Public report — turso, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 13:01 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Tursodatabase/turso

No baseline yet — first run coverage not measuredbounded contexts not declared
38% At Risk
Maturity 74% Strong Architecture 73% Strong Performance 69% Strong Code Health 63% Adequate Readiness 37% Weak Security 22% Critical

Small · 9,494 LoC · 20 projects · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Security (22%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

67/69dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
167findings with an exact file:lineof 180 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
69/105dimensions across the health lenses9494 LoC · 20 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Preview lens: this repo is pre-1.0 / in development, so the colour bands are relaxed to what a preview needs — *green* means good enough for a preview, not yet production-stable. Code correctness and security stay near-strict even here; the score itself is absolute and comparable across repos.

tursodatabase/turso carries serious gaps (38%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Security (22%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (37%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: Small (~9,494 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 63% Adequate Architecture 73% Strong Maturity 74% Strong Readiness 37% Weak · gated by R8, P3 Security 22% ⚠ Critical · gated by D28, D31, D36, D38, C1 Performance 69% Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 22% · 46% weightReadiness 37% · 25% weightCode Health 63% · 14% weightPerformance 69% · 8% weightArchitecture 73% · 4% weightMaturity 74% · 2% weight

Raise Security 22 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 38 → ~53.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 23%Plumbing 27%Tests 50%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €7,700–€39,000
Cost to rebuild€7,700–€39,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (129–415 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 38% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 29% boilerplate · 24% straight-line · 47% branching logic
Dead frontend code~1722 LoC unreachable (15 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€24,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 22% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — library/CLI, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
+15.4 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection
2
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
+8.3 pts · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
+8.2 pts · Medium effort · Test Coverage

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 22%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (9,494 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 22%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch EncryptionExample EncryptionExample Turso.Data Data EncryptionExample->Turso.Data NativeAotSample NativeAotSample OpenApiTitler OpenApiTitler Turso.Raw Raw Turso.Data->Turso.Raw Turso.Data.Sqlite Sqlite Turso.Data.Sqlite->Turso.Data Turso.Data.Sqlite.NativeAot NativeAot Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite Sqlite Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite->Turso.Data.Sqlite Turso.Platform.Client Client Turso.Serverless.Client Client

At a glance — Code Health · 63% · Adequate

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 6.9 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 8.3 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 9.7 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 8.6 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 8.2 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 7.1 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 9.7 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 8.0
The Bad
D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 5.7 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 5.6 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 4.9 R3 · React / TS Large Files 5.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 5.3

At a glance — Architecture · 73% · Strong

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 9.6 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 9.6 D22 · .NET / C# Internal API Consistency 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 8.3 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 R11 · React / TS Import Boundaries 8.8 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0
The Bad
AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 6.0
The Ugly
AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.0

At a glance — Maturity · 74% · Strong

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 9.4 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.7 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 37% · Weak · gated by R8, P3

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 9.8 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 7.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 7.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 10.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 6.7
The Bad
P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 6.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 6.0
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 1.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 4.1 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 0.0

At a glance — Security · 22% · Critical · gated by D28, D31, D36, D38, C1

The Good
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 9.4 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 0.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 3.5 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 2.5 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 0.0

At a glance — Performance · 69% · Strong

The Good
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 9.5
The Bad
PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 6.3 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 5.9

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components51High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration29High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures13High / Critical

Roadmap

First, secure sensitive data by implementing encryption at rest and managing keys in a vault, or confirm if infrastructure handles this. Next, clean up the codebase by removing unused dependencies and explicitly declaring all imports. Then, improve reliability by adding tests for all unreached production modules. After that, restrict the public API by making types internal by default to protect against breaking changes. Finally, establish a formal schema migration strategy using Entity Framework to manage database changes explicitly.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+15.4 ptsMediumData Protection
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+8.3 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+8.2 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.+7.8 ptsMediumLibrary API & versioning
Adopt EF migrations (dotnet ef migrations add + Migrate() on startup) as the explicit, versioned schema strategy — no migration mechanism was detected.+7.8 ptsMediumSchema migrations
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+7.5 ptsMediumTooling
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+7.1 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).+7.1 ptsMediumDR & Backup

