Public report — go-api-boilerplate, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
150findings with an exact file:lineof 167 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
50/118dimensions across the health lenses12237 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
vardius/go-api-boilerplate carries serious gaps (46%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Code Health (91%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (90%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (33%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (52%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 2 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene).
For scale: Small (~12,237 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (91%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
121 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required. Showing the first 100; the full set is in the report.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 46% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code
~21 LoC unreachable (3 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€22,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 33% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.9) — DDD/clean architecture, domain model, event-driven integration, event sourcing × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server.key, events_test_was_created.json.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 33%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server.key, events_test_was_created.json. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server.key, events_test_was_created.json.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
70 modules, 134 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
50
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
22
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
12
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
6
High / Critical
A04:2021 — Insecure Design
1
Medium
Roadmap
Immediately resolve the two leaked secrets in server.key and events_test_was_created.json to eliminate critical security exposure. Strengthen the build pipeline by integrating automated security scanning to fail the build on regressions, while simultaneously removing unused dependencies and enforcing explicit import declarations. Finally, enforce production deployment controls through approval gates and refactor message handlers to replace synchronous remote calls with asynchronous messaging for better system stability.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server.key, events_test_was_created.json.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 49 of 50 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 50 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 150 of 167 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 user.OnRegisterWithFacebook (cognitive 38) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with commands.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 user.OnRegisterWithGoogle (cognitive 38) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with commands.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 domain.RegisterUserDomain (cognitive 19) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with init.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 19 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 6 Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with main.go (2), client_repository.go, commands.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with client.go, commands.go, router.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with event_bus.go (2), env.go, client.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server.key, events_test_was_created.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: private-key · ×3k8s/tls/server.key:4detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with server.key, k8s-secrets.tf, values.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×8.github/workflows/auth-publish.yaml:13detected by semgrep finding
Medium: math-random-used · ×2cmd/auth/main.go:8detected by semgrep finding
Low: cookie-missing-httponly · ×2cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/auth.go:40detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 8 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with event_store.go (4), auth-publish.yaml, migrate-publish.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with main.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with auth.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×5cmd/auth/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×12k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yamldetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: KSV-0003 · ×5k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yamldetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4), deployment.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 12 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (4), Dockerfile (4), web-publish.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.
Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR pattern scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset (personal data reaching log/console sinks, URLs and query strings, or unprotected browser storage); matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. NotApplicable when the scan runs and detects no PII/GDPR surface (no unearned 10); reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap, never as not-applicable, if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
58 of 58 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go.
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×36cmd/web/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×13cmd/web/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]cmd/web/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 36 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (31), go.mod (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (36 issue-level).
Resolve the 13 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (11), go.mod (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
The domain package `github.com/vardius/go-api-boilerplate/cmd/auth/internal/domain/token` imports `gopkg.in/oauth2` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. (×3) — commands.go:10, events.go:8, token.go:12
The domain package `github.com/vardius/go-api-boilerplate/cmd/user/internal/domain/user` imports `pkg:infrastructure` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — commands.go:11
What to do
Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).
Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.
`ClientRepository` leaks the infrastructure/framework type `ClientInfo` through its contract. A repository should be a persistence PORT over an aggregate ROOT — expose intention-revealing whole-aggregate operations (Save/FindByID) and keep framework types, query specifications and business logic out of its contract so callers can't bypass the aggregate's invariants. — client.go:30
What to do
Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
`WhenUserAccessTokenWasRequested` reads an eventually-consistent read model (a repository query on the infrastructure/persistence layer) while handling a message. Its correctness depends, in real time, on a SIBLING event handler having already updated that projection — but the in-memory bus publishes before the read model settles, so a concurrent flow can read stale state. React by publishing a follow-up message (or read through the write-side aggregate), rather than querying another handler's asynchronously-maintained projection inside this one. — when_user_access_token_was_requested.go:23
`OnChangeEmailAddress` reads an eventually-consistent read model (a repository query on the infrastructure/persistence layer) while handling a message. Its correctness depends, in real time, on a SIBLING event handler having already updated that projection — but the in-memory bus publishes before the read model settles, so a concurrent flow can read stale state. React by publishing a follow-up message (or read through the write-side aggregate), rather than querying another handler's asynchronously-maintained projection inside this one. — commands.go:94
`OnRegisterWithEmail` reads an eventually-consistent read model (a repository query on the infrastructure/persistence layer) while handling a message. Its correctness depends, in real time, on a SIBLING event handler having already updated that projection — but the in-memory bus publishes before the read model settles, so a concurrent flow can read stale state. React by publishing a follow-up message (or read through the write-side aggregate), rather than querying another handler's asynchronously-maintained projection inside this one. — commands.go:176
`OnRegisterWithFacebook` reads an eventually-consistent read model (a repository query on the infrastructure/persistence layer) while handling a message. Its correctness depends, in real time, on a SIBLING event handler having already updated that projection — but the in-memory bus publishes before the read model settles, so a concurrent flow can read stale state. React by publishing a follow-up message (or read through the write-side aggregate), rather than querying another handler's asynchronously-maintained projection inside this one. — commands.go:239
`OnRegisterWithGoogle` reads an eventually-consistent read model (a repository query on the infrastructure/persistence layer) while handling a message. Its correctness depends, in real time, on a SIBLING event handler having already updated that projection — but the in-memory bus publishes before the read model settles, so a concurrent flow can read stale state. React by publishing a follow-up message (or read through the write-side aggregate), rather than querying another handler's asynchronously-maintained projection inside this one. — commands.go:325
What to do
Remove synchronous remote calls from message handlers — react by publishing further messages, so services stay temporally decoupled.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.
`WasCreated` is an event — it should be an immutable record of a fact that happened — but `TokenInfo` shows it carries behaviour or infrastructure rather than plain data (a runtime-typed data blob it deserializes, an embedded broker message handle, or a live aggregate back-reference). That couples every consumer to the producer's serialization/framework details and lets the recorded fact be reinterpreted or mutated after the fact. Keep events as self-describing value data; move deserialization/behaviour to the consumer. — events.go:44
What to do
Keep one handler per command (single owner); use events for the fan-out where many subscribers react.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
`clientRepository.Save` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — client_repository.go:23
`tokenRepository.Save` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — token_repository.go:23
`userRepository.Save` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — user_repository.go:28
What to do
Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether Apply/When folds reconstruct state purely from the event (no DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random or IO) so replay is reproducible.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether persisted events are immutable facts (init-only/readonly) — a settable event member lets stored history be rewritten.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.
Do you agree with this assessment?
ES3 · PII in the event store4.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the append-only event log avoids un-erasable personal data (or has a crypto-shredding strategy) — a GDPR right-to-erasure risk.
Method: Roslyn (event-sourcing gated): high-confidence PII flagged Warning; ambiguous name-like fields adjudicated by language model as person versus fictional. Advisory without model, definitive with.
Persisted event carries personal data (Email) — no crypto-shredding strategy covers it, so it collides with the GDPR right-to-erasure. (×2) — events.go:22, events.go:34
What to do
Adopt crypto-shredding (store PII encrypted with a per-subject key you can throw away) or keep PII out of events and reference it by id so erasure stays possible.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
cmd/web/src/containers/Authorize/index.tsx:69 · cmd/web/src/context/UserContext.tsx:43 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.tsx:69
cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/AuthToken/index.tsx:35 · cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/ClientCredentials/index.tsx:195 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.tsx:35
cmd/web/src/components/common/LoginDrawerButton.tsx:30 · cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/ClientList/CreateClientDrawerButton.tsx:43 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — LoginDrawerButton.tsx:30
cmd/web/src/containers/App/components/Footer/index.tsx:13 · cmd/web/src/containers/App/components/Header/index.tsx:105 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — index.tsx:13
cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/AuthTokenList/index.tsx:25 · cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/ClientList/index.tsx:26 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.tsx:25
cmd/web/src/components/common/LoginForm.tsx:44 · cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/ClientList/CreateClientForm.tsx:38 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — LoginForm.tsx:44
cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/AuthToken/index.tsx:63 · cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/ClientCredentials/index.tsx:258 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.tsx:63
cmd/web/src/components/common/LoginForm.tsx:161 · cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/ClientList/CreateClientForm.tsx:114 · cmd/web/src/containers/Security/components/ClientList/CreateClientForm.tsx:124 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — LoginForm.tsx:161
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 2 application, 2 tooling and 1 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 2 tooling, 1 test roots considered) (×3) — useDocumentClick.tsx, index.tsx, index.ts
Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in cmd/web/src/components/common/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in cmd/web/src/components/common/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists. (×2) — ColorModeSwitcher.tsx:21, withForwardRef.tsx:3
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×2) — index.tsx:5, index.tsx:9
Declared in cmd/web/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
cmd/web/src/hooks/index.ts → cmd/web/src/hooks/useApi.tsx → cmd/web/src/hooks/index.ts (one verified cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 6 files) — index.ts
What to do
Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 6 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (11%; ≈12% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 49 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 68 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC2 Forms & labels — No form control/button found in the parsed markup — AC2 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No styled element found in the parsed markup — AC6 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~1131 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R4 Test Coverage — 1 test file(s) reach none of 49 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Issue — 68 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×36
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— ansi-html 0.0.7: [GHSA redacted] — ansi-html is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ansi-html to 0.0.8 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— ansi-regex 3.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — ansi-regex is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ansi-regex to 3.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— ansi-regex 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — ansi-regex is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ansi-regex to 4.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— ansi-regex 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — ansi-regex is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ansi-regex to 5.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— body-parser 1.19.0: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against body-parser 1.19.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.19.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— browserify-sign 4.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — browserify-sign is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin browserify-sign to 4.2.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— cross-spawn 6.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 6.0.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— cross-spawn 7.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— decode-uri-component 0.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — decode-uri-component is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin decode-uri-component to 0.2.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— flatted 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.4.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/dgrijalva/jwt-go 3.2.0+incompatible: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace github.com/dgrijalva/jwt-go if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/valyala/fasthttp 1.16.0: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/valyala/fasthttp is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/valyala/fasthttp@v1.34.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— glob-parent 5.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — glob-parent is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob-parent to 5.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.0.0-20200602114024-627f9648deb9: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/net@v0.17.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 23 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.0.0-20200602114024-627f9648deb9: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2022-0288, GO-2024-3333, GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/oauth2 0.0.0-20200107190931-bf48bf16ab8d: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.27.0
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.3.5: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/text@v0.3.8`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/text 0.3.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5970.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— http-proxy-middleware 0.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.7 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.19.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.19.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 0.19.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 0.19.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— ip 1.1.5: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; ip is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ip 1.1.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— is-svg 3.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — is-svg is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.2.2 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against is-svg 3.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against is-svg 3.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— js-yaml 3.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— json5 1.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json5 to 1.0.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— @babel/traverse 7.11.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— cipher-base 1.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — cipher-base is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cipher-base to 1.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 2.5.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.5.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.5.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.0.0-20200302210943-78000ba7a073: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 24 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.0.0-20200302210943-78000ba7a073: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-2961, GO-2025-4116, GO-2026-5932.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.28.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.79.3. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against google.golang.org/grpc 1.28.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— json-schema 0.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — json-schema is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json-schema to 0.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— loader-utils 1.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 1.4.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against loader-utils 1.2.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 1.2.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— loader-utils 1.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 1.4.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against loader-utils 1.4.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 1.4.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— pbkdf2 3.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — pbkdf2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin pbkdf2 to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against pbkdf2 3.1.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— sha.js 2.4.11: [GHSA redacted] — sha.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sha.js to 2.4.12 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— shell-quote 1.7.2: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.7.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— tar 6.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.1.11, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.1.11; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against tar 6.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/auth-publish.yaml:13— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/migrate-publish.yaml:13— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/user-publish.yaml:13— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/web-publish.yaml:13— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: string-formatted-query pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:44— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:115— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:42— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:113— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High IaC: DS-0002 cmd/auth/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: this image's final stage has no shell, no package manager and no `/etc/passwd`, so there is no account to create and a `USER` naming one would not resolve. Use the numeric form instead — `USER 65532:65532` before the entrypoint (65532 is the conventional nonroot uid) — and give that uid ownership of anything the process writes by copying it in with `COPY --chown=65532:65532` from the build stage, including any `VOLUME` path. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 cmd/migrate/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 cmd/user/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: this image's final stage has no shell, no package manager and no `/etc/passwd`, so there is no account to create and a `USER` naming one would not resolve. Use the numeric form instead — `USER 65532:65532` before the entrypoint (65532 is the conventional nonroot uid) — and give that uid ownership of anything the process writes by copying it in with `COPY --chown=65532:65532` from the build stage, including any `VOLUME` path. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 cmd/web/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
Leaked secret: private-key k8s/tls/server.key:4— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: jwt cmd/auth/internal/domain/token/events_test_was_created.json:6— jwt detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] cmd/web/yarn.lock— elliptic 6.5.4: [GHSA redacted] — elliptic is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin elliptic to 6.6.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against elliptic 6.5.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.6.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.6.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against elliptic 6.5.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 cmd/web/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 cmd/migrate/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 cmd/user/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 cmd/auth/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/web-publish.yaml:0— Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/user-publish.yaml:0— Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/migrate-publish.yaml:0— Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/auth-publish.yaml:0— Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/client_repository.go:179— cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/client_repository.go:179-192 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:243-256 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/client_repository.go:179` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) cmd/auth/main.go:59— cmd/auth/main.go:59-72 | cmd/user/main.go:55-70 — `cmd/auth/main.go` and `cmd/user/main.go` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/main.go:59` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) cmd/auth/main.go:105— cmd/auth/main.go:105-118 | cmd/user/main.go:100-113 — `cmd/auth/main.go` and `cmd/user/main.go` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/main.go:105` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:296— cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:296-309 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:382-395 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:296` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go:84— pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go:84-97 | pkg/eventbus/pushpull/event_bus.go:86-99 — `pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go` and `pkg/eventbus/pushpull/event_bus.go` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 50 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:58— pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:58-71 | pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:56-69 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:58` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:138— cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:138-150 | cmd/auth/internal/domain/token/token.go:144-156 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:138` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/commands.go:64— cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/commands.go:64-76 | cmd/auth/internal/domain/token/commands.go:113-125 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/commands.go:64` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/router.go:76— cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/router.go:76-88 | cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/router.go:91-103 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/router.go:76` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/health.go:36— cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/health.go:36-48 | cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/health.go:36-48 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/health.go:36` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/user.go:63— cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/user.go:63-75 | cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/user.go:86-98 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/user.go:63` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/application/config/env.go:100— cmd/auth/internal/application/config/env.go:100-111 | cmd/user/internal/application/config/env.go:118-129 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/application/config/env.go:100` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:36— cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:36-47 | cmd/auth/internal/domain/token/token.go:38-49 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:36` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) cmd/auth/main.go:38— cmd/auth/main.go:38-49 | cmd/user/main.go:37-48 — `cmd/auth/main.go` and `cmd/user/main.go` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/main.go:38` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) pkg/eventbus/memory/event_bus.go:36— pkg/eventbus/memory/event_bus.go:36-47 | pkg/eventbus/memory/event_bus.go:64-75 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go:128— pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go:128-139 | pkg/eventbus/pushpull/event_bus.go:130-141 — `pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go` and `pkg/eventbus/pushpull/event_bus.go` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 50 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:112— cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:112-122 | cmd/auth/internal/domain/token/token.go:118-128 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:112` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/router.go:34— cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/router.go:34-44 | cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/router.go:39-49 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/router.go:34` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:140— cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:140-150 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:191-201 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:140` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:22— cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:22-32 | cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go:23-33 — before extracting anything, compare `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go` and `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 55 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go:60— pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go:60-75 | pkg/eventbus/pushpull/event_bus.go:61-76 — `pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go` and `pkg/eventbus/pushpull/event_bus.go` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 50 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go:60` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:168— pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:168-183 | pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:166-181 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:168` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:219— pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:219-234 | pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:217-232 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:219` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:198— cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:198-212 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:222-236 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:198` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:87— pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:87-101 | pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:85-99 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:87` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:116— pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:116-130 | pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:114-128 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:116` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/repository/client_repository.go:25— cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/repository/client_repository.go:25-35 | cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/repository/token_repository.go:25-35 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/repository/user_repository.go:30-40 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/repository/client_repository.go:25` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:97— cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:97-107 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:123-133 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:174-184 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:97` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) pkg/eventstore/mongo/event_store.go:120— pkg/eventstore/mongo/event_store.go:120-130 | pkg/eventstore/mongo/event_store.go:153-163 | pkg/eventstore/mongo/event_store.go:187-197 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/eventstore/mongo/event_store.go:120` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/auth/main.go:8— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used cmd/user/main.go:8— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:192— cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:192-203 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:256-267 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:342-353 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:192` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:43— cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:43-54 | cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go:44-55 | cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/user.go:44-55 — before extracting anything, compare `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go` and `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 55 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:43` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/token_repository.go:107— cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/token_repository.go:107-116 | cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/token_repository.go:78-87 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/token_repository.go:107` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:270— pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:270-279 | pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:268-277 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:270` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) cmd/auth/main.go:91— cmd/auth/main.go:91-98 | cmd/user/main.go:85-93 — `cmd/auth/main.go` and `cmd/user/main.go` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/main.go:91` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go:116— pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go:116-123 | pkg/eventbus/pushpull/event_bus.go:118-125 — `pkg/eventbus/pubsub/event_bus.go` and `pkg/eventbus/pushpull/event_bus.go` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 50 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
domain.RegisterUserDomain (cyclomatic 20) cmd/user/internal/domain/init.go:14— domain.RegisterUserDomain has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
user.OnRegisterWithFacebook (cyclomatic 20) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:239— user.OnRegisterWithFacebook has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 20 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 240). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
user.OnRegisterWithGoogle (cyclomatic 20) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:325— user.OnRegisterWithGoogle has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 20 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 326). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
jwtAuthorizer.Auth (cyclomatic 16) pkg/auth/authorizer.go:32— jwtAuthorizer.Auth has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 49 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1064.
user.OnRegisterWithFacebook (cognitive 38) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:239— user.OnRegisterWithFacebook has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 35, boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 17). Most of this is not in the body itself: 0 of the 38 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 240). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
user.OnRegisterWithGoogle (cognitive 38) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:325— user.OnRegisterWithGoogle has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 35, boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 17). Most of this is not in the body itself: 0 of the 38 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 326). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
domain.RegisterUserDomain (cognitive 19) cmd/user/internal/domain/init.go:14— domain.RegisterUserDomain has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
ServiceContainer.Close (cognitive 17) cmd/user/internal/application/services/services.go:43— ServiceContainer.Close has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, loops 1 (nesting depth added 5). Most of this is not in the body itself: 5 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 4 function literals inside it that branch (lines 51, 59, 67, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
user.OnRegisterWithEmail (cognitive 16) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:176— user.OnRegisterWithEmail has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 5). Most of this is not in the body itself: 0 of the 16 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 177). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-log cmd/user/internal/domain/user/email_address.go:23— Personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Under GDPR Article 5(1)(c) logs should carry the minimum needed to operate the system; prefer a pseudonymous identifier over the personal value itself.
Change coupling: connection.go ↔ server.go pkg/grpc/connection.go— `pkg/grpc/connection.go` and `pkg/grpc/server.go` change together 62% of the time (8 of the 13 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling clique: when_token_was_created.go, when_user_email_address_was_changed.go, when_user_was_registered_with_facebook.go, when_user_was_registered_with_google.go cmd/auth/internal/application/eventhandler/when_token_was_created.go— 4 files — `cmd/auth/internal/application/eventhandler/when_token_was_created.go`, `cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_email_address_was_changed.go`, `cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_was_registered_with_facebook.go`, `cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_was_registered_with_google.go` — all change together with no explicit dependency: a fully-connected co-change clique, not 6 separate couplings. They share one concern (thin parallel siblings over a common abstraction), so extract the shared part into ONE unit and the whole clique's coupling clears at once — you do not need to break each pair individually.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 8 floating ref(s) across 8 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (8 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
Secret passed as a command-line argument — 4 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): web-publish.yaml: docker login docker.pkg.github.com -u $GITHUB_ACTOR -p ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}; user-publish.yaml: docker login docker.pkg.github.com -u $GITHUB_ACTOR -p ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}; migrate-publish.yaml: docker login docker.pkg.github.com -u $GITHUB_ACTOR -p ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} …. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/application/services/services.go:76— cmd/auth/internal/application/services/services.go:76-94 | cmd/user/internal/application/services/services.go:82-100 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/application/services/services.go:76` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 5) cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_connected_with_facebook.go:28— cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_connected_with_facebook.go:28-41 | cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_connected_with_google.go:28-41 | cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_was_registered_with_email.go:28-41 | cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_was_registered_with_facebook.go:28-41 | cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_was_registered_with_google.go:28-41 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/application/eventhandler/when_user_connected_with_facebook.go:28` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 4) cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:121— cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:121-133 | cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go:111-123 | cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go:164-176 | cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/user.go:134-146 — before extracting anything, compare `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go` and `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 55 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:121` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 3) cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:171— cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:171-183 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:195-207 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:219-231 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:171` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 4) cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:109— cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:109-120 | cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go:99-110 | cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go:152-163 | cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/user.go:122-133 — before extracting anything, compare `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go` and `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 55 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:109` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 4) cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:254— cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:254-264 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:275-285 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:340-350 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:361-371 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/domain/user/commands.go:254` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 6) pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:144— pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:144-153 | pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:192-201 | pkg/eventstore/mysql/event_store.go:242-251 | pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:142-151 | pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:190-199 | pkg/eventstore/sqllite/event_store.go:240-249 — there are 6 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 6 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 5) cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:94— cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:94-103 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:144-153 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:195-204 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:218-227 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:242-251 — there are 5 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 5 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/domain/client/client.go:94` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) cmd/auth/internal/domain/token/token.go:100— cmd/auth/internal/domain/token/token.go:100-109 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:93-102 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:119-128 | cmd/user/internal/domain/user/user.go:170-179 — there are 4 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 4 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/domain/token/token.go:100` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 4) cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:81— cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:81-89 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:97-105 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:113-121 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:129-137 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mysql/user_repository.go:81` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/grpc/server.go:37— cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/grpc/server.go:37-45 | cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/grpc/server.go:51-59 | cmd/user/internal/interfaces/grpc/server.go:37-45 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 9) cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/client_repository.go:58— cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/client_repository.go:58-65 | cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/token_repository.go:49-56 | cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/token_repository.go:65-72 | cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/token_repository.go:81-88 | cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/token_repository.go:97-104 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/user_repository.go:66-73 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/user_repository.go:82-89 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/user_repository.go:98-105 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/user_repository.go:114-121 — there are 9 copies across 3 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 9 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/client_repository.go:58` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/user_repository.go:150— cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/user_repository.go:150-157 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/user_repository.go:171-178 | cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/user_repository.go:192-199 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/user/internal/infrastructure/persistence/mongo/user_repository.go:150` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:84— cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:84-90 | cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go:127-133 — before extracting anything, compare `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go` and `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/token.go` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 55 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/auth/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/client.go:84` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Low IaC: KSV-0003 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— CPU not limited This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `k8s/helm/charts/microservice/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0015 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— CPU requests not specified This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `k8s/helm/charts/microservice/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0016 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— Memory requests not specified This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `k8s/helm/charts/microservice/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0018 k8s/helm/charts/microservice/templates/deployment.yaml— Memory not limited This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `k8s/helm/charts/microservice/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low: cookie-missing-httponly cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/auth.go:40— A session cookie was detected without setting the 'HttpOnly' flag. The 'HttpOnly' flag for cookies instructs the browser to forbid client-side scripts from reading the cookie which mitigates XSS attacks. Set the 'HttpOnly' flag by setting 'HttpOnly' to 'true' in the Cookie. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-secure cmd/user/internal/interfaces/http/handlers/auth.go:40— A session cookie was detected without setting the 'Secure' flag. The 'secure' flag for cookies prevents the client from transmitting the cookie over insecure channels such as HTTP. Set the cookie's Secure flag on the cookie value your language's API exposes — and set it to a condition, not a constant, where the same handler also serves plaintext requests. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Dormant codebase — 58 of 58 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 58 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cyclonedx-gomod` over the module graph — or Go's own build info, which already records the module set in the binary, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement· No network policy · ×1
No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`go test ./... -v -race -cover`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.go), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
0
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Run 019fc922-107d-71d6-bc5e-a7890d556c7b · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 68 · Warnings: 80 · Recommendations: 17 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 19:38 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.