Public report — archived-EventHub, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-07-2026 @ 19:18 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Tranvuongduy2003/archived-EventHub

35% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle

Medium · 25,854 LoC · 6 projects · rebuild ~0.3 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (21%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

65/69dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
29findings with an exact file:lineof 105 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
69/107dimensions across the health lenses25854 LoC · 6 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

tranvuongduy2003/archived-EventHub carries serious risk (35%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Architecture (89%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (83%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (21%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Domain Modelling (30%) is the next concern — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); 7 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene (Dependency Hygiene); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience).

For scale: Medium (~25,854 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (89%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 21% · 46% weightDomain Modelling 30% · 25% weightSecurity 51% · 14% weightMaturity 59% · 8% weightEvent-Driven 75% · 4% weightCode Health 83% · 2% weightArchitecture 89% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 21 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 35 → ~46.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 5%Plumbing 28%Generated 67%
New since the last scan (1+)

1 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Coupon/CreateCoupon/CreateCouponCommandValidator.cs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €13,000–€63,000
Cost to rebuild€13,000–€63,000 (0.1–0.4 person-years (211–667 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 35% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · 47% boilerplate · 38% straight-line · 15% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€38,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 21% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.8) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 7 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+12.0 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
2
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+11.2 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
3
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+11.2 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 21%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.3 person-years rebuild (25,854 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 21%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
86 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
Evidence: DM5 setters: 23 · DM4 anemic: 22 · DM2 primitive ids: 41
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch EventHub.Application Application EventHub.Domain Domain EventHub.Application->EventHub.Domain EventHub.Domain.Shared Shared EventHub.Domain->EventHub.Domain.Shared EventHub.Infrastructure Infrastructure EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence Persistence EventHub.Infrastructure->EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence->EventHub.Application EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence->EventHub.Domain EventHub.Infrastructure.SignalR SignalR EventHub.Infrastructure.SignalR->EventHub.Application EventHub.Infrastructure.SignalR->EventHub.Domain EventHub.Presentation Presentation EventHub.Presentation->EventHub.Infrastructure

At a glance — Code Health · 83% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 89% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 59% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 21% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, D12, P5, P7

At a glance — Security · 51% · Adequate · gated by D36, C1

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 30% · Weak · gated by DM1, DM2, DM4, DM7

At a glance — Event-Driven · 75% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures3High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection2Medium
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration2High / Critical

Roadmap

First, codify backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure as code, while documenting recovery time and procedure objectives to ensure true disaster resilience. Next, address the seven deprecated dependencies and the single missing automated test to improve code hygiene and coverage. Finally, implement standard HTTP resilience handlers to prevent external service failures from taking the application down, and resolve the single missing test in the test distribution.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 7 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+12.0 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+11.2 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+11.2 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+9.2 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+12.1 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.+12.0 ptsMediumOutbound HTTP resilience
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+11.2 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.+10.6 ptsMediumObservability

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 15 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 33% mixed · 67% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
source/EventHub.Presentation/appsettings.json5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
source/EventHub.Presentation/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/Helpers/PagingHelper.cs7.3MixedCyclomatic Complexity: PagingHelper.QueryPaginate (cyclomatic 17)
source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/CreateEvent/CreateEventCommandHandler.cs7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: CreateEventCommandHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 16)
source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs7.8MixedGod Classes: ClassTooLong: ApplicationDbContextSeed
source/EventHub.Application/Queries/Event/GetCreatedEventsByUserId/GetCreatedEventsByUserIdQueryHandler.cs8.5Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: GetCreatedEventsByUserIdQueryHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 21)
source/EventHub.Application/Queries/Event/GetPaginatedEvents/GetPaginatedEventsQueryHandler.cs8.5Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: GetPaginatedEventsQueryHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 16)
source/EventHub.Infrastructure/Services/NotificationService.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (33 lines × 2)
source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/CreateEvent/CreateEventCommandValidator.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (33 lines × 2)
source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Coupon/CreateCoupon/CreateCouponCommandValidator.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)
source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/SeedWork/Repository/CachedRepositoryBase.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 3)
source/EventHub.Infrastructure/FilesSystem/AzureFileService.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)
source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/Attributes/ClaimRequirementFilter.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)
source/EventHub.Presentation/Templates/ResetPasswordEmailTemplate.html9.0Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: plaintext-http-link
source/EventHub.Infrastructure/Configurations/ApplicationConfiguration.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 65 of 69 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 69 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D31D34D35D36AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX9C1C2C3DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 29 of 105 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019faf50-c864-7f99-875f-de762429ca02.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was GetCreatedEventsByUserIdQueryHandler.Handle at 21.

GetCreatedEventsByUserIdQueryHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 21)source/EventHub.Application/Queries/Event/GetCreatedEventsByUserId/GetCreatedEventsByUserIdQueryHandler.cs:26
PagingHelper.QueryPaginate (cyclomatic 17)source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/Helpers/PagingHelper.cs:79
CreateEventCommandHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 16)source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/CreateEvent/CreateEventCommandHandler.cs:65
GetPaginatedEventsQueryHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 16)source/EventHub.Application/Queries/Event/GetPaginatedEvents/GetPaginatedEventsQueryHandler.cs:21

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was PagingHelper.QueryPaginate at 25.

PagingHelper.QueryPaginate (cognitive 25)source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/Helpers/PagingHelper.cs:79
CreateEventCommandHandler.Handle (cognitive 18)source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/CreateEvent/CreateEventCommandHandler.cs:65

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

ClassTooLong: ApplicationDbContextSeedsource/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs:0
FileTooLong: Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cssource/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

6 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) · ×2source/EventHub.Infrastructure/Services/NotificationService.cs:75
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×2source/EventHub.Infrastructure/FilesSystem/AzureFileService.cs:79
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Coupon/CreateCoupon/CreateCouponCommandValidator.cs:8
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3)source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/SeedWork/Repository/CachedRepositoryBase.cs:187

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: EventHub.Domain.Shared

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 29 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

52 outdated, 3 vulnerable, 7 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: AutoMapper · ×3
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Abstractions · ×7
Outdated: FluentValidation · ×52

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 57 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is source/EventHub.Presentation/Controllers/UsersController.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 20701 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 projects, 649 source files, 20701 hand-written lines of code (20701 production / 0 test), plus 51632 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 15 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The README is a thin single-file guide for an eventhub project that describes the folder structure and gives a brief star-giving note but does not cover architecture/design patterns, Clean Architecture, or run-setup steps. The document clips mid-Explanation of Folders at 'EventHub.Infrastructure.SignalR' before covering the outlined topics such as Applied Architecture and Design Patterns, Unit of Work Pattern, Domain-Driven Design (DDD), CQRS, Transactional Outbox, Idempotency, CI/CD, and how to run the application. The visible content is sparse and lacks a clear table of contents.

XML-doc coverage: EventHub.Domain.Shared · ×6source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/EventHub.Domain.Shared.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The README is a thin single-file guide for an eventhub project that describes the folder structure and gives a brief star-giving note but does not cover architecture/design patterns, Clean Architecture, or run-setup steps. The document clips mid-Explanation of Folders at 'EventHub.Infrastructure.SignalR' before covering the outlined topics such as Applied Architecture and Design Patterns, Unit of Work Pattern, Domain-Driven Design (DDD), CQRS, Transactional Outbox, Idempotency, CI/CD, and how to run the application. The visible content is sparse and lacks a clear table of contents.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 valuable / 2 redundant across 90 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×2source/EventHub.Infrastructure/Configurations/ApplicationConfiguration.cs:17

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with ApplicationConfiguration.cs, PagingHelper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 6 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split EventHub.Application

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Split EventHub.Application finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

100 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×2source/EventHub.Presentation/appsettings.json:30detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 2 low.

Low: plaintext-http-link · ×2source/EventHub.Presentation/Templates/ResetPasswordEmailTemplate.html:490detected by semgrep finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002source/EventHub.Presentation/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026source/EventHub.Presentation/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness3.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

54 of 74 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs.

Concentrated knowledge decay
Largest orphaned filesource/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/3 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM).

No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IRepositoryBase<T>` declares 21 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IRepositoryBase.cs:16
  • `IUnitOfWork` declares 33 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IUnitOfWork.cs:15

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls4.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Only 1 imperative guard call site(s) — too few to demonstrate default-deny across handlers.

What to do

  • Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

  • `Conversation` references the aggregate root `Event` directly (via `Event`) — hold its `EventId` instead. — Conversation.cs:26
  • `Conversation` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `Host`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Conversation.cs:30
  • `Conversation` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `User`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Conversation.cs:34
  • `Coupon` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `Author`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Coupon.cs:45
  • `Coupon` references the aggregate root `Payment` directly (via `Payments`) — hold its `PaymentId` instead. — Coupon.cs:51
  • `Event` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `Author`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Event.cs:76
  • `Event` references the aggregate root `Category` directly (via `Categories`) — hold its `CategoryId` instead. — Event.cs:84
  • `Event` references the aggregate root `Payment` directly (via `Payments`) — hold its `PaymentId` instead. — Event.cs:94
  • `Event` references the aggregate root `Conversation` directly (via `Conversations`) — hold its `ConversationId` instead. — Event.cs:98
  • `Event` references the aggregate root `Ticket` directly (via `Tickets`) — hold its `TicketId` instead. — Event.cs:102
  • `Notification` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `TargetUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Notification.cs:43
  • `Notification` references the aggregate root `Payment` directly (via `Payment`) — hold its `PaymentId` instead. — Notification.cs:51
  • `Payment` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `Author`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Payment.cs:66
  • `Payment` references the aggregate root `Event` directly (via `Event`) — hold its `EventId` instead. — Payment.cs:70
  • `Payment` references the aggregate root `Coupon` directly (via `Coupon`) — hold its `CouponId` instead. — Payment.cs:74
  • `Payment` references the aggregate root `Ticket` directly (via `Tickets`) — hold its `TicketId` instead. — Payment.cs:78
  • `Ticket` references the aggregate root `Event` directly (via `Event`) — hold its `EventId` instead. — Ticket.cs:53
  • `Ticket` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `User`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Ticket.cs:57
  • `Ticket` references the aggregate root `Payment` directly (via `Payment`) — hold its `PaymentId` instead. — Ticket.cs:61
  • `User` references the aggregate root `Event` directly (via `Events`) — hold its `EventId` instead. — User.cs:74
  • `User` references the aggregate root `Payment` directly (via `Payments`) — hold its `PaymentId` instead. — User.cs:76
  • `User` references the aggregate root `Conversation` directly (via `UserConversations`) — hold its `ConversationId` instead. — User.cs:82
  • `User` references the aggregate root `Conversation` directly (via `HostConversations`) — hold its `ConversationId` instead. — User.cs:83
  • `User` references the aggregate root `Ticket` directly (via `Tickets`) — hold its `TicketId` instead. — User.cs:87
  • `User` references the aggregate root `Notification` directly (via `Notifications`) — hold its `NotificationId` instead. — User.cs:89

What to do

  • Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `Conversation.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Conversation.cs:18
  • `Conversation.HostId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Conversation.cs:20
  • `Conversation.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Conversation.cs:22
  • `Conversation.LastMessageId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Conversation.cs:24
  • `Message.ReceiverId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Message.cs:42
  • `Message.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Message.cs:49
  • `Message.ConversationId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Message.cs:52
  • `Coupon.AuthorId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Coupon.cs:43
  • `Event.AuthorId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Event.cs:72
  • `EmailContent.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — EmailContent.cs:21
  • `EventSubImage.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — EventSubImage.cs:15
  • `Expense.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Expense.cs:16
  • `Reason.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Reason.cs:15
  • `Review.AuthorId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Review.cs:17
  • `Review.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Review.cs:20
  • `TicketType.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — TicketType.cs:18
  • `EmailAttachment.EmailContentId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — EmailAttachment.cs:16
  • `SubExpense.ExpenseId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — SubExpense.cs:16
  • `Notification.TargetUserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Notification.cs:31
  • `Notification.InvitationId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Notification.cs:35
  • `Notification.PaymentId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Notification.cs:37
  • `Notification.UserFollowerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Notification.cs:39
  • `Payment.PaymentIntentId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Payment.cs:54
  • `Payment.SessionId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Payment.cs:56
  • `Payment.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Payment.cs:58
  • `Payment.AuthorId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Payment.cs:61
  • `Payment.CouponId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Payment.cs:64
  • `PaymentItem.TicketTypeId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — PaymentItem.cs:17
  • `PaymentItem.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — PaymentItem.cs:20
  • `PaymentItem.PaymentId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — PaymentItem.cs:23
  • `Ticket.TicketTypeId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Ticket.cs:38
  • `Ticket.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Ticket.cs:40
  • `Ticket.AuthorId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Ticket.cs:42
  • `Ticket.PaymentId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Ticket.cs:44
  • `Function.ParentId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Function.cs:28
  • `Invitation.InviterId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Invitation.cs:16
  • `Invitation.InvitedId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Invitation.cs:19
  • `Invitation.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Invitation.cs:22
  • `Permission.FunctionId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Permission.cs:13
  • `Permission.RoleId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Permission.cs:16
  • 4 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 44.

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `Conversation` is an aggregate/entity with 10 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Conversation.cs:11
  • `Message` is an aggregate/entity with 14 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Message.cs:10
  • `Coupon` is an aggregate/entity with 14 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Coupon.cs:12
  • `Category` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Category.cs:8
  • `EmailContent` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — EmailContent.cs:9
  • `EventSubImage` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — EventSubImage.cs:8
  • `Expense` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Expense.cs:9
  • `Reason` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Reason.cs:8
  • `Review` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Review.cs:10
  • `TicketType` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — TicketType.cs:11
  • `EmailAttachment` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — EmailAttachment.cs:9
  • `SubExpense` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — SubExpense.cs:9
  • `Notification` is an aggregate/entity with 15 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Notification.cs:13
  • `Payment` is an aggregate/entity with 19 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Payment.cs:16
  • `PaymentItem` is an aggregate/entity with 11 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — PaymentItem.cs:10
  • `Ticket` is an aggregate/entity with 14 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Ticket.cs:14
  • `User` is an aggregate/entity with 30 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — User.cs:23
  • `Command` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Command.cs:8
  • `Function` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Function.cs:9
  • `Invitation` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Invitation.cs:9
  • `Permission` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Permission.cs:9
  • `UserFollower` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — UserFollower.cs:8

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

  • `Conversation` exposes publicly writable state (Id, EventId, HostId, UserId, LastMessageId, Event, …). — Conversation.cs:11
  • `Message` exposes publicly writable state (Id, Content, ImageUrl, ImageFileName, VideoUrl, VideoFileName, …). — Message.cs:10
  • `Coupon` exposes publicly writable state (Id, Name, Description, Quantity, MinPrice, PercentValue, …). — Coupon.cs:12
  • `Event` exposes publicly writable state (Id, CoverImageFileName, CoverImageUrl, Name, Description, Location, …). — Event.cs:22
  • `Category` exposes publicly writable state (Id, Name, IconImageUrl, IconImageFileName, Color, EventCategories). — Category.cs:8
  • `EmailContent` exposes publicly writable state (Id, Content, EventId, Event, EmailAttachments). — EmailContent.cs:9
  • `EventSubImage` exposes publicly writable state (Id, EventId, ImageUrl, ImageFileName, Event). — EventSubImage.cs:8
  • `Expense` exposes publicly writable state (Id, EventId, Title, Total, Event, SubExpenses). — Expense.cs:9
  • `Reason` exposes publicly writable state (Id, EventId, Name, Event). — Reason.cs:8
  • `Review` exposes publicly writable state (Id, AuthorId, EventId, Content, IsPositive, SentimentPercentage, …). — Review.cs:10
  • `TicketType` exposes publicly writable state (Id, EventId, Name, Quantity, Price, NumberOfSoldTickets, …). — TicketType.cs:11
  • `EmailAttachment` exposes publicly writable state (Id, EmailContentId, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentUrl, EmailContent). — EmailAttachment.cs:9
  • `SubExpense` exposes publicly writable state (Id, ExpenseId, Name, Price, Expense). — SubExpense.cs:9
  • `Notification` exposes publicly writable state (Id, Title, Message, Type, Timestamp, TargetUserId, …). — Notification.cs:13
  • `Payment` exposes publicly writable state (Id, TicketQuantity, CustomerName, CustomerPhone, CustomerEmail, TotalPrice, …). — Payment.cs:16
  • `PaymentItem` exposes publicly writable state (Id, TicketTypeId, EventId, PaymentId, Name, Quantity, …). — PaymentItem.cs:10
  • `Ticket` exposes publicly writable state (Id, TicketNo, CustomerName, CustomerPhone, CustomerEmail, TicketTypeId, …). — Ticket.cs:14
  • `User` exposes publicly writable state (FullName, Dob, Gender, Bio, AvatarUrl, AvatarFileName, …). — User.cs:23
  • `Command` exposes publicly writable state (Id, Name, CommandInFunctions, Permissions). — Command.cs:8
  • `Function` exposes publicly writable state (Id, Name, Url, SortOrder, ParentId, Parent, …). — Function.cs:9
  • `Invitation` exposes publicly writable state (Id, InviterId, InvitedId, EventId, Inviter, Invited, …). — Invitation.cs:9
  • `Permission` exposes publicly writable state (FunctionId, RoleId, CommandId, Function, Role, Command). — Permission.cs:9
  • `UserFollower` exposes publicly writable state (Id, FollowerId, FollowedId, Follower, Followed). — UserFollower.cs:8

What to do

  • Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

  • `IUnitOfWork` (domain layer) references `Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Storage` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/web). — IUnitOfWork.cs:15
  • `CalculatePositivePercentageOfReviewDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) references `System.Net.Http` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/web). — CalculatePositivePercentageOfReviewDomainEventHandler.cs:9

What to do

  • Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).
DM7 · Repository granularity2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

  • `CachedCategoriesRepository` is a repository over `Category`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Category` through its owning aggregate instead. — CachedCategoriesRepository.cs:10
  • `CachedEventsRepository` is a repository over `Event`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Event` through its owning aggregate instead. — CachedEventsRepository.cs:12
  • `CachedReviewsRepository` is a repository over `Review`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Review` through its owning aggregate instead. — CachedReviewsRepository.cs:10
  • `CategoriesRepository` is a repository over `Category`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Category` through its owning aggregate instead. — CategoriesRepository.cs:8
  • `CommandsRepository` is a repository over `Command`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Command` through its owning aggregate instead. — CommandsRepository.cs:10
  • `ConversationsRepository` is a repository over `Conversation`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Conversation` through its owning aggregate instead. — ConversationsRepository.cs:8
  • `CouponsRepository` is a repository over `Coupon`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Coupon` through its owning aggregate instead. — CouponsRepository.cs:8
  • `EmailAttachmentsRepository` is a repository over `EmailAttachment`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `EmailAttachment` through its owning aggregate instead. — EmailAttachmentsRepository.cs:9
  • `EmailContentsRepository` is a repository over `EmailContent`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `EmailContent` through its owning aggregate instead. — EmailContentsRepository.cs:9
  • `EventsRepository` is a repository over `Event`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Event` through its owning aggregate instead. — EventsRepository.cs:12
  • `EventSubImagesRepository` is a repository over `EventSubImage`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `EventSubImage` through its owning aggregate instead. — EventSubImagesRepository.cs:9
  • `ExpensesRepository` is a repository over `Expense`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Expense` through its owning aggregate instead. — ExpensesRepository.cs:8
  • `FunctionsRepository` is a repository over `Function`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Function` through its owning aggregate instead. — FunctionsRepository.cs:10
  • `InvitationsRepository` is a repository over `Invitation`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Invitation` through its owning aggregate instead. — InvitationsRepository.cs:9
  • `MessagesRepository` is a repository over `Message`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Message` through its owning aggregate instead. — MessagesRepository.cs:9
  • `NotificationsRepository` is a repository over `Notification`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Notification` through its owning aggregate instead. — NotificationsRepository.cs:8
  • `PaymentItemsRepository` is a repository over `PaymentItem`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `PaymentItem` through its owning aggregate instead. — PaymentItemsRepository.cs:9
  • `PaymentsRepository` is a repository over `Payment`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Payment` through its owning aggregate instead. — PaymentsRepository.cs:8
  • `PermissionsRepository` is a repository over `Permission`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Permission` through its owning aggregate instead. — PermissionsRepository.cs:8
  • `ReasonsRepository` is a repository over `Reason`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Reason` through its owning aggregate instead. — ReasonsRepository.cs:9
  • `ReviewsRepository` is a repository over `Review`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Review` through its owning aggregate instead. — ReviewsRepository.cs:8
  • `SubExpensesRepository` is a repository over `SubExpense`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `SubExpense` through its owning aggregate instead. — SubExpensesRepository.cs:8
  • `TicketsRepository` is a repository over `Ticket`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Ticket` through its owning aggregate instead. — TicketsRepository.cs:8
  • `TicketTypesRepository` is a repository over `TicketType`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `TicketType` through its owning aggregate instead. — TicketTypesRepository.cs:9
  • `UserFollowersRepository` is a repository over `UserFollower`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `UserFollower` through its owning aggregate instead. — UserFollowersRepository.cs:9
  • `ICachedReviewsRepository` is a repository over `Review`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Review` through its owning aggregate instead. — ICachedReviewsRepository.cs:6
  • `ICommandsRepository` is a repository over `Command`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Command` through its owning aggregate instead. — ICommandsRepository.cs:7
  • `IEmailAttachmentsRepository` is a repository over `EmailAttachment`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `EmailAttachment` through its owning aggregate instead. — IEmailAttachmentsRepository.cs:7
  • `IEmailContentsRepository` is a repository over `EmailContent`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `EmailContent` through its owning aggregate instead. — IEmailContentsRepository.cs:7
  • `IEventSubImagesRepository` is a repository over `EventSubImage`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `EventSubImage` through its owning aggregate instead. — IEventSubImagesRepository.cs:7
  • `IExpensesRepository` is a repository over `Expense`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Expense` through its owning aggregate instead. — IExpensesRepository.cs:6
  • `IFunctionsRepository` is a repository over `Function`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Function` through its owning aggregate instead. — IFunctionsRepository.cs:7
  • `IInvitationsRepository` is a repository over `Invitation`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Invitation` through its owning aggregate instead. — IInvitationsRepository.cs:7
  • `IMessagesRepository` is a repository over `Message`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Message` through its owning aggregate instead. — IMessagesRepository.cs:7
  • `IPaymentItemsRepository` is a repository over `PaymentItem`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `PaymentItem` through its owning aggregate instead. — IPaymentItemsRepository.cs:7
  • `IReasonsRepository` is a repository over `Reason`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Reason` through its owning aggregate instead. — IReasonsRepository.cs:7
  • `IReviewsRepository` is a repository over `Review`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Review` through its owning aggregate instead. — IReviewsRepository.cs:6
  • `ISubExpensesRepository` is a repository over `SubExpense`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `SubExpense` through its owning aggregate instead. — ISubExpensesRepository.cs:6
  • `ITicketTypesRepository` is a repository over `TicketType`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `TicketType` through its owning aggregate instead. — ITicketTypesRepository.cs:7
  • `IUserFollowersRepository` is a repository over `UserFollower`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `UserFollower` through its owning aggregate instead. — IUserFollowersRepository.cs:7

What to do

  • Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.
DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `CalculatePositivePercentageOfReviewDomainEventHandler.Handle` makes a synchronous remote call (an HTTP call) while handling an event. The handler now depends, in real time, on another service being up and fast — the opposite of why you went event-driven. Publish a follow-up message (or use the outbox) instead of calling out and awaiting a response inside the handler. — CalculatePositivePercentageOfReviewDomainEventHandler.cs:20

What to do

  • Remove synchronous remote calls from message handlers — react by publishing further messages, so services stay temporally decoupled.
ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 · Event naming7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `CalculatePositivePercentageOfReviewDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — CalculatePositivePercentageOfReviewDomainEvent.cs:5
  • `DomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — DomainEvent.cs:14
  • `IDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — IDomainEvent.cs:13

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED5 · Idempotency9.6 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `CreateSubExpense.CreateSubExpenseCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateSubExpenseCommandHandler.cs:19

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
P2 · Observability5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 3/5 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

  • The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×10) — ApplicationExtensions.cs:70, CachedRepositoryBase.cs:47, CachedRepositoryBase.cs:73, …

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 97/239 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — AuthController.cs:40, AuthController.cs:66, AuthController.cs:92, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health83%StrongSolid.
Architecture89%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity59%Adequate — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness21%Critical — gated by D8, D9, D12, P5, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security51%Adequate — gated by D36, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling30%Weak — gated by DM1, DM2, DM4, DM7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven75%StrongSolid.
Not included — 38 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 7 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×3
  • Vulnerable: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 13.0.1 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: MailKit — MailKit 4.7.1.1 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: MimeKit — MimeKit 4.7.1 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2
  • Secret: generic-api-key source/EventHub.Presentation/appsettings.json:30 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key source/EventHub.Presentation/appsettings.json:34 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • High IaC: DS-0002 source/EventHub.Presentation/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 22 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×7
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Abstractions 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Features — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Features 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Abstractions 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.Azure.SignalR — Microsoft.Azure.SignalR 1.27.0 — Other Microsoft.Azure.SignalR >= 1.33.1
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) source/EventHub.Infrastructure/Services/NotificationService.cs:75 — source/EventHub.Infrastructure/Services/NotificationService.cs:75-107 | source/EventHub.Application/Hubs/NotificationHub.cs:115-147
  • Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/CreateEvent/CreateEventCommandValidator.cs:11 — source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/CreateEvent/CreateEventCommandValidator.cs:11-43 | source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/UpdateEvent/UpdateEventCommandValidator.cs:15-47
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) source/EventHub.Infrastructure/FilesSystem/AzureFileService.cs:79 — source/EventHub.Infrastructure/FilesSystem/AzureFileService.cs:79-85 | source/EventHub.Infrastructure/FilesSystem/AzureFileService.cs:93-99
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/Attributes/ClaimRequirementFilter.cs:48 — source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/Attributes/ClaimRequirementFilter.cs:48-54 | source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/Attributes/TokenRequirementFilter.cs:33-39
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · GetCreatedEventsByUserIdQueryHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • GetCreatedEventsByUserIdQueryHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 21) source/EventHub.Application/Queries/Event/GetCreatedEventsByUserId/GetCreatedEventsByUserIdQueryHandler.cs:26 — GetCreatedEventsByUserIdQueryHandler.Handle has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · PagingHelper.QueryPaginate (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • PagingHelper.QueryPaginate (cyclomatic 17) source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/Helpers/PagingHelper.cs:79 — PagingHelper.QueryPaginate has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · CreateEventCommandHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • CreateEventCommandHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 16) source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/CreateEvent/CreateEventCommandHandler.cs:65 — CreateEventCommandHandler.Handle has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · GetPaginatedEventsQueryHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • GetPaginatedEventsQueryHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 16) source/EventHub.Application/Queries/Event/GetPaginatedEvents/GetPaginatedEventsQueryHandler.cs:21 — GetPaginatedEventsQueryHandler.Handle has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · PagingHelper.QueryPaginate (cognitive 25) · ×1
  • PagingHelper.QueryPaginate (cognitive 25) source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/Helpers/PagingHelper.cs:79 — PagingHelper.QueryPaginate has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CreateEventCommandHandler.Handle (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • CreateEventCommandHandler.Handle (cognitive 18) source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/CreateEvent/CreateEventCommandHandler.cs:65 — CreateEventCommandHandler.Handle has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D3 · God Classes · ClassTooLong · ×1
  • ClassTooLong: ApplicationDbContextSeed source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs:0 — ClassTooLong — 623 lines, 14 methods.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×1
  • FileTooLong: Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 639 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded).
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Coupon/CreateCoupon/CreateCouponCommandValidator.cs:8 — source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Coupon/CreateCoupon/CreateCouponCommandValidator.cs:8-24 | source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Coupon/UpdateCoupon/UpdateCouponCommandValidator.cs:8-30
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/SeedWork/Repository/CachedRepositoryBase.cs:187 — source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/SeedWork/Repository/CachedRepositoryBase.cs:187-194 | source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/SeedWork/Repository/CachedRepositoryBase.cs:198-205 | source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/SeedWork/Repository/CachedRepositoryBase.cs:222-229
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: EventHub.Domain.Shared — EventHub.Domain.Shared: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Recommendation — 17 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×2
  • redundant comment source/EventHub.Infrastructure/Configurations/ApplicationConfiguration.cs:17 — "Default Lockout settings." — weak keep; the options value is self-describing, but could note why lockout matters (e.g. rate limiting) below it
  • redundant comment source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/Helpers/PagingHelper.cs:81 — "Apply text searches" — weak keep; the QueryPaginate comment already says this
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×2
  • Low: plaintext-http-link source/EventHub.Presentation/Templates/ResetPasswordEmailTemplate.html:490 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link source/EventHub.Presentation/Templates/ResetPasswordEmailTemplate.html:499 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 13 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: source/EventHub.Presentation/Controllers/UsersController.cs, source/EventHub.Application/Hubs/ChatHub.cs, source/EventHub.Presentation/Controllers/PaymentsController.cs, source/EventHub.Application/Hubs/NotificationHub.cs, source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/SeedWork/PaginationFilter.cs, source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/Helpers/PagingHelper.cs, source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Payment/ValidateSession/ValidateSessionCommandHandler.cs, source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Payment/Checkout/CheckoutCommandHandler.cs (+5 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 20701 LoC spread over 6 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split EventHub.Application · ×1
  • Split EventHub.Application — A generic catch-all name that is huge (10k LoC) and sprawls over 142 namespaces despite being large. Suggested: by namespace: EventHub.Messaging, EventHub.Persistence, EventHub.Clients
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 source/EventHub.Presentation/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Concentrated knowledge decay · ×1
  • Concentrated knowledge decay — 54 of 74 significant files have no living knowledge, while the repository is still being changed at a low rate (1 commit(s) in the last 90 days) — so this is one repo-wide knowledge-decay state, not 54 separate risks. The code moved on without the people who understood these files: document them or schedule a read-through before the next change lands in them.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Largest orphaned file · ×1
  • Largest orphaned file source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`dotnet sbom-tool generate` (or the CycloneDX .NET tool) over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite was found in this repository.
Info — 59 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×52
  • Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.9.2 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by EventHub.Domain.Shared).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Abstractions 2.2.0 → 2.3.11 available (referenced by EventHub.Domain.Shared).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Features — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Features 2.2.0 → 5.0.17 available (referenced by EventHub.Domain.Shared).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Abstractions 2.2.0 → 2.3.11 available (referenced by EventHub.Domain.Shared).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Core — Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Core 8.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventHub.Domain.Shared).
  • Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json — Newtonsoft.Json 13.0.3 → 13.0.4 available (referenced by EventHub.Domain.Shared).
  • Outdated: SonarAnalyzer.CSharp — SonarAnalyzer.CSharp 9.24.0.89429 → 10.31.0.145097 available (referenced by EventHub.Domain.Shared).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Annotations — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Annotations 6.7.2 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by EventHub.Domain.Shared).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 8.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventHub.Presentation).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 8.0.8 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventHub.Presentation).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design 8.0.4 → 10.0.2 available (referenced by EventHub.Presentation).
  • Outdated: Serilog — Serilog 4.0.1 → 4.4.0 available (referenced by EventHub.Presentation).
  • Outdated: Serilog.Extensions.Hosting — Serilog.Extensions.Hosting 8.0.0 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by EventHub.Presentation).
  • Outdated: Bogus — Bogus 35.6.0 → 35.6.5 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 8.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 8.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.OpenApi — Microsoft.OpenApi 1.6.15 → 3.9.0 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence).
  • Outdated: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 13.0.1 → 16.2.0 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Azure.Storage.Blobs — Azure.Storage.Blobs 12.21.1 → 12.29.1 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.1.35 → 2.1.79 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 → 11.3.1 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Hangfire — Hangfire 1.8.14 → 1.8.24 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Hangfire.Console.Extensions — Hangfire.Console.Extensions 2.0.0 → 2.1.2 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Hangfire.Mongo — Hangfire.Mongo 1.10.7 → 1.16.1 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: MailKit — MailKit 4.7.1.1 → 4.17.0 available (referenced by EventHub.Infrastructure).
  • + 27 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×6
  • XML-doc coverage: EventHub.Domain.Shared source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/EventHub.Domain.Shared.csproj — EventHub.Domain.Shared: 19 % XML-doc coverage (41/217).
  • XML-doc coverage: EventHub.Presentation source/EventHub.Presentation/EventHub.Presentation.csproj — EventHub.Presentation: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/154).
  • XML-doc coverage: EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence.csproj — EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence: 19 % XML-doc coverage (52/278).
  • XML-doc coverage: EventHub.Infrastructure source/EventHub.Infrastructure/EventHub.Infrastructure.csproj — EventHub.Infrastructure: 21 % XML-doc coverage (21/99).
  • XML-doc coverage: EventHub.Domain source/EventHub.Domain/EventHub.Domain.csproj — EventHub.Domain: 4 % XML-doc coverage (15/363).
  • XML-doc coverage: EventHub.Application source/EventHub.Application/EventHub.Application.csproj — EventHub.Application: 14 % XML-doc coverage (198/1384).
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .6artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .2artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .2artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019faf50-c864-7f99-875f-de762429ca02 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 76 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 45 field(s)
  • ExternalLoginCallbackCommandHandler._emailService source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Auth/ExternalLoginCallback/ExternalLoginCallbackCommandHandler.cs:14
  • ForgotPasswordCommand.Email source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Auth/ForgotPassword/ForgotPasswordCommand.cs:26
  • ForgotPasswordCommandHandler._emailService source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Auth/ForgotPassword/ForgotPasswordCommandHandler.cs:10
  • ResetPasswordCommand.Email source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Auth/ResetPassword/ResetPasswordCommand.cs:34
  • SignUpCommand.Email source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Auth/SignUp/SignUpCommand.cs:30
  • SignUpCommnadHandler._emailService source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Auth/SignUp/SignUpCommnadHandler.cs:14
  • ValidateUserCommand.Email source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Auth/ValidateUser/ValidateUserCommand.cs:29
  • CreateEventCommand.EmailContent source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/CreateEvent/CreateEventCommand.cs:73
  • UpdateEventCommand.EmailContent source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Event/UpdateEvent/UpdateEventCommand.cs:94
  • CheckoutCommand.CustomerEmail source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Payment/Checkout/CheckoutCommand.cs:37
  • CreateUserCommand.Email source/EventHub.Application/Commands/User/CreateUser/CreateUserCommand.cs:33
  • CreateUserCommandHandler._emailService source/EventHub.Application/Commands/User/CreateUser/CreateUserCommandHandler.cs:21
  • UpdateUserCommand.Email source/EventHub.Application/Commands/User/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:17
  • ForgotPasswordDto.Email source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Auth/ForgotPasswordDto.cs:8
  • SignUpDto.Email source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Auth/SignUpDto.cs:8
  • CreateEventDto.EmailContent source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Event/CreateEventDto.cs:52
  • EventDetailDto.EmailContent source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Event/EventDetailDto.cs:75
  • UpdateEventDto.EmailContent source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Event/UpdateEventDto.cs:55
  • CheckoutDto.CustomerEmail source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Payment/CheckoutDto.cs:7
  • PaymentDto.CustomerEmail source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Payment/PaymentDto.cs:17
  • ValidateSessionResponseDto.CustomerEmail source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Payment/ValidateSessionResponseDto.cs:15
  • CreateTicketDto.CustomerEmail source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Ticket/CreateTicketDto.cs:12
  • TicketDto.CustomerEmail source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Ticket/TicketDto.cs:17
  • AuthorDto.Email source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/AuthorDto.cs:11
  • CreateUserDto.Email source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/CreateUserDto.cs:11
  • ResetUserPasswordDto.Email source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/ResetUserPasswordDto.cs:11
  • UpdateUserDto.Email source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/UpdateUserDto.cs:14
  • UserDto.Email source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/UserDto.cs:16
  • ValidateUserDto.Email source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/ValidateUserDto.cs:8
  • EmailSettings.Email source/EventHub.Domain.Shared/Settings/EmailSettings.cs:5
  • EmailContent.EmailAttachments source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/EventAggregate/Entities/EmailContent.cs:28
  • Event.EmailContent source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/EventAggregate/Event.cs:80
  • EmailAttachment.EmailContentId source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/EventAggregate/ValueObjects/EmailAttachment.cs:17
  • EmailAttachment.EmailContent source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/EventAggregate/ValueObjects/EmailAttachment.cs:30
  • Payment.CustomerEmail source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/PaymentAggregate/Payment.cs:40
  • Ticket.CustomerEmail source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/TicketAggregate/Ticket.cs:36
  • IUnitOfWork.EmailAttachments source/EventHub.Domain/SeedWork/Persistence/IUnitOfWork.cs:66
  • IUnitOfWork.EmailContents source/EventHub.Domain/SeedWork/Persistence/IUnitOfWork.cs:71
  • ApplicationDbContext.EmailAttachments source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContext.cs:38
  • ApplicationDbContext.EmailContents source/EventHub.Infrastructure.Persistence/Data/ApplicationDbContext.cs:39
  • + 5 more field(s) in this category.
Phone — 17 field(s)
  • SignUpCommand.PhoneNumber source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Auth/SignUp/SignUpCommand.cs:38
  • ValidateUserCommand.PhoneNumber source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Auth/ValidateUser/ValidateUserCommand.cs:37
  • CheckoutCommand.CustomerPhone source/EventHub.Application/Commands/Payment/Checkout/CheckoutCommand.cs:39
  • CreateUserCommand.PhoneNumber source/EventHub.Application/Commands/User/CreateUser/CreateUserCommand.cs:41
  • UpdateUserCommand.PhoneNumber source/EventHub.Application/Commands/User/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:19
  • SignUpDto.PhoneNumber source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Auth/SignUpDto.cs:11
  • CheckoutDto.CustomerPhone source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Payment/CheckoutDto.cs:9
  • PaymentDto.CustomerPhone source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Payment/PaymentDto.cs:15
  • ValidateSessionResponseDto.CustomerPhone source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Payment/ValidateSessionResponseDto.cs:13
  • CreateTicketDto.CustomerPhone source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Ticket/CreateTicketDto.cs:10
  • TicketDto.CustomerPhone source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Ticket/TicketDto.cs:15
  • CreateUserDto.PhoneNumber source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/CreateUserDto.cs:14
  • UpdateUserDto.PhoneNumber source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/UpdateUserDto.cs:17
  • UserDto.PhoneNumber source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/UserDto.cs:19
  • ValidateUserDto.PhoneNumber source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/ValidateUserDto.cs:11
  • Payment.CustomerPhone source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/PaymentAggregate/Payment.cs:35
  • Ticket.CustomerPhone source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/TicketAggregate/Ticket.cs:31
Name — 8 field(s)
  • CreateUserCommand.FullName source/EventHub.Application/Commands/User/CreateUser/CreateUserCommand.cs:57
  • UpdateUserCommand.FullName source/EventHub.Application/Commands/User/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:23
  • ConversationUserDto.FullName source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/Conversation/ConversationUserDto.cs:7
  • AuthorDto.FullName source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/AuthorDto.cs:14
  • CreateUserDto.FullName source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/CreateUserDto.cs:20
  • UpdateUserDto.FullName source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/UpdateUserDto.cs:23
  • UserDto.FullName source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/UserDto.cs:25
  • User.FullName source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/UserAggregate/User.cs:29
Date of birth — 6 field(s)
  • CreateUserCommand.Dob source/EventHub.Application/Commands/User/CreateUser/CreateUserCommand.cs:49
  • UpdateUserCommand.Dob source/EventHub.Application/Commands/User/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:21
  • CreateUserDto.Dob source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/CreateUserDto.cs:17
  • UpdateUserDto.Dob source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/UpdateUserDto.cs:20
  • UserDto.Dob source/EventHub.Application/SeedWork/DTOs/User/UserDto.cs:22
  • User.Dob source/EventHub.Domain/Aggregates/UserAggregate/User.cs:31

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md