spring-boot-demo — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

xkcoding/spring-boot-demo is sound in substance but carries real gaps (44%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (96%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Accessibility (32%) — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost. Readiness (37%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative… (Text alternatives); Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark,… (Page structure); Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> /… (Forms & labels).

For scale: Small (~16,237 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 96% ★ Exemplary Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 76% Adequate · gated by D34 Readiness 37% Adequate · gated by P3 Security 55% Adequate · gated by D29 Domain Modelling 74% Adequate · gated by DM4 Accessibility 32% Weak · gated by AC1, AC2, AC3

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Accessibility 32% · 46% weightReadiness 37% · 25% weightSecurity 55% · 14% weightDomain Modelling 74% · 8% weightMaturity 76% · 4% weightCode Health 96% · 2% weightArchitecture 100% · 1% weight

Raise Accessibility 32 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 44 → ~53.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (7+)

7 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-08-01) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_6 demo-docker/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 demo-docker/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 demo-docker/Dockerfile
AC3 · Document without a <title> demo-template-enjoy/src/main/resources/templates/page/login.html
AC3 · Page without a main landmark demo-template-enjoy/src/main/resources/templates/page/login.html
AC6 · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) demo-websocket-socketio/src/main/resources/static/bootstrap.css
AC6 · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.6:1) demo-codegen/src/main/resources/static/libs/iview/iview.css

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €6,500–€33,000

Cost to rebuild	€6,500–€33,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (108–342 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 44% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€19,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with tables_derby.sql.

+7.7 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

+10.6 pts · Medium effort · Text alternatives

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

+10.5 pts · Medium effort · Page structure

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (16,237 LoC) · weakest lens: Accessibility 32%

→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

268 modules, 147 dependencies — 2 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 96% · Exemplary

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 9.6 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 9.1 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 76% · Adequate · gated by D34

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 6.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.9 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Ugly

D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 37% · Adequate · gated by P3

The Good

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 8.5

The Bad

D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 5.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

The Ugly

P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 55% · Adequate · gated by D29

The Good

D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.0

The Bad

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 6.0

The Ugly

D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 1.5

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 74% · Adequate · gated by DM4

The Good

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0

The Ugly

DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 3.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 32% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC2, AC3

The Good

AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 6.7

The Bad

AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 3.9 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

The Ugly

AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 1.0 AC3 · Repo Page structure 3.7

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2021 — Injection	18	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	7	High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	6	High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by adding text alternatives for all images, SVGs, and videos to ensure media is accessible. Next, fix the page structure by declaring the language, title, and main landmark, while ensuring proper heading order and removing meta-refreshes. Then, provide programmatic labels for all form controls and buttons, and enforce accessibility checks in your UI test suite to block regressions. Finally, ensure visible focus styles, guard animations for reduced motion preferences, and improve color contrast ratios.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with tables_derby.sql.	+7.7 pts	Low	Secret Scanning
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.	+10.6 pts	Medium	Text alternatives
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.	+10.5 pts	Medium	Page structure
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.	+10.4 pts	Medium	Forms & labels
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses: assert accessibility in your UI test suite with your toolkit's own matcher (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.	+10.4 pts	Medium	A11y enforcement
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.	+8.3 pts	Medium	Visual & motion safety
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+8.2 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.	+7.7 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 25 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 4% slop · 12% mixed · 84% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
demo-docker/Dockerfile	1.1	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java	3.1	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: tainted-file-path
spring-boot-demo-oauth/src/main/resources/application.yml	4.8	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/workflows/maven.yml	5.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
demo-social/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/social/controller/OauthController.java	6.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping
demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java	7.1	Near-clean	Cyclomatic Complexity: IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 (cyclomatic 21)
demo-task-quartz/init/dbTables/tables_derby.sql	7.2	Near-clean	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
demo-actuator/src/main/resources/application.yml	7.2	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): High: spring-actuator-fully-enabled-yaml
demo-admin/admin-client/src/main/resources/application.yml	7.2	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): High: spring-actuator-fully-enabled-yaml
demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java	7.8	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)
demo-ldap/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/ldap/util/LdapUtils.java	7.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-of-sha1
demo-oauth/oauth-resource-server/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/oauth/config/OauthResourceServerConfig.java	7.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: spring-csrf-disabled
demo-rbac-security/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/rbac/security/config/SecurityConfig.java	7.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: spring-csrf-disabled
demo-codegen/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/codegen/utils/CodeGenUtil.java	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: CodeGenUtil.generatorCode (cognitive 23)
demo-zookeeper/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/zookeeper/aspectj/ZooLockAspect.java	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: ZooLockAspect.buildLockKey (cognitive 18)
demo-mq-rabbitmq/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/mq/rabbitmq/handler/DelayQueueHandler.java	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 4)
demo-template-beetl/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/template/beetl/controller/IndexController.java	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 4)
demo-task-xxl-job/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/task/xxl/job/controller/ManualOperateController.java	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 3)
demo-rbac-security/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/rbac/security/util/ResponseUtil.java	9.0	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Low: permissive-cors
demo-https/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/https/config/HttpsConfig.java	9.3	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Low: cookie-missing-secure-flag

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D34D35AC1AC2AC3AC6AC7DM1DM4DM5DM6DM8M1M3M4P1P3P4P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 47 of 55 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd6ad-251f-7fbf-84e6-b7b0248c5ed9.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 at 21.

IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 (cyclomatic 21)demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:81

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 at 27.

IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 (cognitive 27)demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:81

CodeGenUtil.generatorCode (cognitive 23)demo-codegen/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/codegen/utils/CodeGenUtil.java:65

ZooLockAspect.buildLockKey (cognitive 18)demo-zookeeper/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/zookeeper/aspectj/ZooLockAspect.java:94

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

9 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×2demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java:51

Duplicated block (13 lines × 4)demo-mq-rabbitmq/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/mq/rabbitmq/handler/DelayQueueHandler.java:32

Duplicated block (10 lines × 4)demo-template-beetl/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/template/beetl/controller/IndexController.java:28

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java:90

Duplicated block (8 lines × 3)demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java:65

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credentialdemo-task-quartz/init/dbTables/tables_derby.sql:19

What to do

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with tables_derby.sql. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The Spring Boot Demo project has a strong README presence (66 READMEs), but the documentation is mostly single-file per-demo with no overarching architecture or design docs. Each demo reads as an independent guide: one file for each integration (zookeeper, websocket/socketio, war packaging, ureport2, upload, Thymeleaf/freemarker) and a shared README covering project overview, branches, environment, runways, trends, team, open-source recommendations, roadmap, module breakdown, thanks, license, and the English alternate. The visible content is clear but thin: each demo's body clips mid-sentence (e.g., 'aopL' in the first README) before the outline sections appear, so completeness cannot be flagged; no architecture or design docs are present to assess. The Spring Boot demo template repository is a well-organized collection of READMEs covering integration with enjoy/beetl/xxl-job/quartz/Beetl/swagger/spring-social, each documenting its own project and the configuration it needs. The content is mostly complete for the included projects (e.g., pom.xml, EnjoyConfig.java, IndexController.java), but there are gaps: no architecture or design doc files; none of the READMEs cover how to run the demo locally beyond the initial setup steps (cloning repos, modifying config); and the swagger-beauty README is a marketing copy dump with no runnable code. The lack of overarching structure docs means the integration flows between projects are not clear. The Spring Boot demo project set is strong in README documentation: each of the six projects has a detailed README that describes its purpose and includes a pom.xml file plus an outline for the document's sections (e.g. application.yml configuration, Redis defaults, connection pool settings). However, there are gaps — notably no architecture or design documents cover how the individual demos interact with one another or what shared infrastructure they depend on — and none of the READMEs mention the broader Spring Boot project structure beyond the demo itself.

The project overview states 66 integration demos and 55 completed ones but does not state how many of those are currently live or what the roadmap is for the remaining 11.README.md

The pom.xml lists curator version 4.1.0 and zookeeper 3.5.x but the README does not show how to configure the demo with the specified versions.demo-zookeeper/README.md

The Quartz demo is thorough in describing the database tables and configuration but omits any runnable code or test steps.demo-task-quartz/README.md

The environment setup is excellent (frp, domain DNS) but there are no runnable code or test steps for the JustAuth demo.demo-social/README.md

What to do

Resolve the 1 The project overview states 66 integration demos and 55 completed ones… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The pom.xml lists curator version 4.1.0 and zookeeper 3.5.x but the… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The Quartz demo is thorough in describing the database tables and… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×4spring-boot-demo-oauth/src/main/resources/application.yml:9detected by gitleaks finding

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with application.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

18 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 5 medium, 4 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×9.github/workflows/maven.yml:11detected by semgrep finding

Medium: use-of-sha1 · ×5demo-ldap/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/ldap/util/LdapUtils.java:28detected by semgrep finding

Low: cookie-missing-secure-flag · ×4demo-https/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/https/config/HttpsConfig.java:29detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 9 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with UploadController.java (5), maven.yml (2), application.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with OauthController.java (2), LdapUtils.java, OauthResourceServerConfig.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ResponseUtil.java (2), HttpsConfig.java, ClientLogoutSuccessHandler.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 3 medium, 2 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2demo-docker/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_6 · ×3demo-docker/Dockerfile:5detected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0005 · ×2demo-docker/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

49 of 49 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is demo-codegen/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/codegen/utils/CodeGenUtil.java.

Dormant codebase

What to do

Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — welcome.html:35, welcome.html:40

What to do

Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC2 · Forms & labels3.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×6) — login.html:7, login.html:8, login.html:7, …

What to do

Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC3 · Page structure3.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×3) — index.html:2, error.html:2, job.html:2
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×13) — index.html:2, welcome.html:2, authorization.html:2, …
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×3) — common.html:2, index.html:2, login.html:2
user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. (×3) — common.html:6, head.html:3, head.html:3
An empty <title> gives no page name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Put descriptive text in the <title>. — registerTemplate.html:2
An empty heading appears in the document outline announced with no text. Give the heading text, or remove it if it's decorative. (×2) — index.html:8, login.html:8

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC6 · Visual & motion safety6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

`.nav-tabs .open .dropdown-toggle, .nav-pills .open .dropdown-toggle, .nav > li.dropdown.open.active > a:hover` sets color: #ffffff on background-color: #999999 — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — bootstrap.css:3435
`.ivu-btn.disabled,.ivu-btn.disabled.active,.ivu-btn.disabled:active,.ivu-btn.disabled:focus,.ivu-btn.disabled:hover,.ivu-btn[disabled],.ivu-btn[disabled].active,.ivu-btn[disabled]:active,.ivu-btn[disabled]:focus,.ivu-btn[disabled]:hover,fieldset[disabled] .ivu-btn,fieldset[disabled] .ivu-btn.active,fieldset[disabled] .ivu-btn:active,fieldset[disabled] .ivu-btn:focus,fieldset[disabled] .ivu-btn:hover` sets color: #c5c8ce on background-color: #f7f7f7 — 1.6:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. This is a MINIFIED, build-generated sheet — editing the literal here is undone by the next vendor drop or rebuild, so override the rule in your own stylesheet (or fix it upstream / in the source the bundle is built from). — iview.css:1

What to do

Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

No accessibility enforcement found — no accessibility linting at author time and no automated accessibility check in tests or CI. Add your UI toolkit's own accessibility assertion to the test suite (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in the pipeline.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses: assert accessibility in your UI test suite with your toolkit's own matcher (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`DatasourceConfig` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — DatasourceConfig.java:21
`SysClientDetails` is an aggregate/entity with 11 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — SysClientDetails.java:26
`SysRole` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — SysRole.java:23
`SysUser` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — SysUser.java:27
`Permission` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Permission.java:21
`Role` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Role.java:21
`RolePermission` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — RolePermission.java:21
`User` is an aggregate/entity with 11 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — User.java:21
`UserRole` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — UserRole.java:21

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)7.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 4 of 69 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.1 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`mvn test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.

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P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 13 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (24%; ≈26% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 42 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC1 · Text alternatives	1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5	Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 42 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	96%	Exemplary	Solid.
Architecture	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Maturity	76%	Adequate — gated by D34	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	37%	Adequate — gated by P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	55%	Adequate — gated by D29	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	74%	Adequate — gated by DM4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility	32%	Weak — gated by AC1, AC2, AC3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~3150 lines of test source are present (.java) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Maven POM), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.java) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Maven POM — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .java, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.java) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 16 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×9

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/maven.yml:11 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/maven.yml:13 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: spring-actuator-fully-enabled-yaml demo-actuator/src/main/resources/application.yml:25 — Spring Boot Actuator is fully enabled. This exposes sensitive endpoints such as /actuator/env, /actuator/logfile, /actuator/heapdump and others. Unless you have Spring Security enabled or another means to protect these endpoints, this functionality is available without authentication, causing a severe security risk. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: spring-actuator-fully-enabled-yaml demo-admin/admin-client/src/main/resources/application.yml:32 — Spring Boot Actuator is fully enabled. This exposes sensitive endpoints such as /actuator/env, /actuator/logfile, /actuator/heapdump and others. Unless you have Spring Security enabled or another means to protect these endpoints, this functionality is available without authentication, causing a severe security risk. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: tainted-file-path demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java:59 — Detected user input controlling a file path. An attacker could control the location of this file, to include going backwards in the directory with '../'. To address this, ensure that user-controlled variables in file paths are sanitized. You may also consider using a utility method such as org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils.getName(...) to only retrieve the file name from the path.
High: tainted-file-path demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java:79 — Detected user input controlling a file path. An attacker could control the location of this file, to include going backwards in the directory with '../'. To address this, ensure that user-controlled variables in file paths are sanitized. You may also consider using a utility method such as org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils.getName(...) to only retrieve the file name from the path.
High: tainted-file-path demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java:80 — Detected user input controlling a file path. An attacker could control the location of this file, to include going backwards in the directory with '../'. To address this, ensure that user-controlled variables in file paths are sanitized. You may also consider using a utility method such as org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils.getName(...) to only retrieve the file name from the path.
High: tainted-file-path demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java:87 — Detected user input controlling a file path. An attacker could control the location of this file, to include going backwards in the directory with '../'. To address this, ensure that user-controlled variables in file paths are sanitized. You may also consider using a utility method such as org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils.getName(...) to only retrieve the file name from the path.
High: tainted-file-path demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java:93 — Detected user input controlling a file path. An attacker could control the location of this file, to include going backwards in the directory with '../'. To address this, ensure that user-controlled variables in file paths are sanitized. You may also consider using a utility method such as org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils.getName(...) to only retrieve the file name from the path.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×4

Secret: generic-api-key spring-boot-demo-oauth/src/main/resources/application.yml:9 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key spring-boot-demo-oauth/src/main/resources/application.yml:17 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key spring-boot-demo-oauth/src/main/resources/application.yml:21 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key spring-boot-demo-oauth/src/main/resources/application.yml:9 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2

High IaC: DS-0002 demo-docker/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0022 demo-docker/Dockerfile — Deprecated MAINTAINER used

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential demo-task-quartz/init/dbTables/tables_derby.sql:19 — hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.

Warning — 22 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×5

Medium: use-of-sha1 demo-ldap/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/ldap/util/LdapUtils.java:28 — Detected SHA1 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. SHA1 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Instead, use PBKDF2 for password hashing or SHA256 or SHA512 for other hash function applications. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: spring-csrf-disabled demo-oauth/oauth-resource-server/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/oauth/config/OauthResourceServerConfig.java:38 — CSRF protection is disabled for this configuration. This is a security risk. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: spring-csrf-disabled demo-rbac-security/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/rbac/security/config/SecurityConfig.java:64 — CSRF protection is disabled for this configuration. This is a security risk. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping demo-social/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/social/controller/OauthController.java:56 — Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping demo-social/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/social/controller/OauthController.java:69 — Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×3

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_6 demo-docker/Dockerfile:5 — Ensure that LABEL maintainer is used instead of MAINTAINER (deprecated)
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 demo-docker/Dockerfile:17 — Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 demo-docker/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java:51 — demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java:51-56 | demo-upload/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/upload/controller/UploadController.java:71-76 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:108 — demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:108-113 | demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:124-129 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 (cyclomatic 21) · ×1

IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 (cyclomatic 21) demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:81 — IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1

dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 1 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 (cognitive 27) · ×1

IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 (cognitive 27) demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:81 — IpUtil.textToNumericFormatV4 has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, boolean chains 6, loops 4, error handling 1, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CodeGenUtil.generatorCode (cognitive 23) · ×1

CodeGenUtil.generatorCode (cognitive 23) demo-codegen/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/codegen/utils/CodeGenUtil.java:65 — CodeGenUtil.generatorCode has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, boolean chains 2, error handling 2, loops 2 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZooLockAspect.buildLockKey (cognitive 18) · ×1

ZooLockAspect.buildLockKey (cognitive 18) demo-zookeeper/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/zookeeper/aspectj/ZooLockAspect.java:94 — ZooLockAspect.buildLockKey has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, loops 7 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 4) · ×1

Duplicated block (13 lines × 4) demo-mq-rabbitmq/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/mq/rabbitmq/handler/DelayQueueHandler.java:32 — demo-mq-rabbitmq/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/mq/rabbitmq/handler/DelayQueueHandler.java:32-44 | demo-mq-rabbitmq/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/mq/rabbitmq/handler/DirectQueueOneHandler.java:40-52 | demo-mq-rabbitmq/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/mq/rabbitmq/handler/QueueThreeHandler.java:32-44 | demo-mq-rabbitmq/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/mq/rabbitmq/handler/QueueTwoHandler.java:32-44 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `demo-mq-rabbitmq/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/mq/rabbitmq/handler/DelayQueueHandler.java:32` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) demo-template-beetl/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/template/beetl/controller/IndexController.java:28 — demo-template-beetl/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/template/beetl/controller/IndexController.java:28-37 | demo-template-enjoy/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/template/enjoy/controller/IndexController.java:28-37 | demo-template-freemarker/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/template/freemarker/controller/IndexController.java:28-37 | demo-template-thymeleaf/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/template/thymeleaf/controller/IndexController.java:28-37 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 4 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 4 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `demo-template-beetl/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/template/beetl/controller/IndexController.java:28` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java:90 — demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java:90-98 | demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java:120-128 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java:65 — demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java:65-72 | demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java:90-97 | demo-email/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/email/service/impl/MailServiceImpl.java:120-127 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:115 — demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:115-122 | demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:130-137 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:115` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) demo-task-xxl-job/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/task/xxl/job/controller/ManualOperateController.java:105 — demo-task-xxl-job/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/task/xxl/job/controller/ManualOperateController.java:105-110 | demo-task-xxl-job/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/task/xxl/job/controller/ManualOperateController.java:118-123 | demo-task-xxl-job/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/task/xxl/job/controller/ManualOperateController.java:131-136 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:94 — demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:94-98 | demo-websocket/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/websocket/util/IpUtil.java:109-113 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

Recommendation — 15 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×4

Low: cookie-missing-secure-flag demo-https/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/https/config/HttpsConfig.java:29 — A cookie was detected without setting the 'secure' flag. The 'secure' flag for cookies prevents the client from transmitting the cookie over insecure channels such as HTTP. Set the 'secure' flag by calling 'connector.setSecure(true);'. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: unvalidated-redirect demo-oauth/oauth-authorization-server/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/oauth/config/ClientLogoutSuccessHandler.java:23 — Application redirects to a destination URL specified by a user-supplied parameter that is not validated. This could direct users to malicious locations. Consider using an allowlist to validate URLs. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: permissive-cors demo-rbac-security/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/rbac/security/util/ResponseUtil.java:31 — https://find-sec-bugs.github.io/bugs.htm#PERMISSIVE_CORS Permissive CORS policy will allow a malicious application to communicate with the victim application in an inappropriate way, leading to spoofing, data theft, relay and other attacks. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: permissive-cors demo-rbac-security/src/main/java/com/xkcoding/rbac/security/util/ResponseUtil.java:52 — https://find-sec-bugs.github.io/bugs.htm#PERMISSIVE_CORS Permissive CORS policy will allow a malicious application to communicate with the victim application in an inappropriate way, leading to spoofing, data theft, relay and other attacks. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×2

Low IaC: DS-0005 demo-docker/Dockerfile — ADD instead of COPY
Low IaC: DS-0026 demo-docker/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.java) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The project overview states 66 integration demos and 55 completed ones but does not state how many of those are currently live or what the roadmap is for the remaining 11. · ×1

The project overview states 66 integration demos and 55 completed ones but does not state how many of those are currently live or what the roadmap is for the remaining 11. README.md — Add a brief 'Status' section noting which integrations are active, pending, or in backlog so readers can prioritize.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The pom.xml lists curator version 4.1.0 and zookeeper 3.5.x but the README does not show how to configure the demo with the specified versions. · ×1

The pom.xml lists curator version 4.1.0 and zookeeper 3.5.x but the README does not show how to configure the demo with the specified versions. demo-zookeeper/README.md — Link or inline a short configuration snippet showing the required curator/zookeeper compatibility.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The Quartz demo is thorough in describing the database tables and configuration but omits any runnable code or test steps. · ×1

The Quartz demo is thorough in describing the database tables and configuration but omits any runnable code or test steps. demo-task-quartz/README.md — Include a 'Run the Demo' section that starts the project, adds the required Quartz table, and runs the scheduled task.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The environment setup is excellent (frp, domain DNS) but there are no runnable code or test steps for the JustAuth demo. · ×1

The environment setup is excellent (frp, domain DNS) but there are no runnable code or test steps for the JustAuth demo. demo-social/README.md — Add a 'Run the Demo' section that configures the JustAuth starter and runs the OAuth flow.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1

Dormant codebase — 49 of 49 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 49 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Scanner failed to run · ×1

Scanner failed to run — not a clean result — osv-scanner exited 128 with no findings — dependency CVEs were not measured. The scanner exited non-zero and produced no findings because it found no package sources to scan — no lockfile it can resolve is committed to this repository (a manifest alone does not pin versions, so there is nothing to match advisories against). Commit the lockfile your package manager already produces, or generate one in CI before the scan, so this is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1

Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.java) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.

Info — 2 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Maven POM) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	4	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	18	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	7	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fd6ad-251f-7fbf-84e6-b7b0248c5ed9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Xkcoding/spring-Boot-Demo

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 96% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 76% · Adequate · gated by D34

At a glance — Readiness · 37% · Adequate · gated by P3

At a glance — Security · 55% · Adequate · gated by D29

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 74% · Adequate · gated by DM4

At a glance — Accessibility · 32% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC2, AC3

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts