Public report — BlazorShop, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-07-2026 @ 20:15 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Unrealbg/BlazorShop

49% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate

Medium · 22,847 LoC · 10 projects · rebuild ~0.4 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (42%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

70/74dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
59findings with an exact file:lineof 130 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
74/104dimensions across the health lenses22847 LoC · 10 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

unrealbg/BlazorShop carries serious risk (49%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (81%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (42%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (46%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green)… (Deployment & Rollback).

For scale: Medium (~22,847 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.4 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 42% · 45% weightAccessibility 46% · 25% weightMaturity 56% · 14% weightCode Health 64% · 8% weightPerformance 64% · 4% weightSecurity 66% · 2% weightArchitecture 81% · 1% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 42 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 49 → ~54.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 19%Plumbing 38%Tests 31%Generated 12%
New since the last scan (11+)

11 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 4) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/LatestProducts.razor.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/FloatingNumberInput.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 5) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/Search/SearchResult.razor.cs
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/code-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/code-analysis.yml
  • D36 · Workflow token permissions not restricted
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/package-lock.json

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €21,000–€110,000
Cost to rebuild€21,000–€110,000 (0.2–0.7 person-years (351–1,127 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 49% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · 38% boilerplate · 29% straight-line · 33% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.4 person-years of build effort (about ~€64,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 42% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+5.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
2
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
+6.2 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling
3
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+6.2 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.4 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 42%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.4 person-years rebuild (22,847 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 42%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch BlazorShop.API API BlazorShop.Infrastructure Infrastructure BlazorShop.API->BlazorShop.Infrastructure BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults ServiceDefaults BlazorShop.API->BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults BlazorShop.AppHost AppHost BlazorShop.AppHost->BlazorShop.API BlazorShop.Storefront Storefront BlazorShop.AppHost->BlazorShop.Storefront BlazorShop.Web Web BlazorShop.AppHost->BlazorShop.Web BlazorShop.Application Application BlazorShop.Domain Domain BlazorShop.Application->BlazorShop.Domain BlazorShop.Infrastructure->BlazorShop.Application BlazorShop.Storefront->BlazorShop.Application BlazorShop.Storefront->BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults BlazorShop.Web.Shared Shared BlazorShop.Storefront->BlazorShop.Web.Shared BlazorShop.Web->BlazorShop.Web.Shared

At a glance — Code Health · 64% · Adequate

At a glance — Architecture · 81% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 56% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 42% · Weak · gated by P3, P5

At a glance — Security · 66% · Adequate · gated by D36, C1

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Accessibility · 46% · Weak · gated by AC4

At a glance — Performance · 64% · Adequate

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components14High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration6High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection5High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures2High / Critical

Roadmap

First, integrate a static security analysis step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on vulnerabilities. Next, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure code and documentation to ensure data persistence and recovery. Then, implement health checks and automated rollback strategies to safely manage deployments. After that, resolve the two deprecated dependencies to maintain hygiene. Finally, update custom controls to be fully keyboard accessible and fix anchor elements.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+5.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+6.2 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+6.2 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+6.1 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.+4.3 ptsMediumKeyboard semantics
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an a11y linter that can read your UI — no component framework was detected, so the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins would have nothing to lint; use an HTML-template a11y linter (html-eslint, htmlhint) or run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.+4.3 ptsMediumA11y enforcement
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.+4.2 ptsMediumText alternatives
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.+4.1 ptsMediumForms & labels

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 30 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 57% mixed · 43% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/ci.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Payments/Cart.razor.cs5.4MixedExplicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock
.github/workflows/code-analysis.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/package-lock.json5.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/LatestProducts.razor.cs6.0MixedExplicit Debt: Dead code: ToggleCategories
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/Header/HeaderBoxComponent.razor.cs6.4MixedExplicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Storefront/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/appsettings.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
BlazorShop.Application/Mapping/MappingConfig.cs7.3MixedCyclomatic Complexity: MappingConfig.MappingConfig.ctor (cyclomatic 22)
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs7.4MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: Products
BlazorShop.Application/Services/Payment/OrderQueryService.cs7.6MixedExplicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Program.cs7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: Program.Main (cyclomatic 28)
BlazorShop.Application/Services/Payment/CartService.cs7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: CartService.CheckoutAsync (cyclomatic 16)
BlazorShop.Application/Services/SeoMetadataBuilder.cs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Categories.razor.cs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)
BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/Notifications/Toast.razor.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
BlazorShop.Application/Services/CategorySeoService.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: Failure
BlazorShop.Application/Services/ProductSeoService.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: Failure

