Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
zhiyanzhaijie/bestofrs carries serious gaps (46%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (98%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (29%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (45%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage); 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution).
For scale: Medium (~20,720 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 29 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 46 → ~59.
New since the last scan (23+)
- D3 · FileTooLong: icons/mod.rs crates/ui/src/components/icons/mod.rs
- D3 · FileTooLong: sidebar/component.rs crates/ui/src/components/ui/sidebar/component.rs
- D3 · FileTooLong: psql/repo_tag_repo.rs crates/adapters/src/persistence/psql/repo_tag_repo.rs
- D3 · FileTooLong: fuzzy_search/mod.rs crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/fuzzy_search/mod.rs
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D35 · Change coupling: footer.rs ↔ header_nav.rs crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/footer.rs
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
- D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
- D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Cargo.lock
- D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0141 Cargo.lock
- D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0186 Cargo.lock
- D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0097 Cargo.lock
- D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0320 Cargo.lock
- D38 · Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0194 Cargo.lock
- D38 · Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Cargo.lock
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €7,100–€36,000
| Cost to rebuild | €7,100–€36,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 46% quality) |
| Size & shape | Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€21,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 29% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Event-Driven
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 9 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 9 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 3 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by adding tests for all unreached modules to establish a reliable safety net. Next, address the single gap in automated code coverage and ensure every file has corresponding tests. To prevent future regressions, implement a draft release process that allows you to halt a build before it reaches users. Finally, maintain a clear changelog to track what is shipped in each release.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +13.8 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +13.8 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +14.7 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +13.8 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +13.8 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`cargo test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it. | +12.0 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript. | +7.5 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
| Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5. | +7.5 pts | Medium | Cyclomatic Complexity |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cargo.lock | 1.6 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| .github/workflows/ci.yml | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| Dockerfile.worker | 5.8 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| crates/adapters/src/persistence/psql/repo_repo.rs | 7.0 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: PostgresRepoRepo::list_ranked (cyclomatic 16) |
| Dockerfile | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/fuzzy_search/mod.rs | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: fuzzy_search::FuzzySearch (cyclomatic 28) |
| crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/gearmap/mod.rs | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: gearmap::generate_gears (cyclomatic 21) |
| crates/ui/src/js/dom_bridge.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: rewrite_markdown_links (cyclomatic 19) |
| crates/app/src/project/command.rs | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: ProjectCommandHandler::import_projects (cyclomatic 18) |
| crates/ui/src/js/chart_bridge.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: upsert_chart (cyclomatic 17) |
| crates/app/src/repo/query.rs | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: RepoQueryHandler::list_with_tags (cyclomatic 16) |
| crates/ui/src/components/icons/mod.rs | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: FileTooLong: icons/mod.rs |
| crates/app/src/repo/command.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: RepoCommandHandler::import_tags (cognitive 17) |
| crates/ui/src/components/views/repo/list/repo_list/mod.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: repo_list::RepoListIO (cognitive 16) |
| crates/ui/src/components/views/admin/projects/project_table/mod.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: project_table::ProjectTable (cognitive 16) |
| crates/ui/src/components/ui/sidebar/component.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FileTooLong: sidebar/component.rs |
| crates/adapters/src/persistence/psql/repo_tag_repo.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FileTooLong: psql/repo_tag_repo.rs |
| crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/footer.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: footer.rs ↔ header_nav.rs |
| crates/ui/src/components/views/repo/list/mod.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: mod.rs ↔ mod.rs |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 37 of 38 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 38 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 45 of 52 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
7 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was fuzzy_search::FuzzySearch at 28.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 fuzzy_search finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with mod.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 gearmap finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with mod.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 rewrite_markdown_links (cyclomatic 19) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with dom_bridge.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
9 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ProjectCommandHandler::import_projects at 41.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 ProjectCommandHandler finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with command.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 fuzzy_search finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with mod.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 RepoQueryHandler finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with query.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
5 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
No test suite found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
55 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is crates/ui/src/components/icons/mod.rs.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Small-team knowledge concentration finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
9 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 9 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: repo_repo.rs↔command.rs 64%; footer.rs↔header_nav.rs 54%; mod.rs↔mod.rs 50%
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
9 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 7 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium advisory (unsound) finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX9 · CQS / query purity
- `PostgresRepoTagRepo.list_tags_with_meta` is a read-named query yet it performs a durable write on the read path (a persist to a store/repository). A query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica; move the write into a command. — repo_tag_repo.rs:385
- `PostgresRepoTagRepo.list_tags_with_meta_by_values` is a read-named query yet it performs a durable write on the read path (a persist to a store/repository). A query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica; move the write into a command. — repo_tag_repo.rs:476
- `RepoQueryHandler.list_with_tags` is a read-named query yet it performs a durable write on the read path (a persist to a store/repository). A query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica; move the write into a command. — query.rs:166
- `RepoQueryHandler.list_ranked_with_tags` is a read-named query yet it performs a durable write on the read path (a persist to a store/repository). A query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica; move the write into a command. — query.rs:293
- `RepoQueryHandler.list_by_label_with_tags` is a read-named query yet it performs a durable write on the read path (a persist to a store/repository). A query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica; move the write into a command. — query.rs:315
What to do
- Keep query handlers read-only — move the writes/event-publishes into a command handler so reads stay safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica.
DM2 · Strongly-typed ids
DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model
DM5 · Encapsulated state
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
- `RepoQueryHandler.list_with_tags` performs two independent DURABLE writes — a durable state write (`current_repo_ids.insert`, :229) and a second independent durable store write — in one command path with no shared transaction or outbox. A crash between the two leaves the stores diverged (one write committed, the other lost) or emits a phantom record. Wrap both in one transaction, or record the second write in the same store and dispatch it afterwards (a transactional outbox). — query.rs:166
What to do
- Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- No test surface was found — a `#[cfg(test)] mod tests` block beside the code it tests (with `tests/` reserved for integration tests) is where this ecosystem separates tests, and none is present.
What to do
- Add `#[cfg(test)] mod tests` blocks beside the code they cover — the attribute keeps them out of the release build, a stronger separation than a folder — reserve `tests/` for black-box integration tests, and run `cargo test` in CI.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README claims a curated GitHub project list but the evidence shows no such list (only crates/ directories)
- README claims a trend-focused UI layer but there is no corresponding UI in the directory tree
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README claims a curated GitHub project list but the evidence shows no such list (only crates/ directories); README claims a trend-focused UI layer but there is no corresponding UI in the directory tree.
P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
- A CI pipeline exists but no build/compile invocation (a build step for your stack — dotnet build, npm run build, go build, mvn package, cargo build, …) was matched — changes may merge without being compiled.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`cargo test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
- Add an explicit build/compile step to your CI pipeline (whatever your stack uses — e.g. dotnet build, npm run build, go build, mvn package, swift build/xcodebuild) so every change is compiled before merge.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 5 plain JS
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×2) — dom_bridge.js:109, chart_bridge.js:60
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. If it is a CLI, check whether a suite runs it as a child process; otherwise it has no test reaching it. (×5) — dom_bridge.js, chart_bridge.js, theme_bridge.js, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R7 · Dead Code
- 5 file(s) (~348 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
R9 · Circular Imports
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 45% | Weak — gated by R1, R2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 98% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 67% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Readiness | 29% | Weak — gated by D8, D9, R4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 71% | Adequate — gated by D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Event-Driven | 80% | Strong | Solid. |
Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Cargo manifest), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.rs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .rs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for Rust: aggregate-vs-value-object classification cannot be told apart in source (every struct-holding-struct reads alike), and a child COLLECTION (legitimate membership) vs a single embedded aggregate is indistinguishable — advisory (the Swift/Dart parity)
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for Rust: a cross-crate domain leak cannot be told apart in source from a legitimate shared-kernel crate, and most repositories ship a single crate — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for Rust: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable — reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED2 Event/command shape — not gated in Rust source-only: a command with >1 competing handler needs a dispatch/call graph the source-only frontend cannot resolve (inferred/generic call owners decline) — advisory
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 15 finding(s)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:28
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:29
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:30
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:42
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:43
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:46
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:58
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:59
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:62
- High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.worker
- High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfile.worker
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
- No automated tests
Warning — 32 finding(s)
- FileTooLong: icons/mod.rs crates/ui/src/components/icons/mod.rs:0
- FileTooLong: sidebar/component.rs crates/ui/src/components/ui/sidebar/component.rs:0
- FileTooLong: psql/repo_tag_repo.rs crates/adapters/src/persistence/psql/repo_tag_repo.rs:0
- FileTooLong: fuzzy_search/mod.rs crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/fuzzy_search/mod.rs:0
- Change coupling: repo_repo.rs ↔ command.rs crates/adapters/src/persistence/psql/repo_repo.rs
- Change coupling: footer.rs ↔ header_nav.rs crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/footer.rs
- Change coupling: mod.rs ↔ mod.rs crates/ui/src/components/views/repo/list/mod.rs
- Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Cargo.lock
- Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0186 Cargo.lock
- Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0097 Cargo.lock
- Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0141 Cargo.lock
- Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0320 Cargo.lock
- fuzzy_search::FuzzySearch (cyclomatic 28) crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/fuzzy_search/mod.rs:469
- gearmap::generate_gears (cyclomatic 21) crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/gearmap/mod.rs:66
- rewrite_markdown_links (cyclomatic 19) crates/ui/src/js/dom_bridge.js:109
- ProjectCommandHandler::import_projects (cyclomatic 18) crates/app/src/project/command.rs:94
- upsert_chart (cyclomatic 17) crates/ui/src/js/chart_bridge.js:60
- PostgresRepoRepo::list_ranked (cyclomatic 16) crates/adapters/src/persistence/psql/repo_repo.rs:370
- RepoQueryHandler::list_with_tags (cyclomatic 16) crates/app/src/repo/query.rs:166
- LLM evaluation failed
- ProjectCommandHandler::import_projects (cognitive 41) crates/app/src/project/command.rs:94
- fuzzy_search::FuzzySearch (cognitive 38) crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/fuzzy_search/mod.rs:469
- RepoQueryHandler::list_with_tags (cognitive 37) crates/app/src/repo/query.rs:166
- gearmap::generate_gears (cognitive 34) crates/ui/src/components/layout/user/gearmap/mod.rs:66
- rewrite_markdown_links (cognitive 33) crates/ui/src/js/dom_bridge.js:109
- RepoCommandHandler::import_tags (cognitive 17) crates/app/src/repo/command.rs:149
- repo_list::RepoListIO (cognitive 16) crates/ui/src/components/views/repo/list/repo_list/mod.rs:18
- project_table::ProjectTable (cognitive 16) crates/ui/src/components/views/admin/projects/project_table/mod.rs:31
- upsert_chart (cognitive 16) crates/ui/src/js/chart_bridge.js:60
- TooManyFunctions: crate::components::icons crates/ui/src/components/icons/mod.rs:4
- Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0194 Cargo.lock
- Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Cargo.lock
Recommendation — 3 finding(s)
- Test reliability not included
- Small-team knowledge concentration
- No tests found
Info — 2 finding(s)
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 9 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 3 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 9 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |