Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
wshobson/agents carries serious gaps (51%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (92%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (92%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (30%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (59%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow and knowledge is concentrated in too few people (a bus-factor risk).
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Hobby (~715 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.
Raise Readiness 30 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 51 → ~68.
New since the last scan (4+)
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,600–€8,000
| Cost to rebuild | €1,600–€8,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 51% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 39% boilerplate · 29% straight-line · 32% branching logic |
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 16 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 9 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, address the single missing test case to improve test coverage. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all projects to enhance observability. Then, introduce a static application security testing step, such as CodeQL, to identify vulnerabilities early. Finally, codify backup and disaster recovery procedures in infrastructure as code, and ensure every change is compiled via an explicit build step in the CI pipeline.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +20.1 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +20.1 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package. | +20.1 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC (snapshot/replication/geo-redundant) to back the DR plan. | +20.1 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +6.2 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +6.2 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Add an explicit build step to your CI pipeline (e.g. dotnet build / dotnet publish) so every change is compiled before merge. | +9.5 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root. | +6.5 pts | Medium | Folder & project structure |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml | 3.7 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| .github/workflows/eval-report.yml | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/dependabot.yml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown |
| plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/configmap-template.yaml | 6.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: KSV-01010 |
| .github/workflows/validate.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: gha-curl-pipe-shell |
| tools/yt-design-extractor/pyproject.toml | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: uv-missing-dependency-cooldown |
| plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/service-template.yaml | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0108 |
| tools/tests/test_adapters.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
| plugins/backend-development/skills/api-design-principles/assets/rest-api-template.py | 9.3 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): Low: wildcard-cors |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 31 of 33 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 33 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 26 of 34 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
13 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was doc_gardener.check_stale_artifacts at 55.
What to do
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
27 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was doc_gardener.check_stale_artifacts at 144.
What to do
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
1 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D7 · Architectural Integrity
Of 0 mechanizable ADRs, 0 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.
What to do
- Enforce Architectural Integrity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
2 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is plugins/dotnet-contribution/skills/dotnet-backend-patterns/assets/repository-template.cs.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D20 · ADR Quality
Evaluated 1 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.0/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.
What to do
- Improve ADR Quality — currently 8.0/10. — Evaluated 1 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.0/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
9 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 0 medium, 2 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 7 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with eval-report.yml (3), dependabot.yml (2), pyproject.toml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with configmap-template.yaml, rest-api-template.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
16 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 3 medium, 11 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment-template.yaml, service-template.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 11 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment-template.yaml (11). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with configmap-template.yaml (2), deployment-template.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
2 of 2 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is plugins/dotnet-contribution/skills/dotnet-backend-patterns/assets/repository-template.cs.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
What to do
- Grow the ADR log (currently 1) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists but no build invocation (dotnet build / dotnet publish / a build step) was matched — changes may merge without being compiled.
What to do
- Add an explicit build step to your CI pipeline (e.g. dotnet build / dotnet publish) so every change is compiled before merge.
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
P5 · DR & Backup
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC (snapshot/replication/geo-redundant) to back the DR plan.
- Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
X1 · Async correctness
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 92% | Adequate — gated by D2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 92% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 59% | Adequate — gated by D16, D34 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 30% | Weak — gated by D9, P2, P3, P5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 72% | Adequate — gated by D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 57 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — ~3762 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — none of 1 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (38 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 10 finding(s)
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:11
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:28
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/eval-report.yml:36
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/eval-report.yml:39
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/eval-report.yml:69
- High: gha-curl-pipe-shell .github/workflows/validate.yml:241
- High: uv-missing-dependency-cooldown tools/yt-design-extractor/pyproject.toml:22
- High IaC: KSV-0014 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0108 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/service-template.yaml
- Dimension evaluation failed
Warning — 6 finding(s)
- Medium IaC: KSV-01010 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/configmap-template.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-01010 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/configmap-template.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0125 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- LLM evaluation failed
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) tools/tests/test_adapters.py:9
- Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
Recommendation — 17 finding(s)
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0004 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0011 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0015 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0016 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0018 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0020 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0020 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0021 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0021 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0106 plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/deployment-template.yaml
- Low: wildcard-cors plugins/backend-development/skills/api-design-principles/assets/rest-api-template.py:31
- Low: request-host-used plugins/kubernetes-operations/skills/k8s-manifest-generator/assets/configmap-template.yaml:101
- Test reliability not included
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 9 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 16 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |