Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
wso2/product-integrator-si carries serious gaps (49%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (94%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (31%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (47%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency… (Security & performance tooling); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup).
For scale: Hobby (~1,412 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.
Code Health
94% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
47%
Weak · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
31%
Weak · gated by P1, P3
Security
71%
Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 31% · 47% weightMaturity 47% · 26% weightSecurity 71% · 14% weightCode Health 94% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 31 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 49 → ~63.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (9+)
- D19 · LLM evaluation failed
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 modules/distribution/src/docker-distribution/filtered/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 modules/distribution/carbon-home/resources/dockerfiles/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 modules/distribution/carbon-home/resources/dockerfiles/Dockerfile
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €14,000–€72,000
| Cost to rebuild | €14,000–€72,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 49% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€43,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 31% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with deployment.yaml.
2
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
3
Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Bad
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 27 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 3 | Medium |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 1 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Establish a continuous integration workflow that builds and tests every change to ensure immediate feedback. Integrate static analysis and security scanning directly into the build pipeline to fail on regressions rather than relying on local checks. Document disaster recovery procedures and restore processes to ensure data resilience. Finally, resolve the identified secret leak and maintain a changelog to track release history.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with deployment.yaml. | +15.4 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +17.8 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally. | +17.8 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery). | +16.8 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +15.4 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +6.4 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java. | +6.4 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +10.0 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml | 1.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: KSV-0045 |
| modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml | 1.7 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| modules/distribution/carbon-home/resources/dockerfiles/Dockerfile | 6.3 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: DS-0001 |
| modules/distribution/carbon-home/conf/server/deployment.yaml | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| modules/distribution/src/docker-distribution/filtered/Dockerfile | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 |
| modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java | 7.4 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.init (cognitive 30) |
| modules/samples/sample-clients/kafka-producer/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/sample/kafka/client/KafkaClient.java | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: KafkaClient.main (cyclomatic 25) |
| modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/util/filewriting/BothFileWriting.java | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
| modules/samples/artifacts/PublishEventsToGooglCloudStorage/GCSSinkSample.siddhi | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: detected-username-and-password-in-uri |
| modules/samples/sample-clients/http-server/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/http/server/HttpsServerListnerHandler.java | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: weak-ssl-context |
| modules/samples/sample-clients/kafka-producer/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/sample/kafka/client/EventSendingUtil.java | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: EventSendingUtil.publishEvents (cognitive 27) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 24 of 25 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 25 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D21D28D29D31D34D35D38D40D41D42M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5P6
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 40 of 52 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement: Runtime enforcement is read from committed policy files — a Tetragon/Falco/Kyverno stack installed cluster-wide (Helm release, platform add-on) with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a committed policy is declared intent, not proof the engine is running and blocking in the live cluster.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was KafkaClient.main at 25.
KafkaClient.main (cyclomatic 25)modules/samples/sample-clients/kafka-producer/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/sample/kafka/client/KafkaClient.java:45
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.init at 30.
CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.init (cognitive 30)modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java:245
KafkaClient.main (cognitive 30)modules/samples/sample-clients/kafka-producer/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/sample/kafka/client/KafkaClient.java:45
EventSendingUtil.publishEvents (cognitive 27)modules/samples/sample-clients/kafka-producer/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/sample/kafka/client/EventSendingUtil.java:37
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
4 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/util/filewriting/BothFileWriting.java:72
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java:452
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/util/filewriting/BothFileWriting.java:63
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D13 · Secret Scanning
1 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credentialmodules/distribution/carbon-home/conf/server/deployment.yaml:355
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with deployment.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Improve Secrets (history) — currently 8.0/10. — 2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 3 medium, 0 low.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml:32
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with 01-siddhi-operator.yaml, GCSSinkSample.siddhi, HttpsServerListnerHandler.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
30 finding(s): 3 critical, 3 high, 17 medium, 7 low.
Critical IaC: KSV-0045 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
High IaC: KSV-0056 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
Medium IaC: DS-0001 modules/distribution/carbon-home/resources/dockerfiles/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026 modules/distribution/src/docker-distribution/filtered/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 16 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with 00-prereqs.yaml (6), 01-siddhi-operator.yaml (6), Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with 00-prereqs.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with 00-prereqs.yaml, 01-siddhi-operator.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
5 of 5 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java.
Orphaned knowledgemodules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies (OSV).
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D40 · Network Egress Confinement
0/2 network-egress controls present (network policy, egress restriction).
No network policy
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement
0/2 syscall-confinement controls present (seccomp, AppArmor/SELinux).
No seccomp profile
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement
0/2 runtime-enforcement controls present (threat detection, admission control).
No runtime threat detection
No admission-control policy
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No runtime threat detection finding(s) in Runtime Threat Enforcement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No admission-control policy finding(s) in Runtime Threat Enforcement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 8 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.3 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P5 · DR & Backup
What to do
- Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
- Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 94% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 47% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 31% | Weak — gated by P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 71% | Strong | Solid. |
Not included — 69 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~45073 lines of test source are present (.java) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Maven POM), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.java) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Maven POM — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .java, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.java) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 6 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Critical IaC: KSV-0045 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
- Critical IaC: KSV-0112 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: KSV-0056 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential modules/distribution/carbon-home/conf/server/deployment.yaml:355
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Orphaned knowledge modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java
Warning — 29 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 modules/distribution/carbon-home/resources/dockerfiles/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: KSV-0048 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0049 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0113 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0012 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0125 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml:3
- Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml:16
- Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml:57
- Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml:64
- Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 modules/kubenetes/00-prereqs.yaml:139
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 modules/distribution/src/docker-distribution/filtered/Dockerfile:1
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 modules/distribution/carbon-home/resources/dockerfiles/Dockerfile:21
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 modules/distribution/carbon-home/resources/dockerfiles/Dockerfile:1
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml:32
- Medium: detected-username-and-password-in-uri modules/samples/artifacts/PublishEventsToGooglCloudStorage/GCSSinkSample.siddhi:26
- Medium: weak-ssl-context modules/samples/sample-clients/http-server/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/http/server/HttpsServerListnerHandler.java:67
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/util/filewriting/BothFileWriting.java:72
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java:150
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- KafkaClient.main (cyclomatic 25) modules/samples/sample-clients/kafka-producer/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/sample/kafka/client/KafkaClient.java:45
D16 · Bus Factor
- dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.init (cognitive 30) modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java:245
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- KafkaClient.main (cognitive 30) modules/samples/sample-clients/kafka-producer/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/sample/kafka/client/KafkaClient.java:45
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- EventSendingUtil.publishEvents (cognitive 27) modules/samples/sample-clients/kafka-producer/src/main/java/org/wso2/si/sample/kafka/client/EventSendingUtil.java:37
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/CalculatePerformanceStreamProcessorExtension.java:452
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) modules/performance/extension/siddhi-execution-performance/component/src/main/java/org/wso2/extension/siddhi/execution/throughput/util/filewriting/BothFileWriting.java:63
Recommendation — 15 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 modules/distribution/src/docker-distribution/filtered/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0011 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0015 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0016 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0018 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0110 modules/kubenetes/01-siddhi-operator.yaml
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D40 · Network Egress Confinement
- No network policy
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement
- No seccomp profile
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement
- No AppArmor/SELinux confinement
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement
- No runtime threat detection
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement
- No admission-control policy
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 2 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 3 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 30 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |