Executive summary
Read through the Preview lens: this repo is pre-1.0 / in development, so the colour bands are relaxed to what a preview needs — *green* means good enough for a preview, not yet production-stable. Code correctness and security stay near-strict even here; the score itself is absolute and comparable across repos.
xmolecules/nmolecules is sound in substance but carries real gaps (61%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (95%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (51%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (57%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped… (Release Hygiene); Make types internal by default (Library API & versioning).
For scale: Hobby (~308 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.
Code Health
95% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
57%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
51%
Adequate · gated by P3
Security
72%
Adequate · gated by D29
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 51% · 47% weightMaturity 57% · 26% weightSecurity 72% · 14% weightCode Health 95% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 51 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 61 → ~67.
Code composition — where the lines go
Plumbing 79%Tests 21%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €71–€320
| Cost to rebuild | €71–€320 |
| Domain complexity | Low |
| Quality factor | 0.8× (at 61% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 100% boilerplate · 0% straight-line · 0% branching logic |
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with LayerAttributesTest.cs.
2
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
3
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Coverage overstates real safety
Coverage looks healthy (10.0/10) but test quality is weak (4.4/10) — low assertion density, heavy mocking, or skipped tests. The coverage number overstates how much the suite actually protects you: lines are executed, but little is asserted, so regressions can slip through green tests.
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
8.9
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
6.9
D39 · .NET / C#
IL Efficiency
10.0
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
10.0
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX10 · Repo
Code composition
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX4 · Repo
Dependency direction
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX8 · Repo
Test isolation
10.0
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 7 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, integrate automated security scanning into the CI pipeline to prevent security regressions from reaching production. Next, maintain a changelog to clearly document each release and restrict library APIs to expose only necessary public interfaces. Additionally, document key architectural decisions to preserve institutional knowledge. Finally, address the single redundant comment finding to improve code clarity.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with LayerAttributesTest.cs. | +5.9 pts | Low | Comment Value |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +10.2 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +10.2 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 3 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with DDDAttributesTest.cs, LayerAttributesTest.cs, EventsAttributesTest.cs. | +4.8 pts | Low | Test Quality |
| Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers. | +9.3 pts | Medium | Library API & versioning |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +7.6 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 7 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release.yml (5), build.yml (2). | +3.3 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +3.0 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| .github/workflows/release.yml | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/build.yml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| tests/nMolecules.Architecture.Test/Layered/LayerAttributesTest.cs | 6.0 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: Dead code: TransferMoney |
| tests/nMolecules.Events.Test/Attributes/EventsAttributesTest.cs | 6.0 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: Dead code: AccountOpened |
| tests/nMolecules.DDD.Test/Attributes/DDDAttributesTest.cs | 6.7 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: Dead code: BankAccount |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 38 of 41 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 41 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D35D39AX10AX3AX4AX5AX8GD1M1M2M3M4P1P10P3P6X1X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 19 of 31 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
6 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 0 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
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D8 · Code Coverage
Line coverage 100.0%, branch coverage 100.0%.
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D9 · Test Distribution
3 test methods: 3 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
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D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 3 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 3 tests.
No assertions: TestAttributes tests/nMolecules.DDD.Test/Attributes/DDDAttributesTest.cs:22
What to do
- Resolve the 3 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with DDDAttributesTest.cs, LayerAttributesTest.cs, EventsAttributesTest.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). other: measured (0 flaky).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
5 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 1 deprecated packages.
Deprecated: xunit
Outdated: coverlet.collector
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 5 packages use a banned license.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted debt markers + 5 dead symbols across 308 LoC (0.5/KLoC) → score 8.9.
Dead code: BankAccount tests/nMolecules.DDD.Test/Attributes/DDDAttributesTest.cs:11
What to do
- Resolve the 5 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with LayerAttributesTest.cs (2), EventsAttributesTest.cs (2), DDDAttributesTest.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D18 · Solution Shape
6 projects, 19 source files, 389 hand-written lines of code (308 production / 81 test), 3 inter-project edges.
Thin analysable surface across projects
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The single README is a strong architectural documentation set that clearly states the project's goals (expressing DDD concepts, making human readers determine what building blocks exist, and enabling tool integration) and gives concrete examples of annotations like [Entity], [ValueObject], and [Repository]. It explains why Ubiquitous Language names should not appear in building-block titles and links to NuGet packages for each domain. The document is well-structured with an outline (Expressing DDD Concepts; Expressing Eventing Concepts; Expressing Architecture; Installation; Release Instructions) and covers all four named XML-doc coverage targets (DDD, Events, Architecture), though the latter two are only started in the body and not yet clipped.
XML-doc coverage: nMolecules.DDD src/nMolecules.DDD/nMolecules.DDD.csproj
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — The single README is a strong architectural documentation set that clearly states the project's goals (expressing DDD concepts, making human readers determine what building blocks exist, and enabling tool integration) and gives concrete examples of annotations like [Entity], [ValueObject], and [Repository]. It explains why Ubiquitous Language names should not appear in building-block titles and links to NuGet packages for each domain. The document is well-structured with an outline (Expressing DDD Concepts; Expressing Eventing Concepts; Expressing Architecture; Installation; Release Instructions) and covers all four named XML-doc coverage targets (DDD, Events, Architecture), though the latter two are only started in the body and not yet clipped.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 36 sampled symbols.
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D24 · Comment Value
0 valuable / 1 redundant across 3 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.
redundant commenttests/nMolecules.Architecture.Test/Layered/LayerAttributesTest.cs:21
What to do
- Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with LayerAttributesTest.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 6 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D27 · Navigability
100 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:12
What to do
- Resolve the 7 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release.yml (5), build.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
2 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D39 · IL Efficiency
0 of 16 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX8 · Test isolation
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- Expressing Eventing Concepts section is completely empty
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: Expressing Eventing Concepts section is completely empty.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P10 · Library API & versioning
- 16/16 types (100%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
What to do
- Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
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X1 · Async correctness
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 95% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 57% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 51% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 72% | Adequate — gated by D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 55 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — No production methods were analyzable, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — No production methods were analyzable, so cognitive complexity was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 308 LoC the codebase is tiny and single-purpose despite six projects, so explicit boundaries are unnecessary.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — no production source files with tracked history to analyse
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — This repo is a library, not a deployed service — it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 9 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:12
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:15
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:14
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:16
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:25
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:30
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:35
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
- High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0
Warning — 10 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt
- Dead code: BankAccount tests/nMolecules.DDD.Test/Attributes/DDDAttributesTest.cs:11
- Dead code: TransferMoney tests/nMolecules.Architecture.Test/Layered/LayerAttributesTest.cs:6
- Dead code: BankAccount tests/nMolecules.Architecture.Test/Layered/LayerAttributesTest.cs:11
- Dead code: AccountOpened tests/nMolecules.Events.Test/Attributes/EventsAttributesTest.cs:7
- Dead code: MoneyTransferredPublisher tests/nMolecules.Events.Test/Attributes/EventsAttributesTest.cs:12
D10 · Test Quality
- No assertions: TestAttributes tests/nMolecules.DDD.Test/Attributes/DDDAttributesTest.cs:22
- No assertions: TestAttributes tests/nMolecules.Architecture.Test/Layered/LayerAttributesTest.cs:18
- No assertions: TestAttributes tests/nMolecules.Events.Test/Attributes/EventsAttributesTest.cs:26
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Deprecated: xunit
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
Recommendation — 3 finding(s)
D18 · Solution Shape
- Thin analysable surface across projects
D24 · Comment Value
- redundant comment tests/nMolecules.Architecture.Test/Layered/LayerAttributesTest.cs:21
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- no production source files with tracked history to analyse
Info — 9 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Outdated: coverlet.collector
- Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk
- Outdated: NFluent
- Outdated: xunit
- Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: nMolecules.DDD src/nMolecules.DDD/nMolecules.DDD.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: nMolecules.Architecture src/nMolecules.Architecture/nMolecules.Architecture.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: nMolecules.Events src/nMolecules.Events/nMolecules.Events.csproj
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 7 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list nMolecules.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 2 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |