Public report — MyRecipeBook, published 29 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-06-2026 @ 22:02 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

WelissonArley/MyRecipeBook

50% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate

Small · 2,972 LoC · 10 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Security (42%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

56/58dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
29findings with an exact file:lineof 77 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
58/93dimensions across the health lenses2972 LoC · 10 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

welissonArley/MyRecipeBook carries serious risk (50%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Architecture (86%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (80%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (42%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (49%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Strengthen data-at-rest protection (Data Protection); policy-based authorization (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture).

For scale: Small (~2,972 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (86%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 42% · 47% weightReadiness 49% · 26% weightMaturity 52% · 14% weightCode Health 80% · 8% weightArchitecture 86% · 4% weight

Raise Security 42 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 50 → ~57.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 6%Plumbing 42%Tests 46%Generated 6%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,900–€9,400
Cost to rebuild€1,900–€9,400 (0.1 person-years (32–99 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 50% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 57% boilerplate · 31% straight-line · 12% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€5,600 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 42% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
+9.3 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection
2
Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
+9.3 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls
3
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
+4.4 pts · Low effort · ADR Quality

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 42%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (2,972 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 42%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+7.5 pts/run over 5 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +7.5 pts/run over 5 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 50, unchanged across 5 runs.

025507510029 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurity

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch MyRecipeBook.API API MyRecipeBook.Application Application MyRecipeBook.API->MyRecipeBook.Application MyRecipeBook.Communication Communication MyRecipeBook.API->MyRecipeBook.Communication MyRecipeBook.Exceptions Exceptions MyRecipeBook.API->MyRecipeBook.Exceptions MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure Infrastructure MyRecipeBook.API->MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure MyRecipeBook.Application->MyRecipeBook.Communication MyRecipeBook.Domain Domain MyRecipeBook.Application->MyRecipeBook.Domain MyRecipeBook.Application->MyRecipeBook.Exceptions MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure->MyRecipeBook.Domain

At a glance — Code Health · 80% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 86% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 52% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 49% · Weak · gated by P2

At a glance — Security · 42% · Weak · gated by C2

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration3High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components2High / Critical

Roadmap

First, strengthen data protection by encrypting sensitive columns and securely storing keys. Next, implement policy-based access controls to enforce authorization rules across the application. Then, add security response headers to improve the web-security posture. After that, adopt a structured logging framework to improve observability. Finally, enable automated dependency scanning to maintain security and performance tooling.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.+9.3 ptsMediumData Protection
Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.+9.3 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+4.4 ptsLowADR Quality
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+4.0 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+4.0 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.+7.8 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+3.2 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+5.9 ptsMediumObservability

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 19 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 16% mixed · 84% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/DatabaseMigration.cs7.0MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Filters/IdsFilter.cs7.8MixedCode Coverage: Low coverage: IdsFilter.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/DependencyInjectionExtension.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: DependencyInjectionExtension.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Services/Storage/AzureStorageService.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: AzureStorageService.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Services/ServiceBus/DeleteUserProcessor.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: DeleteUserProcessor.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Services/ServiceBus/DeleteUserQueue.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: DeleteUserQueue.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/Version0000001.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: Version0000001.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/Version0000002.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: Version0000002.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/Version0000003.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: Version0000003.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/Version0000004.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: Version0000004.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/VersionBase.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: VersionBase.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Extensions/ConfigurationExtension.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: ConfigurationExtension.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Program.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: Program.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Controllers/MyRecipeBookBaseController.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: MyRecipeBookBaseController.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/BackgroundServices/DeleteUserService.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: DeleteUserService.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Application/UseCases/Login/DoLogin/DoLoginUseCase.cs8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: DoLoginUseCase.cs ↔ RegisterUserUseCase.cs
src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Controllers/RecipeController.cs8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: RecipeController.cs ↔ DependencyInjectionExtension.cs
README.md9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: The README describes itself but does not link to a Getting Started, installation, or prerequisites section.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 56 of 58 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 58 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8C1C2C5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8P9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 29 of 77 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f1567-6312-762b-bf13-7b295638dee7.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — absence of evidence here means the scan found no in-repo trace, not that the control does not exist.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/DatabaseMigration.cs:31

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: MyRecipeBook.Communication · ×3

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 12 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 79.4% — 15 file(s) below 50% · 1 method(s) over the CRAP-30 risk line.

Low coverage: DependencyInjectionExtension.cs · ×15src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/DependencyInjectionExtension.cs
CRAP 42: IdsFilter.Applysrc/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Filters/IdsFilter.cs:9

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

129 test methods: 129 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 129 tests.

Mock framework: Moq

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). other: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

31 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 1 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: AutoMapper
Deprecated: xunit
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Google · ×31

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 32 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/DependencyInjectionExtension.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2972 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 projects, 233 .cs files, 5880 hand-written lines of code (2972 production / 2908 test), plus 390 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 33 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a solid one-page description of the project (what it does, its features, supported databases, CI/CD, Sonarcloud integration, DDD/SOLID architecture, FluentValidation validation, unit/integration tests, and JWT tokens) but it is cut off mid-sentence by the scanner. The visible portion is mostly prose with no concrete documentation for any of the outlined topics (e.g. 'Curso na Udemy', '.NET Core: um curso orientado para o mercado de trabalho', or the architecture/design docs).

The README describes itself but does not link to a Getting Started, installation, or prerequisites section.README.md
XML-doc coverage: MyRecipeBook.API · ×6src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/MyRecipeBook.API.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The README describes itself but does not link to a Getting Started,… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent spelling of 'Registered' in response class names. One is spelled 'Regitered' (typo) while the other is 'Generated'.
Inconsistent spelling of 'Encrypter' vs 'Encripter'. The interface is named 'IPasswordEncripter' which is a misspelling of 'Encrypter'.
Inconsistent naming for the logged-in user service. One is a class/namespace 'LoggedUser' and the other is an interface 'ILoggedUser'. While this might be intentional, the namespace 'MyRecipeBook.Domain.Services.LoggedUser' suggests the concept is 'LoggedUser', but the interface is 'ILoggedUser'.
Inconsistent interface naming for user repositories. One is 'IUserReadOnlyRepository' and the other is 'IUserDeleteOnlyRepository'. The pattern 'IUser[Action]Repository' is used, but 'ReadOnly' and 'DeleteOnly' are not parallel in structure (one describes state, one describes action).

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent spelling of 'Registered' in response class names. One is… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent spelling of 'Encrypter' vs 'Encripter'. The interface is… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for the logged-in user service. One is a… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

95 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: AutoMapper 13.0.1 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness3.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 of 11 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Application/UseCases/User/Register/RegisterUserUseCase.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: DoLoginUseCase.cs↔RegisterUserUseCase.cs 70%; RecipeController.cs↔DependencyInjectionExtension.cs 67%

Change coupling: DoLoginUseCase.cs ↔ RegisterUserUseCase.cs · ×2src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Application/UseCases/Login/DoLogin/DoLoginUseCase.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 245 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C1 · Data Protection4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls1.7 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
  • Only 1 imperative guard call site(s) — too few to demonstrate default-deny across handlers.

What to do

  • Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
  • Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
C5 · Data-Subject Rights4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether GDPR data-subject requests are supported in code — erasure, export/portability, consent.

Method: Roslyn scan: GDPR data-subject-rights corroboration (erasure/export/consent vocabulary co-occurring with subject-id store crossing or explicit GDPR pattern). Deterministic, gated by PII.

  • Corroborated rights: erasure ✓ · export ✗ · consent ✗. The missing right(s) would have to be fulfilled manually.

What to do

  • Implement data export/portability for a data subject (a machine-readable export of their personal data).
  • Track GDPR consent (lawful basis) alongside the personal data it authorises.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `ExceptionReceivedHandler` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — DeleteUserService.cs:40

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 10 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

P9 · Domain vs controller coverage8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

What to do

  • Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.
S1 · Web-Security Posture6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 0/63 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — DeleteUserService.cs:27, DashboardController.cs:11, LoginController.cs:14, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.8 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health80%StrongSolid.
Architecture86%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity52%Adequate — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness49%Weak — gated by P2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security42%Weak — gated by C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 36 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 3 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 1 event handler(s); a message-bus package
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 5 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 13.0.1 — AutoMapper 13.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.9 — System.Text.Json 6.0.9 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0009 Dockerfile — WORKDIR path not absolute
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×1
  • Vulnerable: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 13.0.1 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Warning — 23 finding(s)
D8 · Code Coverage · Low coverage · ×15
  • Low coverage: DependencyInjectionExtension.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/DependencyInjectionExtension.cs — 44.3% line coverage (94/212).
  • Low coverage: AzureStorageService.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Services/Storage/AzureStorageService.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/8).
  • Low coverage: DeleteUserProcessor.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Services/ServiceBus/DeleteUserProcessor.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/10).
  • Low coverage: DeleteUserQueue.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Services/ServiceBus/DeleteUserQueue.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/8).
  • Low coverage: DatabaseMigration.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/DatabaseMigration.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/66).
  • Low coverage: Version0000001.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/Version0000001.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/14).
  • Low coverage: Version0000002.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/Version0000002.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/40).
  • Low coverage: Version0000003.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/Version0000003.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: Version0000004.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/Version0000004.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/10).
  • Low coverage: VersionBase.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/Versions/VersionBase.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/12).
  • Low coverage: ConfigurationExtension.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Extensions/ConfigurationExtension.cs — 9.1% line coverage (2/22).
  • Low coverage: Program.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Program.cs — 46.4% line coverage (64/138).
  • Low coverage: IdsFilter.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Filters/IdsFilter.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/52).
  • Low coverage: MyRecipeBookBaseController.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Controllers/MyRecipeBookBaseController.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/10).
  • Low coverage: DeleteUserService.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/BackgroundServices/DeleteUserService.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/12).
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: MyRecipeBook.Communication — MyRecipeBook.Communication: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: MyRecipeBook.Exceptions — MyRecipeBook.Exceptions: abstractness 0.13, instability 0.00, distance 0.88 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure — MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.13, instability 0.17, distance 0.71 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×2
  • Change coupling: DoLoginUseCase.cs ↔ RegisterUserUseCase.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Application/UseCases/Login/DoLogin/DoLoginUseCase.cs — `src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Application/UseCases/Login/DoLogin/DoLoginUseCase.cs` and `src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Application/UseCases/User/Register/RegisterUserUseCase.cs` change together 70% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: RecipeController.cs ↔ DependencyInjectionExtension.cs src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Controllers/RecipeController.cs — `src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Controllers/RecipeController.cs` and `src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Application/DependencyInjectionExtension.cs` change together 67% of the time (8 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×1
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.2 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/DatabaseMigration.cs:31 — src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/DatabaseMigration.cs:31-40 | src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/Migrations/DatabaseMigration.cs:50-59
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 42 · ×1
  • CRAP 42: IdsFilter.Apply src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/Filters/IdsFilter.cs:9 — Cyclomatic 6 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Recommendation — 10 finding(s)
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 10 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner (largest: src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/DependencyInjectionExtension.cs). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The README describes itself but does not link to a Getting Started, installation, or prerequisites section. · ×1
  • The README describes itself but does not link to a Getting Started, installation, or prerequisites section. README.md — Add a short 'Getting Started' block covering how to install .NET Core and run the API locally.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent spelling of 'Registered' in response class names. One is spelled 'Regitered' (typo) while the other is 'Generated'. · ×1
  • Inconsistent spelling of 'Registered' in response class names. One is spelled 'Regitered' (typo) while the other is 'Generated'. — Rename 'ResponseRegiteredRecipeJson' to 'ResponseRegisteredRecipeJson' to fix the typo and align with standard English spelling. (symbols: MyRecipeBook.Communication.Responses.ResponseRegiteredRecipeJson, MyRecipeBook.Communication.Responses.ResponseGeneratedRecipeJson)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent spelling of 'Encrypter' vs 'Encripter'. The interface is named 'IPasswordEncripter' which is a misspelling of 'Encrypter'. · ×1
  • Inconsistent spelling of 'Encrypter' vs 'Encripter'. The interface is named 'IPasswordEncripter' which is a misspelling of 'Encrypter'. — Rename 'IPasswordEncripter' to 'IPasswordEncrypter' to correct the spelling. (symbols: MyRecipeBook.Domain.Security.Cryptography.IPasswordEncripter, MyRecipeBook.Domain.Security.Cryptography.IPasswordEncripter.IsValid)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for the logged-in user service. One is a class/namespace 'LoggedUser' and the other is an interface 'ILoggedUser'. While this might be intentional, the namespace 'MyRecipeBook.Domain.Services.LoggedUser' suggests the concept is 'LoggedUser', but the interface is 'ILoggedUser'. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for the logged-in user service. One is a class/namespace 'LoggedUser' and the other is an interface 'ILoggedUser'. While this might be intentional, the namespace 'MyRecipeBook.Domain.Services.LoggedUser' suggests the concept is 'LoggedUser', but the interface is 'ILoggedUser'. — Ensure the interface name matches the concept, e.g., 'ILoggedUser' is fine if it represents the logged-in user, but check if 'ILoggedUser' is the standard prefix for interfaces in this codebase. (symbols: MyRecipeBook.Domain.Services.LoggedUser.ILoggedUser, MyRecipeBook.Domain.Services.LoggedUser)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent interface naming for user repositories. One is 'IUserReadOnlyRepository' and the other is 'IUserDeleteOnlyRepository'. The pattern 'IUser[Action]Repository' is used, but 'ReadOnly' and 'DeleteOnly' are not parallel in structure (one describes state, one describes action). · ×1
  • Inconsistent interface naming for user repositories. One is 'IUserReadOnlyRepository' and the other is 'IUserDeleteOnlyRepository'. The pattern 'IUser[Action]Repository' is used, but 'ReadOnly' and 'DeleteOnly' are not parallel in structure (one describes state, one describes action). — Consider renaming to parallel structures, e.g., 'IUserReadOnlyRepository' and 'IUserWriteOnlyRepository' or 'IUserDeleteRepository'. However, if 'DeleteOnly' is specific to a delete operation, it may be acceptable. The main issue is the lack of parallelism in the naming convention for repository interfaces. (symbols: MyRecipeBook.Domain.Repositories.User.IUserReadOnlyRepository, MyRecipeBook.Domain.Repositories.User.IUserDeleteOnlyRepository)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 2972 LoC split over 10 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 7 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (7 orphaned of 11 analysed files in total).
Info — 39 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×31
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Google — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Google 8.0.10 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks — Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks 8.0.10 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks.EntityFrameworkCore 8.0.10 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.8.1 → 10.2.3 available.
  • Outdated: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 13.0.1 → 16.1.1 available.
  • Outdated: File.TypeChecker — File.TypeChecker 4.1.1 → 4.4.0 available.
  • Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.10.0 → 12.1.1 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration 8.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder 8.0.2 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection 8.0.1 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Sqids — Sqids 3.1.0 → 3.2.1 available.
  • Outdated: Azure.Messaging.ServiceBus — Azure.Messaging.ServiceBus 7.18.2 → 7.20.1 available.
  • Outdated: Azure.Storage.Blobs — Azure.Storage.Blobs 12.22.1 → 12.29.1 available.
  • Outdated: BCrypt.Net-Next — BCrypt.Net-Next 4.0.3 → 4.2.0 available.
  • Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.1.35 → 2.1.79 available.
  • Outdated: FluentMigrator — FluentMigrator 6.2.0 → 8.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: FluentMigrator.Runner — FluentMigrator.Runner 6.2.0 → 8.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 8.0.10 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 8.0.10 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: OpenAI — OpenAI 2.0.0 → 2.11.0 available.
  • Outdated: Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql — Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql 8.0.2 → 9.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 8.1.2 → 8.19.1 available.
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 6.0.2 → 10.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: coverlet.msbuild — coverlet.msbuild 6.0.2 → 10.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: FluentAssertions — FluentAssertions 7.0.0-alpha.3 → 8.10.0 available.
  • + 6 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×6
  • XML-doc coverage: MyRecipeBook.API src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.API/MyRecipeBook.API.csproj — MyRecipeBook.API: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/46).
  • XML-doc coverage: MyRecipeBook.Application src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Application/MyRecipeBook.Application.csproj — MyRecipeBook.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/97).
  • XML-doc coverage: MyRecipeBook.Domain src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Domain/MyRecipeBook.Domain.csproj — MyRecipeBook.Domain: 4 % XML-doc coverage (4/94).
  • XML-doc coverage: MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure/MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure.csproj — MyRecipeBook.Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/80).
  • XML-doc coverage: MyRecipeBook.Communication src/Shared/MyRecipeBook.Communication/MyRecipeBook.Communication.csproj — MyRecipeBook.Communication: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/86).
  • XML-doc coverage: MyRecipeBook.Exceptions src/Shared/MyRecipeBook.Exceptions/MyRecipeBook.Exceptions.csproj — MyRecipeBook.Exceptions: 57 % XML-doc coverage (36/63).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — CommonTestUtilities references Moq.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list MyRecipeBook.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json2artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .3artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.0

Run 019f1567-6312-762b-bf13-7b295638dee7 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 5 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 5 field(s)
  • User.Email src/Backend/MyRecipeBook.Domain/Entities/User.cs:5
  • RequestLoginJson.Email src/Shared/MyRecipeBook.Communication/Requests/RequestLoginJson.cs:5
  • RequestRegisterUserJson.Email src/Shared/MyRecipeBook.Communication/Requests/RequestRegisterUserJson.cs:5
  • RequestUpdateUserJson.Email src/Shared/MyRecipeBook.Communication/Requests/RequestUpdateUserJson.cs:6
  • ResponseUserProfileJson.Email src/Shared/MyRecipeBook.Communication/Responses/ResponseUserProfileJson.cs:6

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md