Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
vercel/hyper carries serious gaps (41%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Code Health (91%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (21%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (50%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); Automate deployment (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or a pipeline… (Deployment & Rollback); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: — (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly — (—). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (91%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 21 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 41 → ~59.
New since the last scan (60+)
- D8 · No automated tests
- D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml
- D35 · Change coupling: term-group.tsx ↔ terms.tsx lib/components/term-group.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: sessions.ts ↔ ui.ts lib/actions/sessions.ts
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- R10 · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2 locations) test/unit/window-utils.test.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) lib/actions/header.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 3 locations) lib/utils/plugins.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 4 locations) lib/utils/plugins.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) app/menus/menus/shell.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) app/menus/menus/edit.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 3 locations) app/menus/menus/edit.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) lib/reducers/ui.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] lib/utils/config.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] lib/utils/plugins.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] test/unit/to-electron-background-color.test.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] typings/extend-electron.d.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] typings/extend-electron.d.ts
- R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 57, cognitive 60) lib/reducers/ui.ts
- R2 · Complex function IUiReducer (cyclomatic 37, cognitive 24) lib/reducers/ui.ts
- R2 · Complex function createSession (cyclomatic 22, cognitive 25) app/ui/window.ts
- R2 · Complex function ISessionReducer (cyclomatic 15, cognitive 9) lib/reducers/sessions.ts
- R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 12) lib/components/tabs.tsx
- R4 · No test reaches this file app/plugins.ts
- R4 · No test reaches this file app/ui/window.ts
- R4 · No test reaches this file app/session.ts
- R8 · Unused dependency '@ava/babel'
- R8 · Unused dependency '@ava/typescript'
- P2 · No structured logging
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 33 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, implement structured logging and observability across all projects to improve monitoring and debugging capabilities. Next, automate the deployment process to ensure releases are repeatable and easily reversible. Then, expand test coverage to include currently unreachable modules and resolve existing code coverage gaps. Finally, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring all imports.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +18.9 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +18.9 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +22.7 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Automate deployment (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or a pipeline deploy stage) so releases are repeatable and reversible. | +22.7 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +22.7 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +22.7 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +5.3 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 33 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with nodejs.yml (13), e2e_comment.yml (6), codeql-analysis.yml (4). | +5.0 pts | Medium | Static Analysis (SAST) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| .github/workflows/nodejs.yml | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| pnpm-lock.yaml | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| app/pnpm-lock.yaml | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml | 4.5 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/dependabot.yml | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown |
| pnpm-workspace.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: pnpm-block-exotic-sub-dependencies |
| .npmrc | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age |
| app/.npmrc | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age |
| app/config/open.ts | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: detect-child-process |
| app/pnpm-workspace.yaml | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: pnpm-minimum-release-age |
| lib/components/term-group.tsx | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: term-group.tsx ↔ terms.tsx |
| lib/actions/sessions.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: sessions.ts ↔ ui.ts |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 41 of 43 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 43 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 85 of 90 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — the solution has no test code.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
D19 · Documentation Quality
The single README is a solid project description for the Hyper CLI tool. It states the goals (extensible CLIP experience built on open web standards), gives usage links to download releases and install via AUR, NixOS, Homebrew Cask, and chocolatey, and outlines an outline of future sections including Contribute, Known issues, Error building node-pty, codesign errors, Related Repositories. It is clear but lacks a dedicated architecture or design document for the CLI's structure, routing, and extension model.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The single README is a solid project description for the Hyper CLI tool. It states the goals (extensible CLIP experience built on open web standards), gives usage links to download releases and install via AUR, NixOS, Homebrew Cask, and chocolatey, and outlines an outline of future sections including Contribute, Known issues, Error building node-pty, codesign errors, Related Repositories. It is clear but lacks a dedicated architecture or design document for the CLI's structure, routing, and extension model.
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
33 finding(s): 0 critical, 33 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 33 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with nodejs.yml (13), e2e_comment.yml (6), codeql-analysis.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level).
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: term-group.tsx↔terms.tsx 50%; sessions.ts↔ui.ts 50%
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
112 finding(s): 3 critical, 55 high, 42 medium, 12 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 47 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (47). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (47 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- No Helm/Kubernetes/compose manifests or pipeline deploy stage found — releases appear manual, which is slower and riskier to reverse.
What to do
- Automate deployment (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or a pipeline deploy stage) so releases are repeatable and reversible.
R1 · Type Safety
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication
- test/unit/window-utils.test.ts:15 · test/unit/window-utils.test.ts:49 — window-utils.test.ts:15
- lib/actions/header.ts:32 · lib/actions/header.ts:65 — header.ts:32
- lib/utils/plugins.ts:481 · lib/utils/plugins.ts:507 · lib/utils/plugins.ts:548 — plugins.ts:481
- lib/utils/plugins.ts:419 · lib/utils/plugins.ts:479 · lib/utils/plugins.ts:505 · lib/utils/plugins.ts:548 — plugins.ts:419
- app/menus/menus/shell.ts:23 · app/menus/menus/view.ts:27 — shell.ts:23
- app/menus/menus/edit.ts:66 · app/menus/menus/edit.ts:99 — edit.ts:66
- app/menus/menus/edit.ts:112 · app/menus/menus/shell.ts:26 · app/menus/menus/view.ts:30 — edit.ts:112
- lib/reducers/ui.ts:143 · lib/reducers/ui.ts:171 — ui.ts:143
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 · Import Boundaries
- lib/utils/config.ts:6 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../app/plugins) — import the package by name instead. — config.ts:6
- lib/utils/plugins.ts:37 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../app/plugins) — import the package by name instead. — plugins.ts:37
- test/unit/to-electron-background-color.test.ts:3 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../app/utils/to-electron-background-color) — import the package by name instead. — to-electron-background-color.test.ts:3
- typings/extend-electron.d.ts:6 reaches into another package with a relative path (../app/config) — import the package by name instead. — extend-electron.d.ts:6
- typings/extend-electron.d.ts:7 reaches into another package with a relative path (../app/plugins) — import the package by name instead. — extend-electron.d.ts:7
What to do
- Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — ui.ts:134, ui.ts:123, window.ts:122, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — plugins.ts, term.tsx, plugins.ts, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 5 application, 16 tooling and 5 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (5 application, 16 tooling, 5 test roots considered) — release.js
- Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. — object.ts:5
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — index.ts:6
- Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
X1 · Async correctness
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 91% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 61% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 21% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, R4, R8, P2, P4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 50% | Adequate — gated by D29, D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 60 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 85 finding(s)
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:11
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:19
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:38
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:42
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:53
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:67
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml:17
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml:24
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml:32
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml:39
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml:44
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/e2e_comment.yml:59
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:26
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:28
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:40
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:80
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:95
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:101
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:111
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:116
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:136
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:138
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:150
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nodejs.yml:164
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Dimension evaluation failed
- No automated tests
Warning — 2 finding(s)
- Change coupling: term-group.tsx ↔ terms.tsx lib/components/term-group.tsx
- Change coupling: sessions.ts ↔ ui.ts lib/actions/sessions.ts
Recommendation — 2 finding(s)
- Test reliability not included
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 33 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 112 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |