Public report — AspNetCore.Starter, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 17:57 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Youssefbennour/AspNetCore.Starter

56% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
lower third — near Weak

Small · 3,111 LoC · 5 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (38%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

53/58dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 5 LLM-assisted, advisory
31findings with an exact file:lineof 116 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
58/100dimensions across the health lenses3111 LoC · 5 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

youssefbennour/AspNetCore.Starter carries serious risk (56%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Code Health (98%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (77%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (38%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Event-Driven (66%) is the next concern — services couple through their messages, so they can't evolve or deploy independently.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 11 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene (Dependency Hygiene); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience).

For scale: Small (~3,111 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (98%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 38% · 46% weightEvent-Driven 66% · 25% weightSecurity 71% · 14% weightMaturity 75% · 8% weightArchitecture 77% · 4% weightCode Health 98% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 38 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 56 → ~70.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 3%Plumbing 52%Tests 21%Generated 24%
New since the last scan (9+)

9 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D20 · No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g. lost or duplicated work) are stated docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0001-record-architecture-decisions.adoc
  • D20 · Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why not a different container platform) or trade-offs beyond the listed consequences docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0006-use-docker.adoc
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/Starter.BFF/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 src/Starter/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/Starter/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.Development.json
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.json
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/Starter.BFF/bin/Debug/net9.0/appsettings.Development.json
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/Starter.BFF/bin/Debug/net9.0/appsettings.json

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,600–€8,100
Cost to rebuild€1,600–€8,100 (0.1 person-years (27–86 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 56% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 47% boilerplate · 48% straight-line · 5% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€4,900 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 38% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.5) — service/app, CQRS, event-driven integration × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with sample-realm.json.
+11.6 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+9.3 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Resolve the 11 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+16.0 pts · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 38%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (3,111 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 38%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 11 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 11 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Starter Starter Starter.Common Common Starter->Starter.Common Starter.BFF BFF Starter.BFF->Starter.Common

Architecture — module dependency matrix

77 modules, 63 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…rHandling.ErrorModels…ceptions.AbstractionsStarter.Common.Events…ommon.Events.EventBus…mmon.Events.Publisher…ommon.Requests.ModelsStarter.Contracts.DataStarter.Passes.Data…hReport.DataRetriever…orHandling.Exceptions…nts.EventBus.InMemory…ts.Publisher.InMemory…ualConsistency.Outbox…mmon.Responses.Models…er.Contracts.EventBus…racts.GetAllContracts…ontracts.SignContract…s.SignContract.Events…arter.Offers.EventBus…arter.Passes.EventBus…kPassAsExpired.Events…n.BusinessRulesEngine…ataAccess.Orms.EfCore…rms.EfCore.DbContexts….Common.ErrorHandling…cts.EventBus.InMemory…ers.EventBus.InMemory…ses.EventBus.InMemory…s.EventBus.Persistent…ntracts.Data.Database…ontract.BusinessRules…ontract.BusinessRules….Offers.Data.Database….Passes.Data.Database…s.EventBus.Persistent…racts.PrepareContract…s.EventBus.PersistentStarter.Offers.Prepare…s.EventBus.Persistent…r.Passes.RegisterPass…rHandling.ErrorModels1…ceptions.Abstractions2Starter.Common.Events3…ommon.Events.EventBus4…mmon.Events.Publisher5…ommon.Requests.Models6Starter.Contracts.Data7Starter.Passes.Data8…hReport.DataRetriever9…orHandling.Exceptions10…nts.EventBus.InMemory11…ts.Publisher.InMemory12…ualConsistency.Outbox13…mmon.Responses.Models14…er.Contracts.EventBus15…racts.GetAllContracts16…ontracts.SignContract17…s.SignContract.Events18…arter.Offers.EventBus19…arter.Passes.EventBus20…kPassAsExpired.Events21…n.BusinessRulesEngine22…ataAccess.Orms.EfCore23…rms.EfCore.DbContexts24….Common.ErrorHandling25…cts.EventBus.InMemory26…ers.EventBus.InMemory27…ses.EventBus.InMemory28…s.EventBus.Persistent29…ntracts.Data.Database30…ontract.BusinessRules31…ontract.BusinessRules32….Offers.Data.Database33….Passes.Data.Database34…s.EventBus.Persistent35…racts.PrepareContract36…s.EventBus.Persistent37Starter.Offers.Prepare38…s.EventBus.Persistent39…r.Passes.RegisterPass407111111211111111111211111111111121311211111111121111111111+37 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 98% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 77% · Adequate · gated by AX2

At a glance — Maturity · 75% · Exemplary

At a glance — Readiness · 38% · Adequate · gated by D8, D12, P5, P7

At a glance — Security · 71% · Adequate · gated by D28

At a glance — Event-Driven · 66% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration11High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures10High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by addressing the 11 deprecated dependencies and 2 vulnerable dependencies to improve overall hygiene. Next, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure as code, ensuring clear RTO/RPO documentation and restore plans. Then, implement resilience handlers for outbound HTTP clients to prevent failures from cascading. Finally, resolve the single leaked secret in the sample-realm.json file.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with sample-realm.json.+11.6 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+9.3 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 11 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+16.0 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+16.0 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.+16.0 ptsMediumOutbound HTTP resilience
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.+9.3 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance.+4.6 ptsLowLicense Compliance
Improve Code Coverage — currently 2.4/10.+8.8 ptsMediumCode Coverage

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 16 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 31% mixed · 69% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.Development.json3.0MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.json3.0MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Starter/Dockerfile3.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Configs/keycloak/sample-realm.json4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: signing-key
src/Starter.BFF/Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Starter/appsettings.json7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Starter.BFF/bin/Debug/net9.0/appsettings.Development.json7.9Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
src/Starter.BFF/bin/Debug/net9.0/appsettings.json7.9Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
src/Starter/Program.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/Starter.IntegrationTests/Common/TestEngine/Configuration/ConfigurationExtensions.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: SetFakeSystemClock
src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 3)
docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0001-record-architecture-decisions.adoc8.5Near-cleanADR Quality: No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g. lost or duplicated work) are stated
docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0006-use-docker.adoc8.5Near-cleanADR Quality: Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why not a different container platform) or trade-offs beyond the listed consequences
README.adoc9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: The Getting Started section omits a prerequisite for Keycloak authentication, which is critical to local development and appears in the Local Development Guide link.
src/Starter.Common/GlobalUsings.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment
src/Starter.Common/Localizations/LocalizationModule.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 53 of 58 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 58 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D7D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D25D26D27D28D29D31D34D35AX1AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6AX8C2ED1ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P2P4P5P7P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 31 of 116 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc8c5-c963-72a7-8bcd-2e86bbd671cb.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (7): D19, D20, D21, D24, D25, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (9 lines × 3)src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:18

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Starter.Common

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 6 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 3 mechanizable ADRs, 2 are prevented by analyzers, 1 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage2.4 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 2.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 7.9%.

What to do

  1. Improve Code Coverage — currently 2.4/10. — Line coverage 7.9%.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

39 test methods: 22 unit, 17 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 39 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene1.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

64 outdated, 2 vulnerable, 11 deprecated, 1 prerelease packages.

Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol · ×2
Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore · ×11
Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore
Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc · ×64

What to do

  1. Resolve the 11 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: signing-keyConfigs/keycloak/sample-realm.json:632

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with sample-realm.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 65 packages use a banned license.

Banned license: SonarAnalyzer.CSharp

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce License Compliance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 2491 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.7.

BarePragmaDisablesrc/Starter/Program.cs:56
Dead code: SetFakeSystemClocksrc/Starter.IntegrationTests/Common/TestEngine/Configuration/ConfigurationExtensions.cs:45

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 projects, 178 source files, 3682 hand-written lines of code (2491 production / 1191 test), plus 1334 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 6 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The starter template is clear and well-structured: a one-line title plus an explanatory README that lists features, prerequisites, a step-by-step getting started guide with Docker commands, local development notes, and a project structure section clipped mid-sentence. The architecture decision log (ADL) documents the transactional outbox pattern, BFF localization, exceptions-for-validations decisions, and static-code-analysis adoption — all present in the outline and named sections — giving strong design coverage. Coverage is low across XML docs (Starter.BFF: 0/14; Starter.Common: 7%) but the visible content is excellent.

The Getting Started section omits a prerequisite for Keycloak authentication, which is critical to local development and appears in the Local Development Guide link.README.adoc
XML-doc coverage: Starter · ×3src/Starter/Starter.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The Getting Started section omits a prerequisite for Keycloak… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.adoc. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 14 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 7.4/10 (mixed — many ADRs miss context or consequences). 2 flagged with a specific gap.

No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g. lost or duplicated work) are stateddocs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0001-record-architecture-decisions.adoc
Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why not a different container platform) or trade-offs beyond the listed consequencesdocs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0006-use-docker.adoc

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g.… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001-record-architecture-decisions.adoc. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0006-use-docker.adoc. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 2 redundant across 82 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×2src/Starter.Common/GlobalUsings.cs:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with GlobalUsings.cs, LocalizationModule.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D25 · ADR Conformance / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

7 conform / 0 violate across 14 ADRs.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 5 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

94 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×8src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.Development.json:11detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (4), appsettings.Development.json (3), sample-realm.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 7 medium, 2 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2src/Starter.BFF/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 · ×7src/Starter.BFF/Dockerfile:1detected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×2src/Starter.BFF/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 7 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3), appsettings.Development.json (2), appsettings.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `DatabaseConnectionFactory` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_connection; e.g. `_connection` at line 17). — DatabaseConnectionFactory.cs:6

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED3 · Event naming9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `OfferPrepareEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — OfferPrepareEvent.cs:6

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `PassExpiredEventHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — PassExpiredEventHandler.cs:14
  • `ContractSignedEventHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — ContractSignedEventHandler.cs:14

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 5 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 14) — reach 20 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P2 · Observability9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 2/3 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 3, 2 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

  • The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — OpenIdConnectModule.cs:38
  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 17/18 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. — PersistentEventBus.cs:21

