react-telefone-brasileiro — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

victorjean9/react-telefone-brasileiro carries serious gaps (41%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Code Health (86%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Security (75%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (15%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (54%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage); 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution).

For scale: Hobby (~129 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (86%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 86% Strong Architecture 69% Adequate Maturity 54% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 15% ⚠ Critical · gated by D8, D9, P1, P3 Security 75% Adequate · gated by D38

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 15% · 47% weightMaturity 54% · 26% weightArchitecture 69% · 14% weightSecurity 75% · 8% weightCode Health 86% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 15 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 41 → ~63.

New since the last scan (17+)

17 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €36–€180

Cost to rebuild	€36–€180 (0.1 person-years (1–2 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 41% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Hobby · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.

+21.2 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage

Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

+21.2 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

+24.5 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

At a glance — Code Health · 86% · Strong

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 7.2

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Adequate

The Good

D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 54% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Bad

D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 6.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.0

The Ugly

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 15% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, P1, P3

The Good

D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0

The Ugly

D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 0.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 75% · Adequate · gated by D38

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0

The Ugly

D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	50	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration workflow to automatically build the code and run the test suite on every push or pull request. Next, address the lack of automated tests by resolving the identified coverage gaps and ensuring all relevant code paths are tested. Then, document significant architectural decisions in a dedicated location to preserve context and consequences. Finally, update the root README with a quick-start section to help new contributors understand how to build and run the project.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.	+21.2 pts	Low	Code Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.	+21.2 pts	Low	Test Distribution
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+24.5 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).	+6.3 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.	+6.0 pts	Medium	Documentation (README)
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10.	+4.7 pts	Medium	Documentation Quality
Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.	+4.7 pts	Medium	Folder & project structure
Resolve the 35 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (34), yarn.lock.	+1.1 pts	Medium	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 3 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 33% slop · 34% mixed · 33% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
package-lock.json	1.3	Slop	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
yarn.lock	7.2	Mixed	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
src/TelefoneBrasileiroInput.js	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: getMask (cognitive 29)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 17 of 19 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 19 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D8D9D13D15D19D21D28D29D33D35D38M1M2M3M4P1P3

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 51 of 60 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc9c5-531c-734a-a3d5-17e3e3d38ae4.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was getMask at 29.

getMask (cognitive 29)src/TelefoneBrasileiroInput.js:55

What to do

Resolve the 1 getMask (cognitive 29) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with TelefoneBrasileiroInput.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a focused React input component for Brazilian phone numbers with an installation, import, and two example components (basic 8-digit, DDD-9-digit), plus a clipped 'Parâmetros visuais' section that the outline names but the body does not cover. It is clear and complete for its one-file documentation set.

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The single README is a focused React input component for Brazilian phone numbers with an installation, import, and two example components (basic 8-digit, DDD-9-digit), plus a clipped 'Parâmetros visuais' section that the outline names but the body does not cover. It is clear and complete for its one-file documentation set.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

67 finding(s): 9 critical, 39 high, 13 medium, 6 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×35package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×9package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×4package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

Resolve the 35 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (34), yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (35 issue-level).
Resolve the 9 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.

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M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

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M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

No test surface was found — there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.

What to do

Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.

What to do

Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	86%	Strong	Strongest area.
Architecture	69%	Adequate	Acceptable, with room to improve.
Maturity	54%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	15%	Critical — gated by D8, D9, P1, P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	75%	Adequate — gated by D38	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 76 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (6 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (6 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (6 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (6 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (6 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (6 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (6 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC make this an empty stub rather than a real codebase needing boundaries.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — God-class detection found no readable class surface — neither a C#/VB workspace nor a language-neutral code model — so class size could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D4 Code Duplication — No analyzable source was loaded, so code duplication was not measured (the solution failed to load, or the language model was unavailable).
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 49 finding(s)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×35

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.16.7: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — async 2.6.3: [GHSA redacted] — async is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin async to 2.6.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — body-parser 1.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against body-parser 1.19.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.19.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — decode-uri-component 0.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — decode-uri-component is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin decode-uri-component to 0.2.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — flatted 3.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.2.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — follow-redirects 1.14.6: [GHSA redacted] — follow-redirects is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin follow-redirects to 1.14.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against follow-redirects 1.14.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.16.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.16.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against follow-redirects 1.14.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — http-proxy-middleware 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin http-proxy-middleware to 2.0.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — ip 1.1.5: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; ip is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ip 1.1.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — json5 1.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json5 to 1.0.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — json5 2.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json5 to 2.2.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — loader-utils 3.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 3.2.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 3.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — minimatch 3.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.0.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.0.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — node-forge 0.10.0: [GHSA redacted] — node-forge is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 1.4.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.10.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.10.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 13 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against node-forge 0.10.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against node-forge 0.10.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — nth-check 1.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — nth-check is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 0.1.13 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.1.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.1.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — postcss 7.0.39: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 8.5.12 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 7.0.39, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 7.0.39; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 7.0.39, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against postcss 7.0.39: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — postcss 8.4.5: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.12 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.4.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.4.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — qs 6.9.6: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.9.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against qs 6.9.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.14.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.14.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.9.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
+ 10 more in this group — see findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×9

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — @babel/traverse 7.16.7: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — ejs 3.1.6: [GHSA redacted] — ejs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ejs to 3.1.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ejs 3.1.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ejs 3.1.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — form-data 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 3.0.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 3.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — loader-utils 1.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 1.4.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against loader-utils 1.4.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 1.4.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — loader-utils 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 2.0.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against loader-utils 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — minimist 1.2.5: [GHSA redacted] — minimist is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimist to 1.2.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — shell-quote 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — webpack 5.65.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares webpack ^5.65.0, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 5.76.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so webpack moves onto 5.76.0 or later; if the flagged 5.65.0 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin webpack with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against webpack 5.65.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.104.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.104.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against webpack 5.65.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×4

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — serialize-javascript 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — serialize-javascript 6.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — svgo 1.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — svgo is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.8.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — svgo 2.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — svgo is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin svgo to 2.8.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against svgo 2.8.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.8.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.8.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against svgo 2.8.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1

No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.

Warning — 4 finding(s)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — @babel/helpers 7.16.7: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — @babel/runtime 7.16.7: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/runtime is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/runtime to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 2 dependency files: package-lock.json, yarn.lock)

D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1

single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 18 commit(s) sampled).

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getMask (cognitive 29) · ×1

getMask (cognitive 29) src/TelefoneBrasileiroInput.js:55 — getMask has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

Recommendation — 3 finding(s)

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (18 commit(s) sampled).

D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1

No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (Vitest, Jest, Mocha, or the runtime's built-in runner (`node --test`, `bun test`, `deno test`)), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.

Info — 4 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. Your package.json IS read in this same run: the frontend dependency lens (R8) parses it for unused declarations, undeclared imports and misplaced production dependencies — what is missing here is the outdated/deprecated/unmaintained signal for those npm packages, not the manifest.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · git history depth insufficient · ×1

git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

D35 · Change Coupling · git history depth insufficient · ×1

git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	0	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	67	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fc9c5-531c-734a-a3d5-17e3e3d38ae4 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Victorjean9/react-Telefone-Brasileiro

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

At a glance — Code Health · 86% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Adequate

At a glance — Maturity · 54% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 15% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, P1, P3

At a glance — Security · 75% · Adequate · gated by D38

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts