-pack/extensions.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The Python function template README duplicates the local-run steps… finding(s) in Documentation Quality β€” start with README.md. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 Β· Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled Β· advisory

What it measures: Whether names β€” types, methods, variables β€” are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective Exemplary / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 Β· Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

0 of 1 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 Β· Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed β€” scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST)3.4 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings β€” likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files β€” exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 3.4 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

9 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 4 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag Β· Γ—5.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:38detected by semgrep finding
Medium: var-in-href Β· Γ—4core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/environment-assets/env-assets-section.component.html:121detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) β€” start with codeql-analysis.yml (4), index.js. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) β€” start with env-assets-section.component.html, env-overview-section.component.html, jenkins-status.component.html. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 Β· IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

trivy and checkov found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md.

D32 Β· Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)8.1 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns β€” logging or storing data without safeguards.

Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR pattern scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset (personal data reaching log/console sinks, URLs and query strings, or unprotected browser storage); matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. NotApplicable when the scan runs and detects no PII/GDPR surface (no unearned 10); reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap, never as not-applicable, if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 8.1 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-log Β· Γ—2core/jazz_cognito-admin-authorizer/index.js:191detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) β€” start with index.js, scmFactory.js. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 Β· JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) β€” the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 Β· Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned β€” last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 0.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

159 of 159 significant source file(s) are orphaned β€” their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/service-overview/service-overview.component.ts.

Largest orphaned file Β· Γ—3core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/service-overview/service-overview.component.ts
Dormant codebase

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness β€” start with service-overview.component.ts, create-service.component.ts, service-metrics.component.ts. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 Β· Change Coupling8.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together β€” pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only β€” tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file β‰₯10 revisions, β‰₯5 shared commits, β‰₯50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only β€” test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 8.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: delete.js↔get.js 92%; delete.js↔getList.js 92%; delete.js↔update.js 92%

Change coupling clique: config.js, create.js, delete.js, get.js, getList.js, index.js, update.js, error-handler.js, logger.js, response.js, utils.jscore/jazz_deployments/components/config.js
Change coupling: get.js ↔ getList.jscore/jazz_environments/components/crud/get.js

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Change coupling clique finding(s) in Change Coupling β€” start with config.js. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling β€” start with get.js. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database β€” read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable β€” .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 0.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

46 finding(s): 14 critical, 20 high, 12 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Β· Γ—19core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Β· Γ—13core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Β· Γ—12core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 19 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities β€” start with yarn.lock (19). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 13 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities β€” start with yarn.lock (13). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities β€” start with yarn.lock. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS Β· M = Maturity Β· P = Readiness.

AX10 Β· Code composition0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” How the codebase splits by code ROLE β€” domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention β€” a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX3 Β· Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 Β· Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

DM6 Β· Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Domain Modelling β€” Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies β€” a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES β€” resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES β€” rename the layer and the check evaporates.

M1 Β· Documentation (README)9.3 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README β€” how to run the test suite.
M2 Β· Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found β€” no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision β€” dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences β€” and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 Β· Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether the repo is organised deliberately β€” src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder β€” it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 Β· Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled Β· advisory

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 Β· CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 Β· Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step β€” in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 Β· Deployment & Rollback10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) β€” from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

R1 Β· Type Safety3.5 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 203 typed · 379 plain JS β€” the untyped files are builds/azure-config-pack/nodejs/index.js, builds/jazz-build-module/apigee/templates/coreAPI_default/Common/resources/jsc/cf_CORS.js, builds/jazz-build-module/apigee/templates/coreAPI_secure/Common/resources/jsc/cf_CORS.js, builds/jazz_azure-create-service/components/ApiApp.js, builds/jazz_azure-create-service/components/ClientFactory.js, builds/jazz_azure-create-service/components/CommandMapping.js (+373 more).

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 Β· Code Duplication7.6 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • core/jazz_t-vault/index.js:396 · core/jazz_usermanagement/index.js:480 β€” the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block β€” it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead β€” the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in β€” and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. β€” index.js:396
  • core/jazz_asset-event-handler/index.js:366 · core/jazz_environment-event-handler/index.js:633 β€” the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour β€” the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. β€” index.js:366
  • core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/environment-logs/env-logs-section.component.ts:32 · core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/service-logs/service-logs.component.ts:52 β€” the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour β€” the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. β€” env-logs-section.component.ts:32
  • core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/service-overview/service-overview.component.ts:291 · core/jazz_ui/src/app/secondary-components/create-service/oss/create-service.component.ts:1241 β€” the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. β€” service-overview.component.ts:291
  • core/jazz_apigee-proxy-aws/components/error-handler.js:26 · core/jazz_apigee-proxy-aws/components/error-handler.js:47 β€” all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block β€” it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead β€” the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in β€” and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. β€” error-handler.js:26
  • core/jazz_asset-event-handler/index.js:135 · core/jazz_environment-event-handler/index.js:139 · core/jazz_slack-event-handler/index.js:132 β€” the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block β€” it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead β€” the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in β€” and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. β€” index.js:135
  • core/jazz_asset-event-handler/utils/utils.js:38 · core/jazz_environment-event-handler/utils/utils.js:38 β€” the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block β€” it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead β€” the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in β€” and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. β€” utils.js:38
  • core/jazz_deployments/index.js:325 · core/jazz_deployments/index.js:472 β€” all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block β€” it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead β€” the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in β€” and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. β€” index.js:325

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 Β· Import Boundaries5.8 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Architecture β€” Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

  • core/jazz_ui/src/app/environment-module/environment.module.ts:12 reaches into another package with a relative path (../primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-datepicker) β€” import the package by name instead. β€” environment.module.ts:12
  • core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/daterange-picker.component.ts:2 reaches into another package with a relative path (./ng2-datepicker) β€” import the package by name instead. β€” daterange-picker.component.ts:2
  • core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-datepicker/lib-dist/ng2-datepicker.component.d.ts:3 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../ng2-slimscroll) β€” import the package by name instead. β€” ng2-datepicker.component.d.ts:3
  • core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-datepicker/lib-dist/ng2-datepicker.module.js:4 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../ng2-slimscroll) β€” import the package by name instead. β€” ng2-datepicker.module.js:4
  • core/jazz_ui/src/app/service-module/service.module.imports.common.ts:5 reaches into another package with a relative path (../primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-datepicker) β€” import the package by name instead. β€” service.module.imports.common.ts:5
  • core/jazz_ui/src/app/service-module/service.module.ts:21 reaches into another package with a relative path (../primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-datepicker) β€” import the package by name instead. β€” service.module.ts:21
  • core/jazz_ui/src/app/shared-module/shared.module.ts:36 reaches into another package with a relative path (../primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-datepicker) β€” import the package by name instead. β€” shared.module.ts:36

What to do

  • Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity8.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) β€” real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster β€” extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) β€” index.js:317, index.js:37, index.js:38, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≀ 5.
R3 Β· Large Files7.9 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 Β· Test Coverage8.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Readiness β€” Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph β€” measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph β€” measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL β€” if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) β€” create-service.component.ts, env-logs-section.component.ts, ResourceFactory.js, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 Β· Tooling6.7 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Readiness β€” Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck β€” detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test βœ“ · lint βœ“ · typecheck βœ—

What to do

  • Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 Β· Dead Code9.6 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • 191 file(s) (~24307 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: core/jazz_ui/src/main.ts imports './environments/environment', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. β€” jazz_ui
  • 8 file(s) (~340 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package DOES declare main/module/exports β€” but every declared target is missing from the scanned tree, which is what a build-output entry (dist/, lib/, out/) looks like before the package is built. Point a declared target at the source entry, or build the package before scanning, so reachability can follow it. β€” sls-app-template-nodejs
  • Unreachable from the 52 application, 26 tooling and 115 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check β€” an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (52 application, 26 tooling, 115 test roots considered) (×5) β€” slimscroll.directive.js, utils.js, utils.js, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports β€” every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 Β· Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Readiness β€” npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps β€” from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json β€” installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) β€” utils.js:26, utils.js:28, utils.js:29
  • Declared in builds/jazz_azure-create-service/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members β€” dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 Β· Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Architecture β€” Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) β€” files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

Reference β€” by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health68%Adequate β€” gated by R1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture54%Adequate β€” gated by AX10Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity67%Adequate β€” gated by D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness50%Adequate β€” gated by R8Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security69%Adequate β€” gated by D29, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Not included β€” 76 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives β€” No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) β€” accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels β€” No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) β€” accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure β€” No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) β€” accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics β€” No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) β€” accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness β€” No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) β€” accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety β€” No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) β€” accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement β€” No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) β€” accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies β€” no DI registrations detected
  • AX2 Stateful singletons β€” no singleton implementations detected
  • AX4 Dependency direction β€” not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX6 Interface segregation β€” not assessed β€” interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion β€” not applicable β€” not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation β€” no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity β€” no CQRS query handlers detected β€” query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness β€” Advisory β€” this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection β€” Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository β€” because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls β€” Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository β€” because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail β€” Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository β€” because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention β€” Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository β€” because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights β€” Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository β€” because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity β€” Most of this repository's production source (.go, .java, .js, .py, .ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured β€” whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality β€” ~4363 lines of test source are present (.ts, .js) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored β€” this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability β€” Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene β€” Dependency hygiene not measured β€” no supported dependency manifest was read
  • D14 License Compliance β€” Not scored β€” this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)), which this pass does not parse yet β€” so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D16 Bus Factor β€” dormant codebase β€” no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D18 Solution Shape β€” D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .go, .java, .py, .ts β€” the .NET project files present are an immaterial minority β€” so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity β€” Most of this repository's production source (.go, .java, .js, .py, .ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured β€” whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality β€” N/A β€” ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency β€” No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling β€” At only 20452 LoC across a single project there is no need for bounded contexts.
  • D24 Comment Value β€” No inline comments to assess β€” comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance β€” no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability β€” No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed β€” tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored β€” this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes β€” Most of this repository's production source (.go, .java, .js, .py) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product β€” whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored β€” this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities β€” Not scored β€” no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) β€” not scanned yet) β€” where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing β€” The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact β€” no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy β€” No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency β€” The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D4 Code Duplication β€” Most of this repository's production source (.go, .java, .js, .py) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured β€” whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) β€” Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .go, .java, .py, .ts, which this pass does not read β€” so no class could be assessed. Not scored β€” this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity β€” no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles β€” architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage β€” Coverage not included β€” suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution β€” Test source is present (.ts, .js) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored β€” this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries β€” not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing β€” reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids β€” not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id β€” reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling β€” not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model β€” not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM5 Encapsulated state β€” not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
  • DM7 Repository granularity β€” not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state β€” reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED1 Event-Driven β€” not scored β€” this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (5 CQRS handler(s))
  • ED5 Idempotency β€” no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected β€” idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing β€” not scored β€” this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code β€” no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs β€” not analysed β€” these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty β€” Reported, not scored β€” and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability β€” This repo is a library, not a deployed service β€” it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
  • P5 DR & Backup β€” not evidenced β€” repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene β€” not evidenced β€” no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience β€” not applicable β€” this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations β€” no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage β€” no coverage report found on disk β€” produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov β€” `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan β€” a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline β€” Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos β€” a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene β€” Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos β€” a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene β€” Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos β€” a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness β€” uses a yarn lockfile β€” dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • S1 Web-Security Posture β€” Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository β€” because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene β€” Advisory β€” this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness β€” not analysed β€” these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation β€” not analysed β€” these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling β€” not analysed β€” these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging β€” not analysed β€” these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types β€” not analysed β€” these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A β€” Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue β€” 39 finding(s)
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· High CVE Β· Γ—19
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” @angular/common 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” upgrade to 20.3.25. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/common 4.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 20.3.27 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.27 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against @angular/common 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” @angular/compiler 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” upgrade to 20.3.27. This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/compiler 4.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 20.3.27 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.27 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against @angular/compiler 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” @angular/core 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” upgrade to 20.3.27. This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/core 4.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 20.3.27 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.27 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against @angular/core 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” async 2.2.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” async is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the * this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin async to 2.6.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” brace-expansion 1.1.6: [GHSA redacted] β€” brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.6, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” braces 1.8.5: [GHSA redacted] β€” braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.8.5, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.8.5; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” browserify-sign 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” browserify-sign is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin browserify-sign to 4.2.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” debug 2.6.3: [GHSA redacted] β€” debug is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin debug to 2.6.9 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against debug 2.6.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” fstream 1.0.11: [GHSA redacted] β€” fstream is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fstream to 1.0.12 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” hawk 3.1.3: [GHSA redacted] β€” hawk is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 9.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.1.3, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.1.3; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” hoek 4.2.1: [GHSA redacted] β€” no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; hoek is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it β€” upgrade or replace that dependent.
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” json5 0.5.1: [GHSA redacted] β€” json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 1.0.2 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.5.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.5.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” lodash 4.17.19: [GHSA redacted] β€” upgrade to 4.17.21. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 4.17.19, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.19: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” minimatch 3.0.3: [GHSA redacted] β€” minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.0.3, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” qs 6.4.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.4.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against qs 6.4.0, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 6.14.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.14.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.4.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” semver 5.3.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” semver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin semver to 5.7.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” sshpk 1.11.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” sshpk is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sshpk to 1.13.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” tough-cookie 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] β€” tough-cookie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tough-cookie to 2.3.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against tough-cookie 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” y18n 3.2.1: [GHSA redacted] β€” y18n is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin y18n to 3.2.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· Critical CVE Β· Γ—13
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” cipher-base 1.0.3: [GHSA redacted] β€” cipher-base is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cipher-base to 1.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” deep-extend 0.4.1: [GHSA redacted] β€” deep-extend is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin deep-extend to 0.5.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” form-data 2.1.2: [GHSA redacted] β€” form-data is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^2.3.3 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 2.5.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 2.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 2.5.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.5.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 2.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” fsevents 1.1.1: [GHSA redacted] β€” fsevents is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fsevents to 1.2.11 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against fsevents 1.1.1: [GHSA redacted], MAL-2023-462.
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” json-schema 0.2.3: [GHSA redacted] β€” json-schema is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json-schema to 0.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” loader-utils 0.2.17: [GHSA redacted] β€” loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 1.4.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.2.17, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.2.17; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” loader-utils 1.1.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 1.4.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against loader-utils 1.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 1.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 1.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” minimist 0.0.10: [GHSA redacted] β€” minimist is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^1.2.0 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimist to 0.2.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimist 0.0.10, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 0.2.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.2.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against minimist 0.0.10: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” minimist 0.0.8: [GHSA redacted] β€” minimist is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^1.2.0 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimist to 0.2.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimist 0.0.8, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 0.2.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.2.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against minimist 0.0.8: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” minimist 1.2.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” minimist is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^1.2.0 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimist to 1.2.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimist 1.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 1.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.2.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against minimist 1.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” pbkdf2 3.0.9: [GHSA redacted] β€” pbkdf2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin pbkdf2 to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” sha.js 2.4.8: [GHSA redacted] β€” sha.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sha.js to 2.4.12 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” tar 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] β€” tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.2.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.2.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 16 advisories this scan raises against tar 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST) Β· High Β· Γ—5
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:38 β€” GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks β€” as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:42 β€” GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks β€” as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit β€” keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:53 β€” GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks β€” as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/autobuild` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit β€” keep the full `github/codeql-action/autobuild` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:67 β€” GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks β€” as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit β€” keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: ssrf core/jazz_test-lambda/index.js:124 β€” The following request request.post() was found to be crafted from user-input `event` which can lead to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities. It is recommended where possible to not allow user-input to craft the base request, but to be treated as part of the path or query parameter. When user-input is necessary to craft the request, it is recommeneded to follow OWASP best practices to prevent abuse. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary β€” and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· Critical vulnerability Β· Γ—1
  • Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” elliptic 6.5.3: [GHSA redacted] β€” elliptic is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin elliptic to 6.6.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against elliptic 6.5.3, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 6.6.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.6.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 8 advisories this scan raises against elliptic 6.5.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· High vulnerability Β· Γ—1
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” diff 3.2.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” diff is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin diff to 3.5.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against diff 3.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 3.5.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.5.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against diff 3.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning β€” 21 finding(s)
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· Medium CVE Β· Γ—12
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” ajv 4.11.5: [GHSA redacted] β€” ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 6.14.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.11.5, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.11.5; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ajv 4.11.5, and their fixed versions do not agree β€” anything below 6.14.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.14.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ajv 4.11.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” bn.js 4.11.9: [GHSA redacted] β€” bn.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin bn.js to 4.12.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” extend 3.0.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” extend is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin extend to 3.0.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” hosted-git-info 2.4.1: [GHSA redacted] β€” hosted-git-info is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin hosted-git-info to 2.8.9 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” micromatch 2.3.11: [GHSA redacted] β€” micromatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 4.0.8 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.11, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.11; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” ms 0.7.2: [GHSA redacted] β€” ms is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 2.0.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.7.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.7.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” path-parse 1.0.5: [GHSA redacted] β€” path-parse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-parse to 1.0.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” randomatic 1.1.6: [GHSA redacted] β€” randomatic is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 3.0.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.1.6, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.1.6; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” request 2.81.0: [GHSA redacted] β€” no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; request is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it β€” upgrade or replace that dependent.
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” stringstream 0.0.5: [GHSA redacted] β€” stringstream is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin stringstream to 0.0.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” uuid 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] β€” uuid is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the * this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.0.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.0.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/jazz_ui/src/app/primary-components/daterange-picker/ng2-slimscroll/yarn.lock β€” yargs-parser 4.2.1: [GHSA redacted] β€” yargs-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (β€” 5.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.2.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.2.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST) Β· Medium Β· Γ—4
  • Medium: var-in-href core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/environment-assets/env-assets-section.component.html:121 β€” Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary β€” and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: var-in-href core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/environment-overview/env-overview-section.component.html:338 β€” Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary β€” and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: var-in-href core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/jenkins-status/jenkins-status.component.html:71 β€” Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary β€” and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: var-in-href core/jazz_ui/src/app/secondary-components/create-service/oss/create-service.component.html:971 β€” Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary β€” and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D32 Β· Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) Β· Medium Β· Γ—2
  • Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-log core/jazz_cognito-admin-authorizer/index.js:191 β€” Personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Under GDPR Article 5(1)(c) logs should carry the minimum needed to operate the system; prefer a pseudonymous identifier over the personal value itself.
  • Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-url core/jazz_usermanagement/scm/scmFactory.js:40 β€” Personal data appears to be placed in a URL or query string. URLs are recorded in server and proxy access logs, browser history and outbound Referer headers, so the value escapes the system's own retention controls. Move it to a request body or use an opaque identifier.
D16 Β· Bus Factor Β· dormant codebase Β· Γ—1
  • dormant codebase β€” no living knowledge left to concentrate β€” All 4 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains β€” nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
D35 Β· Change Coupling Β· Change coupling clique Β· Γ—1
  • Change coupling clique: config.js, create.js, delete.js, get.js, getList.js, index.js, update.js, error-handler.js, logger.js, response.js, utils.js core/jazz_deployments/components/config.js β€” 11 files β€” `core/jazz_deployments/components/config.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/crud/create.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/crud/delete.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/crud/get.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/crud/getList.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/crud/index.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/crud/update.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/error-handler.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/logger.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/response.js`, `core/jazz_deployments/components/utils.js` β€” all change together with no explicit dependency: a fully-connected co-change clique, not 55 separate couplings. They share one concern (thin parallel siblings over a common abstraction), so extract the shared part into ONE unit and the whole clique's coupling clears at once β€” you do not need to break each pair individually.
D35 Β· Change Coupling Β· Change coupling Β· Γ—1
  • Change coupling: get.js ↔ getList.js core/jazz_environments/components/crud/get.js β€” `core/jazz_environments/components/crud/get.js` and `core/jazz_environments/components/crud/getList.js` change together 91% of the time (10 of the 11 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module β€” a sibling reference still needs an import β€” so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Recommendation β€” 7 finding(s)
D34 Β· Knowledge Freshness Β· Largest orphaned file Β· Γ—3
  • Largest orphaned file core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/service-overview/service-overview.component.ts β€” One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining β€” a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file core/jazz_ui/src/app/secondary-components/create-service/oss/create-service.component.ts β€” One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining β€” a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file core/jazz_ui/src/app/pages/service-metrics/service-metrics.component.ts β€” One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining β€” a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D11 Β· Test Reliability Β· Test reliability not included Β· Γ—1
  • Test reliability not included β€” Test source is present (.ts, .js) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored β€” this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D19 Β· Documentation Quality Β· The Python function template README duplicates the local-run steps verbatim for requirements.txt and requirements-dev.txt, repeating the same install-and-test process twice. Β· Γ—1
  • The Python function template README duplicates the local-run steps verbatim for requirements.txt and requirements-dev.txt, repeating the same install-and-test process twice. templates/function-template-python/README.md β€” Merge the two run-section blocks into one so the repeated commands are shown only once.
D34 Β· Knowledge Freshness Β· Dormant codebase Β· Γ—1
  • Dormant codebase β€” 159 of 159 significant files have no living knowledge β€” the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 159 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D8 Β· Code Coverage Β· Coverage not included Β· Γ—1
  • Coverage not included β€” suite not readable by the collector β€” Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.ts, .js) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem β€” so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored β€” this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov β€” `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan β€” a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info β€” 3 finding(s)
D12 Β· Dependency Hygiene Β· Dependency hygiene not measured Β· Γ—1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured β€” no supported dependency manifest was read β€” No dependency manifest this pass reads for hygiene (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) was found in this repository, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED β€” a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE β€” outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D19 Β· Documentation Quality Β· XML-doc coverage Β· Γ—1
  • XML-doc coverage: extensions builds/azure-config-pack/extensions.csproj β€” extensions: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
D22 Β· Internal API Consistency Β· No exposed public API Β· Γ—1
  • No exposed public API β€” No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B β€” Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension β€” the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative β€” never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json β€” kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 Β· Secrets (history)gitleaksβ€”gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepβ€”semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .9artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)β€”none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0β€”
D31 Β· IaC & Container Securitytrivyβ€”trivy config --format json --quiet .0artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 Β· Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepβ€”semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/gdpr.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .2artifacts/raw/semgrep-gdpr.json
D33 Β· JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivyβ€”trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0β€”
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceβ€”provenance: not applicable β€” The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact β€” no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).0β€”
D37 Β· Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosureβ€”disclosure: not applicable β€” No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0β€”
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerβ€”osv-scanner --format json --recursive .46artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 Β· Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningβ€”runtime-hardening: not applicable β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0β€”
D41 Β· Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningβ€”runtime-hardening: not applicable β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0β€”
D42 Β· Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningβ€”runtime-hardening: not applicable β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0β€”

Run 019fc9d8-d38d-775a-84c7-2e37bac77c58 Β· every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric β€” drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md