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 3 suppression(s) across the 19170 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health98%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Architecture77%Adequate — gated by AX2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity75%ExemplarySolid.
Readiness38%Adequate — gated by D8, D12, P5, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security71%Adequate — gated by D28Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven66%StrongSolid.
Not included — 42 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 2491 LoC the codebase is small despite 5 projects and no boundaries declared, so explicit bounded contexts are not warranted.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 4 value object(s); 5 domain event(s)
  • ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P1 CI/CD gates — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. Automated CI/CD gates are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 14 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×8
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.Development.json:11 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.json:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.Development.json:11 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.json:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key Configs/keycloak/sample-realm.json:632 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.Development.json:11 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.json:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Starter/appsettings.json:15 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×2
  • Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.10.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: MailKit — MailKit 4.8.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Starter.BFF/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Starter/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: signing-key Configs/keycloak/sample-realm.json:632 — signing-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
D14 · License Compliance · Banned license · ×1
  • Banned license: SonarAnalyzer.CSharp — SonarAnalyzer.CSharp 9.32.0.97167 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
Warning — 26 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×11
  • Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect 7.4.0 — Legacy,CriticalBugs
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 7.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.2 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.
  • Deprecated: Verify.Xunit — Verify.Xunit 28.4.0 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `Verify.XunitV3`; migrate the reference to it.
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.ApiExplorer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.ApiExplorer 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×7
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/Starter.BFF/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 src/Starter/Dockerfile:17 — Ensure the base image uses a non latest version tag
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/Starter/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.Development.json:11 — Base64 High Entropy String
  • Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/Starter.BFF/appsettings.json:12 — Base64 High Entropy String
  • Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/Starter.BFF/bin/Debug/net9.0/appsettings.Development.json:11 — Base64 High Entropy String
  • Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/Starter.BFF/bin/Debug/net9.0/appsettings.json:12 — Base64 High Entropy String
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Prerelease dependency · ×1
  • Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore resolves to 1.8.0-rc.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1
  • dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 5 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
D17 · Explicit Debt · BarePragmaDisable · ×1
  • BarePragmaDisable src/Starter/Program.cs:56 — #pragma warning disable S6966 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×1
  • Dead code: SetFakeSystemClock src/Starter.IntegrationTests/Common/TestEngine/Configuration/ConfigurationExtensions.cs:45 — Method SetFakeSystemClock — no references found in solution.
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g. lost or duplicated work) are stated · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences for not recording decisions (e.g. lost or duplicated work) are stated docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0001-record-architecture-decisions.adoc — Add a Context section explaining why records matter (e.g. prevents duplication, clarifies intent) and a Consequences section on the cost of not recording (lost traceability, hard to refactor against)
D20 · ADR Quality · Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why not a different container platform) or trade-offs beyond the listed consequences · ×1
  • Decision is generic ('We decided to use Docker') with no context (why not a different container platform) or trade-offs beyond the listed consequences docs/ArchitectureDecisionLog/0006-use-docker.adoc — State why Docker was chosen over alternatives and note the trade-offs: learning curve for new developers, dependency versioning complexity, and the cost of maintaining an image repository
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:18 — src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:18-26 | src/Starter/Offers/EventBus/Persistent/OffersOutboxWorker.cs:19-27 | src/Starter/Passes/EventBus/Persistent/PassesOutboxWorker.cs:20-28 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Starter/Contracts/EventBus/Persistent/ContractsOutboxWorker.cs:18` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Starter.Common — Starter.Common: abstractness 0.17, instability 0.00, distance 0.83 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
Recommendation — 6 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×2
  • redundant comment src/Starter.Common/GlobalUsings.cs:1 — "Global using directives" — delete - the comment restates the global directive block
  • redundant comment src/Starter.Common/Localizations/LocalizationModule.cs:27 — "Formatting numbers, dates, etc." — delete - already obvious from the opts comment
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×2
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Starter.BFF/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Starter/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The Getting Started section omits a prerequisite for Keycloak authentication, which is critical to local development and appears in the Local Development Guide link. · ×1
  • The Getting Started section omits a prerequisite for Keycloak authentication, which is critical to local development and appears in the Local Development Guide link. README.adoc — Add a Prerequisites subsection under Getting Started noting that Docker Compose must be configured with Keycloak credentials (or an environment variable) so the up command runs successfully.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Info — 70 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×64
  • Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc — Asp.Versioning.Mvc 8.1.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer — Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer 8.1.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.1.35 → 2.1.79 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.11.0 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 → 11.3.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 11.11.0 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Grafana.OpenTelemetry — Grafana.OpenTelemetry 1.1.0 → 1.11.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: JetBrains.Annotations — JetBrains.Annotations 2024.3.0 → 2026.2.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.4.1 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 8.0.10 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect 8.0.10 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.JsonPatch — Microsoft.AspNetCore.JsonPatch 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.NewtonsoftJson — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.NewtonsoftJson 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Abstractions 7.4.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 7.4.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging 7.4.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols 7.4.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect 7.4.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 7.4.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 9.0.2 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: NSwag.AspNetCore — NSwag.AspNetCore 14.2.0 → 14.7.1 available (referenced by Starter).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.10.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by Starter).
  • + 39 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×3
  • XML-doc coverage: Starter src/Starter/Starter.csproj — Starter: 9 % XML-doc coverage (6/67).
  • XML-doc coverage: Starter.BFF src/Starter.BFF/Starter.BFF.csproj — Starter.BFF: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/14).
  • XML-doc coverage: Starter.Common src/Starter.Common/Starter.Common.csproj — Starter.Common: 7 % XML-doc coverage (10/152).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — Starter.UnitTests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — Starter.IntegrationTests references NSubstitute.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .9artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .11artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc8c5-c963-72a7-8bcd-2e86bbd671cb · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md