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 52 files carrying findings, judged against the Preview bar: 2% slop · 35% mixed · 63% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
testing/sqlright/Dockerfile2.3SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
.devcontainer/Dockerfile.squid3.0MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Cargo.lock3.0MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
Dockerfile.antithesis4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
bindings/javascript/package-lock.json4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
bindings/react-native/package-lock.json4.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
packages/turso-sync-js/.yarn/releases/yarn-4.9.2.cjs5.1MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
bindings/javascript/.yarn/releases/yarn-4.9.2.cjs5.1MixedSecrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token
testing/differential-oracle/fuzzer/docker-runner/Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
testing/simulator/simulator-docker-runner/Dockerfile.simulator5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
testing/sqlancer/sqlancer-runner/Dockerfile.sqlancer5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
serverless/javascript/package-lock.json5.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
bindings/go/go.mod5.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024
bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/TursoSession.cs6.0MixedExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs6.0MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
.devcontainer/Dockerfile6.2MixedIaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: DS-0010
bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite.csproj6.4MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
Dockerfile.cli6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
testing/stress/Dockerfile.antithesis-config6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs7.0Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: SqliteDataReader.GetSchemaTable (cyclomatic 18)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 67 of 69 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 69 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D20D21D22D26D27D28D29D30D31D33D34D35D36D38AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8C1GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P3P4P5P6P8PF1PF2PF3R1R10R11R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 167 of 180 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fdc50-d3d4-7c17-9fe5-913262da43e5.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D22, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was requireNative at 146.

requireNative (cyclomatic 146) · ×2bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js:67
transition (cyclomatic 37)bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs:137
nextToken (cyclomatic 25)bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs:56
TursoSession.BatchAsync (cyclomatic 23)bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/TursoSession.cs:135
SqliteCommand.SplitStatements (cyclomatic 18)bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteCommand.cs:513

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 requireNative (cyclomatic 146) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with index.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 transition (cyclomatic 37) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with turso-sql-split.mjs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 nextToken (cyclomatic 25) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with turso-sql-split.mjs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was requireNative at 318.

requireNative (cognitive 318) · ×2bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js:67
isFileMusl (cognitive 20) · ×2bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js:28
nextToken (cognitive 46)bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs:56
TursoSession.BatchAsync (cognitive 40)bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/TursoSession.cs:135
SqliteDataReader.GetSchemaTable (cognitive 28)bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:393

+ 7 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 requireNative (cognitive 318) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with index.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 isFileMusl (cognitive 20) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with index.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 nextToken (cognitive 46) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with turso-sql-split.mjs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs · ×6bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs:0
TooManyMethods: SqliteCommand · ×5bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteCommand.cs:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with index.js (2), SqliteConnection.cs, SqliteDataReader.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with SqliteCommand.cs, SqliteConnection.Aggregates.cs, SqliteDataReader.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  3. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:350
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:105
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:503
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs:433

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

20 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Turso.Raw(net8.0)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 33 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: TursoRow (LCOM4 5)bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/TursoResultSet.cs:11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

128 test methods: 128 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 128 tests.

Skipped test: TestCommitTransactionbindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Tests/TursoTests.cs:303

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 13 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js (6×146=876); bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js (5×146=730); bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs (9×18=162)

Hotspot: bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js · ×10bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

16 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 9494 LoC (0.9/KLoC) → score 8.3.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×7bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/Turso.Serverless.Client.csproj:21
BarePragmaDisable · ×5bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnectionStringBuilder.cs:188
TodoComment · ×2bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:326
HackComment · ×2bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:346

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite.csproj (2), Turso.Data.Sqlite.csproj, Turso.Data.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 BarePragmaDisable finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs (3), SqliteConnectionStringBuilder.cs, TursoSession.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

20 projects, 179 .cs files, 12383 hand-written lines of code (9494 production / 2889 test), 26 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 API inconsistencies across a 400-member sample of 87 exposed types.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 8 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

55 % of calls cross a namespace and 1 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 finding(s): 0 critical, 16 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×12.aristo/canon-matches.toml:148detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 12 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with yarn-4.9.2.cjs (6), encryption.go (2), canon-matches.toml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.10detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

29 finding(s): 1 critical, 16 high, 2 medium, 10 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×16.devcontainer/Dockerfile.squiddetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: DS-0010.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×2.devcontainer/Dockerfile.squiddetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0014 · ×10.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (5), Dockerfile.antithesis (3), Dockerfile.simulator (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile, Dockerfile.squid. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 of 36 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteBlob.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: index.ts↔promise.ts 100%; promise-bundle.ts↔promise-vite-dev-hack.ts 94%; promise-turbopack-hack.ts↔promise-vite-dev-hack.ts 94%

Change coupling: index.ts ↔ promise.ts · ×10bindings/javascript/sync/packages/common/index.ts

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with index.ts (3), promise-bundle.ts (3), promise-default.ts (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

92 finding(s): 4 critical, 11 high, 74 medium, 3 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×11Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×4bindings/javascript/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0190 · ×35Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 35 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (20), Cargo.lock (15). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (35 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 11 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (10), Cargo.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `ITursoPlatformClient` declares 49 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. (×3) — TursoPlatformClient.generated.cs:29, TursoPlatformClient.generated.cs:29, TursoPlatformClient.generated.cs:29

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
  • Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `SetLength`'s body only throws NotSupportedException — sometimes a deliberate contract, often an unfinished stub. Confirm it's intentional. (×3) — SqliteBlob.cs:86, SqliteBlob.cs:86, SqliteBlob.cs:86
  • `ChangeDatabase`'s body only throws NotSupportedException — sometimes a deliberate contract, often an unfinished stub. Confirm it's intentional. (×6) — SqliteConnection.cs:154, SqliteConnection.cs:154, SqliteConnection.cs:154, …
  • `ClearAllPools` has an empty body — confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. (×3) — SqliteConnection.cs:201, SqliteConnection.cs:201, SqliteConnection.cs:201
  • `GetCustomAttributes`'s body only throws NotSupportedException — sometimes a deliberate contract, often an unfinished stub. Confirm it's intentional. (×6) — TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:633, TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:633, TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:633, …
  • `IsDefined`'s body only throws NotSupportedException — sometimes a deliberate contract, often an unfinished stub. Confirm it's intentional. (×3) — TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:639, TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:639, TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:639
  • `GenerateNextSequenceValueOperation`'s body only throws NotSupportedException — sometimes a deliberate contract, often an unfinished stub. Confirm it's intentional. (×3) — TursoSqliteUpdateSqlGenerator.cs:62, TursoSqliteUpdateSqlGenerator.cs:62, TursoSqliteUpdateSqlGenerator.cs:62
  • A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. — TursoTests.cs:304

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 4 of 8 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • 508/683 types (74%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.

What to do

  • Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
P3 · Security & performance tooling1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

  • EF Core is used but neither migrations nor EnsureCreated were detected — confirm how the production schema is created and evolved.

What to do

  • Adopt EF migrations (dotnet ef migrations add + Migrate() on startup) as the explicit, versioned schema strategy — no migration mechanism was detected.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC — Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 30 use(s) across 50,389 production line(s) (~0.6/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene5.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 21 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
R1 · Type Safety8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication4.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • bindings/javascript/packages/common/promise.ts:326 · bindings/javascript/packages/common/promise.ts:394 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/promise.ts:299 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-bundle.ts:314 — promise.ts:326
  • bindings/javascript/packages/common/promise.ts:394 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/promise.ts:299 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-bundle.ts:314 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-default.ts:314 — promise.ts:394
  • bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/promise.test.ts:332 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/promise.test.ts:377 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/promise.test.ts:988 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/promise.test.ts:1131 — promise.test.ts:332
  • bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise.test.ts:186 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise.test.ts:207 — promise.test.ts:186
  • bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/promise.test.ts:377 · bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise.test.ts:207 — promise.test.ts:377
  • bindings/javascript/packages/common/compat.ts:202 · serverless/javascript/src/connection.ts:423 · serverless/javascript/src/connection.ts:524 — compat.ts:202
  • bindings/javascript/sync/packages/common/types.ts:70 · bindings/react-native/src/types.ts:265 — types.ts:70
  • bindings/javascript/packages/common/compat.ts:561 · bindings/javascript/packages/common/promise.ts:1195 — compat.ts:561

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 · Import Boundaries8.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

  • bindings/javascript/packages/native/turso-sql-runner-split.test.ts:2 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../turso-sql-split.mjs) — import the package by name instead. — turso-sql-runner-split.test.ts:2
  • testing/conformance/javascript/__test__/compat.test.js:31 imports @tursodatabase/serverless/compat, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — compat.test.js:31

What to do

  • Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — index.js:67, index.js:67, protocol.ts:1, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

