Lightweight .NET messaging broker on RocksDB
Public report — FluxQueue, published 1 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 01-07-2026 @ 17:40 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Vonbv25/FluxQueue

No regression bounded contexts not declared
45% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate
Architecture 96% Exemplary Performance 76% Strong Code Health 73% Strong Maturity 66% Adequate Readiness 38% Weak Security 33% Weak

Small · 3,036 LoC · 7 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Security (33%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

57/60dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
55findings with an exact file:lineof 82 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
60/95dimensions across the health lenses3036 LoC · 7 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

vonbv25/FluxQueue carries serious risk (45%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Architecture (96%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Performance (76%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (33%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (38%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Protect endpoints by default-deny (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup).

For scale: Small (~3,036 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (96%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 73% Strong Architecture 96% ★ Exemplary Maturity 66% Adequate Readiness 38% Weak · gated by D8, P3, P5 Security 33% Weak · gated by D36, C2 Performance 76% Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 33% · 46% weightReadiness 38% · 25% weightMaturity 66% · 14% weightCode Health 73% · 8% weightPerformance 76% · 4% weightArchitecture 96% · 2% weight

Raise Security 33 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 45 → ~55.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 34%Plumbing 29%Tests 38%
New since the last scan (9+)

9 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-06-21) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • AXR1 · WCAG 2.4.2 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface
  • AXR1 · WCAG 3.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface
  • AXH1 · Runtime security header not set: content-security-policy
  • AXH1 · Runtime security header not set: strict-transport-security
  • AXH1 · Runtime security header not set: x-content-type-options
  • AXH1 · Runtime security header not set: x-frame-options
  • AXH1 · Runtime security header not set: referrer-policy
  • AXH1 · Runtime security header not set: permissions-policy
  • SC1 · NuGet dependencies are not locked

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,800–€15,000
Cost to rebuild€2,800–€15,000 (0.1 person-years (47–154 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 45% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 29% boilerplate · 17% straight-line · 54% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€8,700 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 33% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — service/app, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
+11.5 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls
2
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
+11.1 pts · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture
3
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+9.3 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 33%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (3,036 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 33%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+5.0 pts/run over 7 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +5.0 pts/run over 7 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 45, unchanged across 7 runs.

025507510019 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityPerformance

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch FluxQueue.BrokerHost BrokerHost FluxQueue.Core Core FluxQueue.BrokerHost->FluxQueue.Core FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions Abstractions FluxQueue.BrokerHost->FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp Amqp FluxQueue.BrokerHost->FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp FluxQueue.Console Console FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp->FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions

At a glance — Code Health · 73% · Strong

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 9.7 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 8.4 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 9.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.6 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.5 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 9.4 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.7 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 8.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.9
The Bad
X3 · Repo Exception handling 6.8
The Ugly
X1 · Repo Async correctness 4.3

At a glance — Architecture · 96% · Exemplary

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 8.9 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.8 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 8.4 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 8.9 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 66% · Adequate

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 8.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0
The Bad
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 38% · Weak · gated by D8, P3, P5

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 9.2 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 7.0
The Bad
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0
The Ugly
D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 3.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0

At a glance — Security · 33% · Weak · gated by D36, C2

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 8.8 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.6
The Ugly
D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 0.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.5

At a glance — Performance · 76% · Strong

The Good
PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 7.8 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0
The Bad
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 6.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration4High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components2High / Critical

Roadmap

First, enforce strict access controls by implementing default-deny policies and imperative guards across all handlers. Next, harden the web security posture by adding essential response headers and ensuring defense-in-depth measures are in place. Then, establish a robust disaster recovery plan by codifying backups and documenting recovery procedures. Finally, improve deployment safety by adding readiness probes and automated rollback strategies, while extending structured logging to ensure full observability across all services.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.+11.5 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.+11.1 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+9.3 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+8.8 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.+7.4 ptsMediumObservability
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+2.3 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+2.3 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+2.3 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 23 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 4% slop · 31% mixed · 65% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs1.0SlopExplicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock
FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueSweeper.cs6.3MixedCognitive Complexity: QueueSweeper.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 18)
Dockerfile.test6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Program.cs6.5MixedChange Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: Program.cs ↔ QueueIngressProcessor.cs
FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/FluxQueueLinkProcessor.cs7.0MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (24 lines × 2)
FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngineHelpers.cs7.0MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)
FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpMessageBody.cs7.8MixedCode Coverage: Low coverage: AmqpMessageBody.cs
FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueRequestValidator.cs7.8MixedCode Coverage: Low coverage: QueueRequestValidator.cs
FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpHostedService.cs8.0Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: AmqpHostedService.cs
FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions/Models/DeliveryDisposition.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
unit-tests/FluxQueue.Core.Test/QueueEngineHardeningTests.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: Utf8
FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpAddressMapper.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: AmqpAddressMapper.cs
FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/FluxQueueAmqpEndpointFactory.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: FluxQueueAmqpEndpointFactory.cs
FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/QueueEgressSource.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: QueueEgressSource.cs
FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/QueueIngressProcessor.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: QueueIngressProcessor.cs
FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/Http/QueueHttpExceptionFilter.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: QueueHttpExceptionFilter.cs
FluxQueue.BrokerHost/DependencyInjection.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: DependencyInjection.cs
FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueEngineOperations.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: QueueEngineOperations.cs
FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueNameRules.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: QueueNameRules.cs
FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueuePolicyProvider.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: QueuePolicyProvider.cs

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 57 of 60 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 60 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8C2GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 55 of 82 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f1ec4-c0ba-7185-9685-058c8ba7bd6b.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync at 18.

QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync (cyclomatic 18)FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:180
QueueActor.RunAsync (cyclomatic 17)FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:988

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was QueueActor.RunAsync at 31.

QueueActor.RunAsync (cognitive 31)FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:988
QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync (cognitive 30)FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:180
QueueEngine.SweepExpiredNoLock (cognitive 28)FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:515
QueueActor.ProcessCommand (cognitive 22)FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:1086
QueueSweeper.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 18)FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueSweeper.cs:26

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 QueueActor.RunAsync (cognitive 31) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with QueueEngine.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync (cognitive 30) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with QueueEngine.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 QueueEngine.SweepExpiredNoLock (cognitive 28) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with QueueEngine.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.csFluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:0
ClassTooLong: QueueEngineFluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (24 lines × 2)FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/FluxQueueLinkProcessor.cs:63
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:423
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:936
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngineHelpers.cs:28

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: FluxQueue.Core

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 9 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 4.5% — 17 file(s) below 50% · 23 method(s) over the CRAP-30 risk line.

Low coverage: AmqpAddressMapper.cs · ×17FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpAddressMapper.cs
CRAP 110: QueueSweeper.ExecuteAsync · ×2FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueSweeper.cs:26
CRAP 319: QueueEngine.ReconcileAsyncFluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:180
CRAP 286: QueueActor.RunAsyncFluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:988
CRAP 224: QueueActor.ProcessCommandFluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:1086

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 17 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with AmqpAddressMapper.cs, AmqpHostedService.cs, AmqpMessageBody.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 CRAP 110 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with AmqpMessageBody.cs, QueueSweeper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 CRAP 319 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with QueueEngine.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

61 test methods: 46 unit, 15 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 61 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). integration: measured (0 flaky); other: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

15 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

Outdated: AMQPNetLite.Core · ×15

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 18 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

Small-team knowledge concentration

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 3036 LoC (0.3/KLoC) → score 9.5.

EmptyCatchBlockFluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:1259
TodoCommentFluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions/Models/DeliveryDisposition.cs:8
Dead code: Utf8unit-tests/FluxQueue.Core.Test/QueueEngineHardeningTests.cs:656

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 projects, 43 .cs files, 4873 hand-written lines of code (3036 production / 1837 test), 9 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

FluxQueue's documentation is clear and complete for a single-node embedded broker with RocksDB persistence: the README covers features (durable messaging, lease-based processing, DLQ), architecture (transport layer, broker host, lease sweeper, reconciliation worker, queue engine, RocksDB), and an outline of every named doc path. The architecture diagram is rich and well-structured; the detailed per-path XML-doc coverage is zero for all packages except FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions (0/6) where 14 out of 6 are covered, indicating a gap in cross-package documentation.

XML-doc coverage: FluxQueue.Console · ×5FluxQueue.Console/FluxQueue.Console.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — FluxQueue's documentation is clear and complete for a single-node embedded broker with RocksDB persistence: the README covers features (durable messaging, lease-based processing, DLQ), architecture (transport layer, broker host, lease sweeper, reconciliation worker, queue engine, RocksDB), and an outline of every named doc path. The architecture diagram is rich and well-structured; the detailed per-path XML-doc coverage is zero for all packages except FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions (0/6) where 14 out of 6 are covered, indicating a gap in cross-package documentation.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

23 valuable / 1 redundant across 200 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentFluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpHostedService.cs:43

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with AmqpHostedService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 7 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

84 % of calls cross a namespace and 1 % go through an interface, but 97 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 3 low.

High IaC: DS-0002Dockerfile.testdetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×3Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: QueueEngine.cs↔QueueIngressProcessor.cs 80%; Program.cs↔QueueSweeper.cs 77%; Program.cs↔QueueIngressProcessor.cs 60%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: QueueEngine.cs ↔ QueueIngressProcessor.cs · ×2FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs
Change coupling: Program.cs ↔ QueueSweeper.csFluxQueue.BrokerHost/Program.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with Program.cs, QueueEngine.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 of 236 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 3 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetFluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:517

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 7 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 2/3 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
  • Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No BenchmarkDotNet suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a BenchmarkDotNet project for the hot paths (with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations), and run it in CI to catch regressions.
PF2 · Allocation hygiene7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC — Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 19 use(s) across 5,385 production line(s) (~3.5/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

S1 · Web-Security Posture4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×3) — QueueEgressSource.cs:136, QueueEgressSource.cs:152, QueueIngressProcessor.cs:53

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 6/9 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×3) — QueueEngine.cs:988, QueueHttpExceptionFilter.cs:5, QueueEgressSource.cs:41

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling6.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

  • An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — QueueEngine.cs:1259

What to do

  • Swallowed exception (empty catch)
X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health73%StrongSolid.
Architecture96%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity66%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Readiness38%Weak — gated by D8, P3, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security33%Weak — gated by D36, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance76%StrongSolid.
Not included — 36 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • AXH1 Runtime security headers — no data
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility (rendered) — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — only 1/3 markers (2 event handler(s))
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 6 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×2
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: QueueEngine.cs ↔ QueueIngressProcessor.cs FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs — `FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs` (context FluxQueue) and `FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/QueueIngressProcessor.cs` (context FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 80% of the time (8 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: Program.cs ↔ QueueIngressProcessor.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Program.cs — `FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Program.cs` (context FluxQueue.BrokerHost) and `FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/QueueIngressProcessor.cs` (context FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 60% of the time (6 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
D17 · Explicit Debt · EmptyCatchBlock · ×1
  • EmptyCatchBlock FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:1259 — empty catch block
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.test — Image user should not be 'root'
Warning — 43 finding(s)
D8 · Code Coverage · Low coverage · ×17
  • Low coverage: AmqpAddressMapper.cs FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpAddressMapper.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/26).
  • Low coverage: AmqpHostedService.cs FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpHostedService.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/56).
  • Low coverage: AmqpMessageBody.cs FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpMessageBody.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/32).
  • Low coverage: FluxQueueAmqpEndpointFactory.cs FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/FluxQueueAmqpEndpointFactory.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/58).
  • Low coverage: FluxQueueLinkProcessor.cs FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/FluxQueueLinkProcessor.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/308).
  • Low coverage: QueueEgressSource.cs FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/QueueEgressSource.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/262).
  • Low coverage: QueueIngressProcessor.cs FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/QueueIngressProcessor.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/226).
  • Low coverage: QueueEngineHelpers.cs FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngineHelpers.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/228).
  • Low coverage: QueueEngine.cs FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs — 2.4% line coverage (22/912).
  • Low coverage: QueueHttpExceptionFilter.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/Http/QueueHttpExceptionFilter.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/38).
  • Low coverage: DependencyInjection.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/DependencyInjection.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/12).
  • Low coverage: QueueEngineOperations.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueEngineOperations.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/18).
  • Low coverage: QueueNameRules.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueNameRules.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/60).
  • Low coverage: QueuePolicyProvider.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueuePolicyProvider.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/10).
  • Low coverage: QueueReconcilerHostedService.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueReconcilerHostedService.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/20).
  • Low coverage: QueueRequestValidator.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueRequestValidator.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/150).
  • Low coverage: QueueSweeper.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueSweeper.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/70).
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 110 · ×2
  • CRAP 110: QueueSweeper.ExecuteAsync FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueSweeper.cs:26 — Cyclomatic 10 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
  • CRAP 110: AmqpMessageBody.ExtractPayload FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpMessageBody.cs:9 — Cyclomatic 10 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync (cyclomatic 18) FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:180 — QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · QueueActor.RunAsync (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • QueueActor.RunAsync (cyclomatic 17) FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:988 — QueueActor.RunAsync has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1
  • TodoComment FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions/Models/DeliveryDisposition.cs:8 — // TODO: for in-flight messages that are not acked within visibility timeout, should we have a separate disposition to distinguish from explicit release? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×1
  • Dead code: Utf8 unit-tests/FluxQueue.Core.Test/QueueEngineHardeningTests.cs:656 — Method Utf8 — no references found in solution.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · QueueActor.RunAsync (cognitive 31) · ×1
  • QueueActor.RunAsync (cognitive 31) FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:988 — QueueActor.RunAsync has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync (cognitive 30) · ×1
  • QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync (cognitive 30) FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:180 — QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · QueueEngine.SweepExpiredNoLock (cognitive 28) · ×1
  • QueueEngine.SweepExpiredNoLock (cognitive 28) FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:515 — QueueEngine.SweepExpiredNoLock has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · QueueActor.ProcessCommand (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • QueueActor.ProcessCommand (cognitive 22) FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:1086 — QueueActor.ProcessCommand has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · QueueSweeper.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • QueueSweeper.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 18) FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueSweeper.cs:26 — QueueSweeper.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×1
  • FileTooLong: FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 813 lines.
D3 · God Classes · ClassTooLong · ×1
  • ClassTooLong: QueueEngine FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:0 — ClassTooLong — 798 lines, 26 methods.
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1
  • Change coupling: Program.cs ↔ QueueSweeper.cs FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Program.cs — `FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Program.cs` and `FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueSweeper.cs` change together 77% of the time (10 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/FluxQueueLinkProcessor.cs:63 — FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/FluxQueueLinkProcessor.cs:63-86 | FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/FluxQueueLinkProcessor.cs:115-138
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:423 — FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:423-435 | FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:466-478
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:936 — FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:936-946 | FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:954-964
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngineHelpers.cs:28 — FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngineHelpers.cs:28-34 | FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngineHelpers.cs:40-46
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: FluxQueue.Core — FluxQueue.Core: abstractness 0.13, instability 0.00, distance 0.88 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 319 · ×1
  • CRAP 319: QueueEngine.ReconcileAsync FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:180 — Cyclomatic 18 with 2.4% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 286 · ×1
  • CRAP 286: QueueActor.RunAsync FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:988 — Cyclomatic 17 with 2.4% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 224 · ×1
  • CRAP 224: QueueActor.ProcessCommand FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:1086 — Cyclomatic 15 with 2.4% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 196 · ×1
  • CRAP 196: QueueEngine.SweepExpiredNoLock FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:515 — Cyclomatic 14 with 2.4% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 132 · ×1
  • CRAP 132: QueueRequestValidator.Validate FluxQueue.BrokerHost/Services/QueueRequestValidator.cs:58 — Cyclomatic 11 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 103 · ×1
  • CRAP 103: QueueEngine.TryReceiveBatchNoLock FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:309 — Cyclomatic 10 with 2.4% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Recommendation — 12 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×3
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile.test — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 FluxQueue.Console/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D16 · Bus Factor · Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1
  • Small-team knowledge concentration — 0 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 0 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `FluxQueue.Console` with 28 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 92 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.6 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 3036 LoC across 7 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/AmqpHostedService.cs:43 — "ignore cancellation races during teardown" — trim - mostly restates 'ignore' already present; keep only the WHY part
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 3 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:517 — 3 of 236 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: FluxQueue.Core.QueueEngine.SweepExpiredNoLock @ FluxQueue.Core/QueueEngine.cs:517, 399 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.7/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Info — 21 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×15
  • Outdated: AMQPNetLite.Core — AMQPNetLite.Core 2.5.1 → 2.5.3 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Azure.Containers.Tools.Targets — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Azure.Containers.Tools.Targets 1.21.0 → 1.23.0 available.
  • Outdated: Google.Protobuf — Google.Protobuf 3.33.5 → 3.35.1 available.
  • Outdated: Grpc.AspNetCore — Grpc.AspNetCore 2.76.0 → 2.80.0 available.
  • Outdated: Grpc.Tools — Grpc.Tools 2.78.0 → 2.81.1 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 9.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Abstractions 10.0.3 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions — Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions 10.0.3 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options.DataAnnotations — Microsoft.Extensions.Options.DataAnnotations 10.0.3 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 6.0.2 → 10.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.11.1 → 18.7.0 available.
  • Outdated: NUnit — NUnit 4.2.2 → 4.6.1 available.
  • Outdated: NUnit.Analyzers — NUnit.Analyzers 4.3.0 → 4.14.0 available.
  • Outdated: NUnit3TestAdapter — NUnit3TestAdapter 4.6.0 → 6.2.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting — Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting 10.0.3 → 10.0.9 available.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×5
  • XML-doc coverage: FluxQueue.Console FluxQueue.Console/FluxQueue.Console.csproj — FluxQueue.Console: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: FluxQueue.Core FluxQueue.Core/FluxQueue.Core.csproj — FluxQueue.Core: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/65).
  • XML-doc coverage: FluxQueue.BrokerHost FluxQueue.BrokerHost/FluxQueue.BrokerHost.csproj — FluxQueue.BrokerHost: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/73).
  • XML-doc coverage: FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions/FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions.csproj — FluxQueue.Transport.Abstractions: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • XML-doc coverage: FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp/FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp.csproj — FluxQueue.Transport.Amqp: 40 % XML-doc coverage (14/35).
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list FluxQueue.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json2artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .4artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.0—

Run 019f1ec4-c0ba-7185-9685-058c8ba7bd6b · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 6 · Warnings: 43 · Recommendations: 12 · Info: 21 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 01-07-2026 @ 17:40 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md