Mortdeus/solana-Copy-Sniper-Mev-Trading-Bot

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

21 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command at 38. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::token_serializable::convert_to_serializable at 25 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 1 file carries no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of its over-threshold functions was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/token_serializable.rs (grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::token_serializable::convert_to_serializable at 25). They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.

What to do

1. Resolve the 3 grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with commands.rs, hardcap.rs, secondbuy.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
2. Resolve the 3 swap.swap (cyclomatic 16) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with swap.js (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 2 grpc.handleStream (cyclomatic 21) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
4. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cyclomatic Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

17 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::secondbuy::handle_detection_event at 139.

What to do

1. Resolve the 6 grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with shred_stream.rs (2), secondbuy.rs, hardcap.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
2. Resolve the 3 swap.swap (cognitive 25) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with swap.js (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 2 grpc.handleStream (cognitive 29) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
4. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 god class(es) detected.

What to do

1. Resolve the 3 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with parsingtransaction.js (2), commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
2. Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with instructions.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 1 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with lib.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
4. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate God Classes in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

21 duplicated block group(s) detected.

+ 8 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

1. Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with instructions.rs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
2. Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with instructions.rs (2), token.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with logger.rs (2), hardcap.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
4. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 production modules (Cargo+npm), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 3 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 4 of the 7 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, or have no source directory of their own).

What to do

1. Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 22 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 test methods: 6 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Rust suite contributes 6 `#[test]` function(s) across 3 file(s) declaring at least one; its unit/integration split is Cargo's own — 0 of those file(s) are integration-test targets under a crate's tests/ directory, and the rest are #[test] functions compiled into the crate they test.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

REDACTED scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 24 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 25 production dependency(ies) this repository's committed lockfile resolves, across 3 product package.json manifest(s). Its 3 `devDependencies` declaration(s) are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ DEPTH: this is the DIRECT production set the lockfile resolves, NOT the transitive closure — only one of the four lock dialects this pass reads states a full graph, so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is outside this verdict, exactly as the JVM arm's declaration-site verdict is. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry. 1 of them publish no licence this pass can read on registry.npmjs.org — an absent field, `UNLICENSED`, or a `SEE LICENSE IN <file>` pointer into a tarball this pass does not download; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged. A further 1 package(s) the lockfile resolves are not published on the public registry at all — a private scope, a workspace-internal name or a git install — and are outside this verdict. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's npm package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Cargo manifest, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

What to do

1. Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate License Compliance in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted task-comment markers across 6879 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

What to do

1. Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The root README gives a strong overview of what the project is (Solana MEV sniper copy trading bot built for PumpFun, Bonk, Raydium) and why Alpenglow matters. It also links to an Alpenglow update announcement and encourages star+watch on Telegram, which are good engagement signals. The four READMEs each document their own directories (1_solana sniper bot(node), 2_copy trading bot(node), #_sniper (Rust)), with the root README covering installation/usage/contributing as a single cohesive doc.

What to do

1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The root README gives a strong overview of what the project is (Solana MEV sniper copy trading bot built for PumpFun, Bonk, Raydium) and why Alpenglow matters. It also links to an Alpenglow update announcement and encourages star+watch on Telegram, which are good engagement signals. The four READMEs each document their own directories (1_solana sniper bot(node), 2_copy trading bot(node), #_sniper (Rust)), with the root README covering installation/usage/contributing as a single cohesive doc.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

5 API inconsistencies across a 400-member sample of 80 exposed types.

What to do

1. Resolve the 1 Massive redundancy in instruction generation methods. For every action… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
2. Resolve the 1 Duplicate RPC client instances. Both `AppState` and `Pump` structs… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 1 Identical types defined in multiple service modules. `TipAccountResult`… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 4 build units (Cargo) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

What to do

1. Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues. semgrep hit a parse error in 3 file(s) — `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/detectionlogs.json`, `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/logs.json`, `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/shredstreamproxy.sh` (line 25) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

41 finding(s): 4 critical, 22 high, 14 medium, 1 low.

What to do

1. Resolve the 22 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (22). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
2. Resolve the 14 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (14). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

What to do

1. Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

What to do

1. Resolve the 1 Malicious package finding(s) in Malicious Dependencies — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.

• A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content. (×2) — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:100, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:106

What to do

• Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

• A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). (×2) — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:264, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:43

What to do

• Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

• Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:99

What to do

• Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.

• No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start by running that check over your rendered pages in CI. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

What to do

• Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

• The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

• Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
• Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
• Add a README to the 4 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.1 pts.

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

• No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

• Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

• README omits the Rust MEV sniper project (jito Shred stream) entirely — reported by the model that read the README against this repository; no term search was run for this one, so nothing here has been checked against the tree. Treat it as a reading to confirm, not as a measured contradiction: verify it against the code before acting on it, and if the footprint it describes does exist, this row is wrong.
• README omits the Node.js copy trading bot with gRPC dashboard and Telegram alerts — reported by the model that read the README against this repository; no term search was run for this one, so nothing here has been checked against the tree. Treat it as a reading to confirm, not as a measured contradiction: verify it against the code before acting on it, and if the footprint it describes does exist, this row is wrong.
• README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists — searched for: `rag`, `langchain`, `llamaindex`, `pinecone`, `weaviate`, `qdrant`, `embeddings`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest files (package.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.slnx, *.yml, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

What to do

• Reconcile the README with reality: README omits the Rust MEV sniper project (jito Shred stream) entirely; README omits the Node.js copy trading bot with gRPC dashboard and Telegram alerts; README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

• No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

• Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

• Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry with tracing-opentelemetry) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

• No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

• Run what this repository's stack ships: cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
• Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
• Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

• Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

• Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
• Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

• A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

• Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

• `Client::new()` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. 3 of the 5 files that make outbound calls are unbounded; the first 3 are listed. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:89
• `Client::new()` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs:88
• `axios.post(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:96

What to do

• Give every client a whole-request bound: `reqwest::Client::builder().timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))` (never `reqwest::get` or `Client::new()`, which have none), ureq's `timeout_global`, or wrap the call in `tokio::time::timeout`; add retry with back-off (`reqwest-retry`'s `RetryTransientMiddleware`, `backoff`) around dependencies that fail.
• Bound every outbound call: pass `signal: AbortSignal.timeout(ms)` to `fetch`, set `timeout` on the axios instance (`axios.create({ timeout })`), and add retries with back-off (`axios-retry`, `p-retry`) and a breaker (`opossum`, `cockatiel`) around dependencies that fail.

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

• 0 typed · 22 plain JS — the untyped files are 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js, REDACTED, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/index.js, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/main.js, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap(offchain).js (+16 more).

What to do

• Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

• 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/ and 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/ are near-verbatim copies of each other: 10 files are byte-identical under the same relative paths (~17978 lines; the trees hold 14 and 25 files). That is one structural fact, not 10 local ones: every edit made to one tree and not the other drifts silently, which is the failure whole-tree forks guarantee. Pick one tree as the single source and produce the other from it (generated, copied at build or release time, or re-exported) — or, if the copy is a stale snapshot nothing produces any more, delete it. Check first whether the copy is a deliberately published deliverable (a template consumers copy verbatim, a released sample frozen at a version); where it is, keep it produced from the source tree rather than edited in place. — REDACTED:1
• 5 of the duplicated blocks reported below have copies in at least two of the sibling directories 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC, 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket under the repository root. That concentration is one structural fact, not 5 local ones: the siblings replicate behaviour none of them owns, which is the shape of a missing shared module — a common library every sibling imports — rather than 5 separate extractions. Check first whether the siblings are deliberately standalone deliverables (scaffold templates, demo apps that must stay copy-pasteable); where they are, the duplication is the design and the per-block rows are the ones to act on. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1
• 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 182 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1
• 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:1 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:1 · 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:1 — these 3 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 156 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:1
• REDACTED:1 · REDACTED:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 125 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — REDACTED:1
• 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:1 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 95 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:1
• 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/index.js:97 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/main.js:75 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/index.js:97
• 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:69 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:114 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:69
• 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:88 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:105 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:88
• 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:136 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:148 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:136
• 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:109 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:162 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:109
• 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:123 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:141 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:123
• 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/main.js:9 · 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:20 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:20 · 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:21 — the 4 copies are spread across 4 files, and the CITED SPAN is a run of MODULE-LEVEL DECLARATIONS — bindings the module declares and exports — rather than statements with a call site. Do not read this as an extract-a-helper row: a call expression cannot stand where a declaration was, and putting one there would delete the names themselves, which are what the rest of the codebase imports. What actually repeats here is the INITIALISER — the same expression shape written once per binding. So give that expression one name (a small helper the initialisers call, or a shared base value they are each derived from) and keep every binding under the name it already has. Where the run is an enumeration — one binding per distinct thing, differing precisely in the thing each one names — the repetition IS the enumeration and collapsing it would delete entries; consider instead whether the set belongs in one exported table the individual names are read out of. Reported because the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/main.js:9

What to do

• Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

• 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:13 reaches into another package with a relative path (./logger.js) — import the package by name instead. — 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:13

What to do

• Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

• (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 20 and cognitive complexity 28; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×2) — REDACTED:86, REDACTED:86
• swap has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 25; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×3) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227, 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:191
• getSplTokenBalance has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×2) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:89, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:89
• tOutPut has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×2) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:56, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:56

What to do

• Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

• 0% of 22 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count

What to do

• Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.

What to do

• Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

• test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.

What to do

• Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

• 2 file(s) (~325 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package DOES declare main/module/exports — but every declared target is missing from the scanned tree, which is what a build-output entry (dist/, lib/, out/) looks like before the package is built. Point a declared target at the source entry, or build the package before scanning, so reachability can follow it. — 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket
• Unreachable from the 3 application, 0 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. This repository declares no build, type-check or test script, so nothing here would fail on a wrong deletion — confirm by hand that nothing loads each file (including by a path built at runtime) before removing it. An undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
• no import path from any entry point (3 application, 0 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×2) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap(offchain).js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap(offchain).js
• Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×18) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:136, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:28, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/config.js:162, …

What to do

• Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

• Declared in 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)

What to do

• Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

• 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js → 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js → 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js
• REDACTED → 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/main.js → REDACTED — REDACTED
• 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js → 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js → 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js
• REDACTED → 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/main.js → REDACTED — REDACTED

What to do

• Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.

Other · Security — Only what this repository's own non-C# files could be read for was assessed — markup this repository SHIPS is scored for third-party script integrity whether or not the repository serves it itself, since a page handed to a consumer runs in that consumer’s origin. Nothing else in this dimension was assessed: the transport, cookie, input-validation and crypto controls are read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository’s language, so their absence here is not a finding about this repository.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

• `https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/chart.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. The URL also names no version, so it resolves to whatever that origin serves at fetch time — the executed bytes can change with nobody touching this repository. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:9

What to do

• Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.