  • 10 file(s) over 400 lines

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage4.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — docker-entrypoint.sqlancer.ts, compat.ts, index.js, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • 3 file(s) (~436 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — javascript
  • Unreachable from the 19 application, 7 tooling and 16 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (19 application, 7 tooling, 16 test roots considered) (×6) — compat.ts, promise-turbopack-hack.ts, promise-vite-dev-hack.ts, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — index.js:98, index.js:82, index.js:201
  • Declared in bindings/javascript/packages/native/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
  • Only test files import it — move it to devDependencies. — compat.test.js:40

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×25) — TursoBatch.cs:77, TursoBatch.cs:120, TursoCommand.cs:113, …

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 225/237 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×12) — TursoServerlessConnection.cs:140, TursoServerlessConnection.cs:159, TursoServerlessConnection.cs:224, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~2.5 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health63%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Architecture73%StrongSolid.
Maturity74%StrongStrongest area.
Readiness37%Weak — gated by R8, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security22%Critical — gated by D28, D31, D36, D38, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance69%StrongSolid.
Not included — 37 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P2 Observability — This repo is a library, not a deployed service — it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 52 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×16
  • High IaC: DS-0002 .devcontainer/Dockerfile.squid — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 .devcontainer/Dockerfile.squid — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.antithesis — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfile.antithesis — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfile.antithesis — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.cli — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 testing/differential-oracle/fuzzer/docker-runner/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 testing/differential-oracle/fuzzer/docker-runner/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 testing/simulator/simulator-docker-runner/Dockerfile.simulator — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 testing/simulator/simulator-docker-runner/Dockerfile.simulator — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 testing/sqlancer/sqlancer-runner/Dockerfile.sqlancer — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 testing/sqlancer/sqlancer-runner/Dockerfile.sqlancer — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 testing/sqlright/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 testing/sqlright/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 testing/sqlright/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 testing/stress/Dockerfile.antithesis-config — Image user should not be 'root'
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×12
  • Secret: generic-api-key .aristo/canon-matches.toml:148 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key docs/language-reference/book/print.html:9342 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key examples/go/encryption.go:31 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key examples/javascript/encryption/encryption.mjs:23 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key examples/python/encryption.py:24 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key packages/turso-sync-js/.yarn/releases/yarn-4.9.2.cjs:583 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: aws-access-token packages/turso-sync-js/.yarn/releases/yarn-4.9.2.cjs:148 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token packages/turso-sync-js/.yarn/releases/yarn-4.9.2.cjs:148 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token bindings/javascript/.yarn/releases/yarn-4.9.2.cjs:148 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token bindings/javascript/.yarn/releases/yarn-4.9.2.cjs:148 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bindings/javascript/.yarn/releases/yarn-4.9.2.cjs:583 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key examples/go/encryption/encryption.go:31 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×11
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — quinn-proto 0.11.14: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.11.15
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/javascript/package-lock.json — js-yaml 4.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.1 (in 6 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/javascript/package-lock.json — postcss 8.5.10: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.5.12
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/javascript/package-lock.json — postcss 8.5.10: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.5.18
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/javascript/package-lock.json — vite 7.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.3.5
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/javascript/package-lock.json — ws 8.20.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.21.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/react-native/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.13: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.16 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/react-native/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.13: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.17 (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/react-native/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.13: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.18 (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/react-native/package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.0 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] serverless/javascript/package-lock.json — tar 7.5.13: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.18 (in 2 lockfiles)
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×7
  • NoWarnInCsproj bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/Turso.Serverless.Client.csproj:21 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Raw/Turso.Raw.csproj:20 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Platform.Client/Turso.Platform.Client.csproj:21 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite.csproj:21 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data/Turso.Data.csproj:21 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/Turso.Data.Sqlite.csproj:22 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite.csproj:21 — EF1001
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×4
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/javascript/package-lock.json — @vitest/browser 3.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.2.5
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/javascript/package-lock.json — @vitest/browser 3.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.2.7
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] bindings/javascript/package-lock.json — vitest 3.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.2.6
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] serverless/javascript/package-lock.json — tar 7.5.13: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.19 (in 2 lockfiles)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1
  • High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.10 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.10 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Critical IaC · ×1
  • Critical IaC: DS-0010 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — RUN using 'sudo'
Warning — 111 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×35
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Cargo.lock — anyhow 1.0.98: RUSTSEC-2026-0190 — upgrade to 1.0.103 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2025-0141 Cargo.lock — bincode: RUSTSEC-2025-0141
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 Cargo.lock — crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 — upgrade to 0.9.20 (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0186 Cargo.lock — memmap2 0.9.5: RUSTSEC-2026-0186 — upgrade to 0.9.11
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2025-0119 Cargo.lock — number_prefix: RUSTSEC-2025-0119
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2024-0436 Cargo.lock — paste: RUSTSEC-2024-0436 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0179 Cargo.lock — postgres-protocol 0.6.11: RUSTSEC-2026-0179 — upgrade to 0.6.12
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0180 Cargo.lock — postgres-protocol 0.6.11: RUSTSEC-2026-0180 — upgrade to 0.6.12
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0173 Cargo.lock — proc-macro-error2: RUSTSEC-2026-0173
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0194 Cargo.lock — quick-xml 0.26.0: RUSTSEC-2026-0194 — upgrade to 0.41.0
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0195 Cargo.lock — quick-xml 0.26.0: RUSTSEC-2026-0195 — upgrade to 0.41.0
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0185 Cargo.lock — quinn-proto 0.11.14: RUSTSEC-2026-0185 — upgrade to 0.11.15
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0235 Cargo.lock — rkyv 0.7.46: RUSTSEC-2026-0235 — upgrade to 0.8.17
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0205 Cargo.lock — scc 2.4.0: RUSTSEC-2026-0205 — upgrade to 3.8.4
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2024-0320 Cargo.lock — yaml-rust: RUSTSEC-2024-0320
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 bindings/go/go.mod — golang.org/x/sys 0.38.0: GO-2026-5024 — upgrade to 0.44.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4155 bindings/go/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.10: GO-2025-4155 — upgrade to 1.24.11 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-4175 bindings/go/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.10: GO-2025-4175 — upgrade to 1.24.11 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-4337 bindings/go/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.10: GO-2026-4337 — upgrade to 1.24.13 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-4340 bindings/go/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.10: GO-2026-4340 — upgrade to 1.24.12 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-4341 bindings/go/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.10: GO-2026-4341 — upgrade to 1.24.12 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-4342 bindings/go/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.10: GO-2026-4342 — upgrade to 1.24.12 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-4601 bindings/go/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.10: GO-2026-4601 — upgrade to 1.25.8 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-4602 bindings/go/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.10: GO-2026-4602 — upgrade to 1.25.8 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-4603 bindings/go/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.10: GO-2026-4603 — upgrade to 1.25.8 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • + 10 more in this group — see findings.md.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×10
  • Hotspot: bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js — bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js changed 6 times in last 90 days, max complexity 146. 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js — bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js changed 5 times in last 90 days, max complexity 146. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs changed 9 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteCommand.cs bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteCommand.cs — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteCommand.cs changed 7 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.Functions.cs bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.Functions.cs — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.Functions.cs changed 7 times in last 90 days, max complexity 16. 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs — bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 37. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs changed 7 times in last 90 days, max complexity 15. 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: bindings/javascript/sync/packages/common/run.ts bindings/javascript/sync/packages/common/run.ts — bindings/javascript/sync/packages/common/run.ts changed 4 times in last 90 days, max complexity 25.
  • Hotspot: bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnectionStringBuilder.cs bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnectionStringBuilder.cs — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnectionStringBuilder.cs changed 5 times in last 90 days, max complexity 15. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data/TursoConnectionOptions.cs bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data/TursoConnectionOptions.cs — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data/TursoConnectionOptions.cs changed 4 times in last 90 days, max complexity 15.
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×10
  • Change coupling: index.ts ↔ promise.ts bindings/javascript/sync/packages/common/index.ts — `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/common/index.ts` and `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/promise.ts` change together 100% of the time (17 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: promise-bundle.ts ↔ promise-vite-dev-hack.ts bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-bundle.ts — `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-bundle.ts` and `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-vite-dev-hack.ts` change together 94% of the time (45 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: promise-turbopack-hack.ts ↔ promise-vite-dev-hack.ts bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-turbopack-hack.ts — `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-turbopack-hack.ts` and `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-vite-dev-hack.ts` change together 94% of the time (45 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: promise-default.ts ↔ promise-vite-dev-hack.ts bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-default.ts — `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-default.ts` and `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-vite-dev-hack.ts` change together 94% of the time (45 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: promise-default.ts ↔ promise-turbopack-hack.ts bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-default.ts — `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-default.ts` and `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-turbopack-hack.ts` change together 94% of the time (45 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: promise-bundle.ts ↔ promise-default.ts bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-bundle.ts — `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-bundle.ts` and `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-default.ts` change together 94% of the time (45 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: promise-bundle.ts ↔ promise-turbopack-hack.ts bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-bundle.ts — `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-bundle.ts` and `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/wasm/promise-turbopack-hack.ts` change together 94% of the time (45 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: index.ts ↔ index.js bindings/javascript/sync/packages/common/index.ts — `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/common/index.ts` and `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js` change together 88% of the time (15 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: index.ts ↔ promise.ts bindings/javascript/packages/common/index.ts — `bindings/javascript/packages/common/index.ts` and `bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/promise.ts` change together 68% of the time (13 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: index.d.ts ↔ index.js bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.d.ts — `bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.d.ts` and `bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js` change together 68% of the time (19 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×6
  • FileTooLong: Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 514 lines.
  • FileTooLong: Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 708 lines.
  • FileTooLong: __test__/async.test.js testing/conformance/javascript/__test__/async.test.js:0 — FileTooLong — 1608 lines.
  • FileTooLong: native/index.js bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js:0 — FileTooLong — 515 lines.
  • FileTooLong: native/index.js bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js:0 — FileTooLong — 523 lines.
  • FileTooLong: differential/parity.test.mjs serverless/javascript/differential/parity.test.mjs:0 — FileTooLong — 996 lines.
D17 · Explicit Debt · BarePragmaDisable · ×5
  • BarePragmaDisable bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnectionStringBuilder.cs:188 — #pragma warning disable CS8765
  • BarePragmaDisable bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:126 — #pragma warning disable EF1001
  • BarePragmaDisable bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:222 — #pragma warning disable EF1001
  • BarePragmaDisable bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:521 — #pragma warning disable EF1001
  • BarePragmaDisable bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/TursoSession.cs:383 — #pragma warning disable CS8425
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×5
  • TooManyMethods: SqliteCommand bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteCommand.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 383 lines, 46 methods.
  • TooManyMethods: SqliteConnection bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.Aggregates.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 873 lines, 118 methods.
  • TooManyMethods: SqliteDataReader bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 695 lines, 69 methods.
  • TooManyMethods: TursoRemoteDataReader bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data/TursoRemoteDataReader.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 209 lines, 36 methods.
  • TooManyMethods: TursoInterop bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Raw/TursoInterop.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 140 lines, 37 methods.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · requireNative (cyclomatic 146) · ×2
  • requireNative (cyclomatic 146) bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js:67 — requireNative has cyclomatic complexity 146 (threshold 15).
  • requireNative (cyclomatic 146) bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js:67 — requireNative has cyclomatic complexity 146 (threshold 15).
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×2
  • TodoComment bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:326 — // TODO: Refactor this out — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:374 — // TODO: nullable? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D17 · Explicit Debt · HackComment · ×2
  • HackComment bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:346 — // ColumnExpression (the above requires JsonScalarExpression). So we hack as if the subquery projects an anonymous type instead, — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • HackComment bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:387 — // HACK: currently the only way to project multiple values from a SelectExpression is to simulate a Select out to an anonymous — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · requireNative (cognitive 318) · ×2
  • requireNative (cognitive 318) bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js:67 — requireNative has cognitive complexity 318 (threshold 15).
  • requireNative (cognitive 318) bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js:67 — requireNative has cognitive complexity 318 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · isFileMusl (cognitive 20) · ×2
  • isFileMusl (cognitive 20) bindings/javascript/packages/native/index.js:28 — isFileMusl has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
  • isFileMusl (cognitive 20) bindings/javascript/sync/packages/native/index.js:28 — isFileMusl has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×2
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 .devcontainer/Dockerfile.squid — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 testing/sqlright/Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · transition (cyclomatic 37) · ×1
  • transition (cyclomatic 37) bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs:137 — transition has cyclomatic complexity 37 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · nextToken (cyclomatic 25) · ×1
  • nextToken (cyclomatic 25) bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs:56 — nextToken has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · TursoSession.BatchAsync (cyclomatic 23) · ×1
  • TursoSession.BatchAsync (cyclomatic 23) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/TursoSession.cs:135 — TursoSession.BatchAsync has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · SqliteCommand.SplitStatements (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • SqliteCommand.SplitStatements (cyclomatic 18) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteCommand.cs:513 — SqliteCommand.SplitStatements has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · SqliteDataReader.GetSchemaTable (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • SqliteDataReader.GetSchemaTable (cyclomatic 18) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:393 — SqliteDataReader.GetSchemaTable has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · SqliteDataReader.GetFieldValue (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • SqliteDataReader.GetFieldValue (cyclomatic 16) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:239 — SqliteDataReader.GetFieldValue has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · TursoSqliteRelationalConnection.InitializeTursoConnection (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • TursoSqliteRelationalConnection.InitializeTursoConnection (cyclomatic 16) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Storage/Internal/TursoSqliteRelationalConnection.cs:61 — TursoSqliteRelationalConnection.InitializeTursoConnection has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D10 · Test Quality · Skipped test · ×1
  • Skipped test: TestCommitTransaction bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Tests/TursoTests.cs:303 — Skipped — https://github.com/tursodatabase/turso/pull/3591
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1165.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · nextToken (cognitive 46) · ×1
  • nextToken (cognitive 46) bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs:56 — nextToken has cognitive complexity 46 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · TursoSession.BatchAsync (cognitive 40) · ×1
  • TursoSession.BatchAsync (cognitive 40) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/TursoSession.cs:135 — TursoSession.BatchAsync has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SqliteDataReader.GetSchemaTable (cognitive 28) · ×1
  • SqliteDataReader.GetSchemaTable (cognitive 28) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:393 — SqliteDataReader.GetSchemaTable has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SqliteCommand.SplitStatements (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • SqliteCommand.SplitStatements (cognitive 24) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteCommand.cs:513 — SqliteCommand.SplitStatements has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SqliteConnection.TryReadIdentifier (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • SqliteConnection.TryReadIdentifier (cognitive 21) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs:654 — SqliteConnection.TryReadIdentifier has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · TursoCommand.Prepare (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • TursoCommand.Prepare (cognitive 21) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data/TursoCommand.cs:152 — TursoCommand.Prepare has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · TursoSqliteRelationalConnection.InitializeTursoConnection (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • TursoSqliteRelationalConnection.InitializeTursoConnection (cognitive 18) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Storage/Internal/TursoSqliteRelationalConnection.cs:61 — TursoSqliteRelationalConnection.InitializeTursoConnection has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SqliteConnection.NormalizeUriDataSource (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • SqliteConnection.NormalizeUriDataSource (cognitive 17) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs:760 — SqliteConnection.NormalizeUriDataSource has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · transition (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • transition (cognitive 17) bindings/javascript/turso-sql-split.mjs:137 — transition has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SqliteDataReader.GetFieldValue (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • SqliteDataReader.GetFieldValue (cognitive 16) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:239 — SqliteDataReader.GetFieldValue has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected depth to be zero at the end of the JSON payload. There is an open JSON object or array that should be closed. Path: $.notable[4] | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 922.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:350 — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:350-367 | bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:428-445
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:105 — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:105-117 | bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite/Query/Internal/TursoSqliteQueryableMethodTranslatingExpressionVisitor.cs:204-215
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:503 — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteDataReader.cs:503-513 | bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data/TursoDataReader.cs:149-158
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs:433 — bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs:433-439 | bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Data.Sqlite/SqliteConnection.cs:465-471
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Turso.Raw(net8.0) — Turso.Raw(net8.0): abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1
  • Low cohesion: TursoRow (LCOM4 5) bindings/dotnet/src/Turso.Serverless.Client/TursoResultSet.cs:11 — TursoRow's methods form 5 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 17 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×10
  • Low IaC: DS-0014 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — RUN using 'wget' and 'curl'
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 .devcontainer/Dockerfile.squid — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile.antithesis — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile.cli — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 testing/differential-oracle/fuzzer/docker-runner/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 testing/simulator/simulator-docker-runner/Dockerfile.simulator — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 testing/sqlancer/sqlancer-runner/Dockerfile.sqlancer — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 testing/sqlright/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 testing/stress/Dockerfile.antithesis-config — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 3 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `Turso.Platform.Client(net8.0)` with 39 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 96 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.3 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 9494 LoC spread over 20 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 3 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (3 orphaned of 36 analysed files in total).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .16artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list bindings/dotnet/Turso.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json1artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .29artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .92artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fdc50-d3d4-7c17-9fe5-913262da43e5 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 52 · Warnings: 111 · Recommendations: 17 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 13:01 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md