Public report of youssefbennour/AspNetCore.Starter, published 22 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 22 October 2026, 04:46 UTC · Survey ID cd_7360126cdd2b4991bfc52329e34f67ab

youssefbennour/AspNetCore.Starter

Measured 22 October 2026, 04:39 UTC, at code version 784d23e

CAI score 42out of 100 At risk Down 1 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

Performance 100 Exemplary Code Health 89 Strong Architecture 82 Strong Event-Driven 66 Adequate Maturity 61 Adequate Security and Compliance 60 Adequate Production Readiness 15 Critical

A small codebase: 2,491 lines of product code in 5 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 15

Findings by how serious they are

33 critical 138 serious 96 minor

2 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
22 October 2026, 04:39 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

77of 84 dimensions measured by tools. The other 7 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
187of 267 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 80 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
84dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 2,491 lines of product code in 5 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

youssefbennour/AspNetCore.Starter scores 42 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 15 and is rated Critical. Its REDACTED Scanning dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning and to resolve the 2 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 42 to about 64.

33 findings are critical: nine in Secrets (history), eight in REDACTED Scanning, five in Dependency Vulnerabilities, two in Dependency Hygiene, two in Explicit Debt, two in IaC & Container Security, two in License Compliance, two in Outbox / dual-write and one in Project dependency cycles.

Watchdog couldn't measure Runtime accessibility in this code, so that dimension is left out of the score. The product code is 2,491 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €4,200, to rebuild.

Code Health 89 Strong Architecture 82 Strong Maturity 61 Adequate, capped by Knowledge Freshness Production Readiness 15 ⚠ Critical, capped by Code Coverage, Dependency Hygiene, REDACTED Scanning, License Compliance, CI/CD gates, Security & performance tooling, DR & Backup and Outbound HTTP resilience Security and Compliance 60 Adequate, capped by Secrets (history) Event-Driven 66 Adequate Performance 100 ★ Exemplary

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Production Readiness 15 · counts for 46%Security and Compliance 60 · counts for 25%Maturity 61 · counts for 14%Event-Driven 66 · counts for 8%Architecture 82 · counts for 4%Code Health 89 · counts for 2%Performance 100 · counts for 1%

If Production Readiness rose from 15 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 42 to about 64.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Business logic 3%Supporting code 51%Tests 22%Generated by tools 24%
New since the last survey: 52 findings

These 52 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026.

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 9 findings

These 9 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: xunit
Rebuild cost: about €4,200 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€1,400 to €7,000, for 24 to 74 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemHigh, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 42. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 2,491 lines of product code, of which 45% is declarations and boilerplate, 50% straight logic and 5% logic with branches

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2).
Raises the score by about 21 points · Low effort · REDACTED Scanning
2
Resolve the 2 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance — start with REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 18 points · Low effort · License Compliance
3
Resolve the 28 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (9), Starter.csproj (8), Starter.BFF.csproj (8).
Raises the score by about 23 points · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €4,200 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 15 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 21 points for low effort, because it clears the 8 REDACTED Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Starter Starter Starter.Common Common Starter->Starter.Common Starter.BFF BFF Starter.BFF->Starter.Common

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

70 modules, with 63 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 2 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 30 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 Common.ErrorHandling.ErrorModels2 Common.ErrorHandling.Exceptions.Abstractions3 Common.Events4 Common.Events.EventBus5 Common.Events.Publisher6 Common.Requests.Models7 Contracts.Data8 Passes.Data9 Reports.GenerateNewPassesRegistrationsPerMonthReport.DataRetriever10 Common.ErrorHandling.Exceptions11 Common.Events.EventBus.InMemory12 Common.Events.Publisher.InMemory13 Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox14 Common.Responses.Models15 Contracts.EventBus16 Contracts.GetAllContracts17 Contracts.SignContract18 Contracts.SignContract.Events19 Offers.EventBus20 Passes.EventBus21 Passes.MarkPassAsExpired.Events22 Common.BusinessRulesEngine23 Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore24 Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts25 Common.ErrorHandling26 Contracts.EventBus.InMemory27 Offers.EventBus.InMemory28 Passes.EventBus.InMemory29 Common.Events.EventBus.Persistent30 Contracts.Data.Database31 Contracts.PrepareContract.BusinessRules32 Contracts.SignContract.BusinessRules33 Offers.Data.Database34 Passes.Data.Database35 Contracts.EventBus.Persistent36 Contracts.PrepareContract37 Offers.EventBus.Persistent38 Offers.Prepare39 Passes.EventBus.Persistent40 Passes.RegisterPass
1 Common.ErrorHandling.ErrorModels
2 Common.ErrorHandling.Exceptions.Abstractions
3 Common.Events
4 Common.Events.EventBus
5 Common.Events.Publisher
6 Common.Requests.Models
7 Contracts.Data
8 Passes.Data
9 Reports.GenerateNewPassesRegistrationsPerMonthReport.DataRetriever
10 Common.ErrorHandling.Exceptions7
11 Common.Events.EventBus.InMemory11
12 Common.Events.Publisher.InMemory1
13 Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox111
14 Common.Responses.Models2
15 Contracts.EventBus1
16 Contracts.GetAllContracts1
17 Contracts.SignContract1
18 Contracts.SignContract.Events1
19 Offers.EventBus1
20 Passes.EventBus1
21 Passes.MarkPassAsExpired.Events1
22 Common.BusinessRulesEngine1
23 Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore11
24 Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts1
25 Common.ErrorHandling21
26 Contracts.EventBus.InMemory111
27 Offers.EventBus.InMemory111
28 Passes.EventBus.InMemory111
29 Common.Events.EventBus.Persistent11
30 Contracts.Data.Database21
31 Contracts.PrepareContract.BusinessRules3
32 Contracts.SignContract.BusinessRules1
33 Offers.Data.Database1
34 Passes.Data.Database21
35 Contracts.EventBus.Persistent111
36 Contracts.PrepareContract11
37 Offers.EventBus.Persistent111
38 Offers.Prepare2111
39 Passes.EventBus.Persistent111
40 Passes.RegisterPass1111
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 Common.ErrorHandling.ErrorModels2 Common.ErrorHandling.Exceptions.Abstractions3 Common.Events4 Common.Events.EventBus5 Common.Events.Publisher6 Common.Requests.Models7 Contracts.Data8 Passes.Data9 Reports.GenerateNewPassesRegistrationsPerMonthReport.DataRetriever10 Common.ErrorHandling.Exceptions11 Common.Events.EventBus.InMemory12 Common.Events.Publisher.InMemory13 Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox14 Common.Responses.Models15 Contracts.EventBus16 Contracts.GetAllContracts17 Contracts.SignContract18 Contracts.SignContract.Events19 Offers.EventBus20 Passes.EventBus21 Passes.MarkPassAsExpired.Events22 Common.BusinessRulesEngine23 Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore24 Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts25 Common.ErrorHandling26 Contracts.EventBus.InMemory27 Offers.EventBus.InMemory28 Passes.EventBus.InMemory29 Common.Events.EventBus.Persistent30 Contracts.Data.Database31 Contracts.PrepareContract.BusinessRules32 Contracts.SignContract.BusinessRules33 Offers.Data.Database34 Passes.Data.Database35 Contracts.EventBus.Persistent36 Contracts.PrepareContract37 Offers.EventBus.Persistent38 Offers.Prepare39 Passes.EventBus.Persistent40 Passes.RegisterPassCommon.ErrorHandling.ErrorModels1Common.ErrorHandling.Exceptions.Abstractions2Common.Events3Common.Events.EventBus4Common.Events.Publisher5Common.Requests.Models6Contracts.Data7Passes.Data8Reports.GenerateNewPassesRegistrationsPerMonthReport.DataRetriever9Common.ErrorHandling.Exceptions10Common.Events.EventBus.InMemory11Common.Events.Publisher.InMemory12Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox13Common.Responses.Models14Contracts.EventBus15Contracts.GetAllContracts16Contracts.SignContract17Contracts.SignContract.Events18Offers.EventBus19Passes.EventBus20Passes.MarkPassAsExpired.Events21Common.BusinessRulesEngine22Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore23Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts24Common.ErrorHandling25Contracts.EventBus.InMemory26Offers.EventBus.InMemory27Passes.EventBus.InMemory28Common.Events.EventBus.Persistent29Contracts.Data.Database30Contracts.PrepareContract.BusinessRules31Contracts.SignContract.BusinessRules32Offers.Data.Database33Passes.Data.Database34Contracts.EventBus.Persistent35Contracts.PrepareContract36Offers.EventBus.Persistent37Offers.Prepare38Passes.EventBus.Persistent39Passes.RegisterPass407111111211111111111211111111111121311211111111121111111111+30 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 89% · Strong ·

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.9 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 8.0 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 8.7 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 8.3 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.9

At a glance — Architecture · 82% · Strong ·

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D7 · .NET / C# Architectural Integrity 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.8 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 8.2 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0
The Bad
AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 5.0

At a glance — Maturity · 61% · Adequate · gated by D34 ·

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 9.0 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 7.5 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D25 · .NET / C# ADR Conformance 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 6.5 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.5
The Ugly
D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 15% · Critical · gated by D8, D12, D13, D14, P1, P3, P5, P7 ·

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 9.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0
The Ugly
D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 3.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 1.6 D13 · .NET / C# REDACTED Scanning 0.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 2.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0

At a glance — Security · 60% · Adequate · gated by D28 ·

The Good
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 7.7 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 8.2 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0
The Bad
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 5.2 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 6.0
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 1.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 66% · Adequate ·

The Good
ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 9.2
The Ugly
ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 4.0

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good
PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures18High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration15High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures7High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection5Medium

Roadmap

Begin by addressing the 28 deprecated dependencies, focusing first on the Starter project files, and immediately remediate the 8 leaked secrets in configuration files like REDACTED. Next, resolve the 2 banned licenses in REDACTED and the 2 vulnerable dependencies to ensure compliance and security. Finally, improve the 60 low-coverage areas, prioritizing AutomaticMigrationsExtensions.cs, DatabaseModule.cs, and ReportsModule.cs to strengthen overall code reliability.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2).+21.2 ptsLowREDACTED Scanning
Resolve the 2 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance — start with REDACTED.+18.3 ptsLowLicense Compliance
Resolve the 28 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (9), Starter.csproj (8), Starter.BFF.csproj (8).+22.6 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+9.1 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 60 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with AutomaticMigrationsExtensions.cs (3), DatabaseModule.cs (3), ReportsModule.cs.+7.9 ptsMediumCode Coverage
Resolve the 5 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with OpenTelemetryModule.cs, ErrorHandlingExtensions.cs, SearchExtensions.cs.+2.4 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+3.3 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+3.3 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 83 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 8% slop · 23% mixed · 69% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.0SlopLicense Compliance: Banned license: SonarAnalyzer.CSharp
REDACTED0.9SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED0.9SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED2.0SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED2.8SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED3.4SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.4SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
src/Starter/Starter.csproj4.9MixedPlatform End-of-Life: End-of-life runtime: .NET net9.0
src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj5.5MixedCode Coverage: No test project references Starter.BFF
REDACTED5.8MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
src/Starter.Common/Validation/Requests/RequestValidationsExtensions.cs6.0MixedExplicit Debt: Dead code: MustBeNumeric
REDACTED6.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
src/Starter.Common/Events/EventBus/Persistent/PersistentEventBus.cs6.7MixedExplicit Debt: Dead code: PublishManyAsync
src/Starter.Common/Events/EventBus/InMemory/InMemoryEventBus.cs6.7MixedExplicit Debt: Dead code: PublishManyAsync
src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/ErrorHandlingExtensions.cs6.7MixedExplicit Debt: Dead code: ToBusinessRuleValidationException
src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Orms/EfCore/PaginationExtensions.cs6.7MixedExplicit Debt: Dead code: ToPaginatedList

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 33

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 138

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 96

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 2

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 77 of 84 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 7 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 1.0 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 84 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D7D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D25D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D39D44AX1AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6AX8C2ED1ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8PF3S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 187 of 267 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a161e7-d819-7eb7-b87a-b77c32abb720.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 151 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 99% of the history; the other 1 hold 1% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/Abstractions/AppException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/AlreadyExistsException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BadRequestException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BusinessRuleValidationException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/ForbiddenException.cs`, … (+26 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — loki Pulling grafana Pulling jaeger Pulling keycloak Pulling postgres Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden grafana Error context canceled prometheus Error context canceled keycloak Error context canceled otel-collector Error context canceled loki Error context canceled jaeger Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: postgres Error context canceled keycloak Error context canceled loki Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden grafana Error context canceled jaeger Error context canceled prometheus Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (7): D19, D20, D21, D24, D25, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (9 lines × 3)src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:18

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ContractsOutboxWorker.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Starter.CommonREDACTED:1

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 6 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

All 3 mechanizable ADR(s) are enforced: 2 by analyzers, 1 by tests. Cycles found: 0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 11.6% — 60 file(s) below 50%.

Low coverage: src/Starter/Reports/ReportsModule.cs · ×60src/Starter/Reports/ReportsModule.cs:1
No test project references Starter.BFFsrc/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 60 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with AutomaticMigrationsExtensions.cs (3), DatabaseModule.cs (3), ReportsModule.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (60 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No test project references Starter.BFF finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with Starter.BFF.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

39 test methods: 22 unit, 17 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 39 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene1.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

64 outdated, 2 vulnerable, 12 deprecated, 1 prerelease packages.

Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol · ×2
Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore · ×28src/Starter/Starter.csproj:16
Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore · ×3REDACTED:47
Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc · ×61

What to do

  1. Resolve the 28 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (9), Starter.csproj (8), Starter.BFF.csproj (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (28 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · REDACTED Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate REDACTED Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 of 299 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 65 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 185 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.

Banned license: SonarAnalyzer.CSharp · ×2REDACTED:43

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate License Compliance in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt8.0 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 deducted debt markers + 11 dead symbols across 2491 LoC in the .NET projects (1.0/KLoC) → score 8.0.

FileScopedPragmaDisablesrc/Starter/Program.cs:56
BlanketAnalyzerSeverityNone.editorconfig:4
Dead code: RegisterPassRequest · ×11src/Starter/Passes/RegisterPass/RegisterPassRequest.cs:3

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 FileScopedPragmaDisable finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 BlanketAnalyzerSeverityNone finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with .editorconfig. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 11 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with RequestValidationsExtensions.cs (3), RegisterPassRequest.cs, ConfigurationExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
  4. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 projects, 178 source files, 3682 hand-written lines of code (2491 production / 1191 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), plus 1334 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 4 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation QualityExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README is a clear project description (a .NET modular monolith starter implementing the BFF pattern with Keycloak authentication) plus an overview of features, prerequisites, and a step-by-step Getting Started guide. It also links to external documentation for modular architecture decisions ('Evolutionary Architecture's documentation'), ADRs ('adr-tools'), and a detailed decision log covering topics such as 'Use one project', 'Use modules', 'Use separate database schemas', 'Use Docker', 'In-Memory event bus', 'Internal sealed as default', testing strategy, static analysis, exceptions for validations, and backend localization. The architecture/decision-logging documents are well organized with a TOC and each decision documented with problem, decision, consequences, and links to further reading.

XML-doc coverage: Starter · ×3src/Starter/Starter.csproj

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 14 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 7.5/10 (mixed — many ADRs miss context or consequences). 3 flagged with a specific gap.

No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g. lost changes or confusion) are stateddocs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0001-record-architecture-decisions.adoc
Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why not a different container platform) or trade-offs beyond the listed consequencesdocs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0006-use-docker.adoc
Consequences are real but trade-offs (e.g. client-side fallback) are not framed as a decision versus an alternativedocs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0013-use-backend-localization.adoc
ADR decides a question another record already decideddocs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0013-use-backend-localization.adoc:1detected by adr-integrity

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g.… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001-record-architecture-decisions.adoc. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0006-use-docker.adoc. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Consequences are real but trade-offs (e.g. client-side fallback) are not… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0013-use-backend-localization.adoc. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment ValueAdequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 0 redundant across 82 sampled comments; 3 shown with locations.

misleading comment · ×3src/Starter.Common/GlobalUsings.cs:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with GlobalUsings.cs, LocalizationModule.cs, OpenIdConnectModule.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D25 · ADR ConformanceExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

5 conform / 0 violate across 14 ADRs.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 5 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

94 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 5 medium, 0 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 37 file(s) — `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/Abstractions/AppException.cs` (line 5), `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/AlreadyExistsException.cs` (line 5), `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BadRequestException.cs` (line 5), `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BusinessRuleValidationException.cs` (lines 3–6), `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/ForbiddenException.cs` (line 5), … (+32 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. In 33 of those file(s) — `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/AlreadyExistsException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BadRequestException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BusinessRuleValidationException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/ForbiddenException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/InternalServerException.cs`, … (+28 more) — the break is a C# primary constructor, which semgrep's grammar cannot parse and which hides the type from every rule scoped to it; those files were re-scanned from a shadow copy with the constructor's parameter list blanked (line and column preserving), which restores the type to the rules, and 0 additional row(s) came from that pass. Only the header's own parameter list is unread in them. In 5 of those file(s) — `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/AlreadyExistsException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BadRequestException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BusinessRuleValidationException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/ForbiddenException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/UnauthorizedException.cs` — the break is at a TYPE DECLARATION (a C# primary constructor semgrep's grammar cannot parse), so the loss is wider than the named lines: rules scoped to that type see no type to scope to and are blind over its whole body, while rules matching statements keep working there. Absence of a type-scoped finding in those types is not evidence of anything.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 2 critical, 3 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.2 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 11 medium, 2 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 11 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (7), REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 of 5 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Starter.Common/Telemetry/OpenTelemetry/OpenTelemetryModule.cs. Counted over 5 of the 138 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×5src/Starter.Common/Telemetry/OpenTelemetry/OpenTelemetryModule.cs:1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with OpenTelemetryModule.cs, ErrorHandlingExtensions.cs, SearchExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 252 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 5 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

End-of-life runtime: .NET net9.0src/Starter/Starter.csproj:4

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with Starter.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX2 · Stateful singletons5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `DatabaseConnectionFactory` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_connection; e.g. `_connection` at line 17). — src/Starter/Reports/DataAccess/DatabaseConnectionFactory.cs:6

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • The namespaces Starter.Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts ↔ Starter.Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is Starter.Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts → Starter.Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox (Starter.Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts.OutBoxMessageConfiguration → Starter.Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox.OutboxMessage, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface. — src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Orms/EfCore/DbContexts/OutboxPersistence.cs:3

What to do

  • Break namespace cycles inside a project by moving the shared type to a namespace both sides can use, or by inverting the back edge behind an interface.
AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED3 · Event naming9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `OfferPrepareEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — src/Starter/Offers/Prepare/OfferPrepareEvent.cs:6

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `PassExpiredEventHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — src/Starter/Offers/Prepare/PassExpiredEventHandler.cs:14
  • `ContractSignedEventHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — src/Starter/Passes/RegisterPass/ContractSignedEventHandler.cs:14

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `UseReports` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — src/Starter/Reports/ReportsModule.cs:16

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 5 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 14) — reach 20 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 2/3 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 3, 2 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

  • Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

S1 · Web-Security Posture4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — src/Starter.BFF/Auth/OIDC/OpenIdConnectModule.cs:38
  • `ValidateAudience = false` means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent. — src/Starter.Common/Auth/JwtBearer/JwtAuthenticationModule.cs:29
  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. (×2) — src/Starter.BFF/Program.cs:5, src/Starter/Program.cs:15
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it. (×2) — src/Starter.BFF/Program.cs:5, src/Starter/Program.cs:15

What to do

  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Re-enable token validation — `ValidateAudience` is set to `false`. If it was switched off because the expected value was wrong or absent, supply that value instead (`ValidAudiences`/`ValidIssuers`, or `IssuerSigningKeys`/`IssuerSigningKeyResolver` for the signature) rather than skipping the check: a disabled check accepts every token, not just the one that was failing.
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X2 · Cancellation propagation8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 23/25 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. — src/Starter.Common/Events/EventBus/Persistent/PersistentEventBus.cs:21
  • 6 async method(s) await work their caller's cancellation cannot reach: a CancellationToken they hold (a parameter, or the one a framework-fixed signature carries) is never passed on, or the call is handed CancellationToken.None, default or an already-cancelled token. Forward the caller's token to that call.
  • Holds a CancellationToken but hands `CancellationToken.None` to the awaited call on this line, so the caller's cancellation never reaches that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible). (×5) — src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:22, src/Starter/Offers/EventBus/Persistent/OffersOutboxWorker.cs:23, src/Starter/Passes/EventBus/Persistent/PassesOutboxWorker.cs:24, …
  • Its signature is fixed by the framework, and the token it carries (`context.HttpContext.RequestAborted`) reaches none of the calls here that take one — so an aborted request or a stopping host still waits for that work. Pass `context.HttpContext.RequestAborted` to them. — src/Starter.Common/Validation/Requests/RequestValidationApiFilter.cs:11

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 3 suppression(s) across the 19170 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health89%StrongSolid.
Architecture82%StrongSolid.
Maturity61%Adequate — gated by D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness15%Critical — gated by D8, D12, D13, D14, P1, P3, P5, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security60%Adequate — gated by D28Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven66%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Performance100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 37 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — loki Pulling grafana Pulling jaeger Pulling keycloak Pulling postgres Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden grafana Error context canceled prometheus Error context canceled keycloak Error context canceled otel-collector Error context canceled loki Error context canceled jaeger Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: postgres Error context canceled keycloak Error context canceled loki Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden grafana Error context canceled jaeger Error context canceled prometheus Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (2,491 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 31 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (5 domain event(s); its domain events are published by services or handlers — no domain entity raises one)
  • ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 128 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 33 finding(s)
D13 · REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret · ×8
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×6
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D28 · Secrets (history) · High secret · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×2
  • Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — REDACTED — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: MailKit — REDACTED — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D14 · License Compliance · Banned license · ×2
  • Banned license: SonarAnalyzer.CSharp REDACTED:43 — `SonarAnalyzer.CSharp` 9.32.0.97167 resolves to SPDX id LGPL-3.0-only, and this run's banned set is AGPL-3.0, GPL-2.0, GPL-3.0, LGPL-3.0. The id is read as an SPDX expression: an `OR` is a choice and is charged only when every branch is banned, an `AND` binds every operand, and a `WITH` exception leaves the licence it attaches to as it is. Each licence id is then matched as a SUBSTRING that starts at a token boundary, not an exact comparison — which is how variants like `-only` and `-or-later` are caught while `LGPL-2.0-only` is not read as `GPL-2.0`, and it is the rule to apply if you re-check this by hand. The set is policy, not law: it is configurable, so a licence banned here may be acceptable in your context, and the row is then something to record an exception for rather than to fix. ★ This arm reads the resolved package list and knows nothing about dependency SCOPE — it cannot tell a runtime dependency from a build- or test-only one, so unlike the Bundler arm it is NOT claiming this ships to your users. Check where it sits before acting. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 65 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 185 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.
  • Banned license: MySql.Data.OpenTelemetry — `MySql.Data.OpenTelemetry` 8.2.0 resolves to SPDX id GPL-2.0-only, and this run's banned set is AGPL-3.0, GPL-2.0, GPL-3.0, LGPL-3.0. The id is read as an SPDX expression: an `OR` is a choice and is charged only when every branch is banned, an `AND` binds every operand, and a `WITH` exception leaves the licence it attaches to as it is. Each licence id is then matched as a SUBSTRING that starts at a token boundary, not an exact comparison — which is how variants like `-only` and `-or-later` are caught while `LGPL-2.0-only` is not read as `GPL-2.0`, and it is the rule to apply if you re-check this by hand. The set is policy, not law: it is configurable, so a licence banned here may be acceptable in your context, and the row is then something to record an exception for rather than to fix. ★ This arm reads the resolved package list and knows nothing about dependency SCOPE — it cannot tell a runtime dependency from a build- or test-only one, so unlike the Bundler arm it is NOT claiming this ships to your users. Check where it sits before acting. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 65 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 185 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write · Dual write (no outbox) · ×2
  • Dual write (no outbox): PassExpiredEventHandler.Handle src/Starter/Offers/Prepare/PassExpiredEventHandler.cs:14 — `PassExpiredEventHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem).
  • Dual write (no outbox): ContractSignedEventHandler.Handle src/Starter/Passes/RegisterPass/ContractSignedEventHandler.cs:14 — `ContractSignedEventHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles · Namespace dependency cycle · ×1
  • Namespace dependency cycle src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Orms/EfCore/DbContexts/OutboxPersistence.cs:3 — The namespaces Starter.Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts ↔ Starter.Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is Starter.Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts → Starter.Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox (Starter.Common.DataAccess.Orms.EfCore.DbContexts.OutBoxMessageConfiguration → Starter.Common.EventualConsistency.Outbox.OutboxMessage, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface.
D17 · Explicit Debt · FileScopedPragmaDisable · ×1
  • FileScopedPragmaDisable src/Starter/Program.cs:56 — #pragma warning disable S6966 — the disable has no matching restore anywhere in this file, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later that nobody weighed against it. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers — that alone turns a standing exemption into a scoped one — or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
D17 · Explicit Debt · BlanketAnalyzerSeverityNone · ×1
  • BlanketAnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:4 — dotnet_analyzer_diagnostic.category-Style.severity = none — every rule in the Style category — this is not one rule switched off, it is a whole set the file never lists: every rule the entry covers is silenced for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and any rule added to that set by a future analyzer upgrade is silenced too, without anybody deciding so. It reads as narrower than it is — the analyzers still run and the build still looks configured — and because no rule is named there is nothing for a reader to look up and no list that will ever disclose what is covered. Replace it with the rules you actually mean to switch off, each on its own line, so the set is finite, visible and reviewable, and the ones nobody chose keep protecting the tree. If the blanket entry is genuinely right, link the decision from a comment above it: a comment that only restates the entry is what the editor generates when it writes this line, so it is a reference to the decision — an issue or a ticket — that clears this row.
Serious — 138 finding(s)
D8 · Code Coverage · Low coverage · ×60
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Reports/ReportsModule.cs src/Starter/Reports/ReportsModule.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: REDACTED REDACTED:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/18).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Reports/GenerateNewPassesRegistrationsPerMonthReport/GenerateNewPassesPerMonthReportModule.cs src/Starter/Reports/GenerateNewPassesRegistrationsPerMonthReport/GenerateNewPassesPerMonthReportModule.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/5).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Reports/GenerateNewPassesRegistrationsPerMonthReport/DataRetriever/NewPassesRegistrationPerMonthReportDataRetriever.cs src/Starter/Reports/GenerateNewPassesRegistrationsPerMonthReport/DataRetriever/NewPassesRegistrationPerMonthReportDataRetriever.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/15).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Reports/DataAccess/DatabaseConnectionFactory.cs src/Starter/Reports/DataAccess/DatabaseConnectionFactory.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/16).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Passes/PassesModule.cs src/Starter/Passes/PassesModule.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/9).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Passes/RegisterPass/ContractSignedEventHandler.cs src/Starter/Passes/RegisterPass/ContractSignedEventHandler.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/10).
  • Low coverage: REDACTED REDACTED:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/34).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Passes/GetAllPasses/GetAllPassesEndpoint.cs src/Starter/Passes/GetAllPasses/GetAllPassesEndpoint.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/24).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Passes/EventBus/Persistent/PassesOutboxWorker.cs src/Starter/Passes/EventBus/Persistent/PassesOutboxWorker.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/13).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Passes/Data/Pass.cs src/Starter/Passes/Data/Pass.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/13).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Passes/Data/Database/AutomaticMigrationsExtensions.cs src/Starter/Passes/Data/Database/AutomaticMigrationsExtensions.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Passes/Data/Database/DatabaseModule.cs src/Starter/Passes/Data/Database/DatabaseModule.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/12).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Passes/Data/Database/PassEntityConfiguration.cs src/Starter/Passes/Data/Database/PassEntityConfiguration.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/7).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Passes/Data/Database/PassesPersistence.cs src/Starter/Passes/Data/Database/PassesPersistence.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/7).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Offers/OffersModule.cs src/Starter/Offers/OffersModule.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/9).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Offers/Prepare/PassExpiredEventHandler.cs src/Starter/Offers/Prepare/PassExpiredEventHandler.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/12).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Offers/EventBus/Persistent/OffersOutboxWorker.cs src/Starter/Offers/EventBus/Persistent/OffersOutboxWorker.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/13).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Offers/Data/Offer.cs src/Starter/Offers/Data/Offer.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/25).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Offers/Data/Database/AutomaticMigrationsExtensions.cs src/Starter/Offers/Data/Database/AutomaticMigrationsExtensions.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Offers/Data/Database/DatabaseModule.cs src/Starter/Offers/Data/Database/DatabaseModule.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/11).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Offers/Data/Database/OfferEntityConfiguration.cs src/Starter/Offers/Data/Database/OfferEntityConfiguration.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/9).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Offers/Data/Database/OffersPersistence.cs src/Starter/Offers/Data/Database/OffersPersistence.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/7).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Contracts/ContractsEndpoints.cs src/Starter/Contracts/ContractsEndpoints.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/5).
  • Low coverage: src/Starter/Contracts/ContractsModule.cs src/Starter/Contracts/ContractsModule.cs:1 — 0.0% line coverage (0/9).
  • + 35 more in this group — see findings.md.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×28
  • Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore src/Starter/Starter.csproj:16 — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore REDACTED:13 — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions src/Starter/Starter.csproj:46 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj:16 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions REDACTED:52 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens src/Starter/Starter.csproj:47 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj:17 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens REDACTED:53 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging src/Starter/Starter.csproj:48 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj:18 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging REDACTED:54 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols src/Starter/Starter.csproj:49 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj:19 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols REDACTED:55 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect src/Starter/Starter.csproj:50 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect 7.4.0 — Legacy,CriticalBugs
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj:20 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect 7.4.0 — Legacy,CriticalBugs
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect REDACTED:56 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect 7.4.0 — Legacy,CriticalBugs
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens src/Starter/Starter.csproj:51 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj:21 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens REDACTED:57 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt src/Starter/Starter.csproj:52 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj:22 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt REDACTED:58 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: xunit src/Starter.UnitTests/Starter.UnitTests.csproj:26 — xunit 2.9.2 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.
  • Deprecated: xunit REDACTED:27 — xunit 2.9.2 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.
  • + 3 more in this group — see findings.md.
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×11
  • Dead code: RegisterPassRequest src/Starter/Passes/RegisterPass/RegisterPassRequest.cs:3 — NamedType RegisterPassRequest — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: SetFakeSystemClock src/Starter.IntegrationTests/Common/TestEngine/Configuration/ConfigurationExtensions.cs:45 — Method SetFakeSystemClock — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.IntegrationTests, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: ISoftDeletable src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Auditing/ISoftDeletable.cs:3 — NamedType ISoftDeletable — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.Common, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: ToPaginatedList src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Orms/EfCore/PaginationExtensions.cs:41 — Method ToPaginatedList — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.Common, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: Search src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Orms/EfCore/SearchExtensions.cs:53 — Method Search — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.Common, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: ToBusinessRuleValidationException src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/ErrorHandlingExtensions.cs:49 — Method ToBusinessRuleValidationException — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.Common, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: PublishManyAsync src/Starter.Common/Events/EventBus/InMemory/InMemoryEventBus.cs:8 — Method PublishManyAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.Common, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: PublishManyAsync src/Starter.Common/Events/EventBus/Persistent/PersistentEventBus.cs:10 — Method PublishManyAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.Common, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: MustBeNumeric src/Starter.Common/Validation/Requests/RequestValidationsExtensions.cs:11 — Method MustBeNumeric — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.Common, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: MustBeGreaterThanOrEquals src/Starter.Common/Validation/Requests/RequestValidationsExtensions.cs:17 — Method MustBeGreaterThanOrEquals — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.Common, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: NumberMustBeInRange src/Starter.Common/Validation/Requests/RequestValidationsExtensions.cs:23 — Method NumberMustBeInRange — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Starter.Common, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×11
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async call defeats the CancellationToken · ×5
  • Async call defeats the CancellationToken: ExecuteAsync src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:22 — Holds a CancellationToken but hands `CancellationToken.None` to the awaited call on this line, so the caller's cancellation never reaches that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible).
  • Async call defeats the CancellationToken: ExecuteAsync src/Starter/Offers/EventBus/Persistent/OffersOutboxWorker.cs:23 — Holds a CancellationToken but hands `CancellationToken.None` to the awaited call on this line, so the caller's cancellation never reaches that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible).
  • Async call defeats the CancellationToken: ExecuteAsync src/Starter/Passes/EventBus/Persistent/PassesOutboxWorker.cs:24 — Holds a CancellationToken but hands `CancellationToken.None` to the awaited call on this line, so the caller's cancellation never reaches that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible).
  • Async call defeats the CancellationToken: PublishManyAsync src/Starter.Common/Events/EventBus/Persistent/PersistentEventBus.cs:18 — Holds a CancellationToken but hands `CancellationToken.None` to the awaited call on this line, so the caller's cancellation never reaches that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible).
  • Async call defeats the CancellationToken: ProcessEventAsync src/Starter.Common/EventualConsistency/Outbox/OutboxProcessor.cs:64 — Holds a CancellationToken but hands `CancellationToken.None` to the awaited call on this line, so the caller's cancellation never reaches that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AX2 · Stateful singletons · Stateful singleton · ×1
  • Stateful singleton: DatabaseConnectionFactory src/Starter/Reports/DataAccess/DatabaseConnectionFactory.cs:6 — `DatabaseConnectionFactory` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_connection; e.g. `_connection` at line 17).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Prerelease dependency · ×1
  • Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore resolves to 1.8.0-rc.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g. lost changes or confusion) are stated · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g. lost changes or confusion) are stated docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0001-record-architecture-decisions.adoc — Add the problem of losing decision rationale over time and the consequence of not having a record (e.g. someone re-creating it from memory)
D20 · ADR Quality · Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why not a different container platform) or trade-offs beyond the listed consequences · ×1
  • Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why not a different container platform) or trade-offs beyond the listed consequences docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0006-use-docker.adoc — State why Docker was chosen over alternatives and note the trade-offs of adding a new infrastructure layer
D20 · ADR Quality · Consequences are real but trade-offs (e.g. client-side fallback) are not framed as a decision versus an alternative · ×1
  • Consequences are real but trade-offs (e.g. client-side fallback) are not framed as a decision versus an alternative docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0013-use-backend-localization.adoc — State the trade-off of relying solely on server-side localization and the benefits of having a client-side backup.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:18 — src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:18-26 | src/Starter/Offers/EventBus/Persistent/OffersOutboxWorker.cs:19-27 | src/Starter/Passes/EventBus/Persistent/PassesOutboxWorker.cs:20-28 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:18` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life · End-of-life runtime · ×1
  • End-of-life runtime: .NET net9.0 src/Starter/Starter.csproj:4 — src/Starter/Starter.csproj declares .NET net9.0 as this project's target framework, and .NET 9 STS, support ended 2026-05-12. An unsupported runtime receives no security patches, so every vulnerability disclosed in it since 2026-05-12 is present and unfixable without moving off it. This is a migration rather than an upgrade: there is no newer release of a runtime that has ended.
D8 · Code Coverage · No test project references Starter.BFF · ×1
  • No test project references Starter.BFF src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj — No test project in this repository references Starter.BFF (7 production source file(s)), so `dotnet test` never loads it and no coverage tool can measure it — its code is absent from the 11.6% above rather than counted at zero. This is the whole assembly, not a gap within one: add a test project that references it (or a ProjectReference from an existing suite) and its coverage starts being measured.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Hollow method · ×1
  • Hollow method — returns a constant without doing the work src/Starter/Reports/ReportsModule.cs:16 — `UseReports` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in.
P1 · CI/CD gates · No CI pipeline · ×1
  • No CI pipeline — No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
P5 · DR & Backup · No DR/backup evidence · ×1
  • No DR/backup evidence — A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×1
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience — The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Token validation disabled · ×1
  • Token validation disabled src/Starter.Common/Auth/JwtBearer/JwtAuthenticationModule.cs:29 — `ValidateAudience = false` means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1
  • NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×1
  • Async method without CancellationToken: PersistIntegrationEvent src/Starter.Common/Events/EventBus/Persistent/PersistentEventBus.cs:21 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method drops its ambient CancellationToken · ×1
  • Async method drops its ambient CancellationToken: InvokeAsync src/Starter.Common/Validation/Requests/RequestValidationApiFilter.cs:11 — Its signature is fixed by the framework, and the token it carries (`context.HttpContext.RequestAborted`) reaches none of the calls here that take one — so an aborted request or a stopping host still waits for that work. Pass `context.HttpContext.RequestAborted` to them.
Minor — 29 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×5
  • Orphaned file src/Starter.Common/Telemetry/OpenTelemetry/OpenTelemetryModule.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/ErrorHandlingExtensions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Orms/EfCore/SearchExtensions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Starter.Common/EventualConsistency/Outbox/OutboxProcessor.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Orms/EfCore/PaginationExtensions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×3
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore REDACTED:47 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 7.1.0 → 10.3.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector REDACTED:34 — coverlet.collector 6.0.2 → 10.1.0 available (referenced by Starter.UnitTests).
  • Outdated: Verify.Xunit REDACTED:20 — Verify.Xunit 28.4.0 → 31.12.5 available (referenced by Starter.IntegrationTests).
D24 · Comment Value · misleading comment · ×3
  • misleading comment src/Starter.Common/GlobalUsings.cs:1 — "Global using directives" — Delete; the global using directive list in the file is self-evident and never restated by a comment.
  • misleading comment src/Starter.Common/Localizations/LocalizationModule.cs:27 — "Formatting numbers, dates, etc." — Delete; opts.SupportedCultures = supportedCultures restates this assignment and explains nothing about localization.
  • misleading comment src/Starter.BFF/Auth/OIDC/OpenIdConnectModule.cs:25 — "Consider switching to SameSiteMode.Strict in production" — Delete; the SameSite=Lax setting is explicit and this comment contradicts it.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×3
  • No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No security response headers detected src/Starter.BFF/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected src/Starter/Program.cs:15 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected · ×3
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected src/Starter.BFF/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected src/Starter/Program.cs:15 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D20 · ADR Quality · ADR decides a question another record already decided · ×1
  • ADR decides a question another record already decided docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0013-use-backend-localization.adoc:1 — docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0013-use-backend-localization.adoc and docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0012-use-exceptions-for-validations.adoc are both in force and decide the same question ("1. Use exceptions for validations"), and neither names the other. If this record replaces the earlier one, say so ("Supersedes …") and mark the earlier one superseded; if both hold, state how they relate.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 5 of 5 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 5 of the 138 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: src/Starter.Common/Telemetry/OpenTelemetry/OpenTelemetryModule.cs, src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/ErrorHandlingExtensions.cs, src/Starter.Common/EventualConsistency/Outbox/OutboxProcessor.cs, src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Orms/EfCore/SearchExtensions.cs, src/Starter.Common/DataAccess/Orms/EfCore/PaginationExtensions.cs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
ED3 · Event naming · Event not named in past tense · ×1
  • Event not named in past tense: OfferPrepareEvent src/Starter/Offers/Prepare/OfferPrepareEvent.cs:6 — `OfferPrepareEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
P2 · Observability · Logging is not universal · ×1
  • Logging is not universal — Only 2/3 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 3, 2 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP · ×1
  • OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP src/Starter.BFF/Auth/OIDC/OpenIdConnectModule.cs:38 — `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1
  • Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 23/25 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Some async methods drop the CancellationToken they accept · ×1
  • Some async methods drop the CancellationToken they accept — 6 async method(s) await work their caller's cancellation cannot reach: a CancellationToken they hold (a parameter, or the one a framework-fixed signature carries) is never passed on, or the call is handed CancellationToken.None, default or an already-cancelled token. Forward the caller's token to that call.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score · ×1
  • Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score — ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 3 suppression(s) across the 19170 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
Minor — 67 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×61
  • Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc — Asp.Versioning.Mvc 8.1.0 → 10.2.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer — Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer 8.1.0 → 10.2.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.1.35 → 2.1.89 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.11.0 → 12.2.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 → 11.3.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 11.11.0 → 12.2.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Grafana.OpenTelemetry — Grafana.OpenTelemetry 1.1.0 → 1.14.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: JetBrains.Annotations — JetBrains.Annotations 2024.3.0 → 2026.2.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.4.1 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 8.0.10 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect 8.0.10 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.JsonPatch — Microsoft.AspNetCore.JsonPatch 9.0.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.NewtonsoftJson — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.NewtonsoftJson 9.0.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 9.0.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 9.0.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 9.0.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions 7.4.0 → 8.23.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 7.4.0 → 8.23.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging 7.4.0 → 8.23.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols 7.4.0 → 8.23.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect 7.4.0 → 8.23.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 7.4.0 → 8.23.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 9.0.2 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: NSwag.AspNetCore — NSwag.AspNetCore 14.2.0 → 14.7.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — REDACTED → 1.20.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • + 36 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×3
  • XML-doc coverage: Starter src/Starter/Starter.csproj — Starter: 9 % XML-doc coverage (6/67).
  • XML-doc coverage: Starter.BFF src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj — Starter.BFF: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/14).
  • XML-doc coverage: Starter.Common REDACTED — Starter.Common: 7 % XML-doc coverage (10/152).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — Starter.UnitTests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — Starter.IntegrationTests references NSubstitute.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Starter.Common REDACTED:1 — Starter.Common: abstractness 0.17, instability 0.00, distance 0.83 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-90be72bb634e4109835481908ffcb662/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .10artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-90be72bb634e4109835481908ffcb662/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .4artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .5artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list Softylines.AspNetCore.Starter.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json7artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .15artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 31 file(s) — `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/Abstractions/AppException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/AlreadyExistsException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BadRequestException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/BusinessRuleValidationException.cs`, `src/Starter.Common/ErrorHandling/Exceptions/ForbiddenException.cs`, … (+26 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).0—

Run 01a161e7-d819-7eb7-b87a-b77c32abb720 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 33 · Warnings: 138 · Recommendations: 29 · Info: 67 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 22-10-2026 @ 04:39 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md