Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
wavesplatform/Waves carries serious gaps (42%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Code Health (100%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (25%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (50%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Hobby (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
100% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
69%
Adequate
Maturity
52%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
25% ⚠
Critical · gated by D9, P2, P3, P6
Security
50%
Adequate · gated by D28, D29
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 25% · 47% weightSecurity 50% · 26% weightMaturity 52% · 14% weightArchitecture 69% · 8% weightCode Health 100% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 25 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 42 → ~57.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (18+)
- D8 · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/scala/com/wavesplatform/crypto/bls/BlsUtils.scala
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/openapi.yaml
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/openapi.yaml
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/openapi.yaml
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/openapi.yaml
- D29 · Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-es-bundle-core.js
- D29 · Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-es-bundle-core.js
- D29 · Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui.js
- D29 · Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui.js
- D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 docker/node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile
- D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 docker/private/Dockerfile
- D35 · Change coupling: swagger-ui-bundle.js ↔ swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-bundle.js
- D35 · Change coupling: swagger-ui-bundle.js ↔ swagger-ui.js node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-bundle.js
- D35 · Change coupling: swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js ↔ swagger-ui.js node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js
- P2 · No structured logging
- SC1 · JavaScript dependencies are not locked
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
2
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with waves-sample.conf.
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 26 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 11 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 10 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by addressing the single test distribution gap to ensure adequate test coverage. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all service-like projects to improve observability. Introduce static application security testing, such as CodeQL, to identify vulnerabilities early in the development cycle. Maintain a current changelog for each release to preserve project history. Finally, resolve the identified leaked secret in the waves-sample configuration to secure sensitive data.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +17.6 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with waves-sample.conf. | +15.6 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +17.6 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package. | +17.1 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub. | +17.1 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +15.6 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +4.8 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root. | +4.2 pts | Medium | Folder & project structure |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| docker/node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile | 3.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json | 4.4 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| docker/private/Dockerfile | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/openapi.yaml | 4.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| .github/workflows/publish-docker-image.yml | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection |
| .github/dependabot.yml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown |
| .github/workflows/publish-to-npmjs.yml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection |
| ride-runner/docker/Dockerfile | 5.8 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-es-bundle-core.js | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml |
| node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui.js | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml |
| node/waves-sample.conf | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| node/src/main/scala/com/wavesplatform/crypto/bls/BlsUtils.scala | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| node/src/main/scala/com/wavesplatform/transaction/utils/EthConverters.scala | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| docker/private/waves.custom.conf | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| docker/Dockerfile | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-bundle.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Change coupling: swagger-ui-bundle.js ↔ swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js |
| node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js ↔ swagger-ui.js |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 30 of 31 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 31 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D5D9D12D13D15D16D21D26D27D28D29D31D33D34D35D36AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6X1X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 49 of 59 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
1 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credentialnode/waves-sample.conf:5
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with waves-sample.conf. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
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D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
169 finding(s): 0 critical, 169 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/scala/com/wavesplatform/crypto/bls/BlsUtils.scala:24
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 24 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with CancelAllLeases-W.json (17), openapi.yaml (4), BlsUtils.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (24 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
11 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 4 medium, 0 low.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3
Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-es-bundle-core.js:2
What to do
- Resolve the 7 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with publish-docker-image.yml (3), dependabot.yml (2), publish-to-npmjs.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with swagger-ui-es-bundle-core.js (2), swagger-ui.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
10 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 2 medium, 2 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 docker/Dockerfile
Medium IaC: DS-0013 docker/node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026 docker/node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 6 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4), node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile, node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile, node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
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D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: swagger-ui-bundle.js↔swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js 73%; swagger-ui-bundle.js↔swagger-ui.js 73%; swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js↔swagger-ui.js 73%
Change coupling: swagger-ui-bundle.js ↔ swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-bundle.js
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
2/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
No artifact signing
No SBOM
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
- A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.
What to do
- Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
- Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
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X1 · Async correctness
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Architecture | 69% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Maturity | 52% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 25% | Critical — gated by D9, P2, P3, P6 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 50% | Adequate — gated by D28, D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — No production methods were analyzable, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D10 Test Quality — ~11 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — No production methods were analyzable, so cognitive complexity was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 39 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/scala/com/wavesplatform/crypto/bls/BlsUtils.scala:24
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/scala/com/wavesplatform/transaction/utils/EthConverters.scala:10
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/openapi.yaml:6085
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/openapi.yaml:6059
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/openapi.yaml:6253
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/openapi.yaml:6252
- Secret: generic-api-key docker/private/waves.custom.conf:101
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:848
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:272
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:278
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:686
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:302
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:716
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:314
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:710
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:344
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:458
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:362
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:812
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:374
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:386
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:392
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:650
- Secret: generic-api-key node/src/main/resources/patches/CancelAllLeases-W.json:410
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:7
- High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/publish-docker-image.yml:60
- High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/publish-docker-image.yml:89
- High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/publish-docker-image.yml:171
- High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/publish-to-npmjs.yml:46
- High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/publish-to-npmjs.yml:50
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 docker/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 docker/node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0029 docker/node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 docker/private/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 ride-runner/docker/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0029 ride-runner/docker/Dockerfile
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential node/waves-sample.conf:5
D18 · Solution Shape
- Dimension evaluation failed
Warning — 11 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-es-bundle-core.js:2
- Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-es-bundle-core.js:2
- Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui.js:1
- Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui.js:1
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: swagger-ui-bundle.js ↔ swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-bundle.js
- Change coupling: swagger-ui-bundle.js ↔ swagger-ui.js node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-bundle.js
- Change coupling: swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js ↔ swagger-ui.js node/src/main/resources/swagger-ui/swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0013 docker/node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 docker/private/Dockerfile
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 docker/node-sbt-builder.Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 docker/private/Dockerfile
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No artifact signing
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No SBOM
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 169 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 11 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 10 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 0 | — |