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 70 of 74 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 74 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D33D34D35D36D37D38D39AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8C1C2C3DM6GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 59 of 130 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019faf84-8873-7bbe-b71d-ad251df1592c.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Program.Main at 28. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being ProductRecommendationRepository.GetFrequentlyBoughtTogetherAsync at 18 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.

Program.Main (cyclomatic 28)BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Program.cs:37
MappingConfig.MappingConfig.ctor (cyclomatic 22)BlazorShop.Application/Mapping/MappingConfig.cs:18
Cart.SelectPaymentMethod (cyclomatic 20)BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Payments/Cart.razor.cs:241
CartService.CheckoutAsync (cyclomatic 16)BlazorShop.Application/Services/Payment/CartService.cs:94

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Cart.SelectPaymentMethod at 63.

Cart.SelectPaymentMethod (cognitive 63)BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Payments/Cart.razor.cs:241
SuccessPayment.razor › OnInitializedAsync (cognitive 30)BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Payments/SuccessPayment.razor:32
Program.Main (cognitive 24)BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Program.cs:37
CartService.CheckoutAsync (cognitive 23)BlazorShop.Application/Services/Payment/CartService.cs:94
MappingConfig.MappingConfig.ctor (cognitive 21)BlazorShop.Application/Mapping/MappingConfig.cs:18

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Cart.SelectPaymentMethod (cognitive 63) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Cart.razor.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 SuccessPayment.razor › OnInitializedAsync (cognitive 30) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with SuccessPayment.razor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Program.Main (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: ProductsBlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

15 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2BlazorShop.Application/Services/SeoMetadataBuilder.cs:37
Duplicated block (24 lines × 2)BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:463
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/DatabaseMigrationBootstrapper.cs:286
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:506
Duplicated block (17 lines × 4)BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/LatestProducts.razor.cs:149

+ 9 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 97 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: AppTokenManager (LCOM4 4)BlazorShop.Infrastructure/Repositories/Authentication/AppTokenManager.cs:17

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

382 test methods: 382 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 382 tests.

Mock framework: Moq

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

41 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 2 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: Blazored.Typeahead · ×2
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Stores · ×41

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 49 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

56 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Program.cs.

Small-team knowledge concentration

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Small-team knowledge concentration finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 deducted debt markers + 3 dead symbols across 21030 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.6.

EmptyCatchBlock · ×4BlazorShop.Application/Services/Payment/OrderQueryService.cs:61
Dead code: Failure · ×3BlazorShop.Application/Services/CategorySeoService.cs:256
CommentedOutCodeBlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/Notifications/Toast.razor.cs:83

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 projects, 584 source files, 33126 hand-written lines of code (21030 production / 12096 test), plus 4640 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 21 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

BlazorShop has strong documentation: a clear README with an outline and a production runbook covering deployment, secrets, forwarded headers profiles, auth/email notes, container/deployment, and smoke tests. The README also lists the full architecture/Docs markdown set (1) and covers BlazorShop.Web.Shared, API, AppHost, and Storefront at 0% coverage, but the visible content is exemplary for a mid-sized e-commerce project.

XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.Domain · ×9BlazorShop.Domain/BlazorShop.Domain.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — BlazorShop has strong documentation: a clear README with an outline and a production runbook covering deployment, secrets, forwarded headers profiles, auth/email notes, container/deployment, and smoke tests. The README also lists the full architecture/Docs markdown set (1) and covers BlazorShop.Web.Shared, API, AppHost, and Storefront at 0% coverage, but the visible content is exemplary for a mid-sized e-commerce project.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

46 valuable / 1 redundant across 200 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentBlazorShop.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:125

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split BlazorShop.Application
Split BlazorShop.Web.Shared

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Split BlazorShop.Application finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Split BlazorShop.Web.Shared finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 · Navigability7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

80 % of calls cross a namespace and 23 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 7.7/10. — 80 % of calls cross a namespace and 23 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-keyBlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/appsettings.json:15detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×5.github/workflows/ci.yml:17detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (3), code-analysis.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 9 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0 · ×3detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 · ×9detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 3 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×3BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×3BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
No build provenance
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

10 of 1718 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 10 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetBlazorShop.Application/Mapping/MappingConfig.cs:18

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — SideNavComponent.razor:29, NewReleases.razor:22
  • A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content. (×2) — Dashboard.razor:128, Dashboard.razor:141

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels5.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×14) — SearchBarComponent.razor:8, Audit.razor:14, Audit.razor:15, …
  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×11) — Dashboard.razor:95, Dashboard.razor:97, Dashboard.razor:98, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×10) — SearchResult.razor:26, Audit.razor:82, Categories.razor:78, …
  • A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — TemplateTable.razor:1

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An <a href="#"> (or javascript:) with a click handler is a button dressed as a link — it announces the wrong role and stops working without JS. Use a <button> for an action. — SideNavComponent.razor:2
  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×2) — SideNavComponent.razor:28, ProductRecommendations.razor:10
  • An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. — index.html:62

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

  • This element's Tailwind text/background colour utilities fall below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Pick a darker or lighter shade. — Notifications.razor:47

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (an a11y linter that can read your UI — no component framework was detected, so the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins would have nothing to lint; use an HTML-template a11y linter (html-eslint, htmlhint) or run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an a11y linter that can read your UI — no component framework was detected, so the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins would have nothing to lint; use an HTML-template a11y linter (html-eslint, htmlhint) or run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent write-side hook, e.g. an event-store append every change flows through), [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `CaptureAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — PayPalPaymentService.cs:15
  • `GetTextColor` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — Styles.cs:12
  • `GetTableFormat` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — Styles.cs:13
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — MappingConfig.cs:20

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 10 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 5/9 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No benchmark suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 23 use(s) across 25,911 production line(s) (~0.9/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 2 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
S1 · Web-Security Posture10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×2) — Program.cs:162, Program.cs:168

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 36/192 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — AuthenticationService.cs:283, AuthenticationService.cs:305, AuthenticationService.cs:343, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

  • An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×4) — OrderQueryService.cs:61, HeaderBoxComponent.razor.cs:74, HeaderBoxComponent.razor.cs:134, …

What to do

  • Swallowed exception (empty catch)
X4 · Structured logging4.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×15) — AuthenticationService.cs:278, AuthenticationService.cs:355, AuthenticationService.cs:377, …

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.8 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health64%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Architecture81%StrongSolid.
Maturity56%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness42%Weak — gated by P3, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security66%Adequate — gated by D36, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Accessibility46%Weak — gated by AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance64%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included — 30 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not gated in TS source-only: aggregate-vs-value-object classification is not 0-FP-separable (every class-holding-class reads alike) — advisory (the Swift/Dart/Rust parity)
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the branded-type idiom (`type Id = string & {__brand}`) is idiom-rare in TS (4 calibration carriers), so a bare-string-id gap is advisory — Stage-E diversification target (tsjs-stageC.md LESSON-A)
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not gated in TS source-only: a cross-package domain leak is not 0-FP-separable from a legitimate shared-kernel package, and most calibration repos are single-package — advisory (candidate-demote)
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the anemic-vs-rich gate is candidate-DETERMINISTIC for TS (behaviour + the component/DTO/readonly-VO exemptions) but the calibration corpus is high-quality (0 witnesses) — advisory, settled at the Stage-E holdout (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: TS idiom favours #private/private/readonly (idiom-rare public-mutable break), so DM5 is advisory pending Stage-E messier-repo witnesses (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not gated in TS source-only: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable; the softest gated dim — advisory
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
  • X8 JS interop contract — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 18 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×5
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/code-analysis.yml:16 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/code-analysis.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
D17 · Explicit Debt · EmptyCatchBlock · ×4
  • EmptyCatchBlock BlazorShop.Application/Services/Payment/OrderQueryService.cs:61 — empty catch block
  • EmptyCatchBlock BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/Header/HeaderBoxComponent.razor.cs:74 — empty catch block
  • EmptyCatchBlock BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/Header/HeaderBoxComponent.razor.cs:134 — empty catch block
  • EmptyCatchBlock BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Payments/Cart.razor.cs:294 — empty catch block
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×3
  • High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.7.5
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×3
  • High IaC: DS-0002 BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Storefront/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 2.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry). One upgrade of brace-expansion 2.1.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/package-lock.json — postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.5.12. This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.18 still leaves at least one of them open, so 8.5.18 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of postcss 8.5.6 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×1
  • Secret: generic-api-key BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/appsettings.json:15 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Warning — 46 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×9
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×3
  • Dead code: Failure BlazorShop.Application/Services/CategorySeoService.cs:256 — Method Failure — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: Failure BlazorShop.Application/Services/ProductSeoService.cs:268 — Method Failure — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: ToggleCategories BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/LatestProducts.razor.cs:36 — Method ToggleCategories — no references found in solution.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2
  • Deprecated: Blazored.Typeahead — Blazored.Typeahead 4.7.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Application/Services/SeoMetadataBuilder.cs:37 — BlazorShop.Application/Services/SeoMetadataBuilder.cs:37-50 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Services/StorefrontSeoMetadataBuilder.cs:37-50 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Application/Services/SeoMetadataBuilder.cs:81 — BlazorShop.Application/Services/SeoMetadataBuilder.cs:81-94 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Services/StorefrontSeoMetadataBuilder.cs:81-94 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2
  • Off the main sequence: BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults — BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: BlazorShop.Web.Shared — BlazorShop.Web.Shared: abstractness 0.17, instability 0.00, distance 0.83 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Program.Main (cyclomatic 28) · ×1
  • Program.Main (cyclomatic 28) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Program.cs:37 — Program.Main has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · MappingConfig.MappingConfig.ctor (cyclomatic 22) · ×1
  • MappingConfig.MappingConfig.ctor (cyclomatic 22) BlazorShop.Application/Mapping/MappingConfig.cs:18 — MappingConfig.MappingConfig.ctor has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Cart.SelectPaymentMethod (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • Cart.SelectPaymentMethod (cyclomatic 20) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Payments/Cart.razor.cs:241 — Cart.SelectPaymentMethod has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · CartService.CheckoutAsync (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • CartService.CheckoutAsync (cyclomatic 16) BlazorShop.Application/Services/Payment/CartService.cs:94 — CartService.CheckoutAsync has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×1
  • CommentedOutCode BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/Notifications/Toast.razor.cs:83 — 11 consecutive commented-code lines
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Cart.SelectPaymentMethod (cognitive 63) · ×1
  • Cart.SelectPaymentMethod (cognitive 63) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Payments/Cart.razor.cs:241 — Cart.SelectPaymentMethod has cognitive complexity 63 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SuccessPayment.razor › OnInitializedAsync (cognitive 30) · ×1
  • SuccessPayment.razor › OnInitializedAsync (cognitive 30) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Payments/SuccessPayment.razor:32 — SuccessPayment.razor › OnInitializedAsync has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Program.Main (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • Program.Main (cognitive 24) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Program.cs:37 — Program.Main has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CartService.CheckoutAsync (cognitive 23) · ×1
  • CartService.CheckoutAsync (cognitive 23) BlazorShop.Application/Services/Payment/CartService.cs:94 — CartService.CheckoutAsync has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MappingConfig.MappingConfig.ctor (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • MappingConfig.MappingConfig.ctor (cognitive 21) BlazorShop.Application/Mapping/MappingConfig.cs:18 — MappingConfig.MappingConfig.ctor has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1
  • TooManyMethods: Products BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 416 lines, 37 methods.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 5 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s): `actions/checkout@v4` (.github/workflows/code-analysis.yml:16), `actions/setup-dotnet@v4` (.github/workflows/code-analysis.yml:20), `actions/checkout@v4` (.github/workflows/ci.yml:17), `actions/setup-dotnet@v4` (.github/workflows/ci.yml:20), `actions/setup-node@v4` (.github/workflows/ci.yml:25)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted · ×1
  • Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (2 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:463 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:463-486 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:532-555 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/DatabaseMigrationBootstrapper.cs:286 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/DatabaseMigrationBootstrapper.cs:286-304 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/DatabaseMigrationBootstrapper.cs:333-351 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:506 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:506-523 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:568-585 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 4) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/LatestProducts.razor.cs:149 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/LatestProducts.razor.cs:149-165 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/NewReleases.razor.cs:71-87 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Public/Deals/TodaysDeals.razor.cs:68-84 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Public/MainPage.razor.cs:108-124 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Storefront/Services/StorefrontClientAppUrlResolver.cs:54 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Storefront/Services/StorefrontClientAppUrlResolver.cs:54-70 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Storefront/Services/StorefrontPublicUrlResolver.cs:70-86 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Services/ProductService.cs:130 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Services/ProductService.cs:130-145 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Storefront/Services/StorefrontApiClient.cs:149-164 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/FloatingNumberInput.cs:36 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/FloatingNumberInput.cs:36-49 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/FloatingTextAreaInput.cs:35-48 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/FloatingTextInput.cs:36-49 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 5) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 5) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/Search/SearchResult.razor.cs:87 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/Search/SearchResult.razor.cs:87-99 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/LatestProducts.razor.cs:148-160 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/NewReleases.razor.cs:70-82 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Public/Deals/TodaysDeals.razor.cs:67-79 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Public/MainPage.razor.cs:107-119 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 4) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/LatestProducts.razor.cs:178 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/LatestProducts.razor.cs:178-190 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Products/NewReleases.razor.cs:100-112 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Public/Deals/TodaysDeals.razor.cs:97-109 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Public/MainPage.razor.cs:137-149 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/NumberInput.cs:12 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/NumberInput.cs:12-20 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/TextInput.cs:21-29 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/FloatingTextInput.cs:27 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/FloatingTextInput.cs:27-33 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Components/FormControls/TextInput.cs:24-30 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Categories.razor.cs:224 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Categories.razor.cs:224-229 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:616-621 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Categories.razor.cs:216 — BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Categories.razor.cs:216-220 | BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Admin/Products.razor.cs:608-612 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1
  • Low cohesion: AppTokenManager (LCOM4 4) BlazorShop.Infrastructure/Repositories/Authentication/AppTokenManager.cs:17 — AppTokenManager's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. Commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces (anywhere in the repo), or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 14 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×3
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Storefront/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D16 · Bus Factor · Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1
  • Small-team knowledge concentration — 56 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 56 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `BlazorShop.AppHost` with 27 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 94 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.5 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 21k LoC across 10 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment BlazorShop.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:125 — "Add memory cache for recommendations" — trim - Stripe/Card already says this; the 'memory cache' label is noise
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split BlazorShop.Application · ×1
  • Split BlazorShop.Application — A 'Application' name that is large and sprawls over 30 unrelated namespaces is a classic grab-bag. Suggested: by namespace: BlazorShop.Carts, BlazorShop.Orders, BlazorShop.Shipping
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split BlazorShop.Web.Shared · ×1
  • Split BlazorShop.Web.Shared — 'Web.Shared' with 27 namespaces and 3k LoC is a sprawling shared assembly. Suggested: by namespace: BlazorShop.Authentication, BlazorShop.Notifications, BlazorShop.Caching
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`dotnet sbom-tool generate` (or the CycloneDX .NET tool) over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 10 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget BlazorShop.Application/Mapping/MappingConfig.cs:18 — 10 of 1718 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: BlazorShop.Application.Mapping.MappingConfig..ctor @ BlazorShop.Application/Mapping/MappingConfig.cs:18, 786 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.9/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Info — 52 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×41
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Stores — Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Stores 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Domain).
  • Outdated: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 16.1.1 → 16.2.0 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions — Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Application).
  • Outdated: MailKit — MailKit 4.16.0 → 4.17.0 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 10.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 10.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.UI — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.UI 10.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 10.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets 10.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: MimeKit — MimeKit 4.16.0 → 4.17.0 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 10.0.1 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Serilog — Serilog 4.3.0 → 4.4.0 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Stripe.net — Stripe.net 50.0.0 → 52.1.1 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools 10.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.API).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 10.0.1 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by BlazorShop.API).
  • Outdated: Blazored.Typeahead — Blazored.Typeahead 4.7.0 → Not available (referenced by BlazorShop.Web).
  • Outdated: Humanizer.Core — Humanizer.Core 3.0.1 → 3.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Web).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Authorization — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Authorization 10.0.6 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Web).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly 10.0.6 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Web).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.DevServer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.DevServer 10.0.6 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Web).
  • Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 8.15.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by BlazorShop.Web).
  • + 16 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×9
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.Domain BlazorShop.Domain/BlazorShop.Domain.csproj — BlazorShop.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/217).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.Application BlazorShop.Application/BlazorShop.Application.csproj — BlazorShop.Application: 1 % XML-doc coverage (5/631).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.Infrastructure BlazorShop.Infrastructure/BlazorShop.Infrastructure.csproj — BlazorShop.Infrastructure: 3 % XML-doc coverage (5/187).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.API BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/BlazorShop.API.csproj — BlazorShop.API: 21 % XML-doc coverage (36/171).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.Web BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/BlazorShop.Web.csproj — BlazorShop.Web: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/234).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.Web.Shared BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/BlazorShop.Web.Shared.csproj — BlazorShop.Web.Shared: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/748).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.AppHost BlazorShop.AppHost/BlazorShop.AppHost.csproj — BlazorShop.AppHost: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults/BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults.csproj — BlazorShop.ServiceDefaults: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/5).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorShop.Storefront BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Storefront/BlazorShop.Storefront.csproj — BlazorShop.Storefront: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/133).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — BlazorShop.Tests references Moq.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .5artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list BlazorShop.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json12artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .6artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .2artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019faf84-8873-7bbe-b71d-ad251df1592c · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 67 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 43 field(s)
  • AdminAuditLogDto.ActorEmail BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Admin/Audit/AdminAuditLogDto.cs:9
  • NotificationSettingsDto.SmtpFromEmail BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Admin/Settings/NotificationSettingsDto.cs:7
  • StoreSettingsDto.StoreSupportEmail BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Admin/Settings/StoreSettingsDto.cs:7
  • UpdateNotificationSettingsDto.SmtpFromEmail BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Admin/Settings/UpdateNotificationSettingsDto.cs:7
  • AdminUserListItemDto.Email BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Admin/Users/AdminUserListItemDto.cs:7
  • AdminUserListItemDto.EmailConfirmed BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Admin/Users/AdminUserListItemDto.cs:15
  • GetOrder.CustomerEmail BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Payment/GetOrder.cs:31
  • GetOrderItem.CustomerEmail BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Payment/GetOrderItem.cs:11
  • SeoSettingsDto.CompanyEmail BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Seo/SeoSettingsDto.cs:36
  • UpdateSeoSettingsDto.CompanyEmail BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Seo/UpdateSeoSettingsDto.cs:34
  • BaseModel.Email BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/UserIdentity/BaseModel.cs:5
  • UpdateProfile.Email BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/UserIdentity/UpdateProfile.cs:12
  • IdentityConfirmationOptions.RequireConfirmedEmail BlazorShop.Application/Options/IdentityConfirmationOptions.cs:9
  • AuthenticationService._emailService BlazorShop.Application/Services/Authentication/AuthenticationService.cs:30
  • NewsletterService._emailService BlazorShop.Application/Services/NewsletterService.cs:12
  • CartService._emailService BlazorShop.Application/Services/Payment/CartService.cs:25
  • SeoConstraints.CompanyEmailMaxLength BlazorShop.Domain/Constants/SeoConstraints.cs:13
  • AdminAuditLog.ActorEmail BlazorShop.Domain/Entities/AdminAuditLog.cs:9
  • AdminSettings.StoreSupportEmail BlazorShop.Domain/Entities/AdminSettings.cs:9
  • AdminSettings.SmtpFromEmail BlazorShop.Domain/Entities/AdminSettings.cs:31
  • NewsletterSubscriber.Email BlazorShop.Domain/Entities/NewsletterSubscriber.cs:7
  • SeoSettings.CompanyEmail BlazorShop.Domain/Entities/SeoSettings.cs:26
  • AdminSettingsService._emailSettings BlazorShop.Infrastructure/Services/Admin/AdminSettingsService.cs:36
  • EmailService._emailSettings BlazorShop.Infrastructure/Services/EmailService.cs:15
  • OrderTrackingService._email BlazorShop.Infrastructure/Services/OrderTrackingService.cs:11
  • SubscribeEmailDto.Email BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.API/Controllers/NewsletterController.cs:32
  • StorefrontSessionInfo.Email BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Storefront/Services/Contracts/IStorefrontSessionResolver.cs:8
  • Authentication.ConfirmEmail BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Constant.cs:49
  • AdminAuditLog.ActorEmail BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Admin/Audit/AdminAuditModels.cs:9
  • StoreSettingsModel.StoreSupportEmail BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Admin/Settings/AdminSettingsModels.cs:18
  • NotificationSettingsModel.SmtpFromEmail BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Admin/Settings/AdminSettingsModels.cs:63
  • UpdateNotificationSettings.SmtpFromEmail BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Admin/Settings/AdminSettingsModels.cs:74
  • AdminUserListItem.Email BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Admin/Users/AdminUserModels.cs:7
  • AdminUserListItem.EmailConfirmed BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Admin/Users/AdminUserModels.cs:15
  • AuthenticationBase.Email BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Authentication/AuthenticationBase.cs:8
  • UpdateProfileModel.Email BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Authentication/UpdateProfileModel.cs:12
  • SubscribeRequest.Email BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Newsletter/NewsletterModels.cs:3
  • GetOrder.CustomerEmail BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Payment/GetOrder.cs:31
  • GetOrderItem.CustomerEmail BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Payment/GetOrderItem.cs:11
  • GetSeoSettings.CompanyEmail BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Seo/GetSeoSettings.cs:34
  • + 3 more field(s) in this category.
Phone — 14 field(s)
  • StoreSettingsDto.StoreSupportPhone BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Admin/Settings/StoreSettingsDto.cs:9
  • AdminUserDetailsDto.PhoneNumber BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Admin/Users/AdminUserDetailsDto.cs:5
  • SeoSettingsDto.CompanyPhone BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Seo/SeoSettingsDto.cs:33
  • UpdateSeoSettingsDto.CompanyPhone BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Seo/UpdateSeoSettingsDto.cs:31
  • UpdateProfile.PhoneNumber BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/UserIdentity/UpdateProfile.cs:15
  • SeoConstraints.CompanyPhoneMaxLength BlazorShop.Domain/Constants/SeoConstraints.cs:12
  • AdminSettings.StoreSupportPhone BlazorShop.Domain/Entities/AdminSettings.cs:11
  • SeoSettings.CompanyPhone BlazorShop.Domain/Entities/SeoSettings.cs:24
  • StoreSettingsModel.StoreSupportPhone BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Admin/Settings/AdminSettingsModels.cs:20
  • AdminUserDetails.PhoneNumber BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Admin/Users/AdminUserModels.cs:28
  • UpdateProfileModel.PhoneNumber BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Authentication/UpdateProfileModel.cs:15
  • GetSeoSettings.CompanyPhone BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Seo/GetSeoSettings.cs:31
  • SeoValidationConstraints.CompanyPhoneMaxLength BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Seo/SeoValidationConstraints.cs:12
  • UpdateSeoSettings.CompanyPhone BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Seo/UpdateSeoSettings.cs:29
Name — 7 field(s)
  • AdminUserListItemDto.FullName BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Admin/Users/AdminUserListItemDto.cs:11
  • CreateUser.FullName BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/UserIdentity/CreateUser.cs:5
  • UpdateProfile.FullName BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/UserIdentity/UpdateProfile.cs:8
  • AppUser.FullName BlazorShop.Domain/Entities/Identity/AppUser.cs:7
  • AdminUserListItem.FullName BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Admin/Users/AdminUserModels.cs:11
  • CreateUser.FullName BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Authentication/CreateUser.cs:8
  • UpdateProfileModel.FullName BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web.Shared/Models/Authentication/UpdateProfileModel.cs:8
Financial (card / IBAN) — 3 field(s)
  • BankTransferInfo.Iban BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Payment/BankTransferInfo.cs:5
  • BankTransferSettings.Iban BlazorShop.Application/DTOs/Payment/BankTransferSettings.cs:5
  • BtInfo.Iban BlazorShop.Presentation/BlazorShop.Web/Pages/Payments/Cart.razor.cs:33

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md