Public report — go-zero, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
97findings with an exact file:lineof 114 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
23/95dimensions across the health lenses63601 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
zeromicro/go-zero is sound in substance but carries real gaps (61%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (99%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (48%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (63%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); Keep the changelog current (Release Hygiene); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation).
For scale: Medium (~63,601 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.0 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
0.8× (at 61% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~1.0 person-years of build effort (about ~€150,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 48% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with makefile.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~1.0 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 48%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with makefile. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with makefile.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
100 modules, 284 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
39
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
26
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
13
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
3
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the single leaked secret in the Makefile to immediately reduce security exposure. Next, address the 18 high-severity static analysis findings, prioritizing the go.yml, codeql-analysis.yml, and reviewdog.yml files, followed by the 18 medium-severity issues in etcd and hash.go. Simultaneously, establish a disciplined release process by maintaining a current changelog with versioned entries for each release. Finally, document significant architectural decisions in a dedicated, easily discoverable location to preserve institutional knowledge.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with makefile.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 21 of 23 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 23 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 97 of 114 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with makefile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
go-zero's documentation is clear and complete for a framework with strong community presence. The READMEs are well-illustrated with logos, badges, and detailed architecture docs (e.g., goctl rpc, model/sql), covering installation/prerequisites, quick starts, features, and the full outline. There is no architecture/design doc present in the visible content; the only missing element is an explicit architecture/usage guide for the three-core projects (AI-Native Development, Windows: mklink, Claude Desktop) that appear in the outline but are not shown. The documentation is excellent for goctl's model/mongo and api/rpc example generators. The READMEs cover the core generator workflows (model generation with type-driven schema, API syntax description including versioning, import blocks, service blocks, hidden channels, and well-known types), plus detailed usage examples, a full proto-definition format, and cross-service/import handling for both internal and external proto directories. All sections in the outline are present and clear; no missing content. The documentation is clear and complete for the goctl/rpc package, covering two example proto-import scenarios (02-sibling and 01-basic) with detailed proto-definition syntax, generation commands, directory structure, and key-learnability points. Both examples are well illustrated with code and a generated output layout, and each has an outline confirming all named sections exist. The absence of architecture or design docs is notable but not flaggable given the visible content.
What to do
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.4/10. — go-zero's documentation is clear and complete for a framework with strong community presence. The READMEs are well-illustrated with logos, badges, and detailed architecture docs (e.g., goctl rpc, model/sql), covering installation/prerequisites, quick starts, features, and the full outline. There is no architecture/design doc present in the visible content; the only missing element is an explicit architecture/usage guide for the three-core projects (AI-Native Development, Windows: mklink, Claude Desktop) that appear in the outline but are not shown. The documentation is excellent for goctl's model/mongo and api/rpc example generators. The READMEs cover the core generator workflows (model generation with type-driven schema, API syntax description including versioning, import blocks, service blocks, hidden channels, and well-known types), plus detailed usage examples, a full proto-definition format, and cross-service/import handling for both internal and external proto directories. All sections in the outline are present and clear; no missing content. The documentation is clear and complete for the goctl/rpc package, covering two example proto-import scenarios (02-sibling and 01-basic) with detailed proto-definition syntax, generation commands, directory structure, and key-learnability points. Both examples are well illustrated with code and a generated output layout, and each has an outline confirming all named sections exist. The absence of architecture or design docs is notable but not flaggable given the visible content.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-keytools/goctl/model/sql/example/makefile:23detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×18.github/dependabot.yml:8detected by semgrep finding
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext · ×18core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml:22detected by semgrep finding
Low: missing-ssl-minversion · ×3core/discov/internal/accountmanager.go:50detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 18 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with go.yml (5), codeql-analysis.yml (4), reviewdog.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).
Resolve the 18 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with etcd.yaml (5), etcd-statefulset.yaml, hash.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with accountmanager.go, redisclientmanager.go, redisclustermanager.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: KSV-0014 · ×2core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yamldetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×17core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yamldetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: KSV-0003 · ×7core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yamldetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 17 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with etcd.yaml (10), etcd-statefulset.yaml (6), Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with etcd-statefulset.yaml, etcd.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 7 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with etcd-statefulset.yaml (5), etcd.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
73 of 205 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is tools/goctl/pkg/parser/api/ast/typestatement.go.
Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with typestatement.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×7go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.
What to do
Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~68438 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .go — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .ts, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 value object(s)
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 integration event(s); 1 event-sourced shape(s) (event folds / event-recording aggregates)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (1 Go aggregate(s) recording domain events (own events-slice append / raise-record))
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 4 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:38— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:53— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/autobuild` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/autobuild` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:67— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:15— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:18— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:43— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: codecov/codecov-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `codecov/codecov-action@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/codecov/codecov-action/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:55— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:58— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/issues.yml:10— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/stale@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/stale@v10`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/stale/commits/v10 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:20— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: zeromicro/go-zero-release-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `zeromicro/go-zero-release-action@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/zeromicro/go-zero-release-action/commits/master --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml:8— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml:9— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml:14— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: reviewdog/action-staticcheck@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `reviewdog/action-staticcheck@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/reviewdog/action-staticcheck/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/version-check.yml:13— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/version-check.yml:16— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×3
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk 1.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.4.1. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk 1.4.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— go.opentelemetry.io/otel 1.40.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.41.0
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk 1.40.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.43.0
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.9.0 (in 2 dependency files: go.mod, tools/goctl/go.mod) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.8.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5004.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.48.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.48.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5932.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential tools/goctl/model/sql/example/makefile:23— hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Orphaned knowledge tools/goctl/pkg/parser/api/ast/typestatement.go— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.80.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.82.1
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml:22— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:45— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:117— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:189— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:261— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:333— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: use-of-md5 core/hash/hash.go:17— Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used core/mathx/proba.go:4— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used core/mathx/unstable.go:4— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls core/prometheus/agent.go:41— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used core/stores/cache/cachenode.go:8— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used core/stores/redis/redislock.go:7— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used core/stores/sqlx/sqlconn.go:8— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls internal/devserver/server.go:72— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls tools/goctl/update/update.go:57— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-of-md5 tools/goctl/util/pathx/file.go:308— Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used zrpc/internal/balancer/p2c/p2c.go:6— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used zrpc/resolver/internal/subset.go:3— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:17— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:89— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:161— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:233— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml:305— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml:1— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 tools/goctl/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×7
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp 1.40.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.43.0 (in 2 dependency files: go.mod, tools/goctl/go.mod)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.50.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.55.0. This one row stands for the 9 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.50.0: [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-4559, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5942 tools/goctl/go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.55.0 (golang.org/x/net/dns/dnsmessage): GO-2026-5942 — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C tools/goctl get golang.org/x/net@v0.56.0`, which updates the require line tools/goctl/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.41.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — upgrade to 0.44.0
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.34.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 tools/goctl/go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.37.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — upgrade to 0.39.0
Medium CVE: GO-2025-3955 go.mod— stdlib 1.25.0 (net/http): GO-2025-3955 — fixed in Go 1.25.1; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. (in 2 dependency files: go.mod, tools/goctl/go.mod) This one row stands for the 39 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.25.0: GO-2025-3955, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) core/stores/sqlx/sqlconn.go:156— core/stores/sqlx/sqlconn.go:156-167 | core/stores/sqlx/sqlconn.go:184-195 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/stores/sqlx/sqlconn.go:156` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) zrpc/resolver/internal/kube/eventhandler.go:31— zrpc/resolver/internal/kube/eventhandler.go:31-42 | zrpc/resolver/internal/kube/eventhandler.go:57-68 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `zrpc/resolver/internal/kube/eventhandler.go:31` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) core/stores/redis/redisclientmanager.go:41— core/stores/redis/redisclientmanager.go:41-52 | core/stores/redis/redisclustermanager.go:37-48 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/stores/redis/redisclientmanager.go:41` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) core/stores/redis/redis.go:2461— core/stores/redis/redis.go:2461-2470 | core/stores/redis/redis.go:2594-2603 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/stores/redis/redis.go:2461` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) core/stores/redis/redis.go:2496— core/stores/redis/redis.go:2496-2505 | core/stores/redis/redis.go:2629-2638 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/stores/redis/redis.go:2496` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) zrpc/internal/clientinterceptors/tracinginterceptor.go:34— zrpc/internal/clientinterceptors/tracinginterceptor.go:34-43 | zrpc/internal/serverinterceptors/tracinginterceptor.go:51-60 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `zrpc/internal/clientinterceptors/tracinginterceptor.go:34` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) core/fx/timeout.go:32— core/fx/timeout.go:32-40 | zrpc/internal/serverinterceptors/timeoutinterceptor.go:42-51 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/fx/timeout.go:32` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) core/stores/redis/redis.go:2430— core/stores/redis/redis.go:2430-2438 | core/stores/redis/redis.go:2562-2570 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/stores/redis/redis.go:2430` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) zrpc/resolver/internal/directbuilder.go:18— zrpc/resolver/internal/directbuilder.go:18-27 | zrpc/resolver/internal/discovbuilder.go:26-34 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `zrpc/resolver/internal/directbuilder.go:18` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) core/stores/redis/redis.go:2556— core/stores/redis/redis.go:2556-2563 | core/stores/redis/redis.go:2622-2629 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/stores/redis/redis.go:2556` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) core/prof/runtime.go:40— core/prof/runtime.go:40-47 | core/stat/usage.go:68-75 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/prof/runtime.go:40` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Change coupling: insert.go ↔ update.go tools/goctl/model/sql/gen/insert.go— `tools/goctl/model/sql/gen/insert.go` and `tools/goctl/model/sql/gen/update.go` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 17 floating ref(s) across 6 workflow file(s), 1 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (6 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) core/codec/rsa.go:55— core/codec/rsa.go:55-69 | core/codec/rsa.go:166-180 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/codec/rsa.go:55` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) core/logx/writer.go:502— core/logx/writer.go:502-512 | core/logx/writer.go:528-538 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/logx/writer.go:502` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) zrpc/internal/clientinterceptors/tracinginterceptor.go:68— zrpc/internal/clientinterceptors/tracinginterceptor.go:68-73 | zrpc/internal/serverinterceptors/tracinginterceptor.go:50-55 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `zrpc/internal/clientinterceptors/tracinginterceptor.go:68` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) core/stores/sqlx/orm.go:154— core/stores/sqlx/orm.go:154-158 | core/stores/sqlx/orm.go:215-219 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/stores/sqlx/orm.go:154` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Low IaC: KSV-0003 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— CPU not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0015 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— CPU requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0016 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— Memory requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0018 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd-statefulset.yaml— Memory not limited
Low IaC: KCV-0042 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml— Ensure that the --cert-file and --key-file arguments are set as appropriate
Low IaC: KCV-0043 core/discov/kubernetes/etcd.yaml— Ensure that the --client-cert-auth argument is set to true
Low: missing-ssl-minversion core/discov/internal/accountmanager.go:50— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: missing-ssl-minversion core/stores/redis/redisclientmanager.go:28— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: missing-ssl-minversion core/stores/redis/redisclustermanager.go:25— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
complexity unreadable for .go — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (5107 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .go, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 3 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: core/mr/mapreduce.go, mcp/request_metadata.go, internal/encoding/encoding.go. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor· Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 2 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (5 single-owned of 205 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). They are anonymized user #2 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #3 (1 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) Every location above sits inside a test/fixture/sample tree, so there may be no live credential to revoke — in that case the performable actions are different ones: confirm each value was never reused outside the tests (a fixture key shared with a staging or demo environment IS a live credential and must be rotated), generate this material at test time instead of committing it so the next one cannot be mistaken for a real leak, and record the deliberate exposure where a reader of the file will see it. Rotate anything that fails the first check.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 72 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (73 orphaned of 205 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first).
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cyclonedx-gomod` over the module graph — or Go's own build info, which already records the module set in the binary, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement· No network policy · ×1
No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`go test -race -coverprofile=coverage.txt -covermode`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.go), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
0
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Run 019fd5fb-d0c0-737f-bde3-aa30b3f9b14a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 29 · Warnings: 60 · Recommendations: 23 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 07:31 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.